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ABSTRACT 
TIllS thesis has examined the problem of target under-achievement of the 
Public Low-Cost Housing Programme (pLCHP) in three Malaysian five-year 
development plans between 1976 and 1990. The study tested the "policy 
implementation" approaches and data were analysed by the combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study focused on: (a) the project's 
preparation and planning; (b) the projects' funding and resourcing; and, (c) the effect 
of inter-actions amongst agencies and actors at the local level. The study confirmed 
that there were associations between these factors and the programme's performance. 
Analyses on time taken to complete the projects' implementation process 
confirmed that there was no significant difference between the five-year plans. This 
implied that no improvement occurred despite attempts and measures to improve this 
programme. The project implementation process involved four stages: (a) preparation 
and planning; (b) resourcing; (c) construction; and, (d) completion. Delays occurred 
because the longest time was spent on the preparation and planning stage. Delays at 
this stage caused further delays in other stages. Target shortfall occurred because of 
implementation delays where the mean project completion time was more than five-
years and a large number of projects were completed outside the intended plan. 
There were also relationships between the programme funding and its 
performance. Delays in implementing the projects caused cost increases and further 
cost increases when projects were not completed within the five-year plan. Delays in 
starting the construction rendered the amount of funding allocated no longer adequate 
to cover the total project cost. Correct estimation and proper project preparation were 
important for building houses within the five-year plan and within the funding 
provided. Inadequate funding was made to this programme and as a result the states 
had to meet project costs from their own funding. The project cost also increased as 
time elapsed from 1976 to 1990 during the three five-year planning periods. 
This study validated the "bottom up" perspective of program implementation 
where it confirmed that there was a relationship between the interactions of actors and 
agencies at the bottom and the programme performance. 
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
The housing objective in Malaysia is to provide every citizen access to housing, 
with a special emphasis on the lower income groups. The Public Low Cost Housing 
Programme (pLCHP) is one of the efforts to house the lower income groups and has 
been implemented through the co-operation of the federal and state governments and 
their organisations. The programme caters for broad categories of lower income 
groups in urban and rural areas to achieve the goal of supplying houses of an adequate 
standard and at an affordable price to lower income groups in large quantities, at a 
cheaper and a faster rate. The government has made sev~ral improvements to the 
programme such as attempts to expedite the implementation process, increase 
programme funding, improving monitoring and enhancing relationships between the 
two levels of government. Despite these attempts, the programme has continued to 
face problems of unmet targets; failing to achieve the targets in each five-year 
development plans. 
This study investigates the factors limiting the programme's performance, by 
analysing the time taken in all stages of implementing the programme and the provision 
of funding, and by comparing the programme's performance across five-year 
development plans, states and implementing agencies. In short, this study investigates 
why there was a gap between policy intention and programme outcome. In addition, 
the study also describes prominent features of the programme's components and also 
provides a detailed account of the public housing implementation process. 
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Research Context 
Housing is one of the basic fundamental human needs. It is a form of 
protection against a hostile nature, a means through which to express individual 
and cultural values, and a way to produce, consume, and accumulate capital 
(Patton,1988; p.xiii). Housing is also related the cultivation and preparation of 
food, the clothing of oneself, the care of one's body, the procreation and 
nurture of children, and the sheltering of these activities (Turner, 1972; p.153). 
Housing is regarded not only in terms of personal meaning but is also an 
expression of social order (Duncan, 1981). Housing reflects the common 
purposes for which it is put to use: working, eating, sleeping, childrearing and 
leisure, although diversified in its forms from the simple mud-brick, thatch roof 
habitations in Africa, the flat-roof dwellings in Middle East, to the pitch roof 
and stilt-supported buildings in Southeast Asia (Grimes,1976; p.3). Despite this 
fundamental need, millions of people are ill housed or not housed at all, 
particularly in the developing or Third World countries (Patton.1988; p.3). 
There are three major factors associated with the housing shortage in 
developing countries. Firstly, as a result of rapid population growth. because of 
sustained fertility and decreased mortality (Dwyer. 1974.p. 11). Secondly. 
because of in-migration to urban centres by rural populations in search of 
employment and better living conditions (Dwyer. 1975; Payne. 1977; 
Drakakis-Smith. 1981; Reitsma and Kleinpening. 1985). Finally. where there is 
a gap between income and affordable house prices: this impedes the poor from 
obtaining a decent housing, as described by Grime as ..... inadequacy of 
incomes of large numbers of households to pay for the housing that is currently 
being produced" (1976; p.63). Abrams states that "the gap between shelter 
cost and income " is an obstacle in progress in meeting housing need (1966; 
p.52). 
Grimes (1976) identified four factors dominating the housing situation 
in most cities: income (listed as the most important ). city size. rate of 
urban population growth. and the policy context of the housing provision. 
These factors produce wide diversity in the options open to developing 
countries in treating their housing problems. Abrams (1969) proposed four 
approaches to answer housing shortages: the construction of public housing; 
urban renewal; development of new towns; and, dispersal of industries. 
2 
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Grimes (1976) on the other hand suggested three approaches: sites and services, co-
operative housing, and public housing. Of these, two popular approaches widely 
discussed in the literature to house low income people are: first, the construction of 
public housing through the major roles of public agency; second, sites and services and 
squatter upgrading programmes, in the case where labour is severely under-used and 
incomes are low. 
Rapid population growth far outstrips the ability of the governments of 
developing countries to provide housing, community services, and even basic 
infrastructure facilities to low income groups, thus preventing access to decent 
housing. Drakakis-Smith (1981) noted that government housing was limited because 
some have been wasted on expensive projects designed to impress electorates rather 
than meet any real needs (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; p.4S). The public housing approach 
has been criticised for imposing modern high standards, Western planning principles 
and the bureaucrats biased values which alienate lower income group. Rents are also 
relatively high because of additional electricity and water bills. In addition, extra 
transportation costs were often inflicted on the occupants because some of the projects 
were located in the urban periphery, a long way from their places of work. However, 
two newly industrialised countries, Singapore and Hong Kong have successfully 
implemented their public housing programme. Moreover, a study by Wagelin (1978) 
on squatters' rehousing schemes in Kuala Lumpur concluded that public housing 
approach can provide a better overall living environment for the target group. 
To meet the housing needs, much of housing is built outside formal housing 
production systems through spontaneous development in urban areas in the form 
known as 'squatter housing', 'illegal development', 'unauthorised housing' or 
'spontaneous shelter' (patton, 1988). These spontaneous settlements are typically 
below minimal standards of health and safety (Dwyer, 1974; p.212; Laquin, 1983). 
They grow in size and are difficult to improve, let alone remove (Jogensen, 1977; 
p.29). The incompetence of government has resulted in spontaneous shelters growing 
more rapidly than public housing. Governments' financial capacities have become 
major constraints to proposals to overcome urban housing problems (Choguill, 1988; 
p.29). In these circumstances, self help buildings such as sites and services and the 
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upgrading of squatters accommodation are the best possible solutions to the housing 
problems, as advocated by Turner. 
Meeting housing problems justifies intervention by the government. Leaving 
the problem entirely to market forces is not only fallacious, but also disastrous because 
private developers are attracted to the lucrative housing market of those who have the 
ability to pay. In contrast to this belief, intervention is seen to " ... affect the price of 
housing: regulation, taxes, and subsidies are most common interventions. Each 
intervention has costs and benefits which are not often explicitly estimated" 
(Malpezzi, 1991; p.209). To Grimes, the interaction between land availability and 
servicing and the provision of housing makes a high degree of government involvement 
inevitable, even if most of the housing market remains in the hands of private enterprise 
(Grimes, 1976; p. 91). 
In Malaysia too, the Public Low Cost Housing Programme (pLCHP) is one of 
several housing programmes formulated by the government to accomplish the aim of 
its housing policy to provide all Malaysians, especially the lower income groups, access 
to adequate and affordable housing. PLCHP was formulated to fulfil the objective of 
supplying affordable houses of adequate standards to lower income groups in large 
quantities, cheaply and quickly. In addition, high expectations were imposed on this 
programme as a means of solving the housing problems of lower income groups. It 
was expected to fulfil the multi-facet objectives of uplifting occupants to better living 
environments, enhancing national unity, providing opportunities to own property and 
gaining political support. 
In spite of the well committed intentions to provide affordable housing to lower 
income groups, the programme has not succeeded in reaching its objective of 
constructing cheap houses in large quantities quickly. Although, the programme has 
been in existence for a long time, still faces many implementation problems. The 
existence of a gap between policy intention, programme implementation and target 
achievement is the crux of the problem. Despite efforts by the government to solve 
these, targets were not met. 
Chapter One: Introduction and Background s 
PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME (PLCHP) 
Public Low Cost Housing Programme (pLCHP) is defined as the construction 
of low-cost houses involving co-operation between federal and state governments. The 
federal government provides loans to state governments to finance this programme. 
The state governments construct housing under this programme with the technical 
assistance provided by either the National Housing Department, the State Economic 
Development Corporations, the Public Works Department or any other agencies 
chosen by the state. The states may sell or rent these houses with option to purchase to 
eligible buyers or occupants from the low-income groups. The state re-Iends the funds 
from the federal government to buyers at the rate of 5.5% per annum with a maximum 
repayment period of 30 years. The selling price is determined by the federal 
government at not more than MS25,000. The low income groups defined by the 
government are those with total household income of not more than M750.00 in 1995. 
PLCHP was the major housing programme for lower income groups before the 
government introduced a new policy by imposing on private developers the duty to 
share the responsibility for building low cost housing for lower income groups in the 
early 1970's. This programme,. which began in 1950, had first concentrated its efforts 
only in urban areas. The original intention was to assist lower income people to 
purchase or rent houses (Jegatheesan, 1979; p.24.). During the 1960's it had become 
an instrument in the clearance of urban slums and squatters, and provided a rehousing 
programme for the urban poor (Malaysia, 1971; p.257). Then in 1968 its emphasis was 
shifted to rural areas and urban fringes. The government endorsed this programme as 
an instrument to provide housing " ... within the means of the poor." (Malaysia, 1976; 
p.330). Currently the programme operates in urban, urban fringe and rural areas, 
especially in areas where low cost housing is not provided by the private sector. Up to 
1995, 182,533 houses had been constructed under this programme. 
Programme Performance 
In each of the five-year plans there was a substantial programme shortfall. The 
programme shortfall is viewed in terms of the dwelling target and underspend. The 
shortfall in dwelling is the diff.erence between the number of houses completed at the 
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end of the five year plan and the original intended target at the beginning of the five-
year plan. The financial underspend is the difference between the actual amount of 
expenditure, incurred compared with the funds allocated in each of the plans. In other 
words, shortfall means the number of houses that were unable to be built and the 
amount of money that was not spent. 
Target Shortfall 
The performance ofPLCHP between 1956-1995 is shown in Table 1.1 which 
illustrates the housing targets and number of houses completed under several five-year 
development plans. The number of houses targeted exhibits a sharp increase from 
35,000 in the First Malaysia Plan (1966-70). Then it reached a peak of 176,500 in the 
Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85), then there was a sudden drop to 45,800 during the 
Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) and finally figures fell to a mere 40,000 for the Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991-95). In contrast, the trend of houses completed in each plan 
shows a slightly different pattern where there was a rapid increase from merely 2,983 
during 1956-60's period to 8,400 during the Second Malaya Plan (1961-65) and 
22,522 during 1966 to 1970; then there was a sudden declined by nearly a half in the 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) (1). Later, the number of houses completed in 3MP 
and 4MP increased to 26,250 and 72,308 respectively. Finally in SMP it dropped to 
26,172. Analysis of the table concludes the existence of a considerable gap of unmet 
targets in terms of the difference between the target number of units and the number of 
houses completed in each plan. 
1 Less emphasis was given to public housing during Second Malaysia Plan (2MP) where lesser 
amounts of funds were allocated to finance the programme compared to previous First Malaysia Plan 
(IMP). At this time also the Housing Trust diminished in its role due to internal problems. Large 
number ofhouses under this programme were built by the newly formed State Economic Development 
Corporations. Other factors contributed to this problem because 2MP was only passed by Malaysian 
Parliament in late 1971, hence physical implementation of projects could only commence in 1972 
after the land survey, site and soil investigation, layout and design had been completed. There were 
also elements of uncertainty as to which authority responsible for approving the new public housing 
scheme because of the adverse criticism that had been made to the Ministty of Local Government and 
Housing in the implementation of this programme in the IMP. This programme was transferred under 
the charge of Deputy Prime Minister which was put under the Ministty of Home Affair. In mid 1973 
the programme was transferred back to the Minisuy of Local Government and Housing. 
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The highest percentage of target achievement under this programme was 64% 
during the First Malaysia Plan (1966-70) where 22,522 houses were built out of 
targeted 35,000 units. Then 57% was achieved during the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-
1990). Amongst the lowest achievement were 26% and 28%, occurred in Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) and Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) respectively. 
The targeted number of houses on each five-year plan consisted of houses 
carried over from previous plan and also new houses formulated for the five-year plan. 
For example, during 3MP the total; number of houses intended were 73,500 that 
comprised of 14,581 houses (20%) carried over from 2MP and 58,919 newly 
formulated houses (80%) within the plan. Out of the target 73,500 houses only 26,250 
houses (36%) completed within the 3MP, comprised of7,454 carried over houses and 
14,945 houses formulated for the plan. The other 46,750 houses (64%) were not 
completed within the plan, where 44,783 houses (60%) were carried forward to 4MP 
and the other 1,967 houses (4%) were cancelled. 
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Table 1.1: 
PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
UNDER "FIVE-YEAR" PLANS 1956-1995 
Five-year Number of Number of 
Plan Period Houses Houses 
Notes: 
n.a.= not available 
Number of 
Houses Not 
" These figures were based on the progress of this programme up to June 1994. 
8 
1. Infonnation on the number of houses targeted and completed in this Table 1.1 was obtained 
from various five-year plan documents. These figures differed slightly when analysing a more 
detailed performance of this programme by the states in Table 1.3 and Chapter Five. This 
variation occurred because data analysis in Table 1.3 and Chapter Five was based on the 
'Fourth Quarterly Reports' end of 1980. 1985 and 1990 prepared by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government {MlaG} Malaysia for this programme. 
2. The focus of this programme during 2MP (1966-1970) was on the urban areas. Thus, nearly 
half of the 22,522 houses built in 2MP were flats. (Malaysia, 1971; p.258). 
Sources; 
1. N.Jegatheesan, 1979; p.26 
2. Malaysia, 1967; p.332 
3. Malaysia, 1971; p.258 
4. Malaysia, 1981; p.360 
5. Malaysia. 1986; p.522, 528, 530 
6. Malaysia, 1991; p.365, 384 
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Financial Shortfall 
Table 1.2 provides infonnation on the financial shortfall for the programme 
between 1966 to 1990. This table verifies that the amount of expenditure in each of the 
plan period was lower than the amount of funds allocated because the number of 
houses completed was lower than the number targeted 
The percentage of financial shortfall between the plans varied between 3% to 
50%. A financial shortfall of 47% occurred during the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) 
and the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). In the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) 
there was a financial shortfall of31% and in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) it 
was only 3%. Finally in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) the financial shortfall was 
50%. 
Infonnation on this financial shortfall implies that, although funds were 
available for the programme, they were not all spent because the number of houses 
completed were lower than intended. There were also other problems of withdrawing 
the funds from the federal government and delays as the result of procedures involved. 
Comparing between Table 1.1. and 1.2 also indicates that, the target shortfall 
was bigger than the financial shortfall. This implies that it was difficult to achieve the 
pre-determined housing target and also difficult to utilise the funds allocated. Although 
the peak of this programme occurred during the 4MP period (1981-85) where about 
97% of total allocation was spent, only 41 % of the housing target was achieved. This 
occurred because a large amount of the funds allocated in the 4MP were utilised for 
the uncompleted and on-going projects approved in earlier plan periods. Increased of 
project costs as the result of inflation was also associated to bigger amount of funding 
utilised. 
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Table 1.2 : 
PROGRAMME' FINANCIAL SHORTFALLS BETWEEN 1966·1990 
Plan Period 
Sources; 
Funds 
Allocated 
Funds 
Utilised 
Funds 
Utilised 
Various Five·year Malaysia Plan Documents 1966 to 1991. 
Financial 
Shortfall 
10 
Financial and target shortfall have become common in the implementation of 
public programmes in Malaysia (Davies, 1981; p.47). This target shortfall similarly, 
occurred to PLCHP. Several reasons were held responsible for problems, such as 
delays in sites acquisition, delays in squatter evictions, contractors failure to complete 
projects (Endan, 1984; p.71), several technical problems (Alithambi, 1979; p.S2) and 
many others. Basically these problems were not new, they had been in existence in the 
sixties (Housing Trust, 1967) and still exist in the nineties (MlaG, 1991a). 
The perfonnance of this programme varied from one plan to another. For 
example, although the number of houses completed during 1976-80 (26,250 units) 
were twice the number of houses completed in the previous plan (1971.75), the 
amount of expenditure spent was five time higher and the amount of funds allocated 
was almost four times as great. This occurred because of high inflation rates of 10.3% 
in 1973 and 17.4% in 1974. Two plan periods showed an almost similar number of 
houses completed, 26,250 units during the 1976·80 and 26,172 units during 1986·80. 
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Table 1.3 provides detailed information on the number of houses targeted and 
built in each state between 1976 and 1990, during the 3MP, 4MP and 5MP. The table 
confirms that the programme has never achieved its target; there is an evident gap 
between the number of houses targeted and the houses completed in each plan and in 
each state. By the end of each five-year plan, the number of houses completed were 
less than the number of houses originally intended. Variable performance occurred 
between the states. Some states have a poor performance, while others have a slightly 
better performance. For example, of the highest number of houses targeted for the 
Third and Fourth Malaysia Plan, 14,194 and 46,227 respectively, in Wilayah 
Persekutuan only 3,718 (26%) and 16,375 (35%) were completed. Another example is 
from the Fifth Malaysia Plan where Pahang and Johor have among the highest housing 
target of 8,813 and 7,114 respectively, however, the number of houses completed were 
5,772 (65%) and 4,560 (64%). 
Increased Allocation 
Increased financial allocation to the programme was one of the attempts to 
solve the implementation problem: ".. increased financial allocations being provided 
for the programme in the Plan, the implementation capacity of the States will be 
strengthened and expanded so as to meet their respective targets." (Malaysia, 1976; 
p.337). For example, during the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) a substantial increase 
in allocation was made, when MS640.9 million was provided compared to only 
MS171.9 million, for the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). Although this was an 
increased of 6.5 times, the amount only increased 2.6 times in 1971's price. Also the 
number of houses completed in 3MP were only about twice of the previous plan. This 
implied that inflation had occurred during 3MP and caused increased in project costs. 
Attempts to alleviate target shortfalls made through increased amount of 
allocations. In 3MP, funds were increased about 35% from $483,730,000 to 
S652,885,563. Then in 4MP, funds increased of 62% from MSl,026 million to 
MS2,694 million as shown in.Table 1.4. Despite increased in funding, problems still 
persisted because:-
Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
Table 1.3: 
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
ACCORDING TO STATES DURING 1976-1990 
States 
Johor 
Kedah 
Kelantan 
Melaka 
Source: 
11 
Compiled from various PLCHP Progress Reports by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
Malaysia between 1980 and 1991. 
2 There is a slight variation between figures reported in the five-year plan's document for houses 
completed by the end of the Third Malaysia Plan and the detailed records at the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government. The number of houses completed in 3MP as appeared in Table 1.1. 
were 26.250 while detailed breakdown for all the states by the end of the plan only showed 22.425 
as in the Table 1.3 above. 
3 There is a slight variation between figures reported in the five-year plan's document for Fourth 
Malaysia Plan and the detailed records according to states by the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. The number of houses completed in 4MP as appeared in Table 1.1. were 72,308, used 
the Fourth Malaysia Plan's document. While the detailed breakdown in this Table 1.3. based on the 
records prepared by MHLG at the end of five-year plan. 
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• The increased total allocation was made to cater for the increased number of 
housing targets (MHLG, 1991a, 1983, 1978). 
• Inadequate allocation was made to each project. The allocation provided to finance 
each project was lower than the actual project cost. The arrangement for the states' 
government to top up additional costs for land and infrastructure did not seem to 
be functioning (MHLG, 1991a). 
• The similar lengthy process of programme resourcing and process of allocation 
withdrawal were unchanged. The peculiar problems of difficult access and 
utilisation offunds continued to exist (MHLG, 1991a, Tan, 1983; p.76). 
Table 1.4: 
ALLOCATION OF FUNt>ING FOR THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME IN THE THIRD AND FOURTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1976-1980 
AND 1981-1985 
States 
Source: 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia. 
A review of several government reports (published and unpublished) was made 
by the author and several factors can be highlighted as being responsible for the 
problem of target shortfall. The factors are:-
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• Implementation Co-ordination: intergovernmental and interdepartmental co-
ordination stressed to ensure proper co-ordination and to ensure that every agency 
played its role meaningfully and adequately in fulfilling national objectives (MHLG, 
1993; p. 7-7; MHLG, 1979":-; p.12). 
• Implementation capacity: appears to be the cause of target and financial shortfall 
(MHLG, 1993; p. 7-6; Malaysia, 1976; p.335). Implementation was stressed in 
several official documents. 
• Land problems: The main shortfall in low cost housing target was reflected in 
problems associated with " .. .inadequate capacity, the protracted process in 
obtaining suitable land" and delays in providing complementary infrastructure 
(Malaysia, 1979, p.211). Problem associated with delays in providing suitable sites 
for the programme has long been recognised in the past, and the blame was put on 
the state governments (MHLG, 1993; p. 7-6; MHLG, 1979:; p.12). 
Significance of the Problem 
Many criticisms were made of the problems of programme under-achievement 
and variable performance. Several factors were said to account for this problem but 
having examined various reports, these problems appear to be persistent and have 
occurred repeatedly in the past. Although the modifications were made to the 
implementation mechanisms, problems of under-achievement occurred repeatedly in 
every five-year plan. There must be an explanation for the problem of the programme's 
consistent under-achievement. 
\. 
The fundamental question to ask is "How appropriate was the combination of 
resources, the implementation process and the implementation mechanism chosen to 
achieve the objective of this programme?" Were the allocation provided sufficient to 
finance the project? Were the funds available when needed? How easy was it to 
withdraw loans? How many steps had to be followed and how quickly was the loan 
available? These are some of the questions that need to be answered. Although this 
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programme was assumed to be well equipped with resources, facilities and suitable 
government mechanisms, yet it is still produced an inadequate output. 
In short, the question of how the combination of resources, activities, 
bureaucratic procedures, administrative structure and implementation mechanism in 
this programme led to the under achievement of programme's objectives measured in 
term of time, cost and quantity has to be considered. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The formulation of the public low cost housing programme and the decision to 
implement it through government mechanisms was made on the assumption a 
government own programme had several advantages. First, the government had direct 
control over the project in terms of number of houses to be built, where to build them 
and had opportunity to operate in areas where low cost housing is unattractive to the 
private sector. Second, the government could provide cheaper and affordable houses, 
because the government is capable of providing financing, land and other resources. 
Third, the government could also devise an implementation mechanism by creating a 
supporting agency or by using existing agencies to facilitate such a programme. Finally, 
since the implementation of this programme uses governmental agencies and 
administrative arrangements,· it would gain all the necessary support, reduce 
unnecessary bureaucratic procedures and as a consequence shorten the overall housing 
delivery process. 
However, the structure of government which consists of federal and state 
government is characterised by dispersed power, differentiation of functions and 
responsibilities, and varied resources. To accommodate and ensure the success of a 
programme like this requires a process of assembling power, responsibilities and 
resources between the two levels of government to achieve an outcome. The federal 
government is in control of finance and give final approval to the list of housing 
projects for this programme. On the other hand it is state governments that provide 
state land and are also empowered to acquire private land for housing projects. 
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The programme also has to go through an implementation process involving 
several agencies who co-ordinate, supervise, approve, control, regulate and finance the 
programme. The longer the implementation process imposed, the slower the pace 
towards the completion of programme is likely to be. 
Several agencies are in control of resources, information or the granting of 
approvals. All these influence the performance of the programme. Policy 
implementation involves an assembly process of different parts and the control of the 
assembly process. It is involves assembling numerous and diverse programme elements 
which are in hands of various parties that are independent of each other into a whole 
(Bardach, 1977). 
To facilitate the implementation of this programme, a technical agency was 
created by the federal government to assist in its execution. Besides employing the 
National Housing Department, state governments may also appoint other agencies to 
assist them. The National Housing Department has the specialised function of assisting 
state governments to build low cost houses, whereas other agencies are the general 
housing development agencies and also non housing agencies. The study investigates 
the achievements of each of by the programme's implementing agencies. 
Programme implementation is also bound by the roles each department has to 
play and also the departmental rules and procedures. While the implementation 
mechanism is designed to facilitate the programme, the involvement of several 
departments can contribute to a slowness in implementation. The environment within 
which the programme operates can produce excessive control. Although the 
programme has been in operation for more than 40 years, the signs of strain and stress 
are reflected by the problem of under-achievement and shortfall. 
Therefore the statement of problem for this research was that inadequate 
funding, (4) lengthy implementation process(S) and inefficient implementation 
... Resource include funding. Inconsistency of resource is insufficiency of funds allocated for 
each project of which the cost estimate was usually lower than actual construction cost. 
Inadequate and rather ad-hoc information available during project formulation. Unavailability 
of land or varied status of land for the programme. 
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mechanisms(6) have caused under-achievement of the public low cost housing 
programme, amongst states and periods of implementation. 
The aim of this study is then to seek an explanation of why the output of the 
programme did not produce the intended result. Searching through the programme 
output between 1970 and 1990 has revealed that there were areas where the 
programme worked very well, featured by ''period o!implementation" and "Iocation 0/ 
implementation" (states). These two factors suggested the existence of variable 
programme performance, which implied that programme output was better in certain 
environments. Investigations must be carried out and comparisons made in order to 
elucidate and understand the internal dynamics of the programme operations which are 
related to good and poor performance. 
OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of the research is to find explanations for the phenomenon of 
target under-achievement and the variable performance of the public low cost housing 
programme in Malaysia amongst states and periods of implementation. Specifically, the 
objectives of this study are to achieve the following:-
1. An examination into factors which account for unsatisfactory programme 
achievement. 
5. The implementation process include the necessary steps, stages and procedures required to 
execute the public low cost housing programme. starting with the formulation of a projects list 
in each state until its completion. Four stages are mentioned in this paper; the project 
formulation stage, the resourcing stage, the construction stage and the completion stage. 
IS. Implementation mechanisms means administrative arrangement and organisational structure 
involved in the implementation of projects. The focus is on the choice of administrative 
arrangements to implement the project which involves the state-federal relationship, division of 
responsibilities and which agency is to provide technical assistance ( the federal's National 
Housing Department or the state own agencies such as the State Economic Development 
Corporations and the Public Works Departments) 
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2. An investigation of major factors expediting and limiting the programme 
achievement. The aim is to identify factors that worked and those that did not 
work during the process of programme implementation. 
3. A description of prominent features of the programme components and a 
detailed account of its implementation process. 
4. To attain relevant findings contributing to the refinement and improvement 
of the public low-cost housing policy for lower income people in Malaysia 
more specifically, and in general to provide lessons to enable policy makers, 
planners and implementers to gain insight into past mistakes and to avoid 
continuing mistakes. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study used in quantitative and qualitative methods to gather information. 
The first stage used a quantitative approach by collecting information on 215 
representative projects from the programme's records. The second stage was a 
qualitative approach, where semi-structured interviews were carried out with those 
involved in the programme's im,plementation on 24 projects. 
The quantitative approach was used to analyse the general pattern of the 
programme and to gain a general overview before selecting cases for further detailed 
studies. The qualitative research provided rich data on the process of policy 
implementation that was not captured by the quantitative approach. Since the 
quantitative approach collects data based on several preconceptions and intervention at 
certain points, it was unable to look into the whole implementation process. The 
qualitative approach has provided information based on the perspectives of programme 
participants and relevant actors. 
During the first stage, 215 projects were selected through disproportionate 
stratified random sampling from a sampling frame of a total of 624 projects in the 
programme. These were projects formulated for the three development plans between 
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1976 and 1990 in seven states of West Malaysia. These projects were stratified into 
four categories; the 'implementation period', 'states', 'implementing agency' and 'status 
of completion'. The seven states were selected to enable the researcher to make 
comparisons of the three types of implementing agencies engaged in the programme. 
This study aimed to discover the general pattern and degree of relationship between 
selected variables by statistical tests. 
Data was collected from programme records, files and documents which are 
available from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the Housing Division 
of the state governments and the implementing agencies. These files provided 
information about the projects'· progress from inception until completion. 
This researcher then conducted a second qualitative stage data collection. The 
quantitative research in the first stage helped with the choice of projects for a 
qualitative investigation. Guided interviews were carried out with the aim of providing 
richness of data, getting the story from the perspective of people involved in the 
programme on detailed descriptions of programme implementation in greater depth. It 
provided answers in a qualitative manner to the question of which factors limiting 
programme achievement. 
During the second stage, 24 projects were selected from the 215 projects in 
stage one by using the contrast sampling method. The selection was based on non-
random and purposive sampling. However, certain criteria were set for the selection of 
cases. The aim was to investigate programme variations across sites, five-year plan 
periods and implementing agencies. At this stage the focus was on providing detailed 
descriptions of project implt~mentation and on examining factors expediting and 
limiting programme performance. 
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Thesis Organisation 
This thesis is presented in two parts consisting of eleven chapters in total. Part 
One comprises the main text; the survey of literature, the background on public 
housing development, the research framework and research design. Part Two is the 
presentation of data which involves two types of analyses and research findings. The 
arrangement of this thesis appeared in Diagram 1.1. 
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview and background of the study which serve 
to provide justifications and direction for the research. 
Chapter 2, the literature review, examines the field of policy implementation. 
This represents attempts by researchers and scholars to explain why there is a gap 
between intentions and outcomes of policies. The underlying argument in this review is 
that, although the government, is better equipped with power, resources and 
mechanisms, several constraints still exist hindering the achievement of policy 
outcomes. This chapter focuses on the emergence of implementation studies with 
various analyses, frameworks and approaches in explaining why this gap exists. 
Definitions about implementation and the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches are 
highlighted to explain how researchers and scholars have viewed policy 
implementation. This chapter specifically discusses: (a) pre-conditions to an effective 
implementation, (b) implementation process and inter-organisational relationships, ( c) 
capability of the government, (d) resources and funding, and (d) linking of the 
literature on implementation studies to the research topic of the implementation 
problems of the public low cost housing programme in Malaysia. 
Chapter 3 describes ~opulation growth, housing construction and housing 
requirements in Malaysia. Chapter 4 provides an overview of housing policies and 
programmes for the lower-income groups in Malaysia. Chapter 5 analyses public low-
cost housing performance during three five-year plans between 1976 and 1990. These 
three chapters help to highlight the various forces at work in housing development in 
Malaysia. 
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Chapter 6 is explanation of the research hypotheses. Chapter 7 describes the 
research methodology, which explains the approach used in data collection and data 
analyses. 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 contain presentation of the quantitative and qualitative 
data, the results of the analysis of the 215 projects during the first stage data collection 
and the 24 projects during the second stage data collection. 
Chapter 11 concludes and summarises the analyses and results of this study and 
puts forward recommendations. It closes with an overview of the implications for the 
policy options to the Malaysian public housing programme. 
The data collection for this study was completed in 1994, at the time when a 
number of important housing policies were formulated and implemented in Malaysia 
such as 'the fund to accelerate construction of low-cost houses' (F ACLCH) with funds 
ofSl,604 million for low-cost apartments construction in urban areas, a time when the 
country achieved economic prosperity, and a preference for privatisation and 
corporatisation policies. This author believes that these will effect and impacts on the 
future direction of housing development in Malaysia. The writing of this thesis was 
completed in 1996, when Malaysia entered into its Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-
2000). Although it is unfortunate that an analysis of these important elements could not 
be incorporated into this research, nevertheless, it is hoped that this study will provide 
some insights into the future of the approach for housing lower income people. 
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This chapter focuses on programme implementation problems faced by 
governments in delivering products as intended in policy statements. Although 
governments are equipped with power, organisations, resources and other advantages, 
the governments also face certain difficulties and other shortcomings in achieving 
policy outcomes. The Iiteratur~ survey in this chapter highlights the constraints faced 
by governments from the perspective of policy implementation studies. The underlying 
argument in this chapter is that shortfalls in the implementation of policy objectives is 
associated with complex implementation process, related to resources allocation, 
bureaucratic procedures, inter-governmental relationships and other constraints. 
In general, public policy implementation is complex, elusive, confusing, faces 
many challenges and is bound by many constraints. It has never been as straight-
forward as it has been thought. The 'blassic" hierarchical model assumed that 
implementers are excluded from any significant roles in the policy process; policies are 
made by a small group of decision-makers and are loyally implemented by subordinate 
administrators.(l) Witnessed by the failures of many the U.S.A's public programmes in 
the 1960s, social scientists attempted to find ways to improve programmes in order to 
achieve their goals. This caused a shift from the 'blassical" view of policy process, to 
an emphasis on what happened to a policy during the implementation process. This 
process is characterised by inter-relationships between different groups of actors, 
rather than a straight line process from top to bottom. Inter-organisational 
relationships are one of the constraints in policy implementation. Public policy is 
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difficult to implement, although all parties and actors agree on and understand, the aim 
of the policy, and have decided on the course of action to achieve it. It is even more 
difficult if objectives are unclear. Implementation difficulties are reflected in signs of 
stress, strain and underachievement. The implementer however, is tied by bureaucratic 
norms, practices and procedures which are difficult to change. To deal with this 
complex phenomenon, this study focuses on the policy implementation approach. This 
examines the processes of getting inter-organisational sanctions of mobilising resources 
and of creating implementation structures. 
The chapter consists of four sections. Section one highlights the emergence of 
implementation studies and discusses attempts to explain implementation problems. 
Section two discusses the two approaches in implementation studies: the 'top-down 
approach' and the 'bottom-up approach. Next, in section three, there is an analysis of 
factors affecting implementation performance, such as clear objectives and pre-
conditions for effective implementation, lengthy processes and delays, inter-agency 
relationships, government capability, and funding and resources. Finally, the last 
section explains the link between this literature review and the problem under study. 
THE EMERGENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 
During the past two decades, there has been an enormous amount of research 
on policy implementation. Waves of policy implementation studies emerged in the 
USA in early 1970 and in Europe during 1980's (Ham and Hill, 1993; p.97). During 
early work implementation studies, researchers analysed a single case programme, 
focused on successes and failures of programmes, and derived a pessimistic conclusion 
about the ability of governments to implement their programmes effectively. Later 
there was a shift in the approach to one which became more analytical and comparative 
in perspective. It investigated implementation success across programmes and 
governmental organisations in terms of specific variables and of conceptual 
frameworks. 
Implementation studies are concerned with activities that take place after policy 
has been formulated. It is concerned with the issues of putting policies into actions. 
The studies look into the question of why programme outputs are not achieved, as 
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originally intended by the policy makers. To a certain extent, the studies are involved 
with the investigation of what went wrong during the stage between the policy 
formulation and policy outcome. This has been emphasised by Ham & Hill as follows:-
'The pioneering implementation studies therefore argue that the process of 
putting policy into action is deserving of study, that it is wrong to take it for 
granted that this process will be smooth and straightforward. Indeed, we may 
go further and suggest that in many ways these studies are concerned with the 
discovery that many things go wrong between policy formulation and output." 
(Ham and Hill, 1993~ p.98) 
As has been explained in the" statement above, policy implementation studies, to a 
certain extent, focus on programme successes or failures. For example, Larson (1980) 
analyses causes of programme success and failure. He points out four reasons for 
failure and suggests responses to each, as follows (Larson, 1980~ p.7) :-
(I) Poor implementation procedures: cause the least amount of failure and can 
be corrected by the programme alteration. 
(2) Intergovernmental complexity: causes a moderate amount offailure and can 
be corrected by making changes to interagency relationships and co-ordination 
efforts. 
(3) Vague and unrealistic goals: a serious programme flaw which requires a 
complete restructuring of programme direction. 
(4) Changes in the economic environment: a very serious cause of programme 
failure, which call for programme termination. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984~ p.197) put in plain terms that policy failure is the 
consequence of one or more of the following causes: bad policy execution, bad policy 
and bad luck. Bad policy execution is related to implementation problems and bad luck 
is due to external circumstances beyond the control of policy makers or implementers. 
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Bad policy which is less commonly or less openly stated as a reason for the failure, is 
due to inadequate information, defective reasoning or unrealistic assumptions. 
Lessons from 'Dashed Expectation in Oakland' 
Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) study on 'Implementation' has been so 
central to the emerging field of implementation studies, that it marks a starting point 
for any review of literature on this subject (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980: p.13.)(2) 
They began their study with the assumption that implementation means 'to carry out, 
accomplish, fulfil, produce, and complete" and scrutinised the efforts of the Economic 
Development Administration (BOA) to produce jobs for the hard-core unemployed in 
Oakland, California as an example of policy failure. 
This study has set a bench mark for policy implementation studies, due to a 
lack of similar studies before theirs. The authors claimed that, although everyone was 
concerned with the inability to implement government programmes, analytical studies 
on implementation were non-existent. In their words ''It must be there; it should be 
there; but in fact it is not." and " ... we have been unable to find any significant analytic 
work dealing with implementation" (pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; p.166).(3) 
Pressman and Wildavsky's study (1973) investigated the implementation 
problem faced by the Economic Development Administration (a federal agency), in 
creating 3,000 jobs amongst minority groups in Oakland. The programme was not 
successful in achieving its target due to two fundamental reasons: it was beset by 
numerous implementation problems and was deficient in concept. The programme 
implementation had to undergo innumerable steps and numerous activities. To 
overcome the problem they called for simplicity in policy implementation and more 
directness in method. The logic was: the fewer the steps, the less the disaster. The 
deficiency in concept was because the government employed faulty economic theory. 
The solution offered to the economic problem was aimed at the wrong target. 
They point out that "The evils that aftlicted the EDA program in Oakland were 
of prosaic and everyday character" and "Failure to recognize that these perfectly 
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ordinary circumstances present serious obstacles to implementation inhibits learning. If 
one is always looking for unusual circumstances and dramatic events, he cannot 
appreciate how difficult it is to make the ordinary happen." (pressman & Wildavsky, 
1973; p.xii). The authors also point out that implementation problems were much 
discussed but lacked thorough analysis. In this study the main problems were ordinary 
bureaucratic practices and interorganisational relationships. Ordinary bureaucratic 
circumstances and practices caused constraints on implementation. For example, like a 
numerous approvals and clearance points having to be obtained from a variety of 
participants, the difficulty of complying with agreements after they were reached, and 
delays due to the processes of going through several steps, all caused constraints . 
Therefore, the greater the number of clearance points needed, the lower the probability 
of programme success- they termed this an "implementation deficit." 
The problem of 'complexity of joint actions' leads to poor chances of policy 
implementation. This inspired a number of multi-actor inter-organisation studies (e.g. 
O'Toole, 1986) and analysis by 'probability theory"to predict implementation success 
and suggest useful tactical advice for implementers (Bowen, 1982; Alexander, 
1989).(4) 
The lessons from Oakland highlight a number of barriers to achieving policy 
objectives. The barriers are: the inter-organisational relationship problems of 
competing and conflicting programme commitments by parties with a low sense of 
urgency; the appearance of new and unforeseen participants; the difference of opinion 
among and within parties about leadership; and, organisation, legal and administrative 
differences. A host of problems can also be anticipated to effect implementation of 
programme even if the causal chain is short. These problems are: undue speed or 
delays; turnover of personnel; vague legislation; severe understaffing; fear of racial 
tensions; conflict between local and federal agencies; overestimation of the degree of 
local support. Their study took the prescriptive approach, in which they concluded:-
• 'Implementation should not be divorced from policy': otherwise the programme 
would fail. Implementation must be conceived as a process part of the whole policy 
design. 
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• The policy designer must consider a more direct means of achieving the desired end. 
The 'bomplexity of joint actions" impaired the implementation process, therefore, 
multiplicity of decision points and clearances had to be minimised. 
• The theory that underlies actions, must be carefully considered. 
• Continuity of leadership has significance for successful implementation. High 
turnover of high powered people at the federal level who designed the policy 
adversely affect the programme implementation. 
• Simplicity in policies is much desired. 
The problems perceived with the EDA programme in Oakland were where the 
programme designers did not have a clear idea of the cause of unemployment. Thus, 
causal theory to remedy the problem was not made available. The EDA was very 
experienced in tackling problems in depressed rural areas, but had only little experience 
in depressed urban neighbourhoods, like Oakland. Meyers views the implementation 
difficulties in the Oakland case as due to a lack of adequate social theories (Meyers, 
1981; p.40). 
Attempts to Explain the Implementation Problem 
The work of Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) not only encouraged the 
emergence of a distinctive literature on implementation but also the beginnings of an 
emphasis on implementers as key actors in the policy process. Several other authors 
also attempted to explain gaps between policy and outcomes. For example, Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1975), stress the psychological and human factors influencing the 
implementers' behaviour. These authors highlight and explore the personal and 
psychological complexities that influence actors in the implementation arena. They 
argued that implementers were not 'faceless automatons': but participants who play 
crucial roles in the policy process. Van Meter and Van Horn suggested of a more 
ambitious framework to studying policy implementation. The framework was drawn 
from three bodies of literature: the organisation theory, impact studies of public policy 
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and selected studies of intergovernmental relations. They proposed six 'blusters of 
variables"that shape linkages between policy and performance (see Diagram 2.1). This 
model specifies relationships between the independent variables and dependent 
variables and makes the relationships among the independent variables explicit. The six 
clusters of variables are:-
1. Policy standards and objectives, 
2. Policy resources, 
3. Inter-organisational communication and enforcement activities, 
4. The characteristics of the implementing agencies, 
5. Economic, social and political conditions, and 
6. The disposition of implementors. 
Van Meter and Van Hom stress that the identification of performance indicators is 
crucial in the analysis of implementation because this assesses the realisation of policy 
standards and objectives (e.g. the number of jobs created, who were hired, and what 
public works progress was achieved). The model also stresses the available resources 
that facilitate the implementation of a policy. The standards and objectives of policies 
have indirect effects on performance. They argue that the delivery of public services 
will be influenced by the manner in which standards and objectives facilitate oversight 
and enforcement. Standards and objectives also have an indirect impact on the 
disposition of implementers through inter-organisational activities. Implementers' 
response to the policy objectives based on their perception and interpretation. This 
model also presents the relationships between policy resources and three other 
components of the model: (1) inter-organisational communication and enforcement 
activities; (2) the characteristics of implementing agencies, and; (3) the economic, 
social and political conditions. Van Meter and VanHorn also clarify that technical 
assistance and other services can be provided if pre-determined during the policy 
decision stage. Also, vigorous enforcement can be carried out by the availability of 
sufficient resources to support that activity. 
McLauglin (1977), focuses on interpersonal relationships between 
implementers and policy formulators as the key to programme success. She is 
concerned with implementers' receptiveness or lack of receptiveness, to the policy 
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change. She argues that programmes' successes are influenced by the amount of 
interest, commitment and support of principal actors. 
POLICY 
Diagram 2.1: A MODEL OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
PROPOSED BY VAN METER AND VAN HORN (1975) 
Source: 
Van Meter and Van Hom (1975) ''The Policy Implementation Process: Conceptual 
Framework" Administration and Society, Vol. 6 No.4, February 1975; page 463. 
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Bardach (1977) classifies and analyses a wide variety of 'sames" that 
implementers can play to divert resources, deflect goals, resist initiatives, and impede 
policies. For example Bardach describes four implementation games that may divert 
resources:-
(1) The "Easy Money game" that has an impact on cost escalation but 
not on the performance. 
(2) The "Budget game" which deflects the policy goals from the intended. 
(3) The "Easy life game", the way that bureaucrats tailor their works to 
suit themselves, and 
(4) The "Pork Barrel game", the way how scarce resources and funding 
are distributed through political games. 
Rein and Rabinovitz, (1978) analyse the looping nature of implementation 
process, that contrary to belief, the implementation process was not a smooth one 
sided transition from legislation, to guidelines, and then to auditing and evaluation. 
They identifY three competing imperatives, the legal imperative, the rational-
bureaucratic imperative, and consensual imperative, that dominated the policy process. 
Because of the need to reconcile these potentially conflicting imperatives, the entire 
implementation process is characterised by a "principle of circularity." 
Meyers (1981; p.37-40) argues that implementation failure is the result of 
'counterintuitive implementation' design. Counterintuitive means that the results of a 
programme are quite different from the expected. Meyers views social programmes as 
subsystems within a larger world system. This subsystems interact with the larger 
system and with other subsystems in a complex manner where the results are 
unpredictable and counterintuitive. He summarises that implementation of social 
programmes are beset by a range of problems: programmes are often not meant 
seriously; fail to achieve their aims; operate counterintuitively; are counterproductive 
and tough to implement. He concludes that the root to these problems is poor 
programme design. In agreement with Pressman and Wildavsky's valid theory of 
causation, Meyers believes that :-
'Designs are poor because we sometimes lack of adequate theories about social 
causation that would enable us to design effective programs, or we disregard 
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the theories we do have. As programmers, we often do not know what we are 
doing. And sometimes we lack the courage, the determination, or the power to 
design workable programs even when we do have the necessary theory." 
(5) (Meyers, 198. J pAl.) 
This notion that implementation design has significant relationships with the policy 
outcomes is also supported by several authors. For example, Hogwood and Gunn 
(1984, p.198) propose that '~ .. the probability of a successful outcome, ... will be 
increased if thought is given at the policy design stage to potential problems of 
implementation." Palumbo and Calista (1987~ p.91) clarify that '~ .. a large part of the 
problem stemmed from poor policy designs rather than implementation." 
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) study the political dimensions of policy 
implementation process by analysing the complex types of linkages and 
interrelationships that characterise the policy system. The rapid growth of case studies 
on policy implementation, led them to integrate those case studies into a more general 
conceptual framework. They explain that policy implementation cannot be analysed in 
isolation. They state that:-
'Specifically, implementation as a general phenomenon cannot be separated 
from the process of formulating and evaluating the policies being implemented. 
This requires consideration of different views of the policy process developed 
by a diverse group of participants and observers, including policy makers, 
bureaucrats, and social scientists. In short, our purpose ... to explore the politics 
of policy implementation." (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; p.viii) 
They look at the policy process within sets of functional environments, in which 
different aspects of the process take place. Within each of these environments there are 
a variety of arenas where actors interact. The use of environments is to minimise the 
misleading conception that implementation is characterised by unidirectional 
phenomenon, as viewed by the classical model. In addition, the concept of 
environments covers a wide variety of different actors who may attempt to influence 
the policy process. Anyone may be involved in the policy process and it is not 
restricted only to governments' actors. 
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Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) propose a framework which views the policy 
process as a system, with a set of interconnected elements, each directly and indirectly 
related to the others. There are three interrelated functional environments: policy 
formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation. Each contains various 
groups of actors and arenas. Each set of environments is linked to each of the others. 
They are connected by various communications and compliance linkages. The 
communication linkages are important between the policy formulation and policy 
implementation because, for an effective implementation, implementers must know 
what they are supposed to do through a consistent, clear and accurate policy. Despite 
the communication linkage, pitfalls and mishaps(6) may occur because of:-
(a) garbled messages by senders, 
(b) misinterpretations by receivers, or 
(c) system failure, in terms of transmission breakdowns, overload, 'hoise': and 
inadequate follow-through or compliance mechanisms. 
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) point out that a variety of different forces 
can shape the implementation process once policy has been formulated. They focus on 
three key variables: 
(1) actors and arena, 
(2) organisational structures and bureaucratic norms, and 
(3) communications networks and compliance mechanisms. 
The implementation environment contains a variety of different actors, operating out of 
divergence arenas, who 'Jockey back and forth" in an attempt to influence the course 
of policy implementation. The task of the formal implementers is to co-ordinate these 
actors in a way that will lead to successful and effective programme performance. This 
is considered as a fundamental challenge since the formal implementers do not have the 
dictatorial authority to order all these diverse actors to conform to their command, 
especially when the actors are outside of the arenas such as the lobby groups or the 
press. To obtain co-operation and compliance from others, therefore, implementers 
must use persuasion, negotiation, and compromise. 
The task of implementers is perceived as complex because of internal and 
external environments. First, implementers have to adjust their implementation 
responsibilities with internal norms which were influenced by the behaviour within their 
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internal settings. Second, the complexity due to the growing use of outside 
intermediaries who are relatively immune to many of the negative sanctions which were 
traditionally employed in an effort to ensure compliance. This framework concluded 
that the implementation environment has become one which increasingly involves more 
political bargaining and other forms of negotiation. 
Hood (1976) realises that failure to implement policies is not associated with 
'administration', but a result of external conditions, of which, politics is one factor. 
Hood explained that '~ .. some failures in policy implementation are caused by ... the 
policies involved are politically too expensive for a given ruling group to judge itself 
able to afford the price." (Hood, 1976; p.8) 
Research on policy implementation thus has progressed substantially since 
Pressman and Wildasky's (1973) seminal work. The first generation of implementation 
studies focused on detailed accounts of how a single decision was carried out and 
described barriers to policy implementation. Second generation studies were concerned 
with implementation success and failure. Some have suggested a development into four 
distinct stages: (1) case studies; (2) the development of a policy implementation 
framework; (3) application frameworks; and (4) the synthesis and revision (Lester, 
et.al, 1987; p.201). 
Definitions of implementation 
Implementation studies are related to acts of carrying out public policies or 
programmes which normally encounter problems related to interpreting policy 
intention, interorganisational problems of getting sanctions and co-operation, and 
measuring policy in terms of unmet objectives, mistakes, delays, deviations and 
successes or failures. Based on this account, several writers offer definitions of 
implementation. 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) propose implementation as a process of 
forging subsequent links and achieving desired results. Van Hom (1975) enunciated 
implementation as action towards the achievement of decided objectives. Mazmanian 
and Sabatier (1983) defined implementation from the point of view of carrying out 
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basic policy decisions which run through a number of stages. Bardach (1977) defines 
implementation from a slightly different angle as an assembly process of numerous 
and diverse programme components in the hands of many. Wolman summarised 
implementation as: 
"In its narrowest definition implementation, as utilized in studies of 
implementation process, appears to refer primarily to the politics of 
administration or of the administrative process. In broader usage, 
implementation may be defined as 'carrying out' process or, as Walter 
Williams (1975) states, 'the process of trying to move from a decision to 
program or project operations' ."( 1981; p.434). 
Implementation according to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973; p.xiii) is "to 
carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete ... constitute the ability to achieve the 
predicted consequences after the initial conditions have been met". Implementation to 
them is concerned with "that part of a public program following the initial setting of 
goals, securing of agreement, and commitment of funds" (1973; p.xii). To these 
authors, policies imply theories. It is causation between initial conditions and future 
consequences. Policies become programmes when initial conditions are created. 
VanMeter and VanHorn stressed actions towards achieving objectives. They 
defined implementation as action by public or private individuals (or groups) that are 
directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions [(Van 
Meter and Van Hom, 1975; p.445) in Ham & Hill, 1993; p.98] The main question of 
implementation is to determine whether those services are delivered as intended and 
whether any changes occurred in the programme structure and operation mandated by 
the statute. Their definition was based on the distinction between policy-making, 
policy implementation and the evaluation of policy outcomes (Ham and Hill, 1993: 
p.98; Nixon, 1980). 
To Hogwood and Guon (1984; p.197), implementation refers to completed 
action and the absence of action means non-implementation. Non-implementation is 
where a policy is not put into effect as intended, perhaps because those involved in its 
execution have been "uncooperative" or "inefficient" or their best effort could not 
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overcome obstacles to effective implementation over which they had little or no 
control. Unsuccessful implementation on the other hand is where the policy was 
carried out in full, but due to unfavourable external circumstances, the policy failed to 
produce the intended result. 
In contrast, Nixon (1980) views implementation as not necessarily a complete 
action to achieve the intended goal, but factors which tend either to facilitate or to 
hinder the process of implementation. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier defined implementation as an understanding of 
activities that take places after a programme was formulated; events and activities 
taking place after the issue of public policy directives which include the behaviour of 
the administrative body and the web of direct and indirect political, economic, and 
social forces that represent the behaviour of all those involved, and ultimately the 
impacts of the programme (1983; p.4). 
Bardach (1977) views public policy implementation as what happens after the 
policy had been formulated. Therefore he states that " ... a policy or program-
implementation process is an assembly process. II Bardach views implementation as " ... 
a process of assembling numerous and diverse program elements" which are in the 
hands of various parties, that are independent from each other. As a result the 
implementation process is associated with a process he calls "politics". This includes 
persuasion and bargaining between government agencies in order to activate others to 
contribute to the programme (Bardach, 1977: p.36). He argues that "implementation 
problems" are control problems, but they are specific to the assembly activities that 
constitute the "implementation process". 
Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) defines implementation as (1) a declaration of 
government preferences, (2) mediated by a number of actors, (3) actors create a 
circular process characterised by reciprocal power relations and negotiations. 
When reviewing the literature several elements were incorporated into 
definitions of implementation: 
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(1) actions related to the carrying out, accomplishing and completing the 
policy, 
(2) actions taken after policy had been formulated by public or private 
individuals or group 
(3) actions aimed at the achievement objective, 
(4) interorganisational co-operation towards the policy, 
(5) meeting the initial conditions 
(6) environments with a number of actors 
(7) a clear objective or intention by the policy makers, 
(8) factors facilitating or hindering the process 
Pressman and Wildavsky, Van Meter and Van Hom, and Mazmanian and Sabatier 
stress the importance of meeting pre-conditions before the implementation is to be 
carried out. The definitions provided by the above scholars illustrate a variety of 
meaning of the word 'implementation', dependent upon which perspective one is 
looking. 
Controversies Abo~t Implementation Studies 
'What an implementation study is" is the subject of disagreement by many 
scholars. O'Toole has pointed out his doubt that '~ . .implementation researchers are 
not in agreement about what constitutes the subject of their inquiry. Some take 
implementation to refer to all that is part of the process between initial statement of 
policy and ultimate impact in the world. Others restrict implementation to the actions 
of those charged with handling a policy" (Otoole, 1985; p.183) 
Other scholars question the area or boundary of implementation studies. For 
example, Davies and Mason 'kazing up at the bottoms" wrote about the boundary 
implementation studies as follows:-
'~ question which is immediately raised is whether we are confusing evaluation 
with the study of implementation. In other words, we may be going beyond the 
remit of implementation studies into the realms of 'impact' studies." 
(1982;p.148) 
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Utilization-focused evaluation, the title ofa book by Patton (1986), assesses on 
'how far from and in what ways the program can deviate from the ideal plan while still 
meeting fundamental implementation criteria" (patton, 1986; p.148.) Patton states that 
there are several 'hlternatives types" of implementation evaluation, dealing with 
different kinds of implementation issues. However, first the evaluator must determine 
that the programme in question actually exists. Then, he or she may employ one or a 
combination, of the following evaluation approaches: (1) effort evaluation, (2) on-
going programme monitoring,. (3) process evaluation, (4) component evaluation, and 
(5) the treatment specification approach. Each of these approaches answers a different 
question and focuses on different aspects of programme implementation. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) noted that :-
')\II implementation studies seek to evaluate program performance, though 
they can differ markedly in evaluative criteria employed. They can also be 
distinguished by where they focus on either policy outputs or eventual 
outcomes (or both)" (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; p.9-10) 
O'Toole mentioned the difficulties of defining the research since 
implementation researchers are not in agreement ' .. about what constitutes the subject 
of their inquiry.' Views differ on what implementation constituted; for some, 
implementation '~ .. refer[s] to all that is part of the process between initial statement of 
policy and ultimate impact in .the world': while others '~ .. restrict implementation to 
the actions of those charged with handling a policy," which excludes (1) behaviour of 
actors not directly designated to the policy, although they may be the necessary 
participants in converting policy into actions, and (2) whether the prescribed actions 
are likely to have the expected effects on the real world (p.183). 
Van Horn (1979) emphasises the importance of distinguishing between the 
policy implementation and policy impacts. Van Horn explains that 'Policy 
implementation encompasses actions by public and private individuals or groups that 
affect the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions" (1979; p.9). 
This implies that policy implementation concerns with the achievement of targets. 
Thus, policy implementation is modest in its aspiration, whereas, policy impact 
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examines the policy's ultimate effect on society and its beneficiaries. He further 
suggests that implementation research should ask questions about what happened and 
why did it happened. 
As highlighted above, there is divergence in terms of what constitutes 
implementation studies. There is some disagreement among scholars. Therefore, 
Lane's (1987; p.527) assertive statement concludes that ')\s long as the concept of 
implementations remains unexplicated, any theory about the condition for successful 
implementation will remains ambiguous." His analysis is based on the dictionary 
meaning that implementation has a double meaning: execution and accomplishment. 
Now we have a better understanding of what implementation is and how it 
varies. We also perceive the relationships between the characteristics of policy design 
and implementation performance. Views about policy making have been changed to 
recognise the urgency of implementation in design of a policy. There are a range of 
variables available to clarify implementation and its outcomes. Inspite of this progress, 
only a partial or middle theory of implementation has been developed (palumbo, 1987; 
p.91). 
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
This section discusses the main features of the two approaches m 
implementation studies: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. 
The Top-down Approach 
Implementation studies are commonly grouped into two approaches: 'top down 
, and the 'bottom up'. In fact, Hasenfeld and Brock (1991) added a third group, 
classified as 'iterative". The' 'top down' is concerned with the way that the 
implementation process is structured in achieving policy objectives. The 'bottom-up' is 
concerned with organisations and actors who are responsible for putting policies into 
practice. Also, the distinction between the two depends on who did what in achieving 
the policy output. The weakness of the top-down approach is that assumes only that 
the agencies and actors mandated in the policy are involved with implementation policy 
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and also assumes the superiority of the mandated agencies. To the contrary, in reality 
implementation also involves other actors who are not mandated. However, the 
weakness of the 'bottom up'- approach is that it is only concerned with those are 
involved with the policy. The fundamental features of a top down approach are: 
(1) Starts with policy decision by governmental officials. 
(2)Concerned with the consistency of actions and policy decisions. 
(3) Concerned with achievement of objectives as intended. 
(4) Factors affecting policy outputs 
(5) Policy reformulation over time. 
Prominent studies of the variety top down are works by Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975) , Van Hom (1979), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) and Edwards (1980). 
Lester et.al (1987) summarised the number of variables thought to affect 
implementation by these scholars (Van Meter and Van Hom, Edwards, and 
Mazmanian and Sabatier) and found that they ranged from four to seventeen. Lester et 
al, however, argued that the more important variables were not identified. They 
similarly questioned, the circumstances under which those variables were more 
important than others. 
A number of criticisms were made about the top-down approach to policy 
implementation: 
• The top-down approach neglects other actors, since it starts from the perspectives 
of central decision-makers. The policy decision makers are the key actors, while 
others are basically viewed as obstacles to policy execution. This is contrary to 
reality since implementation also involves the private sector, street level 
bureaucrats, local implementing officials and other policy subsystems. 
• Top-down models are difficult to use in the situation where there is no dominant 
policy (statute) or agency, but rather a multitude of government directives and 
actors of which none is superior to the others. 
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• The top-down approach underestimates or ignores the strategies used by street level 
bureaucrats and target groups to get around central policies or to divert them for 
their own purposes. 
• The issue of evaluation employed by the top-down approach: this uses the 
yardsticks of outputs as stipulated by programme objectives. 
There are a whole series of arguments about the distinction between the two 
approaches and Sabatier (1986) has made an attempt to combine the two. Sabatier's 
summary of the distinction between the two approaches appears in Diagram 2.2 in this 
thesis. 
Bottom-up Approach 
The 'bottom up' approach emerged because of dissatisfaction with the 
weaknesses of the 'top down' approach. It employed a quite different perception of 
implementation. 'Bottom-up' focuses on the strategies maintained by various actors in 
pursuit of their objectives since local actors often deflect centrally mandated 
programmes for their own ends. 
Barrett and Fudge (1981) argue that much of the literature takes managerial 
approach and views the problem of implementation in terms of co-ordination, control 
or obtaining compliance with policy. This approach treats implementers as agents for 
policy makers and tends to play down issues such as power relations, conflicting 
interests and value systems between individuals and agencies responsible for making 
policy and those responsible for taking action. Barret and Fudge introduce 
implementation as a 'hegotiating process" and as 'action and responses" (Barrett and 
Fudge 1981;p.3-32}.They suggest that:-
'~ .. rather than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series 
of consequential actions, the policy-action relationship needs to be regarded as 
a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those 
seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends." 
(Barrett and Fudge 1981; pA) 
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Diagram 2.2: COMPARISON BElWEEN TOP-DOWN AND BOTIOM-UP APPROACH 
Initial focus (Central) Government Local implementation 
decision, e.g. new pollution structure (network) involved 
control law . in a policy area, e.g., pollution 
control 
Identification of From top down and from From bottom (govt. and 
major actors in the government out to private private) up 
process sector (although importance 
attached to causal theory also 
calls for accurate 
understanding of target 
group's incentive structure) 
Evaluative criteria Focus on extent of attainment Much less clear. Basically 
of formal objectives (carefully anything the analyst chooses 
analyzed). May look at other which is somehow relevant to 
politically significant criteria the policy issue or problem. 
and unintended consequences, Certainly does not require any 
but these are optional careful analysis of official 
govt. decision(s) 
Overall Focus How does one steer system to Strategic interaction among 
achieve (top) policy-maker's multiple actors in policy 
intended results? network. 
Source: From Paul A.Sabatier, (1986),'Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to 
Implementation Research: a Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis.' Journal of Public 
Policy, Vol. 6, No.1, p.33. 
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Implementation as a Negotiating Process 
Barrett and Fudge look at implementation from the point of view of control 
over policy execution or the ability to obtain compliance with the policy objective as 
the key factor in determining implementation success and failure. It is assumed that 
control or compliance can be only achieved by producing the 'right' incentive or 
recourse to sanctions and enforcement mechanisms. Thus the limit of control or 
compliance depends on the amount of power (resources, legitimacy, authority) to 
operate sanctions and incentives possessed by one agency vis-a-vis those it is seeking 
to control. But, to Barret and Fudge compliance is not only a matter of control, and 
compliance in this sense needs to be distinguished from the issue of consensus-actors 
and agencies who agree to support programmes. Without total control over resources, 
agencies and the whole implementation 'environment', those wanting to do something 
may be forced to compromise their original intentions in order to get any action at all. 
They thus put a different perspective over implementation:-
'if implementation is defined as 'putting policy into effect', that is, action in 
conformance with policy, then compromise will be seen as policy failure. But if 
implementation is regarded as 'getting something done', then performance 
rather than conformance is the central objective, and compromise a means of 
achieving performance albeit at the expense of some of the original intentions. 
Emphasis thus shift to the interaction between policy-makers and 
implementers, with negotiation, bargaining and compromise forming central 
elements in a process that might be characterised as 'the art of the possible'." 
Barrett and Fudge 1981; p.21). 
Barret and Fudge rejected the notion that implementation process starts with 
formulation of policy and ends with action. But, 
'Rather, it is appropriate to consider implementation as a policy/action 
continuum in which an interactive and negotiation process is taking place over 
time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom 
action depends." (Barrett and Fudge 1981; p.2S) 
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Implementation as Action and Responses 
Based on the argument that understanding the relationship between policy and 
action requires an action perspective which looks into the groups of actors involve, the 
agencies they operate within and the factors influencing their behaviour, Barrett and 
Fudge considered actors and agencies in combination of roles: first, making policies to 
be implemented by others; neXt, implementers of someone else's policy, and; finally, 
the interested party for the policy outcomes made or implemented by others. Thus, the 
focus of attention shifts from policy to the organisations themselves, to what is going 
on, who is doing it and why. 
This approach stressed importance of two way policy interactions based upon 
negotiations and compromise. Policy implementation needs to be regarded as a process 
of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between policy makers and 
implementers. Finally the 'discretion' approach expresses policy implementation in a 
way that suits implementers rather than policy makers. As a result, the outcome of 
policy may be different from what was intended. This approach explains unmet policy 
intentions because local implementers possess certain degrees of autonomy to change 
policy to suit local needs. If successful policy implementation means the executing of 
goals exactly as intended by policy makers then there can be no discretion at the middle 
and lower level of organisation (palumbo and Harder,1981). 
FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation literature has highlighted numerous factors affecting policy 
implementation following O'Toole's (1985) study of multi-actor implementation, 
which was based on more than 100 studies, providing a list of a range key of variables 
used for analysing the inter-organisation problem. For example, Montjoy and O'Toole 
(1979 and 1984) and O'Toole (1983) consider policy specificity, resources, agency 
goals, routines, world view, structure of interdependence, technical requirements of the 
tasks, facilitator, perceived risk for implementers. Hambleton (1983) identifies policy 
messages, multiplicity of agents, multiplicity of perspectives, and multiplicity of 
ideologies, resources and politics of planning. 
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Much of the focus of policy implementation studies especially during the early 
days was heavily influenced by the top-down model. This was because the literatures 
was set in an American public policy scenario which examined how federal policies 
(Washington's) were implemented at the state and local level. Those programmes 
suffered shortfalls because of an apparent gap between the federal government's 
aspiration and local reality. The top down approach stressed clear objectives or goals, 
or the presence of legislation. This approach was concerned with giving advice to top 
actors about securing successful implementation. 
In the USA federal policy is made through the formulation of a statute which is 
followed by the creation of an agency, funds and personnel. Therefore the legal 
imperative is considered important, because it can structure administrative behaviour 
and execute the implementation process through the proper design of legislation. In a 
democratic system such as in the USA, where legislators and chief executives are 
elected officials; policy should be made by legislators and to be implemented by civil 
servant. 
Awareness of and attention to the implementation process occurred because 
public policy administration has moved from classic public administration to 
development of a systems approach to political life . In the classic public 
administration era, legislation was seen as non-problematic after it was formulated. 
Civil servants would implement it faithfully. Then policy analysts looked further 
beyond the policy formulation stage into subsequent outcomes of legislation or policy 
decisions and what extent the outcomes of decisions were consistent with original 
policy objectives. It was realised that implementation was not as easy a process as had 
been previously assumed. 
Several constraints hindered and strained programme implementation, ranging 
from ambiguity of objectives, faulty assumptions and inadequate preconditions before 
policies were implemented, lengthy processes, delays, problem of interorganisational 
and intergovernmental relationships, insufficient funding, inadequate resources, 
incapability of government, inappropriate implementation design and many others. 
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Wolman's (1980) article entitled 'determinants of program success and failure' 
attempts to present a comprehensive framework for explaining and understanding 
programme performance. It presents a set of research questions to assist investigation 
into the determinants of programme performance and also questions and answers to be 
considered during policy formulation and implementation. The framework is divided 
into two parts: the formulating process and carrying out process. Programme success 
may be impeded by problems or inadequacies in one or more of the components in 
either the formulating stage or carrying out stage, or in both. The components of the 
formulating process include: 
(1) Problem conceptualisation: stressing the importance of an adequate 
problem conceptualisation throughout the policy formulation and implementation 
process. 
(2) Theory evaluation and selection: stresses that if the causes of problem are 
not adequately understood, it will difficult to device an appropriate policy. To develop 
an adequate theory of causation, we must have adequate data describing the problem 
and a theory explaining causes of the problem. 
(3) Specification of objectives: clear and specific objective are important to 
permit a programme to be designed and accomplished. 
(4) Programme design: appropriate programme design is feasible through the 
adequate understanding of the cause of problem. 
(5) Programme structure: stressed the importance of administrative structure 
through which the programme design is to be carried out in order to accomplish 
objective. 
The components of carrying out process include: 
(1) resource adequacy: recognising that resources must be adequately 
provided. 
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(2) management and control structure: this is an important aspect related to 
capability of organisations to carty out policy as intended. 
(3) bureaucratic rules and regulations: detailed rules are necessary as means of 
controlling and ensuring activities by members of an agency consistent with its 
objectives. But, the rules itself may contribute to failure. 
(4) political effectiveness: stresses that the administering departments have 
adequate political resources to carry out the programme as intended. 
(5) feedback and evaluation: inadequate feedback is a common reason for 
programme failure. Therefore a process of continual adjustment to the programme is 
necessary. 
Wolman stresses on the three part policy process begin with formulation and 
continue to carrying out. This framework seem as the components are interrelated to 
one another and means that to achieve successful implementation the programme must 
be right from the beginning. 
Clear Objectives and Pre-conditions to Implementation 
Sabatier and Mazmanian outlines six pre-conditions to be met for effective 
policy implementation. Theyare:-
a) clear policy objectives, 
b) legislation based on sound theory, 
c) well structured enabling legislation to attain 
what is intended and sympathetic agencies, 
d) Capable leadership in implementing agencies 
e) The programme receives active support, and 
f) The programme is stable and non-conflicting. 
These conditions are not to be used to measure a programme's effectiveness , but a 
recipe for ensuring success of any implementation effort. 
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Inspired by the study by Christopher Hood of 'perfect administration', 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984; p.198-206) elaborated on analysis for 'perfect 
implementation.' They suggested a set of ten pre-conditions as necessary to achieve 
'perfect implementation'. These includes:-
• Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints. These occur because some obstacles to implementation are outside 
the control of administrators, since they are external to the policy and 
implementing agency. Obstacles such as physical or political about which that 
the administrator can do very little must be considered during the policy 
making stage. 
• That adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the 
programme. 
• That the required combination of resources is actually available. 
• That the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and 
effects. 
• That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, 
if any, intervening links. 
• A single implementer which does not depend on other agencies for programme 
success. If other agencies are involved, they must minimal in numbers and 
dependency. 
• Complete understanding and accord towards objectives. The programme 
objectives must be clearly defined and understood by the organisation. 
However, it was pointed out that, most often, programmes' objectives are 
difficult to identify, vague, poorly communicated downward and outward from 
an organisation. Furthermore official objectives may be not be compatible with 
one another and possibly proliferated with 'unofficial' goals by certain 
professional or other groups in the programme. Programmes' objectives are 
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also amended and experience changes over time. On discussing policy 
orientation, Ham and Hill (1991; p.12) confirmed that '~ .. policies invariably 
change over time." This occurs because of incremental adjustments to earlier 
decisions, or major changes of direction. 
• Tasks are fully specified in a correct sequence with clear responsibility 
identified. 
• Perfect communication and co-ordination. It is necessary to have a unitary 
administrative system with a single line of authority. Communication also 
contributes to co-ordination and implementation. Contrary to this, 
organisations are prone to compartmentalism, professionalism and the activities 
of many groups with their own values, goals and interest to protect. 
• That those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance: the ability 
to command perfect obedience and no resistance at any point in the 
administrative system. Those in authority must also be able to secure total and 
immediate compliance from others whose consent and co-operation are 
required for success of the programme. 
These preconditions are an ideal situation where it is difficult to attain. However, it 
provides a framework for understanding why policies are not achieved. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) analysed implementation by focusing on the 
outcome of policy. These authors consider policy objectives of prime importance any 
policy implementation. A policy will undergo three stages; formulation, implementation 
and reformulation. The formulation process is just the beginning, clarifying on whom 
the policy is targetted. They view this as the role of legislators. Van Hom argues that 
policy formulation requires adequate theory about how the world outside works. 
Similarly Pressman and Wildavsky agreed that the creation of a statute is analogous to 
adopting theory of how things work. In their words " .. . Policies imply theories." In 
examining implementation process Mazmanian and Sabatier urge programmes' 
objectives should be verified for the following factors:-
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1. How consistent is the original objective with the policy outcomes or the 
outcomes of the implementing process? 
2. What modifications were made to the original objective and directives? 
3. What factors affect modifications? Why and what is the impact of 
modifications on goal attainment? 
To Sabatier and Mazmanian (1983), three sets of variables are involved in the 
implementation process. First, the tractability of the problem which concern with 
technical difficulties, diversity of target group behaviour, target groups as percentage 
of the population and the amount of behavioural changes intended. Second, the ability 
of statute to structure implementation. This is related to the question of how to 
formulate statute so that it is capable of structuring implementation to achieve goals, 
gain participation and receive support. Therefore, the statute must contain elements of: 
clear and consistent objectives, adequate causal theory and financial resources, capable 
institution and formal access by outsiders. Finally, non-statutory variables. Factors and 
groups influencing implementation include: socio-economic conditions and technology, 
public and constituency support, and the capability of implementing officials. This 
framework has been applied over twenty times by Sabatier and Mazmanian themselves 
and others in variety of policy areas and political system (p.83). 
These independent variables will result in five stages of development in the 
implementation process. The five stages are: policy output, compliance with policy, 
actual and perceived policy impacts and finally revision of statute. Nixon (1980) 
simplified the implementation process into two stages: the interpretation of the policy 
stage and the response stage. The model of policy implementation process proposed by 
Sabatier and Mazmanian is shown in Diagram 2.3 of this thesis. 
McFarlane (1989) tested the statutory coherence hypothesis which states that 
effective implementation is a function of the extent to which a statute coherently 
structures the implementation process. This hypothesis is derived from the Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's framework for the policy implementation. She used the Federal Family 
Planning Programme (USA). The research confirmed that statutory coherence was a 
powerful predictor of subsequent implementation. The study also confirmed that two 
variables, clear objectives and hierarchical integration, are specially important for 
effective implementation. Implementation also deals with the enforcement of law. 
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Sometimes it seems that certain legislation is being enforced slowly. This is because, 
when the law is created, there is no clear indication of who is responsible for enforcing 
it. To ensure programme success, it must be based on strong staffing, assertive 
leadership, and stringently enforced rules. Inadequate enforcement or lax individuals 
are the only reasons for unsuccessful implementation. 
Diagram 2.3: FLOW DIAGRAM OF mE VARIABLES INVOLVED IN mE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
1. Availability of valid technical theory and technology 
2. Diversity of target-group behavior 
3. Target group as a percentage of the population 
4. 
1. Clear and consistent objectives 
2. Incorporation of adequate causal theory 
3. Financial resources 
4. Hierarchical integration with and among 
implementing institutions 
S. Decision-rules of implementing agencies 
6. Recruitment of implementing official 
outsiders 
Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980, p.S42) 
1. Socio-economic conditions and technology 
2. Media attention to the problem 
3. Public support 
4. Attitudes and resources of constituency 
groups 
S. Support from sovereigns 
6. Commitment and leadership skill of 
implementing officials 
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Policy implementation is said to comprise measures by public and private 
individuals or groups that affect the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy 
decision. It is a study of the processes of putting policy statements into public services 
through federal, state, and local administrative agencies. Policy implementation 
determines whether those public services were delivered as they were intended, and 
whether changes in programme structure and operation mandated by statute occur. It 
focuses on question of ' what happen?' and 'why did it happen that way?' 
Policy implementation studies are concerned with output and less concerned 
with outcome. It is an attempt to identify the condition under which an intended output 
may be achieved. Implementation studies attempt to evaluate agencies capacities to 
deliver output. It is less concerned with evaluation of the policy itself (Dunsire, 1978: 
p.18). 
Lengthy Process, Delays and Inter-Organisational Relationships 
Pressman & Wildavsky's case study of EDA in Oakland pointed out that the 
project faced implementation problems due to the huge numbers of road-blocks. The 
finding of the study showed that implementation had problems because of the 
innumerable steps involved, wrong theoretical assumptions, multiple agencies rivalries 
and involvement. Innumerable steps suggested that simplicity was much to be desired. 
The fewer the steps, the fewer the chances for disaster. 
Pressman & Wildavsky described the problems of interagencies' relationship, 
such as: sometimes participants may agree on the substantive ends of a proposal but 
still oppose the means for effectuating it. Several reasons explain why this occurred 
such as: 
1. Direct incompatibility with other commitments. (various departments 
competing for scarce resources) 
2. No direct incompatibility, but preference for other programme (the feeling is 
that such programme were not the responsibility of the organisation but should 
be carried by others) 
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3. Simultaneous obligation to other projects agree with the project but have 
projects of their own which should be given priority. 
4. Dependence on others who lack a sense of urgency in the project. 
5. Difference of opinion on leadership and proper organisation. 
6. Legal and procedural differences. 
7. Agreement coupled with lack of power. Lack of resources to carry out such 
programme. 
Pressman and Wildavsky highlighted the sequence of steps that have to be 
taken in order to produce specific outcomes and implied that there should be better and 
shorter way to achieve the same end. But, must be the policy always go wrong because 
of many steps? 
Bardach (1977) studies the complexity of relationship amongst government 
departments and agencies. His study is concerned about programme implementation 
and examines administrative and political obstacles to the achievement of programmes' 
specific goals. This looks into questions concerning public management with a 
sensitivity to organisational and political realities. 
Bardach argues that government institutions do not act in isolation from each 
other, and their behaviour is not independence from the substance of policy they deal 
with. The process of policy making involves a complicated interaction between 
government institutions, actors, and the particular characteristics of substantive policy 
areas (Bardach, 1977; Foreword) 
According to Bardach, the heart of the implementation problem is the 
complexity of intra-departmental relationships, inter-departmental relationships and 
inter-governmental relationships. A single governmental strategy may involve the 
complex and interrelated activities of several levels of governmental bureau and 
agencies, private organisations, professional associations, interest groups and clientele 
population. Intra-departmental relationships involving control and implementation 
issues, are shown by Dunsire's studies to involve " ... a strong ethos obligating others to 
consult the proper quarters and to listen to the office holders advises on matters within 
his jurisdiction." (Dunsire, 197~;p.223). 
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In highlighting several public policies and programmes implemented in the 
USA, Bardach concluded there were three major hazards to subsequent events after 
the formulation of public policy. First; after the policy mandate is agreed to, authorised 
and adopted, there is under achievement of stated objectives (creating jobs for hard-
core unemployed, building new towns, getting teachers to act in different mode.) 
Second, delays in programme implementation and third excessive financial cost 
(Bardach, 1977:p.3). Bardach realised that it was hard to design good policy, harder 
still to formulate them into words and slogans that are pleasing politicians and their 
constituencies, and furthermore unendurably difficult to implement them in a way that 
pleases everyone including the programme's beneficiary or target group (Bardach, 
1977; p.3). He at first believed that implementation problems were serious. 
Surprisingly, Bardach's conclusion was that the most important problems affecting 
public policy are not those of implementation, but the basic political, economic, and 
social theory. Therefore, in the short run, it is essential to invest a great deal of energy 
in designing implement able policies and programmes. Finally, in the long run, it is 
essential to be modest in demands and expectations of government institutions. 
(Bardach, 1977: p.283). Similarly Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p.xvi) agreed that 
faulty implementation arose because aspirations were set too high and asked for too 
much. 
To ensure implementation success, it is appropriate to design policies and 
programmes that withstand social and political pressure during implementation phase. 
Several stresses and strains must be taken into account in designing an implementable 
policy. These are elements that bring adverse affects on the programme-assembly 
process: (1) diversion of resources, (2) deflection of policy goals from the original 
policy mandate, (3) the dilemmas of administration: resistance to explicit, and usually 
institutionalised, efforts to control behaviour administratively, and (4) dissipation of 
personal and political energies in game playing that might otherwise be channelled into 
constructive programmatic action e.g. wastage for too busy defending themselves 
against the manoeuvres by other game players. This results in underperformance and 
delay. (5) Programme assembly process: delay in assembling programme elements and 
delay in reaching collective decisions. (6) Negotiation; by communicating about 
intention and reciprocal expectations. 
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He concludes that the character and degree of many implementation problems 
are inherently unpredictable. The classical symptoms of under perfonnance, delay and 
escalating cost are bound to appear. Some one must be willing and able to set the 
policy back on course. 
Expedited implementation as reported in the strategic petroleum reserve 
programme, can lead to programme failure (Weimer, 1983). The theme of this case is 
that problems can arise if attempts are made to expedite implementation without 
adequate attention to the development of necessary expertise in the face of 
bureaucratic constraints. The analysis of this case employed the evolutionary process 
where four stages have been identified:-
(a.) strategic planning stage: where a general goal is translated into a specific 
plan of execution. 
(b) system design stage: where a detailed planning of programme must be 
completed. 
(c) management control stage: where procedures are developed to ensure the 
system design is carried out in an efficient manner. 
(d) project execution stage: where the plan is actually carried out. 
This is an analysis of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in USA aimed to 
stockpile petroleum of between 150 million to one billion barrels. This target appeared 
to vary from time to time. During Ford administration a goal of 150 million barrels by 
the end of 1978 and 500 million barrels by 1982 was set. Carter re-established a higher 
target of 250 million barrels by end of 1978, 500 million barrels by the end of 1980, 
and one billion barrels by of 1985. By the end of 1980 only about 100 million barrels of 
oil were actually stored in the storage capacity of 250 million barrels. Neither Ford nor 
Carter administration goals were met. Why was the target not met? Weimer identified 
seven sources of implementation failures of each is related to some degree to scarcity 
of resources and inflexibility of expertise. 
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Based upon US defence strategy, the SPR office received a directive to 
accelerate the schedule two years. This acceleration decision was unrealistic in view of 
the weak capability of SPR organisations of personnel and funding. Weimer showed 
that:-
'The acceleration decision is an example of common problem faced by program 
administrators: lack of attention by political decision-makers to limitations in 
managerial resources. Political decision-makers must deal with numerous issues 
and rarely have the time, inclination, or expertise to give serious attention to 
questions of organizational feasibility. The desire for faster results or the 
political necessity of widespread geographic distribution can lead to unrealistic 
program goals, especially for new programs without cost or schedule 
experience." (Weimer, 1983; p.177) 
This programme also suffered planning inadequacies and technical problems, such as 
feasibility studies being completed by inexperienced personnel in the mining and 
petroleum field. Therefore, the feasibility studies had serious deficiencies. Weimer 
suggests lesson to be learnt from an attempt to expedite programme implementation:-
• First, the risks involved in not following the natural progression of the four 
implementation stages; from strategic planning to finally project execution. 
• Second, the importance of giving careful attention to the organisational environment 
of new programmes. 
• Third, external oversight is unlikely to play a constructive role during the early 
stages of implementation when the programme character is largely determined. 
• Finally, the choice of implementing agency. Why were bureaucratic politics allowed 
to become such an important factor in the implementation of the SPR? Why not, the 
White House intervene with the programme? 
Chapter Two: Perspectives on Policy Implementation Studies: A Literature Review 57 
Capability of Government 
Public agencies are often viewed as rule-bound and inflexible bureaucratic 
machines which grind forward regardless of changing problems and circumstances, 
concerned more with their own procedures than with the public they are intended to 
serve (Barret and Fudge, 1981; p.3). Government, whether national, regional or local 
appears to be adept at making statements of intention, but what happens on the ground 
often falls a long way short of the original aspirations. Government either seems unable 
to put its policies into effect as intended, or finds that its interventions and actions have 
unexpected counter-productive outcomes which create new problems. Blame for 
ineffectiveness of government intervention tends to be directed either at those 
responsible for policy-making, for constantly producing the 'wrong policy', or at the 
implementing agencies for being, apparently, unwilling to act (Barret and Fudge, 1981; 
p.3). 
The growing studies in implementation which have chronicled a series of 
mishaps and failures have involved many different implementation efforts. In effect this 
raised the question of whether the government is capable of implementing any policy at 
all (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; p.179). 
A diminishing of faith toward efficacy of public policy and government in 
general has led to a number of slogans such as 'failure of the state', 'governmental 
overload' and 'ungovernability thesis'. The scope of government has increased so 
rapidly that it has produced marginal returns and policy failures. The materials and 
political resources available are insufficient for the tasks assumed within a competitive 
electoral situation. This situation has worsened due to increasing social and economic 
complexity and the increasing interdependence of activities which have resulted in 
policy uncertainties. The state has expanded its policy into areas where its effectiveness 
is low and dependent upon external interest groups. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1983) are pessimistic about the power of government 
to deliver intended programmes' objective. They referred to this phenomenon as a 
'brisis of implementation': because of an inability to translate stated goals into reality. 
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Therefore they emphasise " ... the ability of government to deliver -to implement -the 
specific objectives that are set forth in constitutionally adopted public policies." 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Preface). 
As has been mentioned elsewhere, design is playing a crucial role in effective 
implementation. It is emphasised that the capability to execute implementation as 
intended is related to the choice of implementation design. The government have 
alternatives to the choice of implementers or tools to carty out the policy. The 
literature points out the familiar American model of federal policies implemented by 
state or local authorities. The choice of who implements the policy effects the intended 
outcome. 
Rondinelli et al (1989) have observed contingency planning for innovative 
projects in designing education reforms in developing countries. They elucidate that 
attention should be paid to assessing the capability of public and private organisations 
to implement projects. They use the "contingency" approach which analyses the 
management requirement for project and management capability in order to reduce the 
implementation gap. 
Funding and Resources 
The importance of resources in implementation is obvious as confirmed by 
Van Hom (1979) where it is used as one of the criteria in the framework for the model 
of intergovernmental policy implementation. He states, 
'The importance of resources to any program does not require much 
elaboration: inadequate funds are almost always cited as a reason for the failure 
of implementation efforts. But there are two other aspects of programme 
resources that will also be considered in the analysis ...... , namely, the timing of 
the funds and the size of those funds in relation to the overall budget of the 
community." (Van Horn, 1979; p. 14) 
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Yet, another view asserts that 'it appears that the surest way to avoid intera-
organizational implementation problems is to establish a specific mandate and provide 
sufficient resources ... " (Montjoy·and O'Toole, 1979; p.473) In proposing 'towards a 
theory of policy implementation" they analyse four propositions based on different 
combinations of the variables (a) specificity or vagueness of mandate, and (b) the 
amount of resources provided. They find that effective implementation can be achieved 
if an organisation is provided with a specific mandate and available resources. To the 
contrary, the implementation of policy will be impaired if only a vague mandate is 
issued and any resources are not provided. 
Inadequate resources and funding are highlighted as a hindrance to 
implementation. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) stress the importance of resources and 
funding as one of the preconditions for implementation success. Sufficient resources 
and their availability at every stage of implementation are necessary for a successful 
outcome. Thus, insecurity of resources is hazardous to implementation (Mountjoy and 
O'Toole, 1979). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983; p.23) also realise the significance of 
resources and access to expertise. They explain that money is obviously important for 
any programme. Moreover, theY'argue that an adequate level of funding helps to effect 
policy implementation, but it does not guarantee a decent start. However, Bardach 
(1977) reiterates that one of major hazards to public policy implementation is an 
excessive financial cost. 
Wolman (1981) perceives two important aspects relating to resources: the 
programme funding and staffing. Inadequate programme funding could lead to 
programme failure in three different situations. Firstly, adequate funding is not 
available to meet all objectives but it is sufficient and makes an obvious contribution to 
part of the objectives. Secondly, the funding result has no perceptible impact. In order 
to achieve the objective, a huge amount of funding is required. Finally, with inadequate 
funding objectives can still be achieved, but for a lesser number of recipients than 
intended. 
Thain (1987) stresses that policy implementation requires participation, co-
operation and an inter-organisational relationship because each organisation is holding 
a resource. However no one organisation holds a complete resource; each has to 
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exchange its resources and this leads to power dependence and interdependence among 
actors. 
Several others have studied resources as one of the variables in relation to 
policy implementation. For example, Chase (1979) identifies the availability of 
resources required as one of the basic obstacles to the implementation of the human 
services programme. He further divides resources into four sub-categories: (a) money, 
(b) personnel, (c) space, and (d) supplies of technical equipments. Although a 
programme has been appropriated for funding, a programme manager should also 
consider :-
(1) The limitation on the funds, and 
(2) The availability of additional funds when needed 
Financial legislation and bureaucratic procedures always impose a limitation on the 
way in which funds are appropriated and utilised; for example legislation and 
procedures may limit the utilization of funds in certain geographic areas, within a 
particular financial year, or only for specific purposes after complying with certain 
requirements. This limitation can impair effective implementation. Availability of 
additional funds when required is also an issue that needs considering by the 
programme manager. Chase suggests: 
'Even assuming that the program manager can prove he needs additional 
funding and will spend it competently, whether or not he gets it will nonnally 
depend on a number of factors, including: how much money he will need; the 
general availability of funds; the seriousness of the problem to be addressed; the 
view of the problem by politicians, press, and public over time; and the 
operating agency's capability with the funding resources." (Chase, 1979; pAOl) 
Hambleton highlights 'resources' amongst other variables in analysing the 
growth of a policy planning system. He emphasises that "Resources, and particularly 
financial resources, are central to the policy implementation process." (1983; p.411) 
Hambleton proposes three hypotheses related to these: 
(a) Resources might be expected to promote implementation activities that 
fits the central aims. 
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(b) Availability of resources might be expected to distort implementation 
activity away from the achievement of central aims, and 
( c) The focus of implementation work become the management of 
incremental growth. 
In relation to the first hypothesis, the underlying argument is that implementers at the 
state level conform to federal objectives because they receive a share of resources from 
the central agency. The second hypothesis is taking the bottom-up approach. It argues 
that resources can be utilised by implementers at the local level to further their own 
ends. The underlying assumption to the third hypothesis is that, implementers are busy 
with making urgent decisions and programming the allocation provided. Therefore, 
wider policy considerations ar~ neglected. 
In relation to the resources provided by the central agencles, Hambleton 
stresses that: 
" ... we need to guard against putting too much emphasis on the widely held 
'top down' view that the injection of additional resources will, in itself, speed 
forward the implementation of policy." (Hambleton, 1983; p.412) 
Ingram (1977) questions the basic assumption underlying the use of federal 
grants-in-aid as a tool for implementing federal policies. She argues that the federal 
agency has money, expertise and resources to offer, whilst, the state government 
possesses information and access to Congress. This, cause the undercutting to the 
initial bargaining of the federal agency in the process of bargaining. As a consequence 
the federal's policy objectives are difficult to realised, unless the objectives are shared 
between the two government., 
Despite the importance of resources, implementation can still be carried out 
with determination, investment of time and support by management and councillors. 
This has been shown in a study of budget reform in a rural county's government in 
South Carolina. This county has succeeded in overcoming constraints of inadequate 
staff and financial resources (Massey, 1993). 
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LINKING THE LITERATURE AND THE PROBLEM IN 
QUESTION 
62 
Based on the reVIew of literature above, a number of observations are 
presented. Firstly, implementation studies have attracted major concern in the public 
policy analysis because they are a part of the whole policy process that translates 
policies into actions, outcomes and results, whether as originally intended or otherwise. 
The literature shows that a number of problems are faced during policy implementation 
stage due to unsound theoretical assumption made during the policy formulation stage. 
Furthermore, this problem exists at the end of the policy process as reflected in 'unmet 
goals.' Secondly, to ensure success of policy implementation, several pre-conditions 
must be fulfilled ranging from a clear and structured legislation to consistent resources 
and political support. Thirdly, policy becomes strained and stretched during the 
implementation process due to the complexity of government organisational structures, 
the number of complicated procedures and obstacles. It does not take dramatic actions 
or big events to create an implementation problem. It is just an everyday practice of 
bureaucracy. Fourthly, inter-agency and inter-governmental relationships are areas that 
require special considerations for policy implementation. Finally, policy implementation 
reflects the capability of government to bring about outcomes of public policy. 
Although it is difficult to formulate a good policy, it is more difficult to implement it 
and ever harder still to satisfy everybody. Therefore a reasonable expectation and 
achievable performance must be set during policy formulation (Bardach, 1977). 
Government should make their intentions moderate, recognising that their policies are 
limited and constrained by resources, structure and any unforeseen circumstances. 
The studies of implementation are evidenced in a broader area such as studies 
on air pollution, education, community development, economic development, 
employment and training, housing, welfare and a host of other fields of studies which 
can be found in the implementation literature. A large majority of these studies utilised 
the case studies approach. Although a deep and detailed account of processes are 
provided, still there is a lack of generalisation. Realising this weakness, some scholars 
(e.g. Van Hom and Van Meter, Sabatier and Mazmanian) offer a framework for 
analysis. However, the frameworks are still broad and consist of many variables. Chase 
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(1979) for example, proposes three sets of variables and identifies 15 areas that 
deserve attention and which include 44 more factors for consideration. Why should not 
the study be narrowed down by utilising limited variables but with larger samples? 
Implementation studies may be too complicated for a generalisation, that is why a 
complete and elegant theory of implementation is still not available. 
The studies are also dominated by the American and European policy scenario. 
A broader outlook of policy implementation should be opened up to developing and 
third world countries. This could probably bring some more insights to explain more 
clearly public policy implementation. For example Mahmud (1992) mentions that the 
Malaysian government's is concerned with outputs and the impact of public 
programmes on national growth as well as poverty eradication. The government is 
taking steps to upgrade the planning and implementation capabilities to ensure that 
plans are executed without serious shortfalls. Moreover, Mahmud suggests that in 
order to overcome policy shortfalls governmental processes should be simplified and 
over-centralisation should be reduced. 
In the case ofPLCHP, although several treatments were introduced such as the 
formulation of revolving funds and an increased in allocations, still the bureaucratic 
routine caused delays, lengthy processes and difficulties in accessing the funds. This is 
because the programme is operating with the complexities of government organisation. 
In which agencies compete within the government organisational system in order to 
maintain their effectiveness, to justifY their existence and to protect their domain. 
Government organisation becomes more complex because it is further divided into 
several levels of government. These agencies hold specific resources and power. They 
also represent different interests whether reflecting their own specialist functions, 
departmental interests or the nature of their locations (whether federal, state, regional 
or local). Thus, important public policy like "housing for the people" could the victim 
of this "game" of organisational complexity. There must be ways in which the policy 
can be attained effectively through a proper implementation mechanism, process of 
negotiation and coercion. Or there must be an approach to put back the policy on the 
proper track if it is considered failured, an under-performed or been "derailed"? 
Therefore the more complex the government structure and the more numerous the 
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duplicating agencies, the higher the degree of co-operation and co-ordination among 
them is required. 
Where do this study stands? 
Programme implementation is one of the problem areas in the overall public 
policy process on housing in Malaysia. Policy performance, as expressed by the 
intention of providing all Malaysians access to housing, falls shorts of its promise. 
Taking the 'proximate effects,(7) of the difference between the intended target and 
actual number of houses completed indicate this programme is facing an 
'implementation gap'~ This is. also proven by the problems of under utilization of 
allocation and general under-performance. The implementation of this policy through 
intergovernmental and interagency relationships is difficult and demands a high degree 
of co-operation. Since implementation studies are concerned with the achievement of 
intended objectives, they could offer an answer to the phenomenon of the unmet target 
ofPLCHP in Malaysia which is under study. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have tried to understand the topic of public policy 
implementation - the process of putting policy intention into action - the constraints 
and the problems. There are several approaches adopted in examining the topic of 
implementation such as case studies, evaluation, synthesis, framework of analysis, etc. 
Thus, a range of factors has been offered explaining these problems such as: deficiency 
in concept and complexity. of joint action (pressman and Wildavsky, 1973); 
implementation games between agencies (Bardach, 1977); inter-governmental 
complexity (Larson, 1980); various actors and arenas (Nakamura and Smallwood, 
1980); counterintuitive implementation design (Meyers, 1981; p.37-40) multi-actors 
inter-organisational relationships (O'Toole, 1986), and many others. This range of 
factor confirms that implementation problems of public policies which arise because of 
their execution are dependent on a variety of actors and agencies at various levels of 
government. How the interaction and relationships between these actors and amongst 
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agencies are viewed depends upon the approach one is taking, whether the 'top-down' 
or the 'bottom-up'. Although differences exist between the two, both approaches are 
concerned with interactive amongst actors and between agencies. The 'top-down' 
approach starts from a policy decision (e.g. statute) of the government, emphasising 
policy objectives and assessing the relationships between policy makers and 
implementers. In contrast, 'bottom-uppers' start from interaction amongst the 
multitude of actors at the bottom or operational level, putting less emphasis on policy 
objectives but a wider perspective on the consequences of the policy. 'Top-down' 
emphasises on mandate and hierarchy in contrast to 'bottom-uppers' views that 
interaction not only covers mandated agencies and actors, it also operates in 
circumstances without dominant statute and there is no pre-eminent hierarchy amongst 
actors within the policy and outside the policy. The drawback of these two approaches 
is over-emphasising either 'central' or 'local'. 
In this chapter we have also highlighted various definitions of 
'implementation'. despite the~r differences many authors stress that implementation 
encompasses actions or steps in relation to achievement of policy objectives. These 
definitions also emphasise 'initial conditions' and the process required to achieve 
objectives. Therefore putting policy into effect requires co-ordination and management 
of various elements to achieve the desired goal. These definitions highlight the 'top-
down approach' where public policies are made at the top and transmitted downward. 
On the contrary the 'bottom-uppers' argue that policy may start from the responses at 
the bottom and be transmitted upwards. As a result, policies are made at various level 
of governments and can include 'political intention ... formal decision ... government 
circulars, managerial statements, or detailed administrative procedures providing 
'rules' for the carrying out specific task[s]?" (Barret and Fudge, 1981; p. 11). 
However, it can be argued that policy and its objectives may involve two way 
communication between the top-down and bottom-up process . 
.. 
A range of factors affecting policy implementation has also been highlighted. 
These include initial conditions. to the implementation process, lengthy processes and 
delays, problems of inter-organisational relationships, the capability of the government 
to carry out the policy, the availability of resources and funding and many others. The 
understanding of policy implementation studies will bridge the gap between these and 
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the research topic of the implementation of the Public Low-cost Housing Programme 
(pLCHP) in Malaysia. 
Having considered the implementation of policy studies in this chapter, what 
lessons can we learn from this? What is the author's opinion of implementation from 
the literature reviewed? In this concluding section, this author presents his alternative 
perspective and suggests how policy implementation should be interpreted to further 
enhance the policy-action relationship. 
Implementation as Interaction of Agencies and Actors 
The key point in implementation is the process of putting policy into action, 
starting from the process of translating policy decisions into action. This process 
inevitably requires a certain degree of planning, managing and co-ordinating of 
resources, involving agencies and actors in carrying out those actions and going 
through several levels of government. Implementation problems therefore are 
associated with problems caused by 'multiplicity of agency' or 'interagency 
relationship' or interaction amongst actors. Therefore, this study views implementation 
as including two dominant points: (a) actions to achieve policy objectives, and: (b) 
interaction between actors and amongst agencies that affect the achievement of policy 
objective. Concerned with the limitations of taking only one approach of either 'top-
down' or 'bottom up', this study adopted a combination of the two approaches. This 
combination approach is not to impose on entirely new perspective on implementation, 
rather to help to widen the exploration of the understanding of how the process putting 
policy into action can be carried out. The study of the PLCHP is characterised by the 
goal directed top-down's criteria as a measure of programme performance and at the 
same time emphasis is put upon interaction between agencies and actors at various 
levels of government and through out the implementation process, especially the actors 
and agencies at the bottom that affect the programme performance. 
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Goal directed programme implementation 
Some situations in implementation studies are explicitly goal-directed and aims 
at achieving a specific target. In these situations, under-achievement is considered as 
'implementation deficit". For example, in the construction of public low-cost housing 
in Malaysia the programme's clear goal is constructing a pre-determined number of 
houses, within certain time frame and cost limitation and it is aimed at supplying 
houses for lower income groups. The process of decision making to achieve these 
targets involved two-way consultation of 'bottom-up' and 'top down'. Elmore stated 
that this goal-directed policy consists of '~ .. defining a detailed set of objectives that 
accurately reflect the intent of given policy'{l978; p.191}. The success or failure of the 
organisation is judged by observing the discrepancy between the policy declaration and 
subordinate behaviour. However, Elmore further stated that 'Regardless of how well 
organized an agency might be, its ability to implement program successfully depends, 
to some degree, on its ability to influence agencies at other levels of government." 
(Elmore, 1978; p.197). Therefore, the goal directed as one of the 'top-down' criteria is 
utilised in the study of PLCHP, where the programme's output is measured in 
quantity, time and cost. 
Interaction of actors and agencies 
Both approaches, the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' over-emphasise the policy 
implementation whether from the 'bentre" or from the 'local" approach. The bottom-
up approach for example, adopted the view that programme success was the result of 
the skills of local implementation structure in carrying out action, rather than the effect 
of central government officials. This argument is strengthened by the ability of 'local 
actors' to frustrate the 'centre' by deflecting the mandate, using their own discretion, 
leading to the results of policies not being as intended. This is because actors at the 
bottom subscribe to different perspectives about the goal-directed policy objective. 
Policy is not regarded as fixed but more a series of intentions around which bargaining 
takes place and which can be modified as each set of actors attempts to negotiate and 
maximise their own interests and priorities. 
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It is also important to -recognise that action is the product of negotiation and 
compromise as posited by Barret and Hill [(1981) from Ham and Hill, 1993; p.105]. 
They argued that many policies: (a) represent compromises between conflicting values; 
(b) involve compromises with key interests within the implementation structure; ( c) 
compromise with whom implementation will have impact, and; (d) are framed without 
attention given to underlying forces which will undermine them (e.g. economic forces). 
Barret and Fudge (1981) proposed the rational model of the policy action 
relationship - the step involved in putting policy into effect. They used this analysis as a 
basis for understanding the implementation process by (a) multiplicity and complexity 
of linkages; (b) questions of control and co-ordination; and (c) issues of conflict and 
consensus. From this analysis they suggested policy action needs to be considered in a 
political context and as an interactive and negotiative process taking place over time 
between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom it depends 
(1981; p.29). However, it is not clear how negotiation and bargaining will take place 
when the intention is not to amend the content of a policy, only the manner how of 
carrying out the detailed operation. In this situation, implementers need to comply with 
the objective as well as conforming to the rules, to consider the requirements or 
pressure imposed by actors or agencies. 
Barret and Fudge (1981) proposed the implementation process for negotiation 
and bargaining where changes of intention occurred over time. They posited 
implementation as an interactive process whereby the response may in itself influence 
and change policy during the course of implementation. This shift of intention is 
necessary when co-operation or compliance can only be achieved by negotiation and 
bargaining. They proposed to look at the groups of actors involved, the agencies 
within which they operate and other factors. They suggested also looking at the 
combination of roles; not merely the policy makers' and implementers' relationships, 
but also their roles as interested parties affected by the outcome of the policy made and 
implemented by themselves or others. 
What is bargaining power? It includes factors such as: the functions, 
responsibilities and statutory power conferred upon agencies from 'above'; political 
structure and accountability; environmental pressure and constraints - social, 
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economic, physical and political; access to resources-constitutional, legal, hierarchical, 
financial, technological and information (Barret and Fudge, 1981; p.27). 
Therefore this study takes some features from both the top-down and bottom-
up approaches because the study of implementation is concerned with the explanation 
of the result or outcome of the programme. The study seeks explanation for the 
programme's 'under-achievement" which it predicts is associated with some elements 
of pre-condition, process and environment of the policy which was implemented. It 
also looks at the effect of the interaction between agencies and actors across the levels 
of government and at the actors at the bottom. It needs also to re-emphasise that the 
framework must look as well at actors outside the policy arena, whether a hierarchy 
exists or not, as they to a certain extent, may affect the achievement of the policy 
objective. This also suggests a broader perspective looking into different periods of 
implementation and external forces such as inflation, and whether these may have 
significant effect on the programme implementation 
This study examines the programme or detailed actions, assesses it through the 
implementation of projects, rather than assessing the policy. It considers to the 
realisation of programme including the implementation process, a range of agencies 
and various levels of government. The federal government monitors and provides 
funds and other technical assistance (if requested by state). States government in turn, 
provide other resources e.g. land, management and to meet additional funds if these 
are not adequate. They also monitor projects state-wide, implementing agencies, the 
land and district office and contractors who realise the projects and other departments 
where their service and sanction are required. The question is how do these actors and 
agencies react and view the programme? They are more interested to impose their own 
perspective on the programme. 
The government has indicated that in its view the administrative problems 
associated with project implementation stem from the proliferation of government 
organisations which, together with the administrative culture or style of Malaysian 
officials, results in administrative inefficiencies which cause delays in the projects 
(Davies, 1981; p.2S). 
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Thus, there is a need for more attention to be paid to the interaction between 
the subject matter of policy (and thus specific groups and interests likely to be involved 
in or affected by it) and organisational contexts in shaping the scope and limits for 
action. However, since the process can move from various levels of government, 
therefore it involves interdependence between the actors at the centre M well as actors 
at the bottom. 
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Endnotes 
1 See discussion on the changing perceptions of policy implementation from the "classical" 
model of administration to the recent studies of implementation in R.T.Nakamura and 
F.Smallwood,(1980) The Politics of Policy Implementation, St.Martin Press, N.York. Chapter 
1 provides an explanation about assumptions of the classical model of public administration 
to the problem of implementation. 
2.Some authors call Pressman and Wildavsky study on implementation as "seminal work" 
(e.g. Mazmian and Sabatier, 1983; Alexander, 1989,p.451; Ham and Hill,1993; p.5:), while 
others call "landmark work" (Alterman, 1983; p.64),"attention getting, suggestive study" 
(0'Toole,1985; p.181), "occupies center stage" (Bowen, 1982) 
3 On the contrary, although agreed with the rarity of literature on implementation subject as 
central theme with analytical treatment, Dunshire (1978) disputed that this subject was not 
focused before just because it did not have direct title of 'implementation problem'. Dunshire 
pointed out, although rare, there existed literatures related to implementation such as 
implementation of particular law, judgements and decisions, manual on administration which 
contained treatment of implementation process. 
4.Bowen joins Pressman and Wildavsky's argument about multi-actor implementation. 
Pressman and Wildavsky use multiplicative model from probability theory to support their 
point that the 'complexity joint action' leads to the probability of implementation failures. 
However, Bowens engages the probability theory to explain and predict implementation 
success. She proposes four addenda to predict implementation success: persistence, 
packaging of clearances, bandwagons, and policy reduction. The advice to hopeful 
implementers is to be persistent, use multiple implementation scenario, reduction of 
programmes into'tomponents, calculable clearance points, aim at additive probability and 
obtain information about clearance times and bandwagon effect. 
5 In his book 'The Evaluation Enterprise', Meyers stressed on the understanding of societal 
factors in programme evalution. Thus, a good programme evaluation is 'informed by 
substantive social theory.' 
6 In the language of Nakamura and Smallwood's (1980; p.24) 
7 In Van Hom's terminology of the different between the intended output and actual output. 
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72 
This chapter reviews population growth, housing requirements and housing 
construction in Malaysia. This basic information is necessary to understand some of the 
key issues in housing development in Malaysia. The main focus covers population 
growth and housing development between 1970 and 1991. 
POPULATION GROWTH 
In comparison with most Asian countries, Malaysia is a small state with a 
population of less than 18 million in 1991. About 80% lives in Peninsular Malaysia, 
while the remainder lives in East Malaysia. Originally known as Malaya, this country 
gained independence from the British in 1957, where a federation of eleven states formed 
as the Federation of Malaya. Then in 1963, two more states, Sabah and Sarawak in North 
Borneo, joined in the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia 1• The census covering the 
whole of Malaysia began only with the 1921 census. It reported that the population of 
Peninsular Malaysia was 2.9 millions and in Sabah and Sarawak 240,000. In 1931, the 
population of Peninsular Malaysia had increased to 3.79 million and by 1947 to 4.9 
million people. In 1957, the population of Peninsular Malaysia was 6,279,000. Table 3.1 
below provides information on population growth rates between 1901 and 1991. Over the 
period of 90 years between 1901 to 1991, Malaysia gained a net population increase of 
16.31 million, from 1.26 million in 1901 to 17.57 million in 1991. Population grew at an 
average rate of 3.0 per cent per annum over the period. This growth is rated as 
"explosive" growth (Bogue, 1969; p.36): the population doubles every 23 years at this 
1. Besides Sabah and Sarawak. Singapore also on 9.7.63 joined Malaysia. then on 9.8.65 it separated from 
Malaysia. 
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rate. Population increase had been due to high natural increase, immigration, especially 
before 1950, and also as the result of inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia in 
1963. 
Table 3.1: 
POPULATION SIZE AND GROWTH RATE IN MALAYSIA 1901-1991 
Year Peninsular Sabah and Total Annual 
Malaysia Sarawak Growth 
Rate 
1901 1,020,000 240,000 1,260,000 
1911 2,339,000 450,000 2,789,000 8.1% 
1921 2,907,000 550,000 3,457,000 2.2% 
1931 3,788,000 650,000 4,438,000 2.5% 
1947 4,908,000 870,000 5,778,000 1.6% 
1957 6,279,000 1,100,000 7,379,000 2.5% 
1970 8,809,557 1,629,873 10,439,430 2.7% 
1980 10,944,844 2,191,265 13,136,109 2.3% 
1991 14,127,556 3,439,426 17,566,982 2.6% 
Sources 
1. Malaysia, 1964; p.37. 
2. Malaysia, 1991a; p.2S and 26. 
3. Asmah Ahmad, 1994; p.30. 
In the 1991 the population of Malaysia was 17,566,982 people, of which 
14,127,556 (80%) were in West Malaysia and 3,439,426 (20%) in East Malaysia. The 
census indicates that the three most populated states were Selangor (2,289,236), lohor 
(2,074,297) and Perak (1,880,016). While PerIis, being the smallest state in Malaysia had 
a lesser population of only 184,070 and the Federal Territory of Labuan with 54,307 
people. 1 Table 3.2 provides information on the distribution of population in Malaysia 
according to states during the 1970, 1980 and 1991 censuses. 
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Table 3.2: 
POPULATION OF MALAYSIA ACCORDING TO STATES 1970, 1980 AND 1991 
State 1970 1980 1991 
lahar 1,277,180 1,580,423 2,074,297 
Kedah 954,947 1,077,815 1,304,800 
Kelantan 684,738 859,270 1,181,680 
Melaka 404,125 446,769 504,502 
Negeri Sembilan 481,563 551,442 691,150 
Pahang 504,945 768,801 1,036,724 
Perak 1,569,139 1,743,655 1,880,016 
Perl is 121,062 144,782 184,070 
Pulau Pinang 776,124 900,772 1,065,075 
Sabah 636,431 929,299 1,736,902 
Sarawak 976,269 1,235,553 1,648,217 
Selangor 982,090 1,426,250 2,289,236 
Trengganu 405,368 525,255 770,931 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur 648,276 919,610 1,145,075 
- Labuan 17,173 26,413 54,307 
Total 10,439,430 13,136,109 17,566,982 
Adjusted for under- 10,811,547 13,745,241 
enumeration 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p.2S. 
Between the 1971 and 1991 censuses there was an increase of more than seven 
million people. In 1970 Malaysia had a population of 10,811,547, which by 1980 had 
increased to 13,745,241. The average annual population growth between 1970 and 1980 
was at the rate of 2.3% per annum, while between 1980 and 1991 the growth increased 
slightly to 2.64% per annum. The average annual population growth varied between 
states and between the censuses. Table 3.3 provides information on the annual growth 
rate by state between the 1970 and 1980, and 1980 and 1991 censuses. During 1980-
1991, states which experienced high annual population growth rates were Sabah at 5.69% 
per annum and Selangor at 4.30% per annum. These two states, were also amongst the 
highest growing states during 1970-1980, with rates of 3.79% and 3.73% respectively. 
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Pahang and Kuala Lumpur experienced a decline in the rate of population growth during 
1980-1991, when compared with the previous 1970-1980 period. 
Table 3.3: 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE BY STATE 1970-1980 AND 1980-1991 
State 1970·1980 1980·1991 
Johor 2.13 2.47 
Kedah 1.21 1.74 
Kelantan 2.27 2.90 
Melaka 1.00 1.10 
N.Sembilan 1.35 2.05 
Pahang 4.20 2.75 
Perak 1.05 0.68 
Perl is 1.79 2.18 
Pulau Pinang 1.49 1.52 
Sabah 3.79 5.69 
Sarawak 2.36 2.62 
Selangor 3.73 4.30 
Trengganu 2.59 3.49 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur 3.50 1.99 
- Labuan 4.31 6.55 
Average: Malaysia 2.30 2.64 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a, p.26 
Information on population, the number of occupied houses and the average 
number of persons per household between 1921 and 1991 is shown in Table 3.4. It shows 
that, as the population increased, the number of houses and number of persons per 
household also increased. The number of household per house was usually larger than 1, 
because of extended families. For a period of almost 50 years between 1921 and 1970 the 
number of occupied houses almost doubled. In 1921 there were 624,928 occupied houses, 
compared to 1,447,640 in 1970. In 1970 there were more than 1.4 million occupied 
houses. Then by 1980 there were an additional 915,811 occupied houses with a total 
2,363,451 in 1980. Between 1980 and 1991 there was an increase of more than one 
million occupied houses, bringing the total number of houses to 3,447,597. This indicates 
that, between 1970 and 1991, there was an increase of two million occupied houses at the 
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rate of about one million per decade. In contrast, the population increased in that period 
by about three to four millions per decade. 
Table 3.4 also shows that the number of persons per household increased from 4.8 
in 1931 to 5.22 in 1980 then decreased to 4.91 in 1991. Two reasons were associated with 
the decreased of household size in Malaysia: (a) the effect of family planning, and (b) the 
change of lifestyle and education level where an increasing proportion of women worked 
than previously. 
Table 3.4: 
POPULATION, OCCUPIED HOUSES AND HOUSEHOLD DENSITY 1921-1991 
Year Population Occupied Persons Number of Person Per 
Houses Per House Households Household 
1921 3,457,000 624,928* 4.7* n.a n.a 
1931 4,438,000 688,421* 5.5* n.a 4.8* 
1947 5,778,000 847,579* 5.8* 1,076,608* 5.2* 
1970 10,439,430 1,463,790* 6.0* 1,570,000* 5.21* 
1980 13,136,109 2,363,451 5.6 2,116,295 5.22 
1991 17,566,982 3,447,597 5.1 3,580,016 4.91 
1. * figures for Peninsular Malaysia only (excluding East Malaysia because information was not 
available) . 
2. During 1921 and 1931 censuses, information was coIlected on number of occupied houses 
without information on the number of household (Malaysia, 1964; p.49). 
Sources 
1. Malaysia, 1964; p.49 
2. Ramesh Chander, 1979; p.6 
3. Malaysia, 1991 a; p.30. 
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Population Density 
In 1991 Kuala Lumpur still maintained its position as the most densely populated 
area in Malaysia. In 1991 the density was 4,712 persons per square kilometre. In contrast 
to the last two censuses, the population density in Kuala Lumpur was 2,668 persons per 
square kilometre in 1970. By 1980 it had increased to 3,784 persons per square kilometre. 
This confirms that Kuala Lumpur was experiencing a continuing rapid urbanisation 
process. The next is Pulau Pinang with 1,033 persons per square kilometre. It has 
continued to be the second most densely populated and urbanised states since 1970. On 
the other hand the least densely populated states are Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia, 
and Pahang in West Malaysia. Table 3.5 provides information on population density by 
state in 1970, 1980 and 1991 censuses. 
Table 3.5: 
AREA AND POPULATION DENSITY ACCORDING TO STATE 
1970, 1980 AND 1991 
State Area (sq.km) 1970 1980 1991 
Density/ Density/ Density/ 
Sq.km Sq.km Sq.km 
Iohor 18,986 67 83 109 
Kedah 9,426 101 114 138 
Kelantan 14,943 46 58 79 
Melaka 1,650 245 271 306 
N.Sembilan 6,643 72 83 104 
Pahang 35.965 14 21 29 
Perak 21,005 75 83 90 
Perl is 795 152 182 232 
Pulau Pinang 1,031 753 874 1,033 
Sabah 73,620 9 13 24 
Sarawak 124,449 8 10 13 
Selangor 7,956 123 179 288 
Trengganu 12,955 31 41 60 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur 243 2,668 3,784 4,712 
- Labuan 91 189 290 597 
Total 329,758 32 40 53 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p. 29. 
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In 1991 the population density is 53 persons per square kilometre, increase from 
the previous two censuses of 32 persons in 1970 and 40 persons in 1980. The overall 
population density according to the region in 1991 indicates that Peninsular Malaysia had 
99 persons per square kilometre, which was higher than the national average. Sabah and 
Sarawak maintained a lower figure. It is projected that by the year 2020, Peninsular 
Malaysia will have a density of 102. Therefore, the population pressure will be greater in 
Peninsular Malaysia than in East Malaysia. 
During the 1991 census the average number of persons per household was 4.91. In 
1991 , Kuala Lumpur had the lowest household size of 4.65, while the highest household 
size is Trengganu with 5.30 persons per household, Melaka was the highest in 1980 with 
5.51 persons per household and Sarawak was the highest in the 1970 census with 5.98 
persons per household. 
Table 3.6: 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE ACCORDING TO STATES 1970, 1980 AND 1991 
State/ Year 1970 1980 1991 
Johor 5.95 5.50 4.87 
Kedah 5.16 5.00 4.78 
Kelantan 4.71 4.83 5.08 
Melaka 5.92 5.51 4.92 
N.Sembilan 5.59 5.24 4.78 
Pahang 5.13 5.08 4.94 
Perak 5.62 5.23 4.70 
Perl is 4.81 4.52 4.59 
Pulau Pinang 5.77 5.48 4.99 
Sabah 5.26 5.37 5.15 
Sarawak 5.98 5.45 4.97 
Selangor 5.75 5.33 4.90 
Trengganu 4.74 4.89 5.30 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur (a)* 4.87 4.65 
- Labuan (b)** 5.54 5.03 
Total 5.21 5.22 4.91 
N2ru.i. 
(a)* The Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur formed in 1974, was part of the state of Selangor. 
Data for the household size for the Kuala Lumpur has been included in Selangor. 
(b)** The Federal Territory of Labuan formed in 1984, was part of the state of Sabah. Data for 
the household size was included in Sabah. 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p. 31. 
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HOUSING STOCKS 1970-1991 
Housing Stock in 1991 
The "Population and Housing Census in Malaysia" uses the term "living quarters" 
which generally refers to housing. The census defines living quarters as II ... a place which 
is structurally separate and independent and is meant/or living" (Malaysia, 1992; p.20). 
This means that a living quarter includes any structure built for the purpose of living and 
any structure not built for living, but converted or used for living at the time of the 
census. 
In 1991 there were 4,091,790 living quarters of which 3,447,597 (84%) were 
occupied, while 644,139 (16%) were unoccupied. The 3,447,597 occupied living quarters 
accommodated 3,580,016 households. This implies that the number of households per 
living quarter was still more than one household (1.04). 
Selangor had the biggest number of living quarters (537,422 units) followed by 
Johor (503,222 units). But Johor has the highest absolute number of unoccupied living 
quarters (92,822 units) while the next is SeJangor (82,577 units). The two states that have 
the highest occupancy percentage are Perlis (89%) and Pulau Pinang (88%). While the 
two states that have the highest percentage of vacancy rate are Negeri Sembilan (21%) 
and Johor (18%). The high percentage of unoccupied houses was because of temporarily 
vacant or just being completed while waiting for occupation. The high percentage of 
vacant houses (21%) in Negeri Sembilan was largely located in the rural areas where 
owners temporarily migrated to large urban centres seeking better incomes. The 
following Table 3.7 provides detailed information on the numbers of living quarters and 
their occupancy by states in 1991. 
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Table 3.7: 
NUMBER OF LIVING QUARTERS, OCCUPIED AND VACANT BY STATES, 1991 
State/ Year Total Houses Number of Number of Percentage of 
Occupied Vacant Occupied 
lohor 503,222 410,400 92,822 81.6% 
Kedah 321,439 268,915 52,524 83.7% 
Kelantan 264,780 228,443 36,337 86.3% 
Melaka 120,604 100,053 20,551 83% 
N.Sembilan 179,596 141,942 37,654 79% 
Pahang 243,236 204,192 39,044 83.9% 
Perak 471,370 388,793 82,577 82.5% 
Perl is 44,544 39,663 4,881 89% 
Pulau Pinang 228,711 200,089 28,622 87.5% 
Sabah 369,515 314,517 54,998 85.1% 
Sarawak 365,359 315,957 49,402 86.5% 
Selangor 537,422 450,489 86,933 83.8% 
Trengganu 165,219 142,798 22,421 86.4% 
Federal 
Territory 
Kuala Lumpur 265,487 231,365 34,122 87.1% 
Labuan 11,286 9,981 1,305 88.4% 
Total 4,091,790 3,447,597 644,193 84.3% 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p.3l. 
Housing Stock in 1970 
The 1970 census concentrated on housing data collection in West Malaysia and 
was confined only to the major towns in East Malaysia. In 1970 there were about 1.6 
million private living quarters in West Malaysia of which 1,463,790 (90%) were occupied 
and 182,440 (10%) were vacant. Large numbers of living quarters were located in rural 
areas (76%) while urban areas shared a smaller proportion (24%). The percentages of 
vacant houses2 over the total houses in urban areas were 8% while in rural areas were 
10%. Table 3.8 shows housing stock in 1970 and their distribution according to 
occupancy and states. 
In 1970 there were about 1.57 million private households who occupied 1.45 
million houses. This implies that several households lived in one house. The average 
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number of households per living quarter was 1.08. It was reported that about 425,000 
households or 27% were in urban areas, whereas the balance about 1.14 million 
households or 73% were in rural areas. The average number of persons in urban living 
quarters was 7.1 persons, while in rural areas with lesser people, the average was 5.1 
persons. The national average for number of persons per living quarter was 6.1. This 
implies that in general, a larger number of people lived in rural areas. 
Table 3.8: 
NUMBER OF HOUSES, OCCUPIED AND VACANT BY STATES 1970 
State/ Year Total Houses Number of Number of Percentage 
Occupied Vacant of 
Houses Houses Occupied 
Houses 
lohor 217,392 197,786 19,606 90.1% 
Kedah 196,889 177,668 19,221 90.2% 
Kelantan 151,301 138,562 12,739 91.6% 
Melaka 68,886 62,183 6,703 90.3% 
N.Sembilan 92,869 80,450 12,419 86.6% 
Pahang 103,890 89,308 14,582 86% 
Perak 274,908 248,493 26,415 90.4% 
Peri is 26,461 24,727 1,734 93.5% 
Pulau Pinang 123,405 112,187 11,218 90.9% 
Sabah (a)* (a)* (a)* 
Sarawak (a)* (a)* (a)* 
Selangor 278,291 250,741 27,550 90.1% 
Trengganu 91,938 81,685 10,253 88.9% 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur (b)* (b)* 
- Labuan (a)* (a)* 
Total 1,626,230 1,463,790 182,440 90% 
~ 
(a)* The actual number of houses in Sabah and Sarawak was not available because the 1970 
census was confined only to major towns in Sabah and Sarawak. 
(b)** The Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur was formed in 1974, was part of the state of 
Selangor. Data for the household size was included in Selangor. 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p 31. 
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Housing Stocks in 1980 
Table 3.9 provides information on the number of houses in the census of 1980 and 
its distribution according to states. In 1980 there were 2,632,561 living quarters in 
Malaysia. Out of that total, 2,363,451 or 89.8% were occupied while the other 10.2% 
were reported vacant. In West Malaysia there were 2,313,440 living quarters that 
represented 84% of the total living quarters in Malaysia. Comparing with the 1970 
census, there was an increase of 687,440 units of living quarters. Over the period of ten 
years, the annual increase in living quarters were about 68,700 units per annum. 
Table 3.9: 
NUMBER OF HOUSES, OCCUPIED AND VACANT BY STATES 1980 
State/ Year Total Houses Number of Number of Percentag 
Occupied Vacant e of 
Houses Houses Occupied 
Houses 
lohar 306,410 273,061 33,349 89.1% 
Kedah 234,253 211,803 22,450 90.4% 
Kelantan 188,579 173,111 15,468 91.8% 
Melaka 87,269 77,000 10,269 88.2% 
N.Sembilan 122,352 102,643 19,709 83.9% 
Pahang 166,890 144,460 22,430 86.6% 
Perak 344,013 312,557 31,456 90.9% 
Peri is 33,605 31,339 2,266 93.3% 
Pulau Pinang 156,624 144,339 12,285 92.2% 
Sabah 182,046 160,977 21,069 88.4% 
Sarawak 231,537 211,784 19,753 91.5% 
Selangor 285,294 254,232 31,062 89.1% 
Trengganu 118,374 104,827 13,547 88.6% 
Federal Territory 
- Kuala Lumpur 169,776 156,729 13,047 92.3% 
- Labuan 5,539 4,589 950 82.9% 
Total 2,632,561 2,363,451 269,110 89.8 
Source; 
Malaysia, 1991a; p.32. 
The ratio of urban housing over rural housing has revealed an increased share of 
urban housing, while rural housing showed a decrease in its proportion. There were 31 % 
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houses in urban areas and 69% houses in rural areas. The percentage of vacant houses in 
the urban areas remained the same (8%) as in the 1970 census. 
The 1991 census confirms that there were 4,091,790 living quarters of which 
3,447,597 units or 84% were occupied while 644,193 (16%) were vacant. The 1991 
census showed a higher number of unoccupied living quarters as compared to 1980 
census. Out of those more than four millions living quarters surveyed, 3,345,630 units or 
81.8% were located in West Malaysia. The percentage of occupied houses to the total 
number of houses in West Malaysia is 84%. This figure indicates that the percentage of 
occupied houses in West Malaysia has reduced while the percentage of unoccupied 
houses increased. A summary table about the number of houses between 1970 to 1991 is 
presented in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 shows that number of houses and households increased while 
household size and household per house decreased. Between 1970 to 1991, the number of 
occupied houses increased by 1,983,807 while the number of households were increased 
to 2,010,016. Between 1980 and 1991 occupied houses increased by 1,084,146 and 
number of households increased by 1,063,721, thus number of households per house have 
become smaller, from 5.22 to 4.91. 
Table 3.10: 
NUMBER OF HOUSES, OCCUPIED AND VACANT 1970-1991 
Year Total Number of Number of Number of Household Household 
Number of Occupied Vacant Households Size Per House 
Houses Houses Houses 
1970 1,626,230 1,463,790 162,440 1,570,000 5.6 1.07 
1980 2,632,561 2,363,451 269,110 2,516,295 5.22 1.06 
1991 4,091,790 3,447,597 644,193 3,580,016 4.91 1.04 
1970's figures represent only for West Malaysia. The number of persons per household 
size for Malaysia is 5.21. 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991a; p. 30, 31 and 32. 
A high percentage of unoccupied houses does not mean Malaysia has an excessive 
housing stock. These houses were found vacant only during the census enumeration day 
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where about 60% were categorised as temporarily vacant, just completed and waiting for 
occupation. Eight reasons were reported for the unoccupied houses during the census 
which includes: (1) houses which were temporarily vacant, (2) houses for seasonal 
workers, (3) rest houses, (4) houses which were just completed and waiting for sale, 
rental or occupation, (5) houses waiting for repairs, renovation or rebuilding, (6) houses 
unsuitable for habitation and for demolishing, (7) houses which were vacant for other 
reasons, and (8) houses were vacant for unknown reasons. 
POPULATION PROJECTION AND INCOME LEVEL 
The population of Malaysia is projected to reach 33.7 millions by the year 2020. 
In the period of almost 30 years to the year 2020 the population is expected to double that 
of the 1991's. The annual population growth between 1991 to 2000 is projected at 2.23% 
per annum, between 2001 to 2010 it will be at 2.10% per annum, and afterwards it will 
reduce to 1.95% per annum between 2011 to 2020. By the year 2000 the population of 
Malaysia is projected to be about 20.1 millions. This will be an increase of 2.6 millions of 
people over the 1991 population. In 1984, the government proclaimed the long term 
target 70 million population by the year 2100 to be achieved through decelerating the 
decline in the fertility rate. However, it was argued that the country would reach the 70 
million population even before the year 2100 (Asmah Ahmad, 1994; p.35). Table 3.11 
below provides information on population projection between 1991-2020 and 2100. 
Table 3.11: 
POPULATION PROJECTION 1991-2020 AND 2100 
YEAR POPULATION ANNUAL GROWTH RATES 
(%) 
1991 17,567,000 2.36% (1991-1995) 
1995 20,198,800 2.23% (1991-2000) 
2000 22,585,000 2.11 % (2000-2005) 
2005 25,094,000 2.10% (2001-2010) 
2010 27,808,000 1.99% (2010-2015) 
1.95% (2011-2020) 
2015 30,711,700 1.87% (2015-2020) 
2020 33,719,100 
2100 70,000,000 
Source: 
National Population and Family Plannjng Board, Malaysia, 1990. 
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Urban Population: 
The census of 1970 to 1991 showed the trend towards an increasing percentage of 
the total population living in urban areas. In 1980 about 34% of the Malaysian population 
lived in urban areas and in 1991 the percentage had increased to 43%. With the current 
rate of urban development and the aim for a rapid growth in manufacturing in the future, 
urbanisation process will be greater. As a result, a larger proportion of the Malaysian 
population will live in urban areas. The percentage of the total population living in urban 
areas is projected to increase to 51% by the year 2000, then 58% in 2010 and finally a 
further increase to almost 65% by the year 2020. This information is highlighted in Table 
3.12 below. The increased percentage of urban population will cause a higher demand for 
housing in urban areas. 
Table 3.12: 
URBAN POPULATION IN MALAYSIA: 1980-2020 
Year Total Urban Percentage of Urban 
Population Population 
1970 2,530,433 27.0% 
1980 4,492,500 34.2% 
1990 7,720,000 43.0% 
2000 11,653,500 51.2% 
2010 16,239,800 58.4% 
2020 21,845,000 64.8% 
Source: 
1. International Institute for Environment and Development, 1987; p.261. 
2. National Population and Family Planning Board, Malaysia, 1990. 
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Income 
Income gaps imbalances are still wide in terms of and socio-economic and ethnic 
groups as well as between urban and rural areas. Table 3.13 shows that there are increases 
of mean and median income from 1970 to 1984 then decline in 1987. There are also 
differences of income between the urban and rural areas. For example in 1987 the median 
monthly household income for the national figure was M$738.00 and the urban was 
M$1,004 while the rural area was M$629. Table 3.14 exhibits the distribution of 
household income by urban and rural in 1989. This table shows that the median 
household income for urban areas is between M$1,000 and M$1,249, the rural areas 
between M$600 and M$799 while the overall median for Malaysia is between $800 and 
M$999. This mean that in general about 50 percent of the households have income of less 
than M$999. In comparison the average household income for 1990 was M$ ' 1,167 : per 
month. 
Table 3.13: 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME ACCORDING TO URBAN AND RURAL STRATA 
1970-1987 AND 1990 
(in current prices) 
Total Urban Rural 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
(M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) 
1970 264 166 428 265 200 139 
1973 362 227 570 345 269 184 
1976 514 313 830 495 392 262 
1979 693 436 975 600 550 369 
1984 1,095 723 1,541 1,027 824 596 
1987 1,074 738 1,467 1,004 853 629 
1990 1,167 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
n.a.= data not available. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1986; p.211 
2. Malaysia, 1988; p.21 S 
3. Malaysia, 1991b, p.llO. 
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Table 3.14: 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME ACCORDING TO URBAN AND RURAL STRATA 1970-
1987 AND 1990 
(in 1990's constant prices) 
Total Urban Rural 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
(M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) 
1970 682 429 1,106 685 518 359 
1973 874 548 1,377 833 650 444 
1976 877 534 1,416 845 669 447 
1979 1,061 668 1,493 919 842 565 
1984 1,236 816 1,739 1,159 930 673 
1987 1,143 785 1,561 1,068 907 669 
1990 1,167 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
n.a.= data not available. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1986; p.211 
2. Malaysia, 1988; p.21S 
3. Malaysia, 1991b, p.llO. 
Table 3.15: 
DISTRmUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY URBAN AND RURAL STRATA 
1989 
(in current prices) 
INCOME CLASS URBAN RURAL TOTAL CUMULATIVE 
Percent of Percent of Percent of of Total 
Households Households Households Households 
M$299 and below 3.9 12.0 9.4 9.4 
M$300-399 4.1 10.2 8.2 17.6 
M$400-499 5.5 9.4 8.1 25.7 
M$500-599 6.2 9.7 8.6 34.3 
M$600-799 13.3 16.3 15.2 49.5 
M$800-999 11.6 11.5 11.5 61.0 
M$1 ,000-1,249 11.4 9.4 10.0 71.0 
M$1,250-1,499 8.9 6.0 7.0 78.0 
M$l ,500-1 ,999 11.6 6.9 8.5 86.5 
>M$2,000 23.5 8.6 13.5 100 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Source: 
Economic Planning Unit, Household Income Survey, 1989. 
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Table 3.16 exhibits mean monthly household income by state between 1985 and 
1990. In general the mean monthly increased between 1985 and 1990 was increased. Four 
states exhibit higher average incomes than the national average: Pulau Pinang, Sabah, 
Selangor and the Federal territory Kuala Lumpur. Kelantan is considered the poorest state 
with the lowest ratio of household income to the national average. 
Table 3.16: 
MEAN MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY STATE 1985-1990 
1985 Ratio to 1990 Ratio to 
National National 
($) Average ($) Average 
Johor 1,098 0.97 1,220 0.97 
Kedah 690 0.63 860 0.69 
Ke I an tan 625 0.57 726 0.58 
Melaka 1,040 0.95 1,190 0.95 
Negeri Sembilan 1,039 0.95 1,162 0.93 
Pahang 960 0.87 1,092 0.87 
Perak 883 0.80 1,067 0.85 
Perl is 692 0.63 852 0.68 
Pulau Pinang 1,183 1.08 1,375 1.10 
Sabah 1,212 1.10 1,358 1.08 
Sarawak 1,033 0.94 1,199 0.96 
Selangor 1,590 1.45 1,790 1.43 
Trengganu 756 0.69 905 0.72 
Federal Territory- Kuala Lumpur 1,920 1.75 2,102 1.68 
Malaysia 1,098 1,254 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991 b; p.38. 
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TREND IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
Performance in 1970s 
The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) , with the two pronged 
objectives of poverty eradication and restructuring of society in order to correct income 
distribution imbalances in the Malaysian society has shaped public policy on housing. 
During the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), the government held the strong opinion 
that building low cost and public housing was the responsibility of government, because 
the construction of low cost houses did not appeal to private developers (Malaysia, 1971; 
p.257.) Furthermore, it was one of the programmes to realise the NEP. The plan indicated 
that federal government should focus on housing development in Kuala Lumpur, while 
state governments were responsible for implementing housing programmes in each state, 
with financial assistance from the federal government. 
An allocation of federal funds amounting to M$171.9 million was earmarked for 
public housing, while several state governments implemented public housing schemes 
through their State Economic Development Corporations (Malaysia, 1971; p.258). The 
Urban Development Authority, an agency for urban renewal and redevelopment was 
formed in which housing development is one of the programmes. Besides these, the 
government also formed a company to develop housing for public employees. In addition 
the government allocated M$16.5 million for housing lower income workers. Overall, 
during the Second Malaysia Plan almost M$953.7 million was allocated to implement 
various housing programmes by the public sector. This was a quite substantial sum 
amounting to about 10% of the proposed public expenditure during that plan. 
These substantial amounts of funding were allocated because government 
considered that housing the poor was the social responsibility of the government. 
However, the implementation of the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) marked a policy shift 
by the government because it felt that this responsibility should be shared with private 
developers (Malaysia, 1976; p.336). This shift of policy has caused greater intervention 
by government in the housing industry. In achieving NEP objectives the government has 
regulated the policy of imposing the construction of low cost houses on private 
developers. 
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During the seventies there were two five years plans the Second and Third 
Malaysia Plan. During these the public sector constructed 207,586 houses of which 
39,494 or 19% were the public low cost houses (see Table 3.17 and 3.18). 
During 1971-1980 the private sector managed to complete 536,414 houses. The 
private sector's performance was twice as large as that of the public sector. The 1970s 
witnessed rapid housing development due to strong demand for residential houses. 
Finance for mortgages was also available widely, including more relaxed conditions and a 
higher ratio of loans to property value. Housing loans rose by the end of 1971 to $112.2 
million which was nearly three times the level of 1967. In 1973 the approved housing 
loans increased to $360 million (N.Jegatheesan, 1979; pAl). This amount increased 3.2 
times in nominal price but in 1971's constant price equivalent to M$342 million only. 
Table 3.17: 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 1971-1975 
Sector/Programme Number of Houses 
Completed 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Public Low Cost Housing. 13,244 
Housing in land schemes 41,965 
Institutional Quarters 24,240 
Medium and High- price housing 6,627 
Sub-total 86,076 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Private developers 64,862 
Co-operatives 3,585 
Individuals and groups 105,287 
Sub-total 173,734 
TOTAL 259,810 
N2k;. 
The number of houses targetted during 1971-1975 was not available. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1975; p.360. 
2. Malaysia, 1978; p. 212. 
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Table 3.18: 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 1976-1980 
Programme Target Number of Achievement: 
Houses % of target 
Completed 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Public Low Cost 62,200 26,250 42.6 
Land Development schemes 60,000 36,770 61.3 
Institutional Quarters 41,300 20,560 49.8 
Medium & High Cost 57,300 37,930 66.2 
Sub-total 220,800 121,510 55.0 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Private developers 100,000 199,940 199.5 
Co-operati ves 12,000 4,120 34.3 
Individuals/Groups 150,000 159,070 
Sub-total 262,000 362,680 138.4 
TOTAL 482,800 484,190 100.3 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia. 1976; p. 334. 
2. Malaysia. 1981 ; p. 360. 
Housing Development 1981-1990 
For a period of almost ten years (1981-1990), a total of 706,998 houses were built 
and completed, of which 406,070 were completed during the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
(1981-85) and 300,928 were completed during the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990). The 
overall achievement in term of targeted units, was 44% for the 1981-1985 and 43% for 
the 1986-1990 period. However, the percentages of overall achievement of the public 
sector in terms of meeting the targeted units were slightly better than the private sector. 
During 1981-1985 the public sector achieved 51% of its target, compared with 39% of the 
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private sector. Moreover, during 1986-1990 the public sector achieved 65% of its target, 
whereas the private sector achieved only 37%. (See Table 3.19 and 3.20). 
Overall, the public sector's housing performance during the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
was better than the private sector (excluding groups and individuals) in terms of number 
of houses built. This was due to the huge allocation invested by the government in the 
construction sector as well as in housing development. Under the revised Fourth Malaysia 
Plan a total of $4066.48 million was allocated for various public housing programmes 
which represented 8.32% of the total allocation of the said five year plan (Malaysia, 
1984; Appendix A). During the same period, the private sector's performance was 
restricted as the result of higher interest rates, greater difficulty in obtaining bridging 
finance and restrictions imposed on obtaining financing for house buyers (Malaysia, 
1988; p.155) 
During the 1980s there were several government interventions in the housing 
market, aimed at of promoting the market and making housing more accessible to lower 
income groups. In order to promote the housing market, the government made a directive 
to commercial banks and finance companies to finance the mortgage of 50,000 houses 
under the 'Special Housing Loan Scheme.' This scheme extend maximum repayment 
periods to 20 years and an interest rate of 10% per annum for houses costing M$100,000 
and below. Full financing for houses costing M$50,000 and less was available together 
with 90% financing for houses priced at more than M$50,000 (Malaysia, 1984; p.387). In 
an attempt to make housing more affordable to lower income groups, the government 
issued a directive to the private sector in 1982 that the maximum sale price of low cost 
houses should be M$25,000. 
During the first half of the eighties the public performance in housing 
development was very promising. Then in 1983 housing development experienced a 
sudden sharp increase. Overall, the construction sector's share of the of GDP increased to 
5% in 1983, in contrast to 4.3% in 1980 and 4.8% in 1982. A strong demand for housing 
was the probable cause of this increase. The revision of housing loan eligibility and the 
increase in salary among public servants caused strong demand for housing. 
Then in 1984 housing development began to slacken due to high interest rates on 
bridging end financing, long approval processes and weak demand. Weaker demand was 
associated with the high lending rate charged by commercial banks at 12% per annum 
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and more stringent procedures for government servants to apply for a housing loan. This 
was evidenced by the decreased number of houses built in Kuala Lumpur, where the 
major concentration of housing development was. 
The situation worsened between 1985 and early 1988 when the country was 
facing a recession. Housing development slowed down as a result of fewer people having 
sufficient disposable income (Malaysia, 1987a; p.116; Malaysia, 1987b; p.59). In 1986, 
the Special Low Cost Housing Programme (SLCHP) was launched by the government. 
This programme targeted the construction of 80,000 houses per year for three years. This 
was to combat recession and to increase GDP by two percent. This housing programme 
provided incentives to housing developers, such as better treatment by government 
agencies, flexibility in planning requirements and a greater accessibility to financial 
facilities. The maximum sale price of $25,000 was set for this SLCHP. 
SLCHP received encouraging responses from private developers. The programme 
resulted in the construction of 334,600 houses which exceeded the original target of 
240,000 units. However, until 1990 the progress of this programme was unsatisfactory; 
only 83,940 houses or 35% of the target were completed. This slow performance was also 
associated with the problem of "abandoned houses", in which some of the housing 
projects were incomplete and abandoned by housing developers. In 1990, there were 277 
projects categorised as "abandoned housing projects" consisting of 63,650 houses and 
36,130 buyers, with an estimated value of M$3,630 million (Malaysia, 1991; p.367). 
Medium and high cost houses were in less demand between 1985 and 1987 
(Malaysia, 1987a; p.68). Developers were faced with the hurdles of high holding costs 
and cash flow problems which prevented investment in new projects (Sen, 1988; p.15). 
At the beginning of early 1988 the Malaysian economy showed signs of recovery 
(Malaysia, 1988; p.84). This initiated interest in property acquisitions. The construction 
of low and medium cost housing began to improve but high cost housing still seemed 
oversupplied. Later, towards 1990 the housing market seemed to pickup again with a 
stronger housing demand and rapid housing construction (Malaysia 1991c; p.91). 
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Table 3.19: 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 1981-1985 
Programme Number of Number of Percentage of 
Houses Houses Houses 
Targetted Completed Completed 
(1981-1985) 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Public Low Cost 176,500 71,310 40.4% 
Housing in Land Schemes 110,010 34,980 31.8% 
Institutional Quarters 58,500 25,450 43.5% 
Medium & High Cost 53,560 70,160 131% 
Sub-total 398,570 201,900 50.7% 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Low-cost housing 90,000 19,170 21.3% 
Medium and high price 259,470 85,630 33.0% 
housing 
Co-operative societies 25,260 4,570 18.1% 
Individuals and groups 150,000 94,800 63.2% 
Sub-total 524,730 204,170 38.9% 
TOTAL 923,300 406,070 44.0% 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 198~; p.366. 
2. Malaysia, 1986: p. 522. 
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Table 3.20: 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 1986-1990 
Programme Number of Number of Achievement: 
Houses Houses (% of target) 
Targeted Completed 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Public Low Cost 45,800 26,172 57.1% 
Housing in Land Schemes 57,500 32,056 55.8% 
Institutional Quarters 27,000 11,284 41.8% 
Commercial agencies 18,700 22,794 82.0% 
Sub-total 149,00 97,126 65.2% 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Ordinary Low-cost 130,400 4,937 3.8% 
Special Low Cost 240,000 83,940 35.0% 
Medium & High Cost 169,600 107,442 63.4% 
Co-operatives 12.500 7,483 59.9% 
Individuals/Groups n.a. n.a. 
Sub-total 552,500 203,802 36.9% 
TOTAL 701,500 300,928 42.9% 
Source: 
Malaysia, 1991 ; p.365. 
The target for houses to be achieved by the private sector was carried out through 
consultation between MHLG and the Malaysian Housing Developers Association in each 
of the formulation stage of the five year plan. These two bodies come to agreement and 
decided the target to be achieved by the end of the plan. A detailed analysis of the number 
of houses constructed by the public and private sectors shows that, until 1986 the number 
of houses completed by the public sector were greater than those completed by the private 
sector (without taking into account construction by individuals and groups). Nevertheless, 
from the beginning of 1987 until 1990, the number of houses completed by the private 
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sector were greater than the public sector. The latter had shown a major contribution to 
the number of houses built during the first half of the 1980s but this steadily decreased 
towards 1990. 
When comparing the housing sector's performance between the seventies and 
eighties in terms of capability to deliver houses, there seems to be little change. The total 
number of houses built was in the region of 700,000 units. Census figures on the number 
of living quarters show on increase in more than 1.4 million units between 1980 and 
1991. The increase in the number of living quarters, within almost the same period (1981-
1990) was double the number of houses built. This implies that not all housing 
construction is captured by the official statistics of the MHLG, because people 
constructed houses through the informal sector and many other buildings were used for 
accommodation. Furthermore, compilation of data by MHLG began in 1981 through the 
reports submitted by housing developers, but data was not added from the increases of 
houses built by non-developers and located outside the local authority area. Finally, the 
number of houses built between 1970 and 1980 was based on the estimate~3) 
Housing Backlog 
The housing backlog is a problems in Malaysia, because the number of houses 
constructed was lower than the targeted. For example, during 1981-1985 it was estimated 
that 923,300 houses were required. Of these 365,300 units were to cope with the 
population increase, 273,600 units were for replacement and 284,400 units were to cover 
housing backlog (Malaysia, 1981;p.364). However by 1986 only 406,070 units were 
constructed, whereas during 1986 to 1990 out of 835,500 houses required only 300,928 
units were completed (Malaysia, 1986; p.526).This suggested that 534,572 houses were 
unable to be constructed. At present the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) requires the 
construction of a total of 602,723 houses. About 74% of these are due to new demand 
whilst 26% are for replacement and upgrading (Malaysia, 1991;p.375). In general, the 
housing backlog in Malaysia is large and this problem is more acute in terms of low cost 
housing. 
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HOUSING REQUIREMENTS 1976 TO 2000 
Housing requirement is a gross estimate based on the assumption of the normal 
replacement of housing units and new requirement as a result of the formation of new 
households. Table 3.21 below shows housing requirements, units targetted and the 
number of houses built between 1976 and 1990. 
It was estimated that, for the period between 1976 and 1980, about 515,000 
houses were required which consisted of a 68,000 backlog from the Second Malaysia 
Plan, and 447,000 houses for new requirements, replacement and upgrading. Although, 
only 482,800 houses were targeted for that period, 484,190 houses were completed 
(Malaysia, 1981; p.360). The average housing construction covering from 1976 to 1980 
was 96,838 units per annum. 
For 1981-1985, under the Fourth Malaysia Plan a total of 923,300 were required 
of which 284,400 units were to recover backlog, 273,600 units were for replacement and 
upgrading and 365,300 units were for new requirements. This plan had a target of 
923,300 houses. However, at the end of plan only 406,070 were constructed with a 
shortfall of 517,230. The average construction per annum was also decreased to 81,214 
units. 
During the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) a total of 835,000 houses were 
required of which 349,300 units were for new requirements and 486,200 units for 
replacement and upgrading. However, this plan target a lower number of houses than the 
projected requirements of only 701,500 houses. By the end of the plan, only 300,928 
(42.9%) houses were reported as constructed. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995, 
a total of 602,723 houses is projected to be required. A total of 573,000 units is targeted 
to be built by public and private sector, while the remaining 29,723 houses are to be built 
by groups and individuals. 
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Table 3.21: 
PROJECTION OF HOUSING REQUIREMENTS IN MALAYSIA 1980-2000 
Year Total Requirements. 
1976-1980 515,000 
1981-1985 923,300 
1986-1990 835,500 
1991-1995 602,723 
1996-2000 1,114,279 
Sources; 
1. Malaysia, 1976: p.334. 
2 .Malaysia, 1981: p.366 
3. Malaysia, 1986: p.527 
4. Malaysia, 1991: p.376 
Units Targetted 
482,800 
923,300 
701,500 
573,000 
5. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1987. 
Housing Requirements by States 
UnitsComp1eted 
484,190 
406,070 
300,928 
98 
The Ministry of Housing and Local Government has also prepared projection 
housing requirements between 1986 and 2000 with detail requirements for each state and 
selected towns in Malaysia. Table 3.22 below shows the summary of housing 
requirements for each state between 1986 and 1990. 
The table shows that three states have a larger number of housing requirements 
than other states: lohor and Selangor (includes Kuala Lumpur) because of rapid 
development predicted to take place, whereas Sabah because of a high annual growth rate 
of population. Table 3.22 also shows that housing requirements decreased slightly during 
1991 to 1995 because of lower replacements as the result of sound housing stocks. 
However, during 1996 to 2000 housing requirements are predicted to increase. Three 
states Sabah, Sarawak and Selangor are predicted to have a larger number of requirement 
because of rapid development and formation of new households. Whereas, several states 
such as Kedah, Perak and Kelantan will require a larger number of housing replacements 
because more of their houses will be in a deteriorating state. 
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Table 3.22: 
HOUSING REQUIREMENTS BY STATE 1991-2000 
State 1986·1990 1991·1995 1996·2000 
Johor 81,900 59,931 101,793 
Kedah 64,000 41,787 83,060 
Kelantan 58,100 57,721 80,941 
Melaka 17,100 14,572 16,623 
N Sembilan 22,100 22,460 27,128 
Pahang 66,100 36,860 120,784 
Perak 77,500 58,839 93,293 
Perl is 10,300 5,529 12,440 
Pulau Pinang 32,000 20,741 42,162 
Sabah 107,400 81,448 131,715 
Sarawak 75,000 73,974 132,190 
Selangor 187,800 100,503 216,363 
Trengganu 36,200 28,358 55,783 
Total 835,500 602,723 1,114,279 
Yearly Average 167,100 120,544 222855 
Estimate for Selangor is also include Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1985:526 
2. Malaysia, 1991:376 
3. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1987 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has surveyed three key topics; population growth, housing 
requirements and housing construction between 1970 and 1991. As described earlier, 
between 1970 and 1991, Malaysia gained population about 7.S million with the growth 
rate more than 2% per annum. This high growth rate predicted to continue until year 
2010, where after that the rate decrease below 2% per annum. Between 1970 and 1991 
also, number of occupied houses increased by two million and number of new households 
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increased by two million. On average occupied houses and new households increased 
about 100,000 per year. 
Housing needs were increasing every year as the population increased and new 
households were formed. Housing backlog occurred because there was a gap between 
housing requirements and the number constructed. This chapter has shown that through 
various five-year plans, housing targets were set after considering housing requirements. 
However in 1980s, the number of houses constructed were lower than the targeted units. 
In general, the number of houses completed by private developers and public agencies 
varied between the five-year plans. Between 1970-1980 private developers constructed 
264,802 houses compare with public agencies' 207,586 houses. Then, in the 1980s 
private developers constructed 301,119 houses compare with a bigger number of 398,219 
by public agencies. Private developers achieved 200% target in 3MP compare with 55% 
by public agencies. Public agencies' target achievement was better than private 
developers in 1980s. During 4MP, private agencies achieved 51% compare with 30% of 
target by private developers. Then in 5MP, public agencies achieved 65% whereas private 
developers was 37%. Thus, these confirmed that both private and public sectors did not 
meet their construction target. This also implies that housing industry is slow in 
responding to housing requirements. 
In 1970 about 73% of the population lived in rural areas, but after that urban 
population showed increasing proportion from 34% in 1980 to 43% in 1991. It is 
predicted that by year 2020, urban population will increase to 65% out 35 million 
population. The proportion of urban population will continue to increase in the future and 
urbanisation process generates competition for urban land. Development pressure will 
also larger in Peninsular Malaysia because 80% of its population (80%) lived in 
Peninsular Malaysia while only 20% lived in the less densely populated in East Malaysia. 
Both public and private sector played an important role in the provision of houses 
between 1970 and 1990. During the first half of 1970s there was a clear distinction of 
responsibility for housing lower income groups was on the government. Change to this 
stance occurred in the mid seventies when private developers were also required to share 
the social obligation of providing houses to lower income groups. 
The public agencies was capable of delivering houses to the public because of the 
backing by the government. In the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) the number of 
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houses built by the public agencies were greater than the private developers. However, 
recession, economic situations and the changed priority in overall government planning 
strategy affected public housing performance, as evidenced during the Fifth Malaysia 
Plan. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Labuan formerly was only one of the districts in Sabah. It was gazetted as a Federal Territory 
in 1984. 
Z Reasons for unoccupied houses are: (1) temporary vacant, (2) housing for seasonal workers (3) 
rest houses (4) Just completed; awaiting for sale or for occupation, (5) houses for renovation or 
repairs, (6) deteriorating, unsafe for habitation and waiting for demolishing, and (7) other 
unknown reasons 
3. Information based on interviews with a number of officers involved in the preparation of five-
year plan documents at MHLG and Economic Planning Unit, also officers involved in 
compilation of housing statistics since 1981. 
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Chapter Four 
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES IN 
MALAYSIA 
Introduction 
The study of housing is complex, where it goes beyond the understanding of 
housing merely as a form of human shelter. Housing relates to broader issues of 
urbanisation, finance, econoniic, legislation, intergovernmental relationships, socio-
politics, social-psychology, pl~ng and public policy, and many other related 
perspectives. Thus, housing is a complex good that requires government intervention to 
ensure that the citizen has minimum living standards, including the provision of decent 
affordable housing. 
This chapter assesses housing problems and the efforts adopted by governments in 
providing houses for lower income groups. The chapter begins with a brief overview of 
major housing problems in the Third World, developing countries and newly industrialised 
countries (NIC). Then the chapter moves to the topic on housing policies in Malaysia and 
aims to highlight some of the pertinent issues and criticisms about housing policies. The 
chapter further focuses on public housing programme for the lower-income groups; an 
effort formulated by the government in achieving the objective of providing accessibility to 
affordable housing for lower income groups in Malaysia. Finally, there is a description of 
programme implementation process of public low-cost housing programme and some of 
the problems and issues which have occurred at various stages of the implementation 
process. 
OVERVIEW OF GENERAL HOUSING PROBLEMS 
The literature on urbanisation of developing and Third World countries considers 
the importance of housing policies when analysing the issue of urban development. This is 
because many cities in the Third World and developing countries are faced with housing 
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shortages. These shortages are the result of rapid population growth and migration of 
rural population to urban centres for economic reasons. Poverty and the gap between 
income and house price impedes the purchasing power of the poor for obtaining decent 
housing (Abrams, 1966; Grimes, 1976). This gap between dwelling costs and income has 
become one of the obstacles to progress in housing. 
Respondin~ to these problems, a range of housing policy approaches have been 
adopted by Third ~ and developing countries governments. In general, these policy 
approaches can be cat~d as: (l~e laissez-faire approach', (2) the alarmist 
approach', (3) the institutional framework approach'; (4) the 'partial approach'; (5) the 
'total approach'; and (6) the 'progressive approach' (Johnstone, 1976). The precise nature 
of these housing policy approaches vary significantly from one country to another and are 
dependent upon factors such as level of development, economic resources, public 
agencies' capability, political ideology and the extent of policy commitment to housing the 
urban poor. The main factors contributed to these housing problems besides urban poverty 
and resources constraints, are added with institutional constraints and implementation 
problems. 
Public Housing 
There are three sources of housing supply for the urban poor in the Third World 
cities: public housing, private housing and popular housing (Drakakis-Smith, 1987; p.85). 
Public housing is one of the main types of low-cost housing, as attempt to answer housing 
needs of the urban poor, which involved government intervention in housing market 
through the provision of low-cost houses to low-income people. This public housing 
adopts a conventional approach in housing construction by the public sector that is legally 
constructed, conforming to building regulations imposed by the local authority, established 
finance and proper arrangements of construction. This approach is justified as inevitable 
because the ~vate seao! in inclined toward~~lore profita~l~ b.ousing ventures for middle 
and high j~~~~ people. This is also necessary in the circumstances where the formal 
housing financing-systemdisinclined lower-income groups but targeted primarily to higher 
income households such as for example in Philippines as analysed by Struyk and Turner 
(1986). 
The success of Singapore' and Hong Kong in implementing their public housing 
programmes proved to be a fine model of urban development in answering the housing 
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needs of lower-income groups. The development of public housing in Singapore is 
implemented by the Public Housing Development Board (HOB) who accommodate 
almost 87% of the urban population. The board was formed and took over from the 
Singapore Improvement Trust in 1960, as an attempt to overcome ineffective legislative 
power, token financial backing and a lack of implementation ability. During its earlier 
years, HDB concentrated on efforts to provide basic housing facilities for slum inhabitants 
in the inner city. After which, the emphasis was on building large scale public housing 
estates and new towns. The location of public housing estates and new towns form parts 
of the comprehensive island land-use master plan. HDB adopted the high-rise public 
housing strategy, redistribution of popUlation to overcome political and racial unrest and 
demolition of slums in the urban fringes. The massive public housing construction also 
stimulated economic growth. The planning strategy adopted by the government is a 
combination of free market economics together with strong centralised control of land 
development (Teo, 1989). Public housing development also functioning a 'spatial re-
organisation' (Wang and Geh, 1987). Factors contributing to the success of this 
programme include impressive economic growth, legislative power of land acquisition held 
by statutory agencies that enabled the smooth implementation of large scale development 
(Wang and Geh, 1987), large scale construction and the advantages of a small city-state 
(Teo, 1989). HDB operated as a single housing authority developed new townships, set 
the standards for housing and new townships rather than SUbjecting their planning to local 
authorities, held persuasive power, and was very committed and influential upon other 
authorities. On the financial side, sound wages, high levels of affordability and utilisation 
of the Central Providence Funds (CPF) have assisted the success of this public housing 
programme. House buyers are ~lowed to withdraw their savings from the CPF towards 
the housing purchase. Monthly instalment is paid in a portion by house buyers and another 
portion by CPF from buyers' contribution (Singapore, 1991; p.91). 
In Hong Kong out of 1.6 million permanent housing stocks, 46% are public 
housing (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1990). On assessing the housing policy in Hong 
Kong, Keung (1985) found that the government's intervention through the building of 
public housing was necessary to overcoming housing problems and meeting the people's 
need. 
Despite the success story of Singapore and Hong Kong, in other parts of 
developing and Third World countries faced with some of the drawback of this public 
housing approach. Although public housing plays an important role for a source of 
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housing supply to the urban poor, this "reactionary policy" removed slums and control 
squatters via relocation to public housing. Many public housing programmes were 
criticised for adopting an "alien policy" because of their use of western planning principles 
and designs: as evidenced by the construction of high-rise public housing, a waste of 
resources on expensive projects designed to impress electorates rather than meet any real 
needs, and influence by the bias values of bureaucrats which alienated lower-income 
groups (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; p.4S, 1987; p.100). This type of housing usually costly 
with a high rental and other incidental costs which beyond the financial capabilities of the 
poor. Eventually, this low-cost housing accommodated middle income families instead, 
who could afford to meet the financial consequences. 
The Non-Conventional Approach 
In other parts of Third.World and developing countries other approaches have 
been adopted such as providing infrastructure services and facilities, maximising 
investment potential of scarce resources, prevent wastage of resources, and organising the 
poor into integral urban development through site and services and slum improvements. 
Contrary to the public housing approach, the popular housing approach such as aided self-
help has been adopted as the response to the shortage of affordable housing for the urban 
poor. The 'popular housing' or 'non-conventional' is an 'informal' housing constructed by 
the poor themselves, illegitimate to a certain extent and sub-standard by established 
building regulations. Popular housing is built outside the formal private and public housing 
production system by owners themselves, often with the assistance of family and mends. 
These uncontrolled settlements grow in size and are sometimes difficult to improve, let 
alone remove (Jogensen, 1977; p.29). That is why spontaneous shelters growing more 
rapidly than public housing. The lack of financial capability many of developing countries 
to overcome this housing problem is because they have given higher priorities to 
investment in industry and agriculture, as these provide economic independence from 
other countries, as well as creat;ng income for local people. This explains why there is a 
lack of planning and housing policy in most developing countries (Jogensen, 1977; p.29). 
Johnstone (1976) views 'laissez-faire approach' of housing policy adopted by some 
developing countries helps the private sector to concentrate on housing development for 
the more profitable middle and high classes. Thus, the urban poor have to fulfil their 
housing need by their own means and through spontaneous development. In these 
circumstances, self help buildings such as sites and services and upgrading of squatters 
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accommodation are the best possible solutions to housing problems, as advocated by 
Turner. 
Impediments to Housing Programme Implementation 
Formal housing programmes faced difficulties because they have to fit within the 
bureaucratic process of various departments of states. Inter-departmental relationships 
have often slowing down programme's performance. Public housing and other housing for 
lower-income groups thus suffers from lengthy delivery process. This problem is 
experienced in many countries, whatever the level of development. In the USA, one writer 
observed that this process takes al long time (Fuerst, 1974; p.187). Another writer 
pointed that housing construction in Egypt was associated with lengthy negotiation 
procedures, lack of political will, inadequate cost recovery, unsuitable site locations, and 
incorrect implementation process (Soliman, 1988). In Cameroon, Njoh (1992) revealed a 
weak institutional capacity for housing policy administration. He asserted that the 
persistence of housing problem in Cameroon is not a lack of resources, but a function of 
institutional constraints. These institutional constraints include; inappropriate inter-
organisational models, unnecessary fragmentation of functions, inadequate inter-
organisational interaction, lack of systematic research, poor urban design practices, and 
high housing standards. These problems are rooted in two factors. First, the adoption of 
western administrative model; and, second the protection of economic and political 
interests, which foster ideological belief. In addition, Njoh (1992b) highlighted the factors 
responsible for institutional impediments on private residential development in Cameroon 
because of: (a) too many agencies or institutional actors; (b) excessive centralisation; (c) 
backward administrative practice; (d) unrealistic official pre-conditions for building 
approvals, and; (e) vague law and bye-laws for building development. He states that the 
process required to obtain land title for the building which involved too many complicated 
steps, and was costly for ordinary people. The urban land system favours towards middle 
class groups. 
The popular sector, especially sites and services and upgrading, have been 
accepted as a better approach because it matches the priorities, needs and ability to pay of 
low income groups. Also, this approach has utilised a limited governmental funding and 
made use of more resources from the participants themselves. However, this popular 
sector has not been encouraged or gained a wider acceptance as an approach to answer 
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the housing needs of low-income groups in Malaysia. A number of reasons are associated 
with this. First, urban land is scarce and expensive; the policy is geared towards 
encouraging higher density land use through the formal sector (Sendut, 1983; p.79; 
MIll...G, 1982). Second, there is resentment by land and local authorities to accept this 
approach. The land authority puts great emphasis on the provision of law which restrains 
it from legalising illegal squatter. Local authorities, on the other hand, are concerned with 
imposing planning and building laws where informal housing construction is viewed as 
non-conformist (Idris, 1993; p.19 - 21). When sites and services were proposed, local 
authorities demanded higher standards of planning, infrastructure and amenities that 
resulted in higher development costs and defeated the aim of low development cost 
(MHLG, 1991a). Third, this popular sector is politically unacceptable as it demonstrates 
the incapacity of the government to provide better and completed houses (Linden. 1991; 
p.223). An extensive study of sites and services was carried out for the government in 
1979. However, the study's recommendations were not accepted by state governments as 
a solution to meet the housing demand of the low-income groups (MFaG, 1979). These 
'uncompleted houses' are politically viewed as inappropriate to the government intention 
of providing complete products and opposes the statements and promises to provide a 
better life for the people (MHLG, 1991b). Finally, the success of its neighbour, Singapore, 
impress Malaysia and led to a belief that a similar approach to a certain extent could be 
emulated. The formation of a National Housing Board was proposed to implement a more 
extensive public low-cost housing programme (MHLG, 1991) and as a mechanism to 
attain housing policy goals for lower income groups (NST, 17.1.1993). These reasons as 
described above explain why the Malaysian government prefer a formal approach to low-
cost housing by being directly involved in the construction through various programmes 
and through joint-venture projects with housing developers, or imposing requirements on 
the private sector building low cost housing. 
HOUSING POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is adopting "house owning democracy", the policy which aims to provide 
all Malaysians access to housing with emphasis on affordable housing for the lower 
income groups. To achieve this objective, the government is emphasising the free market 
by encouraging significant roles for the private sector for conventional housing 
development. The government also undertakes housing development through several 
public housing programmes and by its public corporations and government companies. 
Chapter Four: Public Housing PoliCies and Programmes in Malaysia 108 
Although the housing policy is encouraging free enterprise, a certain degree of control is 
imposed on the housing industry through several regulations, policy directives and 
interventions by government. 
The government has also adopted the policy of not controlling the house price 
except for low cost houses which was fixed at a maximum price ofMS2S,000 since 1982. 
The concept of low-cost houses in Malaysia is loosely defined by the houses with a selling 
price of not more than MS25,000. These houses usually have floor areas of between 45 
and 56 square metres, with two bedrooms and are targeted for lower income groups 'Or 
--MS750.00 per month and less. On the other hand low-medium cost are houses with price 
between MS25,0001 and MS50,000, whereas medium cost houses are with the prices 
between MS50,0001 and MS 1 00,000. All houses with price above MSlOO,OOO are 
categorised as high cost housing (MHLG, 1984).(1) 
'., V 
Private Sector Participation 
The roles of private sector especially private housing developers are significant in 
supplying houses in Malaysia. Between 1971 and 1990, private housing developers had 
built about 566,000 houses. Private housing developers through their association, Housing 
Developers Association of Malaysia (HDAM), have close co-operation with the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government (MHLG). This is in line with the policy of "Malaysia 
Incorporated" that encourages a close co-operation between the private sector and the 
government, aimed at bringing benefits to the people and the nation. The Malaysia's 
Second Outline Perspective Plan also stated an enhancement of the roles of the private 
sector in the national economy and by providing support from the government sector 
(Zain, 1993; p.92). 
The role played by the· private sector since the 1980s was considered as 'the 
primary engine of economic growth' in Malaysia (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991). In relation 
to this, the government emphasised the importance of private housing developers in 
fulfilling the housing targets which were considered as a significant contribution to the 
nation (MHLG, 1983; p.2). Also the success of the low-cost housing targets depended on 
the co-operation provided by the private housing developers (NST, 6.5.1993). 
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In each five-year plan, housing targets for private developers were set after 
consultations between the government and HDAM (HDAM, 1990). The important role of 
the private sector in supplying houses is marked by the increasing targets of houses for 
private developers in the five year plan. The number of houses aimed for 3MP were 
100,000 then in 4MP increased to 349,000, in 5MP further ascending to 540,000 and 
finally in 6MP only 386,400 houses. 
In 1979 a National Consultative Council for Housing (NCCH) was formed. This 
aimed to provide a forum between organisations involved in the housing sector and the 
government. This committee includes representatives from the Housing Developers 
Association of Malaysia (HDAM), Masters Builders Association, Association of Bankers, 
Institute of Engineers and Architects Association on private sector side and the 
government, particularly MHLG and Treasury and several other related ministries and 
agencies. This forum aimed to provide a useful platform for the private sector's 
contribution in public policy relating to the housing industry (MHLG, 1983; p.2). 
Two issues are identified in connection with these private housing developers. 
First, they concentrated mainly··on building medium and high cost housing because this 
segment of housing provides more lucrative profits than low cost housing. Prior to 1980, 
private developers built only a small number of low cost houses. Government intervention 
through various policy measures have compelled private developers to build more low 
cost houses as a part of the requirements for housing development. Between 1981 and 
1990, out of 314,241 houses built by private developers 100,379 (32%) were low cost 
housing (MHLG, 1992; p.9). In 1990, out 95,040 houses sold by private developers 
41,126 (43%) were low-cost houses. This increased number oflow-cost houses by private 
developers was partly contributed to by 83,940 special low-cost houses completed by 
1990. 
Secondly, the private housing developers limited funds forced them to rely on 
bridging finance from banks and financial institutions (Ghazali, 1992; p.6). Bridging 
finance means short term loan facilities to bridge the gap between immediate cash 
requirements and anticipated receipt of funds at a future date while waiting for progress 
payment from house buyers. Records obtained from the MHLG showed that on average 
the paid-up capital of these private housing developing companies were less than 
MSl,OOO,OOO (MHLG, 1990; p.87). Because the amount of funds from private housing 
developers were small, inevitably they had to rely on the bridging financing provided by 
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banks and financial institutions whose imposed interest rates were eventually passed on to 
house buyers. 
Laws and Regulations 
In Malaysia conventional housing development is subject to various laws and 
regulations by federal, state and local governments. The most important is the law relating 
to land which is vested in the states government. Land is a state matter, thus the manner of 
its implementation is dependent upon states. This implies that the success and failure of 
Malaysian housing policy thus lies in the hands of individual state government. Approval 
for housing development is also subject to local authorities. In this respect co-ordination 
of housing policies in Malaysia is subject to the trichotomy of the system of federal, states 
and local government . 
There are 34 laws and regulations in connection with housing development. The 
major laws are National Land Code 1965, Strata Titles Act 1985, Housing Developer's 
Act 1966, Housing Developer's (Control and Licensing) Rules 1970, Town and Country 
Planning Act 1973, and Street, Draining and Building by-law 1974. These laws and 
regulations are related to land matters, planning approvals, building permissions and the 
control of housing developers. This to an extent implies positive and negative aspects. On 
the positive side, the housing sector is being regulated to ensure health and safety in 
compliance with planning and building standards and to safeguard public interests. 
However, on the negative side,-· this can be considered as heavily regulated. In obtaining 
approvals and clearance of these laws and regulations, inevitably developers are dealing 
with government agencies, which may face them with red-tape and bureaucratic delays. 
These regulations are also directly causing increase in house prices (W orId Bank, 1989). 
Housing Developers Licensing. 
A housing developer is required to obtain a license from the Ministry to venture 
into business and the advertisement of house sales must first be approved by the MHLG to 
ensure certain procedures and ethics are followed. Housing Developers (Control and 
Licensing) Act came into effect in Iuly 1970 where the law required any person desirous 
of constructing four or more houses to obtain a license from the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government. For a company, it needed to have a paid up capital of $250,000 
whereas for individuals it was required to deposit M$lOO,OOO with the Controller of 
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Housing. The rules were amended in June 1982 which brought substantive changes 
principally, the adoption of a standard sales and purchase agreement when purchasing 
houses from private developers. Also housing developers were required to obtain a permit 
of advertisement and sale of houses. These rules aimed to impose control and to regulate 
the housing industry and to protect consumers from scrupulous developers. In 1991, there 
were 4,823 registered private developers in Malaysia. In 1990 alone, MHLG approved 
1,134 licenses consisting of 564 new housing developers while the remainder were 
renewal cases (MHLG, 1992). 
Government Interventions 
Intervention is the involvement of government in regulating the housing market 
with specific aims or as a result, of certain circumstances. These are carried out by (a) 
imposing broader national policy into housing sector such as the New Economic Policy, 
(b) imposition of certain requirements through housing development approvals (c) 
regulating the market through housing finance control. 
The New Economic Policy 
New Economic Policy (NEP) was incorporated into the housing programme 
during 2MP where the national housing programme emphasised the overriding objective 
of promoting unity through an integrated multi racial community (Malaysia, 1971; p.2S7). 
Dissatisfaction over economic disparity amongst ethnic groups caused the incident of 
bloody racial riots on May 13, 1969. These brought about a transformation in the policy 
stand adopted by the Malaysian government. In the aftermath of the riots, the government 
undertook a radical reconsideration of economic development policies which aimed for the 
improvement of income levels for all groups in the society and in particular which would 
widen the economic opportunj~i~s for the 'bumiputra' (the indigenous or Malays in 
particular) in the rural and urban areas. The over-riding objective was enhancing national 
unity amongst various ethnic groups, and the government strategy achieving this goal 
incorporated a new economic policy (NEP). The objectives of NEP were "to reduce and 
eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment 
opportunities for all Malaysian, irrespective of race." The second objective was set " ... to 
accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance 
so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. II 
(Malaysia, 1971; p.l). This NEP is applied in all government policy fonnulation and 
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implementation including housing and property ownership. Specifically this NEP involved 
imposition of conditions to hou~~ng development such as:-
• Private developers are required to allocate a quota of at least 30% for of all types of 
residential and non-residential property development for purchase by bumiputras. 
• At least 30% of all unit constructed within projects shall be low-cost houses, to be 
sold at pre-determined maximum price, in the 1970s between M$18,000 to M$20,000 
then starting from 1982 not exceeding M$25,OOO. This is to enable lower income 
groups to afford this price range. The control of sale in some states is closely 
monitored by the states government. 
• To hold all units for sale to bumiputras for a minimum period of six months from the 
date of offer for sale of any project. Exemption from state authority is required to sell 
this units to other non-bumiputra buyers. 
• In addition, special discount, ,of five percent of the house's price is also given to 
bumiputras. 
Through this NEP the government has attempted to achieve housing ownership 
that reflects racial balance. Table 4.1 below provides information of the total number of 
houses sold by private developers to bumiputras and other races between 1976 and 1990. 
The total sales to bumiputras were only 20% and still below the minimum 30% target. 
However, the percentage of sales to bumiputras is increasing from 14.8% in 3MP, to 
33.3% in 4MP and finally 34.2% in 5MP. 
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Table 4.1: 
THE SALES OF HOUSES ACCORDING TO BUMIPUTRA AND OTHER ETHNIC 
GROUPS 1976-1990 
3MP 1976-1980 185,212 27,483 14.8% 157,729 85.2% 
4MP 1981-1985 137,348 45,759 33.3% 91,589 66.7% 
5MP 1986-1990 251,495 86,047 34.2% 165,448 65.8% 
., .... :· Total :..i( . 
Source: 
MHLG, Private Sector Housing Report, 1986. 
MHLG, Housing Bulletin 1981-1988, 1989 and 1990. 
Imposition of additional requirements for development. 
The government also imposed several other conditions for housing development 
such as requesting housing developers to build infrastructure, to build oxidation ponds 
which are to be maintained by developers until such times as they are taken over by 
appropriate authority, to construct certain facilities or in tum to pay contribution fees to 
utility agencies such as for drainage and sewerage, telecommunication, water and 
electricity. These practises were aimed to lessen the burden of public funding as the result 
of private housing development. However, if the standards imposed are higher than 
necessary and becoming over-burdened to housing development, they may cause an 
increase in house prices and discourages ventures into the housing sector. 
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Regulating Through Housing Finance 
In Malaysia housing finance is provided by government and the public sector. The 
government provides loans to: (a) public employees through the Treasury Housing Loan 
Division; (b) state governments to construct public low cost houses which in tum allow 
low-income groups to purchase these houses with the interest rate charged at 5.5% per 
annum, and; ( c) to lower income groups building houses on their own land with the 
maximum loan of MS7,500 from MHLG(l). Housing finance by the private sector is 
provided by: (a) commercial banks; (b) finance companies, and (c) building societies. 
Private sector's financial institutions provide short term loans to housing developers in the 
form of 'bridging finance' and long term loans to house buyers known as 'end financing'. (2) 
Several policy measures' and government actions through housing finance have 
directly and indirectly affected the housing development scenario in Malaysia. Intervention 
and regulation through housing finance have brought positive and negative effects to the 
housing sector. For example in 1980, there was a decision to freeze housing loans aimed 
to curb housing speculation and reduce the spiralling house prices. At the same time this 
policy has slowed down the housing industry because it reduced the number of potential 
house buyers. The government intervened the housing market by re-setting eligibility 
criteria for housing loans from government (the Treasury's housing loan), banks and 
financial institutions. To be eligible for housing loans (a) the applicant must be at least 30 
years old; (b) neither the applicant or his or her spouse should have any previous 
mortgage. This restricted the housing market to a smaller number of buyers all with an age 
of at least 30 years and without any previous mortgage. The government also imposed 
property gain taxes on sales of property within less than five years from the date of 
purchase as an approach to discourage housing speculation. 
In 1970 the government began providing housing loans to public sector employees 
to purchase houses. These loans were at 4% per annum interest rate repayable over 15 
years, as against the 9% interest rate charged by the banks and financial institutions. This 
repayment period was extended to 20 years in 1980. This action by the government 
caused increased demand to purchase houses by public employees that in effect was 
associated with a "property boom" in the 1970s (Sen, 1988). The subsidised housing loans 
for government employees through the Housing Loan Division of the Treasury is one of 
J Between 1981 and 1990, 2,753 loans were provided by MHLG under this programme (MIn..G, 
1992; p.4) 
Chapter Four: Public Housing Policies and Programmes in Malaysia 115 
the contributory factors of the housing boom in the early 1970's and continues to play a 
very significant role in the housing'industry in Malaysia until today. On the contrary, when 
the government continued its imposition of a 'partial freeze' on housing loans in 1982, 
coupled with the rise in interest from 4% to 6% effective from 24th October 1986, it 
dampened the housing market (Malaysia, 1987; p.68). When the government later relaxed 
the restrictions and reduced the rate to 5%, to a certain extent there was evidence of an 
increase in housing demand (Bank Negara, 1991; p.150; Sen, 1988; p.17). 
To assist the low-income groups in obtaining housing loans, in December 1976, 
the government directed Employment Provident Funds (EPF) to channel its funds to 
Malaysian Building Society Berhad to disburse housing loans for houses costing below 
MS20,000 at 5.5% interest per annum that would be repayable within 20 years. EPF also 
provides 'partial housing finance', where the government has set a policy allowing 
withdrawal of savings from EPF in line with the objective of promoting house ownership. 
This policy aimed to assist EPF contributors for partial financing in purchasing of houses 
(Dom Karto, 1993; p.57). The government allowed EPF contributors to withdraw their 
savings up to a maximum of MSlO,OOO for the purchase of low-cost houses. Whilst for 
purchasing other types of houses, contributors are allowed to withdraw 45% of their total 
savings or 20% of the house price subject to a maximum of MS20,OOO, whichever is 
lower. 
Until 1993, EPF contributed a significant sum of MSS.44 billion toward the 
provision of 'partial financing' through direct withdrawals and housing loan mortgages 
through the two building societies, Malaysia Building Society Berhad and Borneo Housing 
Mortgage Finance Berhad. Between 1977 and 1990 EPF provided 240,144 withdrawals 
for purchasing low cost houses, another 397,569 withdrawals for other types of houses, 
and also provided mortgages for 8,673 houses. 
In the middle of 1986 the government launched the Special Low Cost Housing 
Programme (SLCHP) which aimed to build 240,000 low-cost houses, over the following 
three years as a measure to b09st the economy and reduce the recession. To encourage 
prospective buyers the government through Bank Negara issued new guidelines for 
housing financing to commercial banks to allow: (a) extending repayment period to a 
maximum of 30 years; (b) lowering the interest rates for bridging finance and end 
financing; (c) standardising all financing documentation, loan evaluation processes and 
procedures; (d) revising and relaxing purchasers eligibility and ability criteria for loan 
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approvals~ ( e) establishing of several standing committees on housing finance both at the 
state and federal levels dealing with all aspects of housing projects particularly referring to 
SLCHP, and; (f) expediting processes of financing for SLCHP both for bridging financing 
and end financing. This policy encouraged private sector venture into low-cost housing 
(Malaysia, 1987(a); p.59). 
In summary, the government intervention in the housing sector through regulating 
and specific actions relating to housing finance has affected the housing development in 
Malaysia. 
PUBLIC SECTOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
The public sector is also involved in the supply of housing through various 
programmes and agencies. The construction of housing by the public sector usually aims 
to provide housing development in tandem with new town development, new frontier 
development and land scheme development, and to provide housing for low income 
people. The public sector's involvement in housing aimed at reaching the low income 
groups and to construct houses in areas that are not lucrative to the private sector (Agus, 
1992). 
Many public corporations and government companies were established as the 
result of the formulation of the NEP which aimed to correct economic imbalance amongst 
ethnic groups. The property boom in 1973-1975 also brought many public agencies 
ventured into housing development, such as the State Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDC), Urban Development Authority (UDA), Council of Trust for 
Indigenous People (MARA), Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) and many others, as an 
approach realising NEP and focused on urban areas. The original emphasis was to supply 
low-cost houses, but later it involved the construction medium and high cost residential 
development or even shop houses. This caused direct competition and overlapping roles 
with the private sector in building houses especially in urban areas. Between 1971 and 
1990 the public sector constructed a total of 506,602 houses through various housing 
programmes. Between 1981 and 1990 public sector constructed 155,663 houses of which 
19,832 (12.7%) were commercial housing built by SEDCs and the Urban Development 
Authority. 
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Shift of Policies in Housing Development 
In general there were major policy changes in housing development. First, there 
was a shift of policy stance in relation to the provision of low-cost houses; from purely the 
public sector to a sharing of responsibility with the private sector through the imposition 
of NEP and technical requirements. Second, there was an emphasis on greater roles of 
private sector and privatisation policy in achieving government objectives. Beginning in 
1986, a number of state governments and private developers carried out joint venture 
projects for low-cost houses. State governments provided land while the private 
developers provided other capital and management to implement the project. To assist the 
joint-venture and privatisation projects, government helped to expedite the approval 
process through a 'one stop agency' which started in 1986. However, these projects also 
faced problems and difficulties in finding suitable sites, obtaining technical expertise, 
fulfilling technical requirements imposed by local authorities, obtaining competence 
contractors, high costing in constructing basic infrastructure, removing squatters and in 
implementing projects which were proposed on ex-mining land. Projects also faced 
difficulties of obtaining end financing for house buyers (Omar, 1993; p.129 and 133). 
Third, the government provided three more special types of funding for low cost housing 
development: (a) funds to revive the abandoned housing projects (FRAHP) formulated in 
June 1990; (b) funds to accelerate construction of low-cost houses (F ACLCH) formulated 
in November 1994, and; (c) the low-cost housing revolving development fund (LCHRDF) 
set up in August 1994. 
In 1991 a fund of MS600 million was allocated aimed at assisting private 
developers and financial institutions to revive abandoned housing projects (Malaysia, 
1992; p.91). Since this scheme was launched, 53 projects with a total of 12,363 houses 
involving 9,885 purchasers have been successfully revived. By the end of 1995 a total of 
82 projects comprising of 25,040 houses were approved to utilise this fund amounting to 
MS286 million. The fund to accelerate construction of low-cost houses (F ACLCH) was 
created to assist low-cost apartments for rental in urban areas. A total fund of M$I,604 
was made for this purpose. On 31.8.1995, a total of 16,484 houses had been approved for 
construction utilising this fund and another 8,451 houses were under construction. Finally 
the low-cost housing revolving development fund (LCHRDF) with an allocation of one 
billion ringgit was set up aimed at supplementing financing for private developers 
construction in low-cost houses (Malaysia, 1995; p.92). 
Chapter Four: Public Housing Policies and Programmes in Malaysia 118 
These changes of policy' stance and the provision of special funding denotes two 
important points: first, the emphasis on housing construction by the private sector, and 
secondly, the emphasis on the construction of low-cost houses for lower income groups. 
CRITICISMS OF HOUSING POLICY 
In general the government should be praised for the number of successes. The 
government has brought private developers into low-cost housing construction through 
intervention and the imposition of certain development requirements. The government also 
stimulated the housing industry through provision of public employees housing loans and 
partial financing through EPF withdrawals. The decision on partial freezing of housing 
loans and imposing property gain tax accomplished its intention of curbing housing 
speculation and price spiralling. The launch of the 'special low-cost housing programme' 
contributed toward the increased number of low-cost houses available for lower-income 
groups. The regulation and intervention of housing industry has protected consumer 
interests. Yet housing policies in Malaysia are not without critics. One criticism is on the 
issue of division of power between federal, states and local authorities where this can be a 
problem area in implementing housing polices. The federal government has to co-ordinate 
policies which must be implemented by 14 state governments and more than 80 local 
authorities. Another criticism is that the government is concerned with the achievement of 
targets which emphasise quantity rather than quality aspects. There are many quality 
aspects to be improved especially concerning low-cost houses. 
Government regulations and impositions of certain standards are partly responsible 
for price increases. It is sometimes difficult to comply with high standards imposed by 
local authorities when building low-cost houses with a maximum allowable selling price of 
M$25,OOO. 
Although there is delineation between different government corporations and also 
with the private sector in housing development, there is competition and an overlap of 
functions in the urban areas. Thus, clearer delineation of functions between private and 
public sector in the urban areas must be formulated. It was criticised that the presence of 
numerous federal agencies who have stakes in housing and simultaneously the existence of 
thirteen states who have power in housing, have shaped the present administrative 
machinery in housing and created a number of constraints in the process of 
implementation. The three constraints are: duplication of activities between these different 
Chapter Four: Public Housing Policies and Programmes in Malaysia 119 
agencies, lack of organisational and functional co-ordination between housing related 
agencies and the tendency for rivalries between agencies (Abu Hassan et al., 1982). 
Iohnstone (1984) criticised the increased roles of state agencies in providing 
houses for the masses because the much of the focus of these agencies was on the high 
and middle-income groups and they failed to supply houses for the need of the lower-
income groups. Johnstone stated that although the government has introduced some 
urgency into the provision of housing especially for the urban poor, the disparity seemed 
to continue to grow because of the ineffective solution and the expansion of the capitalist 
economy which only facilitates the construction of higher cost conventional housing. He 
supported the policy to improve the unconventional housing sector as a means to 
overcome housing demand for the urban poor. 
The government policy on housing developers licensing has been criticised in two 
ways. First, private developers are required to comply with the licensing requirements 
whereas public agencies are exempt because their own acts empower them to venture into 
housing development. Secondly, the housing developer acts and regulations stress only a 
minimum paid-up capital ofM$250,OO without other eligibility criteria to become housing 
developers. The problem of abandoned housing projects has provided a good lesson for 
the quest for more stringent _~~teria to find more capable and reliable developers. 
Improved criteria must be imposed for potential housing developers in order to gain 
confidence from the public. 
The control of prices of low-cost houses and the lower rate of interest on them in 
the short term affect developers and financiers, but these costs eventually are passed on to 
other house purchases where the price is not controlled or even to other sectors of the 
economy. Therefore efforts to co-ordinate the acceptability of not imposing more than the 
necessary standards must be co-ordinated by MHLG. A study by the World Bank found 
that the housing subsidy is large in Malaysia but failed to reduce the price of houses 
because of the regulatory costs, the result of several requirements imposed on housing 
development (World Bank. 1979). It was argued that cost can be reduced if the 
government is willing to review these regulatory impositions. 
The housing policy in Malaysia involved many players. MHLG as a single ministry 
with limited power proved it top l,arge to control housing policies with many states, local 
authorities and other entities. Some of the decisions and guidelines made by :MHLG are 
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sometimes found not to be accepted by other agencies. However, MHLG can playa 
leading role in persuading states and local governments because MHLG is also in charge 
in co-ordination of local government and channelling various annual grants to local 
authorities. MHLG is also in charged of matters relating to planning and fire departments. 
These can to an extent influence states and local governments revising their standards to 
accept a more flexible housing development. Frequently, complaints made by housing 
developers about different standards set by local authorities and 'guidelines' on housing 
programmes set by the ministry were not honoured by local authorities e.g. the reluctance 
to accept reduced standards on a narrow back lane. Housing developers request better 
housing incentives, clearer policy 9n the housing mix of medium and low-cost and review 
of regulations and regulatory practises. 
The Malaysian economy has progressed from a purely dependence upon the 
agricultural and primary sectors to diversification and expansion in manufacturing 
activities during the country's transition into a newly industrialised country. Economic 
growth throughout the 1970s to 1990s and the urbanisation process have caused a strong 
demand for housing. This has been assisted by the availability of mortgage facilities 
provided by the government, banks, financial institutions and building societies. In 
summary three main strands of housing policy in Malaysia can be reflected as follows:-
• The government recognises and encourages the roles of the private sector, especially 
housing developers, in housing development. Their contributions are important 
especially in the attempt to achieve housing targets which are fixed in each five-year 
plan. The roles of these private developers are enhanced by the existing housing 
development system, supported by a well developed formal financing system and the 
system of housing purchase through progress payments. 
• The government regulates and intervenes in the housing market by enforcing the 
provision of laws, regulations and policy directives. Regulating takes place through 
laws related with land, planning, taxation and licensing. Intervention in the market 
takes the fonn of public corporations supplying housing and regulating the housing 
finance. 
• The government participates in housing construction with emphasis on low-cost 
houses for lower-income groups. 
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HOUSING FOR LOWER-INCOME GROUPS 
After reviewing the housing policy in Malaysia, this chapter focuses on housing 
policy for the low-income groups and specifically assessing the public low-cost housing 
programme as one of the public programmes to provide houses for low-income groups in 
urban and rural areas. 
Several policy statements in Malaysia's 'five-year plans' emphasised that the 
government is concerned with the objective, policy and strategy to meet the housing 
needs, of low-income groups. Several efforts have also been made to bring prices within 
the range of low-income people (Malaysia, 1976; p.330). These include the imposition of 
maximum selling prices, a low rate of interest, cross subsidisation in mixed housing 
development, directives to financial institutions to provide loan facilities and many other 
measures. In 1982 the government made a significant policy decision, to limit the selling 
price ofa low-cost house to a m8Ximum price ofMS2S,OOO. Even in 1996 the government 
is still imposing the same maximum price, although under pressure to reconsider its 
decision. 
The low achievement of housing development during the period of the five-year 
plans made the government aware of the nation's inability to meet the demand for, 
particularly low-cost housing. The government acknowledged that " ... so far undertaken 
has not been able to reach the low income masses of the population who are in dire need 
of housing facilities" (Malaysia, 1976; p.33S). Implementation capacity was identified as 
the core of the problem. 
Criticisms of the Housing Policy for Low-Income Groups 
One of the main criticisms made of this policy was the inadequate supply of 
affordable housing to low-income groups as the result of public housing programmes 
failing to meet their pre-determined targets in each of the five year development plans 
(Johnstone, 1983,1984; Agus, 1986, 1986/87, 1989, 1992; Saidi and Yunus, 1991, 
p.1S). Agus (1989, p.l08) rated the public housing programme's perfonnance during the 
various five year plans as ranging from 'deteriorating', and 'very poor' to 'the worst'. 
Johnstone (1976, 1979, 1983, 1984), who carried out extensive studies on urban 
housing policy for the poor in Peninsular Malaysia made the dominant criticisms. He 
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argued that the housing policy and the structure of the housing industry failed to reach 
lower-income groups effectively, because of the nature of housing policy and its support 
for "conventional development". The industry was also highly concentrated into larger 
cities and was catering only for a small portion of the population and controlled by a small 
number of integrated companies' (Johnstone, 1984). The government's policy on housing, 
as it is developed, has supported and facilitated the expansion of the urban economy by 
encouraging construction of higher cost housing and " ... clearing of squatter settlements to 
make way for 'modem' development" (Johnstone, 1983; p. 269). 
Iohnstone (1984) criticised that the complications of housing policy in Peninsular 
Malaysia which has been surrounded by the problem of uneven characteristics of housing 
provision in social and spatial terms. Inadequate housing supply for the lower-income 
group occurred because of large scale housing developers concentrating on more 
profitable ventures building high cost houses in large urban areas. This has resulted in a 
lack of cheap accommodation constructed through the "conventional sector". He argued 
that the overall housing system, economic environment and related legislation had enabled 
capitalists to operate in an opportunist manner. These private developers consisted of a 
few larger private companies, belonging to a diversified interest originating in agriculture 
and mining, and also with considerable foreign equity. They also had connections with 
banks and financial institutions: 'These factors have caused housing disparity in urban 
areas. 
Commenting on how public housing programmes could reach the lowest income 
groups, Johnstone (1984) urged significant cost reduction measures and easier repayment 
terms. Touching on public housing construction, several factors were conducive to cost 
reductions such as land preparation and cost, infrastructure and buildings standards, labour 
and material cost, and the implementation capacity of state authorities. He argued that the 
existent of squatters in urban areas was an approach by the poor to solve their housing 
problems. This is also a manifestation of their inability and unwillingness to pay high costs 
and of the restrictions of the conventional housing market (Johnstone, 1984; p.524). 
Clarity of housing policy is one of the requirements argued by many writers for a 
successful housing programme. In Malaysia, a comprehensive national housing is still in 
preparation. The aim is to gain, a. clear and committed housing policy laid down by the 
federal and state governments. Several writers advocated urgency in preparing and 
adopting a comprehensive housing policy that emphasises housing for lower-income 
Chapter Four: Public Housing Policies and Programmes in Malaysia 123 
people (Alithambi, 1980; Endan, 1984:; Agus, 1986). Fonnulation of a comprehensive 
national housing policy is aimed at overcoming weaknesses in the housing sector. Agus 
(1980) claimed that the existence of many discrepancies in the housing sector was due to a 
lack of comprehensive guidelines for the public and private sectors which resulted in a 
poor and unsatisfactory administration of housing policy. This has also caused several 
misinterpretations of the federal government's housing guidelines by states and local 
authorities. Agus was of the opinion that the implementation problems occurred as a result 
not only of social and economic factors but also of political factors. He asserted the 
urgency of the fonnulation of a comprehensive national housing policy as an approach 
encouraging the low-cost housing implementation by the public and private sectors and 
reaching the right target group (Agus, 1986). The creation of a leading agency at the 
federal level, known as the National Housing Authority, was urged by several authors as 
the proper machinery to implement a public housing policy and programme (Alithambi, 
1979, 1980; Tan, 1982; Agus, 1986, 1992; Goh, 1991). 
Agus (1989) criticised the capability of public agencies in implementing large scale 
housing projects. These weaknesses include administrative incapacity and inefficiency in 
managing the low-cost projects, and the constant intervention of political parties at the 
local level. He viewed the under-achievement of the public housing programme in tenns of 
its failure to achieve pre-determined targets. Reasons for such problems are:-
a) Problems related to land use policies, bUilding codes and planning policies; 
delays in obtaining clearance from land offices and local authorities are the 
common factors blamed..for a project's delay. These delays are a consequence of 
lengthy legal and administrative procedures, conforming to numerous legislations 
and the fact that authorities are overburdened with other responsibilities. 
b) production and construction policies; of public corporations which have to 
operate in the more profitable areas of medium and high cost. Low-cost housing 
construction was neglected and viewed as an unprofitable venture. 
c) management and distribution poliCies,' imposed by the state governments for 
the distribution of houses but lacking in co-ordination and subject to difference 
interpretation, which affect the ability oflower-income groups to own houses. 
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d) financial policies,' the bulk of credit facilities went to middle and high income 
groups. 
Agus concluded that public housing corporations in Malaysia favoured the middle and 
high-income groups. He recommended that, in order to improve the public housing 
achievement, cheap land would be needed to make possible the construction of cheap 
houses, the improvement of the capability and efficiency of approving authorities would be 
required and it would be necessary to increase allocation and better access to credit 
facilities. 
PUBLIC LOW-COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
"Public Low-cost Hou.$'"g Programme" (pLCHP) is a main public housing 
programme amongst several other public housing programmes formulated by the 
government to accomplish the objective of providing affordable housing to lower-income 
groups. This programme is also expected to fulfil the multi-faceted objectives of raising 
occupants to a better living environment, enhancing national unity, providing the 
opportunity to own property, fulfilling housing needs and gaining political support. 
Resettlements of occupants into the public housing schemes provide them with better 
housing and facilities than where they previously lived (Wagelin, 197:8) whether in the 
slum areas or in the rural areas that lacked of potable water, electricity and other facilities. 
The provision of public housing also provides opportunity for owning a house in line with 
the policy of "house owning democracy" (MHLG, 1981; Agus, 1992; p.1). In relation to 
the national unity, the scheme also provides integrity amongst various racial groups 
because the housing allocation was based on the racial composition. The allocation of 
public houses to a certain extent also involved political justification based on ''patron-
client" relationships of occupants in the local political arena (Agus, 1992; p.21; Agus, 
1986) 
PLCHP is a housing programme implemented through an intergovernmental co-
operation and division of responsibility between the federal and states government. Federal 
government acts as a co-ordinator and financier; provides funds in form of loan to states 
government. Whereas states government act as developers, whose borrow money from 
federal and implement the projects. Acting as housing developers for the programme, state 
governments are responsible for planning, implementing and administering the programme. 
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To implement the projects, the states government are assisted by implementing agencies 
that provide technical services. Federal government provides technical assistance to the 
states government through the service of National Housing Department. Houses built 
under this programme are either- for sale or for rent for a number of years with the option 
to buy. The Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) is responsible for co-
ordinating and supervising the programme for the state governments. 
Many of studies conducted on this public housing were directed towards 
arguments concerning technical questions about housing designs and lay-out (Tan 1979; 
Leong, 1979; Gunasilan, 1983; Tan, 1976); cost benefits analysis (Wagelin, 1978); and 
post implementation issues such as housing allocation and satisfaction from the occupants' 
point of view (Sidi, 1991; Yahya, 1993; Mohamad, 1984; Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, 1981, 1982,& 1993), housing distribution (Agus, 1986) and rehousing 
programme (Wagelin, 1970). However, only few people addressed the core issue of the 
difficulty of implementing housing policy for the lower-income groups, including 
Johnstone (1977, 1979, 1983, 1984), Alithambi (1980) and Endan (l984). Alithambi 
(1980) investigated the problem of a gap between policy intention and programme 
implementation. He argued that the ability of the public sector in responding to the 
housing demand was obstructed -by the existence of vague public housing policies, an 
unrealistic production programme, an ineffective organisational leadership and the 
diffusion of the housing efforts by several public institutions. Endan (1984) posited that, 
while the public housing programme made substantial progress, the housing problem is 
tackled in an ad hoc manner, uncoordinated and uncomprehensive. A myriad of public 
housing policies which bear no relationship to one another and cause confusion in the 
housing delivery systems has resulted. He also suggested that the government must be 
prepared for a larger and more effective role in housing to meet the rising expectation of 
the people and to achieve the formulated policy statement on housing for the lower-
income people. The government was also urged to place housing higher on the public 
policy agenda. 
The Malaysian constitution had set out the division of power between the federal 
and state government; in which housing and land are the state's matter. Because housing 
was an important for the welfare of the people, the programme had become a shared 
responsibility between the federal and state governments. Yet, this approach has merits 
and demerits; although the state governments have power over housing matters, the 
independence of the state is wlnerable to the control of funding, the imposition of 
Chapter Four: Public Housing Policies and Programmes in Malaysia 126 
conditions by the federal government, and to political patronage. However, the creation of 
several committees between the two levels of government provided channell for 
negotiation, bargaining and compromising of whatever problems and differences arise 
from the implementation of such public housing policy (Alithambi, 1979). 
According to Alithambi (1980) public housing effort in Peninsular Malaysia was 
still inadequate to meet the demand of newly formed families and low-income urban 
migrants. He perceived the main reasons for the limited performance of public housing 
programme to be the result of iriadequate housing policy, the inexistence for a dynamic 
housing institution to plan for and implement housing programme and the diffusion of 
housing effort over several public institutions. His study showed that housing policy and 
development were disjointed, fragmented and incoherent. The existed wide gaps between 
policies as expressed in five years development plans and the implementation. The 
programme received inadequate funding. The system of projects identification for the 
programme was too politicised, ignoring the declared salient aspect of housing policy. His 
study concluded that a new framework of federal-state participation at policy making and 
project implementation level was required. 
Appraisal to this programme was made by Wagelin (1987) by carrying out an in-
depth study of six public low-cost housing schemes in Kuala Lumpur. He used the 
approach of cost benefit evaluation on the squatter re-housing programme which took into 
account the different impacts of the scheme on ethnic, income differentiated and 
population group. Particular attention was also paid to some social impacts of improved 
housing such an those related to health productivity, crime and inter-ethnic attitude. The 
study showed that one of the impacts of this public housing programme was transforming 
the homogeneous society to a multi-racial one. The cost-benefit appraisal showed that 
only two out of six schemes studied were financially profitable to the government. This 
study addressed both the cost to the producer and the effect on the client. 
Eligibility and Affordability 
The price of houses in Malaysia is rapidly increasing beyond the capability of the 
large majority of the lower income groups. However, this PLCHP is providing a more 
convenient and affordable financial arrangement than other types of low cost houses 
purchasing because the it utilised government funds. During 1970's the low-income 
groups eligible for this programme were defined as those with monthly household income 
Chapter Four: Public Housing PoliCies and Programmes in Malaysia 127 
of less than M$500.00 in Peninsular Malaysia and less than MS700.00 in East Malaysia 
(Malaysia, 1981; p.361). Then, through out the 19805 and 1990s it has been redefined as 
for the people with household incomes between MS400.00 and M$750.00 per month. The 
financial arrangement to purchase a house under this programme is more convenient 
because a purchaser has to pay only a M$143.35 monthly instalments for 30 years and the 
up-front money equivalent to two or three months' instalments. These people usually are 
not qualified to purchase private low cost housing because the available commercial 
financing is for people with a minimum household income ofMS825.00 per month, with 
required instalment of MS275.00 per month and up-front money of about 10% of the 
house price. Application for financing also requires far more stringent credentials. The 
selling price ofPLCHP is normally lower than MS25,OOO because the aim is not to make a 
profit.(3) 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The overall implementation process for the housing production under this 
programme involved participation of federal and state agencies, in conformity with all 
relevant government administrative procedures, subject to planning procedures and 
requirements of local authorities. The process involving initial project planning, acquisition 
of sites, gaining planning permission, obtaining several clearance points from various 
agencies, conforming to legal and administrative requirements and supervision of project 
construction by contractors. As a whole, the process has to undergo four stages:-
(1) The programme preparation and planning stage; involves the process of 
getting the project approval under the 'five year plan', the planning and 
preparation for the project implementation. 
(2) The project reso.urcing stage; involves the budgetary process for annual 
allocation of funds, project funding, and procedures for loan approval and 
withdrawals. 
(3) The construction stage; includes project construction activities from the 
beginning until the completion. 
(4) The completion stage; relates to the process after the completion of 
project construction and occupation by successful house buyers. 
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Preparation and Planning Stage 
In general, a number otWriters is in consensus that delays in obtaining clearance 
for housing development approval was one of the difficulties in Malaysia's housing 
implementation process. This difficulty is associated with lengthy approval process (Sen, 
1988; p.29, World Bank, 1989), administrative delays and bureaucratic red-tapes (Hong, 
1991; p.8; Rachagan, 1992; p.26) where the process went through many steps and a 
number of government agencies (Johnstone, 1983; p.2S6, MHLG, 1986, 1991; HDAM, 
1990). The processes for land conversion and obtaining planning approval were time 
consuming and ranging between three and five years (Teo, 1991; p.27) because there was 
no time limit imposed for this processing of approval (Yin, 1993). 
Although PLCHP is a public programme, it also faced similar difficulties as other 
housing development during the planning and formulation stage. Endan (1984) stated that 
PLCHP had to undergo two stages (a) the formulation stage, and; (b) implementation 
stage. Problems occurred during the formulation stage because the list of proposed 
projects for five-year plan was inadequately prepared. This was associated with two 
factors: the lacked of housing master plan and the project formulation was carried out in a 
tight schedule. To overcome the lacked of master plan, as an alternative, the states had to 
sought assistance from district offices. Districts offices which were handicapped with 
qualified staff in housing matters had to come up with a list of projects proposal. Project 
proposals were also made in a hurry, where some were made without verification on the 
ground. This had resulted that there were some projects occupied by illegal squatters or 
inaccessible to utility supplies. During the implementation stage, projects were plagued 
with many problems such as time consuming to move from preliminary stage to final 
stage, facing with departmental red tapes, delaying in land acquisition and conflicting 
requirement imposed by several departments (Endan, 1984; p.67 to 70). 
This programme also faced a host of other problems at this stage such as 
administrative delays and lengthy process (Agus, 1992; p.1S), incapability of agencies at 
local level to implement public housing projects (MHLG, 1991(a); p.21; Agus, 1992; 
p.24), indecisiveness of the project sites and undetermined about their priority (MHLG, 
1991(b); p.2), land problems (Agus, 1992; p.1S) and problems relating to obtaining 
planning approvals (Agus, 1992; p.18-l9). When analysing factors influencing the 
location, layout and scale of these projects Tan (1979) found out that the 'haphazard 
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location' was due to the absence of overall clear policy worked out by central 
government. The decision on location was based on the availability of land and political 
expediency. Another writer pointed out that the common reason for project delays 
associated with site selection. This occurred because delays in site identification, changed 
of sites after they had been identified and selected for implementation, and; poor or wrong 
choice of sites (Ooi, 1983; p.40). He emphasised that a careful site selection was to be 
made before each five-year plan period began. If this process takes place only at the 
beginning of plan's period, it could resulted in delays of project implementation. 
Moreover, he described that unsuitable sites would caused higher construction cost. 
To overcome problems at this formulation and planning stage it was proposed a 
housing master plan be prepared, so that the state could identified suitable land in advance 
and the state could create its land bank for this programme (End an, 1984; p.69). It was 
also suggested that the programme's planning should be carried out from the very 
beginning with full information about sites, matching financial resources required and 
available, the viability of project, and suitability in relation to socio-cultural factors. To 
achieve successful programme implementation, there was a need for a degree of co-
operation and agreement between the federal and state administrators, to ensure that funds 
are available from federal and site and services available from the state (Tan, 1979). To 
expedite the implementation process, states government were required to expedite the 
land conversion and subdivision process, while local authorities were asked to expedite the 
approval process for lay-out plans and building plans ~G, 1991 (a)~ p.16; Muhammad 
and Loo, 1983; p.18). 
During this planning stage state governments must also appoint a technical agency 
to become implementer for this programme. The state has a choice of to use service of the 
National Housing Department, State Economic Development Corporation, Public Works 
Department, Housing Commission, Local Authorities or any other agencies. These 
implementing agencies play important role to realise the projects. Some states employ a 
single agency to implement housing projects while some states engage several agencies 
(Muhammad and Loo, 1983; p.23). 
Description of problems as highlighted above thus suggests the needs for an 
examination of process involved at this stage. 
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Resourcing Stage 
To enable states government borrow money to finance projects under this 
programme, annual allocation of funds are made to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government (MHLG) for this programme. The ministry decides the projects' estimates 
and their distribution amongst the states. The budgetary process requires scrutiny and 
assessment by the budget examination committee consisting of representatives from 
several federal agencies. The amount of this annual budget depends on the portion of the 
sum allocated for five year plans, the capability and priority of the programme, the 
financial policy decided by the Treasury and also taking into consideration the overall 
economic scenario of the country (MHLG, 1991). Table 4.2 below provides information 
related to funds allocation for public-low cost housing programme under the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government from 1976 to 1990. 
Table 4.2: 
FUNDS ALLOCATION FOR PUBLIC LOW-COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
PROVIDED TO MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY 
REGION, 1976 TO 1990. 
1976-1980 262,947,439 36,369,502 17,473,000 316,789,941 
:·. f981~f985 ·:· 
Source, 
Malaysia (1980-1990) 
States government are the borrowers and they have to apply funding for priority 
projects which they have determined. When applications are received by the MHLG, they 
are assessed by the "Technical Committee of Housing Loan" (TCOHL) whose chaired by 
the ministry's secretary general. Other members consist of several officers in the MHLG 
and representatives from EPU, ICU and the Treasury. The committee then makes 
recommendations to the Treasury (Ooi, 1983; p.38, Mlll...G, 1990; p.6). Project briefs are 
scrutinised, reviewed and assessed in detail based on criteria such as cost estimate, 
financial viability, technical feasibility, designs, location, marketability, etc. Applications 
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for loan are forwarded to the Treasury for further consideration. Loan approval conforms 
to certain internal procedures and, when approved, it is followed by the signing of loan 
agreements between both parties of the federal and state government. Loan disbursement 
to states is made based on the progress of each project. The Treasury will make a final 
decision on the application for loan withdrawal. Loan approval and withdrawal also 
depends on the status of states' arrears and current annuity to the federal government 
(MHLG, 1991a; p.16) The process could be further delayed if negotiations take place 
between federal and state governments to resolve the matter. It sometimes involves 
fundamental financial policies and procedures that require the decision of the National 
Finance Council. 
Two problems were identified in relation to this resourcing stage. First, the process 
to arrive at loan agreement and later for loan withdrawals were lengthy and complicated 
(MIll.G, 1991b; p.8). Second, as the result of this lengthy and complicated financial 
process simultaneously the effect of slow project progress, this programme was unable to 
spent the annual funds at satisfactory level (MHLG, 1991; p.1S) 
Construction Stage 
The construction of the project is carried out by building contractors and the 
selection is made according to government procedures. If there is no major problem arise 
the project is normally completed within 18 months from the date of a tender is awarded. 
Endan (1984; p.71) identified three problems would occur at this stage: (a) when 
contractors unable to complete work within a specified schedule and required extension; 
(b) when contractors abandoned these projects and new contractors had to be appointed, 
and; (c) delays in making payment by government would slowed contractors' work. 
The Completion IOccupancy Stage 
After projects have been completed, certificates of fitness for occupation (CFO) 
must be obtained from the local authority before houses can be legally occupied. The 
issuing CFO is another critical area which caused delay to the whole delivery system of 
this programme (MHLG, 1993;· p.7-21). Utility agencies may impose certain additional 
payment of contribution which was not accounted during the programme budgeting 
(MHLG, 1991b; p.9). Then the subsequent stage is handing over projects to states 
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government who are responsible to manage these projects in terms participants selection, 
rental collections and making loan payment to the federal government. 
Two major problems occurred at this stage identified by Endan (1984; p.71) 
political intervention during the housing allocation to buyers and delays in processing the 
application. As the results there are cases of completed public housing projects were not 
occupied for months or even over.a year because buyers were not selected. MHLG stated 
that these problems occurred because states government were not complying with the 
guidelines provided but inclined towards their own discretion (MHLG, 199Ib; p.10) 
Any project which is unable to be completed within the particular five years period 
it has to be carried forward to the next five-year plan and if the funding is insufficient the 
states have to make applications for additional financing. 
Summary 
There are four main stages involved in implementation of PLCHP from projects 
formulation to completion. The process of programme formulation takes place before the 
beginning of five-year plan. The process involved preparation of projects list by each state 
to the federal government. When these projects approved by federal government, the 
states have to carried out project planning and obtain financing from federal government. 
The subsequent stage is construction of projects and finally the completion stage. Several 
problems occurred during the planning stage because projects were inadequately prepared. 
This implied that poor planning at this stage may contribute to poor achievement at the 
end of the plan. The process involved to reach the completion stage is lengthy and to an 
extent each stage is affected by a number of problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussions have described a brief overview of housing problems in 
the Third World and developing countries and highlighted the policies adopted by these 
countries either the public housing approach or the non-conventional approach. This 
chapter also discussed key issues of housing policies in Malaysia involving both private 
and public sectors emphasising on provision of houses for lower income groups. Finally, 
this chapter focused on the implementation Public Low-Cost Housing Programme by 
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describing the process involved, the problems faced and criticisms made to this 
programme. Based on these discussions important finding are summarised and re-
emphasised as the following paragraphs. 
First, Malaysia prefers public housing and other conventional approach in realising 
its policy statement of providing affordable houses to lower income-groups. To achieve 
this intention the government constructed public housing, carried-out joint venture 
projects with private sector and required private housing developers to build low-cost 
houses as part of the conditions for housing developments. 
Second, the government recognised the significant role played by private housing 
developers. The government adopted free enterprise and support the private sector in the 
housing industry through close co-operation with housing developers association. 
Malaysian government considered private sector as engine of growth for development and 
incorporated the policy that progress achieved by private sector benefits the nation. Since 
private developers inclined towards medium and high cost houses construction because of 
more lucrative profit than low-cost houses, justified intervention by government of 
imposing conditions for housing development approvals. This was also a part of attempt 
to achieve the objective of New Economic Policy of eradicating poverty and restructuring 
the society by providing opportunity for property ownership. 
Third, government intervention in the housing industry was carried out by 
imposing broader national policy such as the New Economic Policy, imposition of 
additional requirements for development approvals and regulating through the housing 
finance. This brought both positive and negative impacts. Housing finance policies such as 
provision of loans for civil servants helped to stimulate the market and withdrawals of 
savings from EPF eased burden"ofhouse purchasing. Government policies in housing had 
significant impact on the housing sector development throughout 1970s to 1990s. These 
policies also brought about negative impacts when over-regulated and excessive 
requirements more than necessary were imposed where these were associated for causes 
responsible for price increases and burdened on housing developers. 
Fourth, implementation of housing policies are dependent upon various level of 
governments involving the states and local authorities and range of other agencies. State 
governments play important roles in realising federal policies on housing because housing 
policies are related to land approvals. Thus, the key issue is co-ordination of federal policy 
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implementation by state governments and local authorities. The review on housing for the 
low-income people confinned tbat the complexity of housing problem for low-income 
people despite the obligation to provide affordable housing, this policy was not adequate 
addressing the problem of answering housing needs. Added with the complexity of 
government structure and many agencies involved, improvements on co-ordination and 
co-operation amongst them are required. 
Fifth, there is a major development of policy on low-cost housing, from purely the 
government responsibility as in early 1970s to a share responsibility with private sector. 
Then, in 1986 Special Low-Cost Housing Programme was launched as an approach to 
stimulate economic growth during recession. In 1994 and 1995 there were efforts of re-
emphasising provision of housing for low-income people in the urban areas where a large 
amount allocation was provided. 
Finally, the Public Low-cost Housing Programme (pLCHP) is still a major public 
housing policy because of its continuity and long established programme involving 
arrangement with state governments. Four stages of the implementation process of this 
PLCHP were identified. This programme was criticised for involving lengthy process and 
many stages. Many problems occurred along the implementation process, especially at 
planning stage. 
To sum up, this author is in opinion that it is important to consider the 'policy 
implementation' perspective in the attempt understanding of the programmes success and 
improvement to public housing policy. Thus, more houses can be produced for those 
needy low-income people for which affordable housing is necessary. 
In the following chapter this author analyses the performance of PLCHP in several 
five-year plans, with main emphasis on three five-year plans between 1976 and 1990. The 
chapter also highlight a brief overview of other housing programmes by the public sector. 
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Endnotes 
l.Th 
e number of houses completed by public sector and private developers between 1981 and 
1990 appeared as in the following table. 
Number of Houses Completed by Private Developers and Public Sector According to Sales 
Price Between 1981 and 1990 
Year 1981-85 Grand 
Total 
Price Public Public 
80,798 74,865 10,315 90,064 
Medium-Cost 46,067 18,598 
High-Cost 5,681 1,441 
.Qni:pa· 
Source: 
MHLG (!992), Bulletin Perumahan 1990; p.9 
The amount of housing credit provided by the public and private sector can be seen in the table 
below. In general the amount of credit provided to the housing sector is showing an increasing 
amount from 1980 to 1990. Treasury Housing Loan shows a significant amount with more than 
30% to the total amount of credit provided. 
Amount of Housing Credit for Mortgages Provided by Public and Private Sector to the 
Housing Sector between 1980 and 1990 
Year Commercial Finance Treasury:: Building Sabah Credit Total Credit Provided 
Banks Companies Government Societies Corporation and 
Loan Bank Rakyat 
1980 $2,233 $620 $1,103 $986 $4,941 
1981 $2,811 $833 $2,094 $1,214 $49 $7,001 
1982 $3498 $1,085 $3,359 $1,450 $77 $9,468.2 
1983 $4,157.5 $1,282.6 $4,230.4 $1,226.2 $139.9 $11,406.9 
1984 $5,129.5 $1,542.8 $5,045.7 $1,740.3 $176.8 $13,635.3 
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1985 $6,306.0 $1,829.0 $6,114.0 $1,906.0 $218.0 $16,373.0 
1986 $7,039.0 $2,076.0 $6,80l.0 $1,944.0 $226.0 $18,086.0 
1987 $7,563.0 $2,265.0 $8,396.0 $1869.0 $269.0 $20,362.0 
1988 $7,712.0 $2,333.0 $8,968.0 $1,75l.0 $291.0 $21,055.0 
1989 $8,143.0 $2,671.0 $9,669.0 $1,635 $318.0 $22,436.0 
1990 $9,587.0 $3,365.0 $10,601.0 $1,610 $340.0 $25,503.0 
Sources: 
Bank Negara Report 1981-1990 
The number ofloans provided for housing mortgages to purchasers between 1986 and 1989 appear 
in the following table. 
Number of Housing Loans Provided by Housing Finance Institutions 
Year Commercial Finance Treasury: Building Total Loan 
Banks Companies Government Societies, Provided 
Loan etc. 
1986 29,334 1O~627 2~,653 1,564 61,178 
1987 38,889 15,295 28,203 1,798 84,185 
1988 39,015 22,123 31,900 6051 9~089 
1989 57,856 30451 29454 4,168 121,929 
Sources: 
Bank Negara Report 1987-1990 
3. The sale of public housing is considered safer from buyers' point of view because they are 
buying houses which have already completed. On the contrary the purchase of low houses from 
private developers is based on progress payments of houses to be constructed. Private sector's 
projects failure known as "abandoned project" is one of serious housing issue and challenge to 
the Malaysian housing development. The purchase of private sector's housing requires a buyer to 
enter into an agreement with housmg developer in advance of housing construction. The buyer has 
also to obtain housing loan from any financial institution. Developers abandoned their housing 
projects due to several reasons such as financial difficulty, poor management and internal 
probl~ litigation and land problems, failure to obtain approval for amendments from authorities 
and many others. The details on abandoned housing projects in Peninsular Malaysia at 31.12.1991 
involved 173 projects of 40,363 houses with 26,129 buyers of estimated value of M$I,918.4 
million. Out this 173 abandoned projects, 88 projects (51 %) cannot be rehabilitated.{Source; 
MHLG,1992) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME IN MALAYSIA 
Introduction 
Until 1995, the government of Malaysia has been implementing six "five-year 
development plans" where housing policies, strategies and programmes are 
incorporated into the plan. Several housing programmes have been formulated and 
translated into the plans. This chapter assesses the performance of the Public Low-
Cost Housing Programme in several five-year development plans with the main 
emphasis on the three 'five year plans' implemented between 1976 and 1990. This 
chapter also discusses problems associated with the achievement of this programme. 
The Public Low Cost Housing Programme (pLCHP) is a public housing 
programme carried out by state governments with loans and technical assistance from 
the federal government. This programme caters for broad categories of low income 
groups in urban and rural areas. Besides PLCHP, the government also formulated 
several public housing programmes include (1) low cost housing construction by state 
economic development corporations, (2) housing by the land and regional development 
authorities, (3) institutional quarters for low income government workers, and (4) a 
special loan scheme for lower income groups to build houses on their own. Meanwhile 
three programmes involve the private sector: (a) the normal low cost housing; (b) 
cross-subsidies imposed on mixed housing development, and; (c) the 'special low cost 
housing programme' launched in 1986. 
PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMMES PERFORMANCE 
In Malaysia, housing supply involves two sources: the public and private 
sector. The public housing programmes encompass supply of houses by the 
government and other public ag~ncies. The public housing programmes under the five 
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year plan are categorised into several programmes and implemented by a number of 
public agencies In addition, the government also provides financial allocations for 
commercial housing to public corporations, such as the state economic development 
corporations and the Urban Development Authority (UDA). 
Under the five year development strategy, these public housing programmes 
are categorised as one components of the 'social services sector. This sector includes 
education, training, health, housing, social development and environment (Malaysia, 
1986; p.271). During the 6MP (1991-1995) for example the 'social services sector 
shared the second largest national allocation (25%) after the economic sector (57%), 
but above the security sector (15%) (Malaysia, 1991; p.62). Despite that, the share of 
public allocation and expenditure on housing out of the total national development, the 
allocation is still considered to be very little (Agus, 1992; p.97; MHLG, 1987). In 'five 
year plans' between 1971 and 19'95, public funds allocated to housing programmes 
have never reached 10 per cent of the total national development allocation. The 
amount of funds allocated by the government for the housing sector ranges from 
merely 3% during the 2MP to 9% during the 5MP and 6MP. 
Table 5.1 below compares the allocation for the 'public low cost housing 
programme' with the total allocation for 'all public housing programmes'. The total 
allocation for all public housing programmes includes funds provided for housing in 
land schemes and new frontiers, institutional quarters and other staff accommodation, 
the state economic development corporations' housing and also funds for the 'public 
low-cost housing programme'. The allocation for the public low cost housing shows an 
increasing share from merely 19% during 2MP to 77% during the 6MP. However, in 
6MP this amount become smaller. This increased share reflects the concern of the 
government to provide housing.for the low-income people that has been proclaimed as 
its policy objective, although the actual amount of allocation has fallen. During the 
4MP, the public low cost housing programme received the largest amount of allocation 
ofMS1,712.22 milIion.(l) During the five year plan revisions, funds were increased and 
also decreased from the original allocation set at the beginning of the plan. Funds were 
increased during the 2MP, 3MP and 4MP but decreased in SMP (due to economic 
recession and some of the projects were transferred to the 'special low cost housing 
programme' which was launched in 1986). 
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Table 5.1: 
ALLOCATION FOR ALL PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMMES AND THE 
PUBLIC LOW COST HOU~ING PROGRAMME IN MALAYSIA, 1971-1995 
Five Year Plan PLCHP 
Original 
Allocation 
(million) 
PLCHP 
Revised 
Allocation 
(million) 
Public Percentage 
Housing PLCHP to 
Programmes Total Public 
Allocation Housing 
(million) Allocation 
3MP (1976-1980) M$480 M$640.09 M$3,195.19 20% 
5MP (1986-1990) M$691.79 M$477.30 M$986.53 48% 
* This 6MP's total allocation for the Public Low Cost Housing Programme also includes 
allocation for sites and services ofM$165 million. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1973; p.213. 
2. Malaysia, 1976; p.333. 
3. Malaysia, 1979; p. 216. 
4. Malaysia, 1981; p. 368. 
5. Malaysia, 1986; p. 530. 
6. Malaysia, 1991; p. 384. 
The achievement of public sector housing programmes was always 
'unsatisfactory' and shortfalls were experienced in every five year plan. The total 
number of houses constructed in each plan was lower than the total number targetted. 
When comparing the performance between other public housing programmes with 'the 
public low cost housing programme', as demonstrated in Table 5.2, the performance of 
"other public housing programmes" was better than the performance of the 'public low-
cost housing programme'. The performance of other public housing programmes 
fluctuated from the high 130%.. in. the 2MP to 65% in 3MP then 59% in 4MP and 
finally 69% in the 5MP. By contrast, the achievement of the "public low cost housing 
programme" was lower, where the achievement ranged from 30% during the 2MP to 
57% during the 5MP. Other public housing programmes achieved better performance 
because these programmes were largely financed through federal grants, where shorter 
procedures involved than through the loan financing. Also in most cases their 
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construction was not subjected to the local authorities' approvals because some of 
these programmes were implemented in the land development schemes and new 
frontier development. Table 5.2 also shows that the highest number of houses 
constructed by the public sector was in the 4MP where 72,308 were constructed by the 
'public low cost housing programme' and 130,600 through other public housing 
programmes. 
Table 5.2: 
TARGET AND COMPLETED: PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
AND OTHER PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMMES IN MALAYSIA, 1971-1995 
Five Year Plan 
::.:. ":: 
Notes: 
PLCHP 
Target 
PLCHP 
Completed 
(%) 
Other 
Public 
Housing 
Programmes 
T 
Other 
Public 
Total 
Number of 
Houses 
Completed 
n.a . = not available. Infonnation related to achievement of 6MP is still not officially available 
during the writing of this thesis. 
1. The number of target and completed houses based on infonnation obtained from various 
Malaysia's 'five-year plan' document as mentioned below. 
2. Although the large proportion of other public housing programmes built low-cost houses, 
these programmes also built a certain percentage of medium and high cost houses. 
3. Out of this 103,200 houses targetted, 27,200 units for medium cost and 200 units for high 
cost houses. 
4. The number of completed houses for the 6MP until May 1995. The actual figure on number 
of completed houses at the end of 6MP is still not available. 
Sources: 
1. Malaysia, 1976; p.332. 
2. Malaysia, 1979; p.212 and 216. 
3. Malaysia, 1984; p.360. 
4. Malaysia, 1986; p.528 
5. Malaysia, 1991; p.384 
6. MHLG, 1995. 
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Low Cost Housing Construction Under Five-Year Plans 
In line with the policy objective of providing affordable housing to lower 
income groups, the government planned to construct low cost housing in each of the 
five year plans. During the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) about 120,600 low cost 
houses were originally planned. This includes 62,100 houses (51%) under the "public 
low cost housing programme" which was implemented through co-operation between 
the federal and state governments.(l) In addition, 33,500 units (28%) were to be 
implemented by the Federal Land Development Authority and also 25,000 houses 
(21 %) were to be implemented by other land and regional development authorities 
(Malaysia, 1976; p.334-335). However, at the end of the plan in 1980, only 55% of 
these houses were completed. 
The achievement of low-cost housing during the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-
1985) was unsatisfactory'. Only 150,900 (37%) low-cost houses were completed out 
of the total 406,100 houses constructed by the public and private sector. Out of this 
total, the public sector completed 72,308 houses under the 'public low cost housing 
programme', 35,000 houses for settlers in the land schemes, 25,400 institutional 
quarters, whereas the private sector only completed 19,200 houses. The contribution 
of private housing developers to the target of low-cost housing during the plan was 
"very poor" because it represented only 21% out of the total 90,000 houses targetted. 
This implied that the private sector housing construction was inclined to medium and 
high priced housing which returned more lucrative profits. Even the public sector 
housing, under the state economic development corporations, built 70,016 medium and 
high priced houses, which exceeded their original target of 53,560 houses (Malaysia, 
1986; p.522). 
During the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990), a bigger target oflow cost houses 
was set. A total of 495,000 low-cost houses was aimed at which consisted of 120,900 
houses (24%) by the public sector(2) and 374,100 houses by the private sector. This 
represented about 70.6% ofthe total 701,500 houses targetted for the plan. Similarly 
1. This PLCHP originally targetted to built 62,100 houses for the 3MP. When detailed proposal 
of projects finally approved by the federal government, 65,168 houses were targetted. Then 
during the revision of3MP in 1978, this target was increased to 73,506 houses. 
:z This 120,900 unit consist of 45,800 by the PLCHP and another 75,100 houses from other 
public housing programmes. See also Table 5.2 where under "Other Public Housing 
Programmes" a total of 103,200 was set as a target of which 27,900 houses were for medium 
cost and 200 units high cost institutional quarters. 
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as with previous plans, the achievement of this low cost housing was still 
'unsatisfactory', where only 164,396 houses (33%) were completed by the end of 1990. 
Out of the total 164,396 low-cost houses built, the public sector completed 74,332 
houses (45%) and the private sector completed 90,064 houses (55%). Despite the 
'unsatisfactory' performance of previous plans, the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) 
targetted the building of 343,800 low-cost houses (60%) out of the total target of 
573,000 houses. This was to be constructed by the public sector of 126,800 houses 
(37%) and by the private sector of217,OOO houses (Malaysia, 1991; p.365). 
THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME 
Construction of low-cost houses under the Public Low Cost Housing 
Programme (pLCHP) involves the co-operation between federal and state 
governments. Federal government provides loans to state governments to finance this 
programme. State governments responsible to construct houses and technical 
assistance provided by either the National Housing Department, the State Economic 
Development Corporations, the, Public Works Department or any other agencies 
appointed by the state. 
This programme began in 1951 where the first scheme completed in 1953, 
consisted of 120 houses at Air Panas, Setapak near Kuala Lumpur (Housing Trust, 
1967; p.30). Until 1995, a total of 182,533 "public low-cost houses" had been 
constructed under the PLCHP which accommodated close to one million people.(3) 
Table 5.3. shows the number of houses constructed under this programme from 1953 
to 1995. The number of houses built in various five-year plans between 1956 and 1991 
were varied, ranging from 2,983 to 72,308. 
Table 5.4 shows the performance of this programme for 1956-1995, that 
includes the amount of allocation, expenditure, houses targetted, the number of houses 
completed and carried over to the next plan under several five year development plans. 
This table shows three important points: (a) the funds utilised were lower than the 
amount of allocation provided" and their percentage varied between plan; (b) the 
number of houses completed were lower than the houses targetted; ( c) a certain 
number of houses were carried over to the next plan, ranging from 13% to 61%. 
3. Based on the estimate that average density was 5.6 person per house and discounting about 
5% of the stocks were vacant or inhabitable (MHLG, 1993). 
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Table 5.3: 
NUMBER OF PUBLIC LOW-COST HOUSES CONSTRUCTED 1953-1995 
Planning Period Year Number of Rouses 
Built 
, 
311 
" 
1953-1955 ,.;;:::::.,.: 
First Malaya Plan 1956-1960 2,983 
Second Malaya Plan 
:: 1961-1965 :/, 8,400 
First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970 22,522 
1971-1975 
.:.: ,,:: 
Second Malaysia Plan :., .• 13,244 
Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 26,250 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 
", '" 
,72,308 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990 26,172 
Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995 ' :',' ,10,343 :' .. , 
Total 182,533 
1. Official ' Five-year development plan' in Malaysia only began in 1956 known as the First 
Malaya Plan (1956-1960) 
2. ;::;: not available 
Sources: 
l. Malaysia, 1967; p.27 to 33. 
2. Malaysia, 1976; p.332. 
3. Malaysia, 1979; p.212 and 216. 
4. Malaysia, 1984; p.360. 
5. Malaysia, 1991; p.384. 
6. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1995. 
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Table 5.4: 
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME UNDER 
"FIVE YEAR PLANS" 1956-1995 
>Plan Period . Funds 
. ~-:. .:.: :.:. 
:;::. 
Al.!ocated .· 
(i!lillion) 
...... 
1966-1970 M$188.1 
1971-1975 M$234.0 
1976-1980 M$640.1 
·\i1981-198~·· 
1986-1990 M$691 .8 
1990-1995** M$735.,0 .::.: 
Notes: 
n.ft. = not available 
... :. ,':>t· 
M$99.8 
(53%) 
M$~h . 
(3~.~) :···. 
$441.6 
M$345.0 
35,000 
73,500 
45,800 
22,522 
26,250 
.. /:: 
26,172 
,::-' " 
n.a. 
"14581 .... :: ", ~ . ',', .:.: 
(30~) 
44,670 
(61 
19,628 
• This column shows the number of houses that were not completed during the five-year plan 
and carried over their completion in the next plan. 
Ail This represents the progressed achieved until June 1994. 
Sources: 
1. NJegatbeesan, 1979: p.26 
2. Malaysia, 1967; p.332 
3. Malaysia, 1971; p.258 
4. Malaysia. 1981; p.360 
5. Malaysia, 1986; p.522, 528. 530 
6. Malaysia, 1991; p.365. 384 
7. Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 1995 
Table 5.5 provides analysis on target and financial shortfalls of the programme 
between 1966 to 1990. The percentage of target shortfalls ranged between 36% to 
72%. The percentage of financial shortfall amongst the plans varied between 3% to 
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61 %. This table shows that target shortfalls were bigger than financial shortfalls, 
where a large percentage of allocation was not spent and a large percentage of houses 
intended were not built. This implied that it was difficult to use the funds allocated and 
difficult to achieve the pre-determined housing target. 
Table 5.5: 
TARGET AND FINANCIAL SHORTFALL BETWEEN 1966-1990 
Plan Year 
THIRD MALAYSIA PLAN 1976-1980 
Financial 
Shortfall 
Target Shortfall 
During the Third Malaysia Plan (3MP) 1976-1980 the government emphasised 
its housing objective of lower income groups with adequate housing. In addition, 
housing ownership was declared as an important component for poverty eradication. It 
stressed that " ... the efforts of public housing programmes will be to bring housing 
within the means of the poor" (Malaysia, 1971; p.330). Dissatisfied with the private 
housing developers' efforts towards building low-cost houses in the previous plan, the 
government took the stand that provision of houses for lower income groups would be 
made through public housing programmes. In the previous plan, only 1 % of the total 
65,000 houses built by private developers as low cost. Private developers concentrated 
on the construction of housing for the middle and higher income groups. However, 
during the plan revision in 1978, it was reported that there was a change to this policy. 
Several state governments had~~en imposing requirements on private developers to 
construct a certain number of low-cost houses as a condition to development approval. 
In the next plan this policy was imposed by all states on housing development 
applications. 
The estimated housing need under the 3MP was 515,000 units. However, the 
total number of houses planned for the public and private sector was 482,800 units. 
Out of these, 220,800 houses (47%) would be built by the public sector and 262,000 
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houses (53%) would be built by private developers, co-operative societies, individuals 
and groups.(2) For the public sector programmes, more than 59% were for the lower 
income groups. A total of M$2,500 million were allocated for the public housing 
programmes at the beginning of the plan. Later, during the mid-term plan review, the 
allocation was increased to M$3,195.19 million. 
This plan also introdticed several "promotional incentives" aimed at 
encouraging housing construction especially for the low-cost housing. These incentives 
were as follows:-
(1) Federal government revised lending terms to state governments for the 
financing of public low cost housing projects. From April 1977, the interest rate was 
increased from 2.5% to 4.0% per annum and payable within 20 years instead of 15 
years. The state governments in tum were allowed to charge house buyers not more 
than 5.5% per annum. Then, in August 1978, a further revision made extending the 
loan periods to 25 years. As the result, the amount of monthly instalments for public 
low-cost housing became less of a burden and more affordable to lower-income 
groups. In 1978, during the plan revision, about $380.6 million of loan had been 
approved to state governments to construct 42,300 houses out of 73,500 targetted 
(Malaysia, 1978~ p.214). 
(2) The Federal goverru11ent also decided in January 1978 to set up revolving 
funds of $5 million for each state government to assist in speeding up the construction 
of public low cost houses. These funds were to be utilised for the payment of land 
acquisition, site preparation and infrastructure development, while waiting for project 
loans approval by the Federal Treasury. 
(3) In December 1976, the government initiated another housing finance 
scheme through the Malaysian Building Society Berhad for the purchase of low-cost 
houses below MS20,OOO. An allocation of MS400 million was made under this 
programme. House buyers were charged interest rate of 5.5% per annum, which was 
far below the market interest rate. Contributors to the Malaysian Employees 
Providence Funds (EPF) and those earning below M$500.00 per month were eligible 
for this loan scheme. By the end of 1978, the Society had approved a loan 
commitment of M$273.1 million to 20,199 low-cost house buyers in 83 projects in 
Peninsular Malaysia. Then by ~~~ end of 1981, a total loan of $476.7 million was 
approved for the purchase of 31,331 houses in 166 housing projects (Bank Negara, 
1982; p. 97). 
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(4) The government also initiated a revolving fund of M$10 million for low-
income people to construct houses on their own land in the rural areas. The maximum 
loan provided under this programme is MS7,500 with 5.5% interest per annum. 
(5) To meet the housing needs in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, an 
additional allocation of MS53.24 million was made available by the Treasury to the 
City Hall. This made up a total of MS156.34 million provided to finance on going 
public low-cost houses in Kuala Lumpur. 
In addition to the ab0v.e" during this plan the government also introduced 
measures to reduce the cost and price of houses aimed to be within the reach of the 
poor. Several polices were made, for example: curbing real estate speculation; issuing 
directives for vacillating conversion of land for residential use, expediting the approval 
process for building plans; modifications of building and infrastructure standards; 
increasing the supply of building materials; and, promoting research into cost 
reduction methods of construction. 
To cater housing for the urban poor, several policy measures were made by the 
government as reported by the 3MP document that includes:-
(1) Joint-ventures with private sectors for the construction of low-cost house 
projects for the price range between MS5,OOO and MS7000. 
(2) 'Sites and services' projects in urban areas as an immediate measure for 
squatter families re-housing. A..p~lot project of 'site and services' supervised by the 
World Bank was implemented in Salak: South near Kuala Lumpur. This project 
consisted of 316 plots catering for the low-income people involved in relocation as the 
result of a highway project. 
(3) To implement squatters improvement schemes through the provision of 
basic services and facilities within their neighbourhood. 
During this plan the government was aware of and recognised that 
" .. .implementation capacity appears to be the core of the problem" 
(MaJaysia,1976;p.335). The revised 3MP reported that implementation problem " .. .in 
low-cost housing reflecting the problems associated with inadequate capacity, 
protracted process in obtaining suitable land and delay in providing complimentary 
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infrastructure." (Malaysia, 191.~;. p.21l). The capability and efficiency of public 
agencies in translating policy objectives into policy outcomes were pointed out as a 
major hurdle to this plan. Co-ordination amongst various public agencies involved in 
housing was one of the areas that needed attention. There were more than 60 public 
agencies involved in public housing programmes (Tan, 1983; MHLG 1979b). The plan 
stressed that the government would strengthen its implementation capability and co-
ordination among various agencies. The Federal government imposed the "top-down" 
implementation where it " ... requires the States to assume positive roles in meeting the 
needs for low-cost housing in their own areas and to be accountable for shortfalls" 
(Malaysia, 1976; p.331). 
As an effort to reduce house prices, there were attempts to persuade the 
federal government to bear the infrastructure cost for the low-cost housing projects. 
But this suggestion was finally turned down by the federal government. 
Other efforts mentioned related to the improvement of the housing target in the 
plan were: 
(1) urging private housing developers to play more active role in housing, 
(2) stressing the importance of physical planning in housing development, 
(3) encouraging industrialists to build housing for their workers, and 
(4) ensuring adequate supply of building materials. 
Performance of PLCHP in 3MP 
During the 3MP, the original target for the PLCHP was 62,200 houses with 
funds of S484 million allocated to the programme. However, when the list of projects 
from all the states finally approved by the federal government total funds ofMSSI7.2 
million were allocated for 65,168 houses. About two years later, during the mid-term 
plan revision in 1978, a number of projects were added and the target was increased to 
72,500 with the total allocation.pfMS640.9 million. When the detailed list of projects 
examined by the federal agencies 72,622 houses with funds of M$638 million were 
approved. The distribution of funds (original and revised), amount of expenditure and 
percentage of funds utilised in IMP for this programme by states appear in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: 
ALLOCATION OF FUNDING AND EXPENDITURE FOR THE PUBLIC LOW 
COST HOUSING PROGRAMME IN THE TIllRD MALAYSIA PLAN 1976-1980 
States 
Kedah 
Kelantan 
Melaka 
Negefi Sembilan, 
Pahang 
Perlis 
Pulau Pinang 
Sabah 
Sahiwak 
Selangor 
Trengganu 
Wilayah 
Total 
Source: 
Original , Revised Amount of Percentage of 
Allocation Allocation Expenditure Allocation 
(M$) (M$) (M$) Utilised 
52,242,000 52,242,000 38,121,000 73% 
17,060,000 27,713,575 19,157,036 69% 
28,274,000 30,824,124 18,494,474 60% 
13,570,000 16,266,500 3,650,000 22% 
12,630,000 22,109,000 18,823,220 85% 
43,873,000 67,889,640 64,838,100 96% 
103,100,000 156,342,703 115,206,170 74% 
517 ,164;S30 :::::: ~~i~8.~§;,~,~3)\.: ,,:,::::1!'~'~?~Q~9'94,:::'::', 1 ·::::;, ~9.~o' ' '.:: 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia. 
At the end of 3MP, the five year plan document reported that 26,250 houses 
(36%) were completed out the 73,500 units targetted.(3) However, the actual progress 
achieved by 31.12.1980 was with 22,425 houses (31%) completed, another 22,203 
houses (30%) under various stages of construction and 28,878 houses (39%) were still 
at various planning stages. The total number of uncompleted houses during this plan 
were 51,041 units which 44,690 had to be continued to the next five year plan and the 
other 6,411 were cancelled, The performance achieved by the state in terms the 
number of houses completed within the plan were ranging from 9% (Kelantan) to 58% 
(Sabah). Three states that had the 'highest number of houses completed were Selangor 
(4,264), Wilayah Persekutuan (3,718) and Johor (2,833). Three states that had the 
smallest number of houses completed were Kelantan (141), Perlis (210) and Sarawak 
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(559). Several states had a large number of uncompleted houses were carried over to 
the next plan such as Wilayah Persekutuan (10,476), Johor (7,374) and Selangor 
(4,363). (See Table 5.7 below). 
Table 5.7: 
CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LOW-COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME IN THE THIRD MALAYSIA PLAN 1976-1980 
States Number of 
Houses 
Carried 
Over From 
2MP 
Johor 6,396 
Kedah 985 
Kelantan 556 
Melaka 556 
N.Sembiian 829 
Pahang 524 
Perak 1,089 
Perl is 228 
Penan2 47 
Sabah 276 
Sarawak 1,239 
Selangor 200 
Tren22anu 320 
Wilayah 13,36 
Total 14,581 
Notes: 
TARGET 
Number"of 
New 
Houses 
Targetted 
for the 
Plan 
4,331 10,727 
3,953 4,938 
1,257 1,813 
2,854 3,410 
3,682 4,511 
5,297 5,821 
2,328 3417 
1,372 1,600 
3,338 3385 
1,876 2,152 
2,113 3,352 
9,302 9,502 
229B" 2618 
6586 7922 
" 50,587 "" 65~168":,: 
COMPLETE 
';"(1"0,693/' """':': 2~83l ':/: 26% 
": :' 3~ 514)(:{ 763 :",;" 22% 
CARRY 
OVER 
Number of 
Houses 
carried 
over to 
next plan 
7,374 
2,587 
1,356 
2,571 
2,382 
2,728 
1,790 
1,379 
2,483 
790 
2,835 
4,363 
1,376 
10,476 
There were 51,261 houses not completed by the end of 3MP period, of which 44,670 (87%) 
were carried forward to the next plan while 6,591 units (13%) were cancelled. Out of the total 
44,670 units carried over to the next plan, 22,203 units (50%) were under various stages of 
construction while 22,467 units (50%) were at early planning stage. 
Source: 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia, 1994. 
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Three important points can be noted by comparing Table 5.6 and 5.7. First, 
there was an increase allocation ofMS120,721,033 or 23% for the increased target of 
8,338 houses or 13% during the 1MP Revision in 1978. However, this allocation in 
1976's price increased only 15% which was close the percentage of target increase. 
Second, these tables show that the percentage of allocation utilised (69%) was higher 
than the percentage of houses completed (31%) in the plan. Third, these tables 
confirmed that both target shortfall and financial shortfall occurred during the 3MP's 
period. This implied that as the result of a number of houses was not completed, 
therefore a certain amount of allocation was unable to spend. 
FOURTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1981-1985 
The housing objective under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (4MP) was " .. to ensure 
that all Malaysians, in particular the low income group, will have access to adequate 
housing" (Malaysia, 1981; p.359). Committed to the policy statement of providing 
houses for lower income groups this plan attempted to achieve the largest housing 
target in the history of five year plans. This optimistic target was influenced by the 
housing industry boom from the late 1970s to the early 1980 and also because of the 
high demand for housing (Malaysia, 1980; p.17, 123 and 124; Khor, 1983; p.146).(4) 
The number of houses aimed at in this plan were almost double the previous 
five year plan's target. The 4MP targetted 923,300 houses by both the public and 
private sector, where 365,300 were catering for population increases, 273,600 were to 
meet housing replacement and 284,400 were to cover housing backlogs. The estimated 
housing requirements for urban areas were about 337,000 houses or 36.5% of the total 
houses required for the plan. 
Out of this total 923,300 houses, 398,570 (43%) were planned to be built by 
the public sector and 524,730 (?7~) were to be built by the private sector. A total of 
376,510 houses for low income groups was planned, of which 286,510 units (76%) 
were to be by public agencies and 90,000 units (26%) were expected to be constructed 
by private housing developers. 
To achieve the intended plan outcomes for public housing, an allocation of 
funds amounted to MS3,399.1 million was made. This amount was 8% higher than the 
amount allocated for the 3MP which was MS3,195.2 million. However, this 4MP 
allocation in 1976's price was lower than 3MP because it was equivalent to MS2,548.1 
million only. The total funds allocated for the housing components during this 4:MP 
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was MS4,066.5 million and in 1976 constant price equal to M$3,048.6 million 
(Malaysia, 1984; Appendix A),<5) 
Several policy measures were taken by the government to improve housing 
construction during this plan, .,especially for low-cost houses. The policy measures 
were as follows:-
(1) All state governments were required to set up a State Liaison Committee 
and to be chaired by the "Menteri Besar" or Chief Minister of the state. This committee 
was responsible for low cost housing rental projects during the plan, deciding the 
numbers, type of houses to be built and approved their locations. This was also 
responsible for ensuring that all low cost housing projects in the state were smoothly 
implemented. 
(2) The government determined that the selling price for low-cost houses was 
not to exceed MS25,000. In addition, it was decided that low-cost houses in the urban 
areas were to be purchased by MBSB for the rental scheme. While the state 
governments would purchase low-cost houses constructed in non-urban areas by 
utilising the federal loans. Then the government would sell those houses directly to 
low-income groups. 
(3) The government required that between 30% and 50% of private housing 
development projects must be low-cost housing. This condition was enforced as a 
requirement when state governments approved applications for land conversion and 
subdivision approvals. At later stage local authorities would ensure that private 
developers conformed to this requirement during building plan approval and the issue 
of buildings' certificates of fitness for occupation. 
(4) The government increased the revolving funds from MSS to MS20 million 
for each state. This would enable the state governments to make payment for the 
construction of public low-cost houses while waiting for the loan withdrawal from the 
federal government. 
(5) The government, through Bank Negara Malaysia, had instructed all 
commercial banks and financial 'institutions to allocate at least 10% of their allocation 
for loans to the housing sector. Interest rates were also fixed at not more than 10% per 
annum, whereas previously it was between 12% and 14% per annum. 
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(6) In order to speed up the construction of public housing, the federal 
government allocated M$2.2 million for the cost of land surveying. The land surveying 
tasks was undertaken by a consortium of license surveyors (PEJUTA). By October 
1982, three quarters (368 out of 496 projects) of the newly proposed sites for public 
low-cost housing had been surveyed. 
(7) Beginning in January 1982 the government also allowed contributors to the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to withdraw their saving up to 45% (subject to a 
maximum ofM$20,000). This reduced the burden of house buying. 
Some of the above policies were implemented, while others were not. The 
maximum selling price ofM$25,000 for low cost houses has continued in force. The 
positive aspect of this policy is that more low-cost houses were available than the 
previous plan and at a controlled price of not exceeding M$25,000. The revolving 
funds of MS20 million for each state government helped to overcome payment 
difficulties while waiting for project loan withdrawals from the central government. 
The policy of Malaysia Building Society Berhad (MBSB) and state governments 
purchasing low cost houses was not implemented due to the financial constraints of the 
government (Endan, 198~; p.126). 
The 4MP experienced shortfall in the overall target, since only 406, 1000 
houses (44%) built instead of 923,300 targetted. This overall shortfall was 56%, but 
the shortfall for low-cost houses was even higher at 66%. The construction shortfall 
was largely due to the cutback in allocation and administrative delays such as problems 
in identifying suitable project sites and preparation of tender documents. The shortfall 
of housing in the land schemes programme was the result of the postponement of 
several land development projects (Malaysia, 1986; p.522). 
Performance ofPLCHP under 4MP 
In 4MP, the original target for public low cost housing was 165,606 houses, 
which consisted of 120,936 units from new projects, while the balance of 44,670 units 
were carried over from projects in the previous five year plan. Then in early 1984, this 
target was increased to 176,502. Despite the poor achievement of only 31 % during the 
previous plan, this plan was a very ambitious one: more than double the previous 
target: attempting to build almost seven times the amounts completed. Table 5.8 below 
shows the target and number of houses completed during the 4MP. By the end of the 
plan only 73,258 houses (42%) completed, 22,431 houses (13%) were under 
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construction and the balance of 80,813 houses (45%) were under various planning 
stages. Out of 102,704 uncompleted houses, 23,661 houses (23%) were carried over 
to the next plan while the other 79,043 houses (77%) were either cancelled or 
transferred to the special low cost housing programme. 
The achievement of 42% in this plan was higher than the 31 % achieved in 
3MP. The actual number of houses completed also was also higher: 72,258 units 
compare with 22,425 in previous plan. The performance in terms of the number of 
houses completed amongst states in this plan was varied, with the lowest 13% (Sabah) 
and highest 89% (perlis). Three states that had the highest percentage of houses 
completed were Perlis, Kedah and Melaka with 89%, 76% and 70% respectively. 
Sabah had the lowest number of houses completed where only 910 out of 4,983 
planned. Wilayah Persekutuan had the highest number of the actual houses completed 
of 16,735 units. 
Table 5.8: 
CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME BY STATE IN FOURTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1981-1985 
TARGET CARRY 
OVER 
Number of Number of Percentage 
Houses New Rouses of Rouses Houses 
Carried Houses Targetted Completed CarryOver 
. Over From Targetted at in the Plan to the Next 
.3MP for the Plan Plan 
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia, 1994. 
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At the beginning of 4MP, funds of M$1,026 million were provided for the 
targetted 165,606 houses. Coping with increases in cost and the extra number of 
houses to be constructed, the allocation for PLCHP was increased to $2,695 million 
during the plan revision in 1983 .(refer Table 5.9 below). This was an increase of more 
than one and half time of the funds allocated at the beginning of the plan. All the states 
received increased funding which amongst the largest were: Wilayah Persekutuan 
received an additional M$201 million totalled up to M$704.6 million; Iohor received 
another M$219 million which total up to M$335 million; and Perak received additional 
funds ofM$203 million that total up to M$288 million. 
By the end of the plan M$2,399.9 million or 89% of funds were utilised. The 
percentage of allocation utilised ranging from 26% to 170% which show large 
variations between states. Some of the states spent more than their allocated funds 
such as Pulau Pinang (170%), Selangor (120%) and Kelantan (109%). Iohor had the 
biggest allocation ofM$334,872,709 and 11,977 houses completed. 
Table 5.9: ALLOCATION OF FUNDING AND EXPENDITURE OF THE PUBLIC 
LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME IN THE FOURTH MALAYSIA PLAN 
1981-1985 
State Original 
Allocation 
Allocation 
(M$) 
Iohor 115,780,000 .; 
Kedah 78 100,000 
Kelantan :t 40,100,000 .':' . 
Melaka 76,200,000 
Neg. Sembilan 75AOO,OOO 
P.Pinang 13,400,000 
Pahang 68,540,000 
Perak 85400,000 
37300,000 
Sabah 34,100,000 
.'. 57;100,000;;). '::::;. Sarawak 
Selangor 105,980000 
Trengganu 37,600,000 .. ;,. 
Wilayah 201,000,000· .. 
:::::, 
1,026,000,000 
Source: 
Revised 
Allocation 
(M$) 
Amount of 
Expenditure 
(M$) 
115,590,786 125,782,519 
%of 
Allocation 
Spend 
·102% 
109% 
.... ..' ·7· .1. 0 /0' ';:.' .. ,.;.;.; ., 
/( .:.:-.. 
76,339,710 69-,-304,264 91% 
84% , 
25,798,000 43 765,936 170% 
207,447,330 210 868,931 102% 
288,081;535 ;;' ; ·. 206,485,09(;.;;; 72% 
89,396,000 92,443,047 103% 
.74°/ ';:,;. 
. ('0 .. ./:. 
318,051,203 382,427,698 120% 
96;611,266 :;;;;;. '84;451,803) ;::::: .... 87% 
704,600,000 550 000 000 , , 78% 
.:.; .:):::-..... :::t:.:(,. ::; .... : .. ,", -:. ,,;. ;:;. 
2,694;S50,94~ ., ·::i: 2,39;,957,855;: .'.:.' : 89% 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia, 1994. 
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Comparing the Table 5.8 and 5.9 show that: (a) the increased of target by 
10,896 houses or 7% with a large allocation increase ofM$I,668,550,943 or 162%; 
(b) this increased of funds was equivalent to 118% only in 1981' s price; (c) the amount 
of allocation utilised (89%) was higher than number of houses completed (42%) in the 
plan; and , (d) these two tables confirmed that both target shortfall and financial 
shortfall occurred during the 4MP's period. 
FIFTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1986-1990 
During the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) a total of 701,500 houses were 
planned. Out of this total 149,000 were to be built by the public sector and the other 
552,500 were to be implemented by the private sector. Out of this total, 495,000 
(71%) were targetted for low-cost houses, 180,200 (26%) targetted for medium-cost 
houses and only 26,300 (3.7%) targetted for high cost houses. The public sector 
planned to construct 149,000 houses, of which 120,900 were to be low-cost units, 
27,900 were to be medium-cost units and only 200 were to be high-cost units. The 
private sector targetted to built 552,000 houses of which 374,100 low-cost houses, 
152,300 medium-cost houses and 26,100 high-cost houses (Malaysia, 1986; p.528 
&1989; p.282) 
Housing policies and strategies developed for the 5MP reflected some past 
policy strategies, as well as incorporating new measures. They were as follows:-
(1) Emphasising and encouraging the construction of bigger numbers of low-
cost and medium-cost houses in urban areas to meet the demand from majority of 
people. 
(2) Encouraging more rental houses to meet the immediate need of people, 
especially low-income workers in urban areas. 
(3) Emphasising human settlement concept in planning and developing housing 
projects. Under this concept, housing development is seen in the broader context of 
creating a "decent and viable human settlement" . For this purpose, the government 
proclaimed that it would ensure, adequate provision of basic infrastructure and social 
facilities on housing projects. 
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(4) Encouraging the greater participation of private developers in low cost 
housing. The government promised to provide as much assistance as possible to 
private developers. 
By the end of 5MP, similarly as previous plans, the number of houses 
completed were lower than the targetted. Only a total of 300,928 houses (43%) were 
completed out of the 701,500 houses targetted. The public sector completed 65% 
while the private sector competed 37% of the target. The percentage of houses 
completed according to category was: 33% low-cost houses, 65% medium-cost and 
75% high-cost. This implied that in practice housing construction was still inclined 
toward medium and high-cost housing. 
During this plan the 'Special Low Cost Housing Programme' was launched in 
1986, The main objective was' promoting economic growth as a measure against 
recession and at the same time providing affordable houses to low-income groups. The 
construction target was 80,000 houses per annum, to be completed by 1989. The initial 
response from the private sector for this programme was very encouraging. Several 
incentives were provided under this scheme such as the exemption from stamp duty on 
sales and purchase agreement for house buyers, free land surveys, relaxation on some 
planning standards, and a reduction in the rate of the land conversion fee and payment 
premium to state governments. A total of 334,600 houses intended to be built by 
private developers were registered by the MHLG out of the original target of240,000 
units. This registered houses exceeded the target by 86,906, or 36%, of the original 
target. In supporting this programme, the Central Bank set lending guidelines for banks 
and finance companies. They were required, by 31st December, 1989, to make 
commitments to individuals to finance the purchase of at least 100,000 units of newly 
constructed houses, each costing $100,000 or less of which at least 60,000 units 
should be less than $25,000. By the end of 1989 the commercial banks and companies 
had financed 150,602 units ot'newly constructed houses of less than $100,000 of 
which 63,889 units were the low-cost. 
However, by the end of 1990, only 99,800 units or 30.5% of these 'special 
low-cost housing programme' were completed. The poor performance was due to 
several reasons, such as unsuitable project locations, management and financial 
problems, misuse of funds, incompetent contractors, and delays in plan approvals 
(Malaysia, 1991; pp. 407-408). In 1990 there were 277 projects abandoned which 
involved 63,560 units and 36,130 buyers. To overcome this problem and to salvage 
some of the projects, the government formed "Tabung Pemulihan Projek 
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Terbengkalai" (Rescue Funds for Abandoned Housing Projects) in 1990 under direct 
supervision of the Bank Negara, with the funds ofMS600 million. 
Performance of PLCHP in 5MP 
Construction under the 'public low cost housing' had a target of 45,800 houses, 
with total funds of $294,253,000. Table 5.10 provides information on the number of 
houses targetted, completed and not completed in SMP by the states. The PLCHP 
under the 5MP aimed for a moderate target, originally only 45,769 houses consisted of 
23,661 carried over from previous plan and 22,108 newly formulated houses. This 
target was almost four times lesser than the previous plan. Three reasons justified for 
lesser targets: (1) lessons from the poor performance in past plans; (2) in line with 
government policy to reduce the public sector's role in providing low-cost houses and 
to encourage the private sector to provide more low-cost houses; and (3) the 
economic recession which had restricted the public funding. 
During the plan revision only a very small increase of total target made, instead 
targets were re-distributed amongst of states. Nine states reduced their targets while 
three states (pahang, Sabah and Sarawak) had a significant increase in the number of 
their targets. 
By the end of5MP, the number of houses completed was 26,172 units (57%), 
out of the total 45,800 targetted. The number of uncompleted houses were 19,628 
units of which 19,392 were carried forward and continued to the 6MP. The percentage 
of houses completed amongst states ranging from 18% to 83%. Three states had 
highest percentage of houses completed were Wilayah Persekutuan (83%), Kedah 
(83%) and Perlis (83%). While, three states had the lowest percentage of completion 
were Sabah (18%), Trengganu (22%) and Kelantan (38%). The problems identified 
related to this shortfall of targets were lack of effective demand, due to largely 
unsuitable locations and unaffordable prices as well as non-performing contractors 
(Malaysia, 1991; p.364). However, the overall PLCHP's performance was still better 
than the private sector's achievement on the construction of houses under the SLCHP 
(Malaysia, 1989; p.283). 
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Table 5.10: 
CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME BY STATE IN FIFTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1986-1990 
States Number of Number of Number of :. Revised ::' Number of Percentage Number of 
Houses New Houses ::,Ta:q~et,:·)::- Houses of Houses Houses 
ar~m f!;:~~ :Z: t'~jli ~;;:~~:~ Completed ~re: 
of the Plan " J6MP) 
Johor 1,882 5,977 7,859 :7;114 :· . 4,560 64% 2,554 
Kedah 1,332 863 1,995 1;233'::,} 1,021 83% ° 
Kelantan 254 2,717 2,971 :'3,072 :,: 1,180 38% 1,486 
Mel aka 941 684 1,625 ,. I,OS? ::': 757 70% 143 
N.Sembilan 1,000 3,552 4,552 : 3,979 2,185 55% 1 765 
Pahan2 5,263 1,059 6,322 t8H':{{ 5...1772 66% 1,588 
Penang 304 592 896 .,:::1:06Sti=,:: 615 58% 450 
Perak 4,759 1 614 6,373 ':: 5~775 ?n( 3~839 67% 1,936 
Perlis 218 770 988 441 : 365 83% 76 
Sabah 450 30 480 . 2,895 " 1 734 60% L161 
Sarawak 137 2,050 2,187 3788 :. 692 18% 2,276 
Selangor 4,771 
° Trenln~anu 388 1,754 2,142 1 333:" 290 22% 815 
Wilayah 2162 445 2,608 .... 1,207:: :· 1,000 83% 207 
}: 
TOTAL :: 23,661 
Source: 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia, 1994. 
The following Table 5.11 provides information on funding and expenditure of 
PLCHP in 5MP. The table shows that all states spent less than funds provided, where 
overall only 76% were utilised. This financial shortfall occurred because of a large 
percentage (43%) of houses were not completed during the plan. A larger proportion 
of funds was utilised during early 5MP, where in 1986 funds ofM$45,515,069 were 
utilised. Then expenditure gradually decreased each year where M$45,515,069 utilised 
in 1987, M$36,693,854 in 1988, M$32,554,630 in 1989 and finally M$17,834,343 
spent in 1990. Larger funds utilised during early 5MP because to make payments for 
construction of carried over projects from 4MP in this plan. Table 5.10 and 5.11 
confirmed that shortfall of targets and expenditure also occurred in this plan. 
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Table 5.11 : 
ALLOCATION OF FUNDING AND EXPENDITURE FOR THE PUBLIC LOW 
COST HOUSING PROGRAMME IN THE FIFTH MALAYSIA PLAN 1986-1990 
States 
Iohor 
Kedah : 
Kelantan 
Melaka· 
Negeri Sembilan 
Pabang 
Perak 
Perlis 
Pulau Pi nang 
Sabah 
Sarawak 
Selangor 
Trengganu 
Total 
Source: 
':\: I :~f:!::)::: 
'"'-:;: ..... . 
53,746,000 40,829,00 76% 
.. ° 
25,451,000 18,101,896 71% 
.1.~,640,000 17,694,386 90% 
54,234,000 49,208,953 91% 
":;:: 5,815,00Q::'::, 4,763,629 ... ,." 82% 
9,894,000 5,126,766 52% 
34,900,000 21,714,017 62% 
38,691,00,0 ) 2,35'8,966 ." 94% , ,,::: 
12,145,000 6,226,650 51% 
294,253,000 223,344,397 76% 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Malaysia, 1994. 
EFFORTS FOR PROBLEM SOLUTION 
./ 
Researching through official documents exhibited that government were 
concerned with over two main housing problems; the shortfall of housing targets and 
the price increase. As the result several measures were introduced (directly and 
indirectly) to overcome the problem such as the adoption of Uniform Building Bye-
Laws and Town and Country Planning Act, 1976, the establishment of National 
Housing Department in 1976 to assist states implementing this programme, the 
increase of pay back period from 20 to 25 year in 1978, increased allocation of funds 
in five year plans and the formulation of a revolving fund in 1978 (Malaysia, 1979; 
214). 
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Revolving Fund 
Project financing was identified as one of the problem areas in the programme 
implementation. To overcome tills problem, in January 1978 the federal government 
approved a revolving fund ofM$5 million to each state with the interest rate at 4.0% 
per annum and payable within 23 years. The aim was to enable state governments to 
financing projects' preliminary works such as land acquisition, site preparations and 
infrastructure development. However in 3MP only nine out of thirteen states were 
issued loans to set up their the revolving funds. In 1978, two states (pahang and Pedis) 
received the revolving funds; in 1979 five more states (Iohor, Kelantan, Melaka, Perak 
and Pulau Pinang); in 1980 two states (Selangor and Negeri Sembilan) received the 
M$5 millions revolving fund. Then during the 4MP the government increased this 
revolving funds to $20 million for each state. This was as a measure to accelerate 
public low cost housing, while awaiting project loans from the federal government. 
(Malaysia, 1981;365, Malaysia, 1986; p.S22). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the attempt of providing affordable houses to lower-income groups, 
government had increased the low-cost housing targets from 120,600 in 3MP by the 
public sector to 406,100 in 4MP and 495,000 in 5MP by both the public and private 
sector. In the three five-year plans, the public sector target increased to 286,510 
houses in 4MP but decreased to 120,900 houses in SMP. The private sector expected 
to build low-cost houses a bigger number of low-cost houses than the public sector in 
SMP with a target of 374,100. However, the achievement of this low-cost houses by 
both sectors was low; 55% in 3MP, 37% in 4MP and 33% in 5MP respectively. 
Similar performance achieved if taking only the public sector; 55% in 3MP, 42% in 
4MP and 45% in 5MP. 
PLCHP is the centre piece of the public housing programmes because a large 
proportion of houses targetted and completed was contributed by this programme. 
This PLCHP too faced target s~~rtfall and in addition its achievement between plan 
and between states was varied. This programme had completed its target only 36% in 
3MP, 42% in 4MP and 57% in 5MP. When houses not completed within the plan, they 
had to be carried forward to next plan or were cancelled. Uncompleted houses were 
large in numbers in each plan. In 3MP, 44,670 houses or 61% of the target carried 
over to 4MP while 6,591 houses or 9% of the target cancelled. Then in 4MP, 42% of 
the target completed while only 13% carried over to 5MP and another 45% either 
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transferred to the SLCHP or cancelled. During SMP also the similar problem of target 
shortfall occurred, where only 57% of the target achieved, 36% carried over to next 
plan and 7% cancelled. Thus, target shortfall become a common problem occurred in 
every plan. 
Financial shortfall was another problem occurred to this programme in the 
three five year plans. Analysis from tables presented in this chapter show that in 
general funds were under-utilised where only 69% was spent in 3MP, 89% spent in 
4MP and 76% used in SMP. This financial shortfall occurred as the result of state 
governments were unable to spend funds provided because large number of targetted 
houses were not completed within the plan. 
Increase of funds allocation was made in 3MP and 4MP catered the increased 
number of targets as well as covered the increased in costs. The analysis found that 
increased in funding was higher than the increase in targets, where in 3MP allocation 
of fund increased by 23% in nominal price catered 13% increased of target. During 
4MP Revision in 1984, allocation of funds increased by 168% whereas target only 
increased by 7%. This large increase in allocation implied the increase in costs which 
associated with the effect of inflation. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the main problem of the public housing 
programmes in Malaysia was t~r~et shortfall, where by the end of five year plans a 
large percentage of public houses intended to build were not completed. As the result, 
funds were under-utilised. Although several efforts and measures were undertaken by 
the government to overcome this, yet the problem still occured from one 'five year 
plan' to another. 
It was realised that implementation as the main factor affected the performance 
of five year plan as stated in SMP document that: "The impact of the social services 
programmes on the desired socio-economic objectives is dependent not only on 
resource availability but also on the capacity to implement." (Malaysia, 1988; p.271). 
The implementation of the public low cost housing programme was done through 
inter-governmental and inter-agency relationships. Implementation was difficult and 
demand a high degree of co-operation. This research is concerned with the inability of 
the programme to produce jts result in relation to time, quantity and cost. The focus is 
not on the impact or the quality of the product but more modest question of output. 
Therefore implementation studie.s .. could draw some insight and parallel perspective to 
explain the phenomenon under investigation. 
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In this chapter also describes several policies and strategies introduced by 
government to improvement achievement of low-cost housing in general and PLCHP 
specifically such as formation of the committee to monitor housing development in 
each state, fixing the price of low cost houses of not exceeding MS25,OOO, instruction 
to financial institution to provide loans for low-cost housing mortgages, provision 
funds for land surveying, allowing EPF withdrawals to assist in house buying" 
attempting to buy low cost houses from private developers and fe-sell them to low 
income groups. 
The following chapter, discusses the hypotheses developed for this study 
drawing out the problems and .. ~$sues that have been discussed in chapter two on 
"implementation literature", chapter three on "population growth and housing 
construction" and chapter four on "public housing development". 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Although in the 4MP document stated that the amount of funds allocated as $1,712.22 
million, the actual funds finally allocated by the Treasury for this programme was even larger. 
An amount of $2,695 million was finally agreed when the central agencies reviewed allocation 
based of ' project by project' basis for the state governments in 1984. 
2. The total of 262,000 houses to be built consisted of 100,000 targeted for private housing 
developers, 12,000 targeted for co-operative societies and 150,000 were to be built by 
individuals and groups. 
3 The target figure for the 3MP of 73,500 was obtained from the Mid-tenn Review of 3MP 
(Malaysia, 1978; p.216). 
4 In 1980 the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia reported a strong demand for residential, 
commercial and industrial building .~~ction activities which had boosted value added in the 
construction sector by 15%. Strong demand in housing was associated with housing property 
boom and adjustment of salary for public servants in July 1980. The rapid increase in demand 
for the housing resulted to pressure on house price increases (Malaysia, 1980; pp. 17, 123 and 
124). High demand for housing because of speculative purchase of new and additional houses 
by the rich who put their money in this type of investment in anticipation of price increase or 
for a high rental (Khor, 1983; p.146). Housing speculation in late 1970s and early 1980 had 
resulted 'chronic shortage' and 'soaring of house price' until the government introduced a 
preventive policy and also slow growth of economy in the 1980s. 
s. Housing components include the PLCHP in the states and Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur, 
sites and services scheme, purchase of housing in the Federal Territory, government quarters, 
government officers housing loan scheme, loan to SEDC, complimentary public housing and 
squatters control in the Federal Territory. Allocation provided under 4MP for these housing 
component totalled up to $4066.5 million (Malaysia, 1984; Appendix A). 
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Chapter Six 
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the research hypotheses developed from the insights of 
previous chapters on policy implementation studies and public housing development in 
Malaysia. 
Hypotheses are tentative statements about matters whose validity before testing 
is usually unknown and they frequently take the form of relationships between two or 
more variables that are observations of common elements in the real world. 
Hypotheses come from our thoughts and are manifested as tentative statements about 
things that the researcher wishes to support or refute (Black and Champion, 1976; 
p.126). In research, hypotheses serve one of three purposes: (a) to test theories; (b) to 
suggest theories; or (c) to describe social phenomena. 
The literature review on implementation studies identified a range of factors 
affecting programme performance, such as vague objectives, faulty assumptions, 
inadequate initial conditions, lengthy processes, delays, interorganisational and 
intergovernmental relationship problems, insufficient funding, inadequate resources, 
the incapability of government, inappropriate implementation design and many other 
factors. A number of implementation issues were raised, such as the possibility of 
programme failure being caused by defects during policy formulation and design or by 
the planning process as well as during policy implementation. Many scholars have 
attempted to explain difficulties·in implementation, but it can be said that consensus on 
factors capable of predicting eff~ctive implementation has not yet been achieved. 
Overview of public housing development in Malaysia have confirmed that 
housing supply to lower income people is inadequate, in spite of the national housing 
objective of providing adequate housing for this category of people. Measures to 
achieve this objective were made, including setting targets of low-cost housing to be 
built by the end of the five-year plan. However, the targets were never met and thus 
expenditure shortfalls occurred. 
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Programme Performance 
Several concepts measuring programme performance are highlighted in the 
literature, including 'success and failure", '~ffectiveness", 'goal-directed': 
'ltchievement of objectives" and 'butput". Public policy performance is usually 
measurable. For example, in BDA's case, performance was measured by ascertaining 
whether implementation was successfully carried out and by determining the number of 
jobs created, examining those who were hired, and assessing the progress of public 
works projects. Van Meter and Van Hom (1975) suggest that availability of resources 
and incentives are amongst the cluster of variables that shape the linkages between 
policy and performance. Van Horn (1979) views performance as a 'proximate effect" 
which '~ .. [is] directed at determining the consequences .... and the degree to which 
programs and services provided by the law are delivered to the intended beneficiaries" 
(Van Hom, 1979; p.l0). In this case, the performance measures are used to assess 
whether or not such goals are realised, an assessment which can be carried out after 
one has identified and understood public policy objectives (Van Horn, 1979; p.lO). 
For the purpose of this thesis, programme performance focuses on target 
achievements in relation to: (a) the number of houses built within the same five-year 
plan or outside the intended plan and the number of uncompleted houses; (b) the time 
taken to complete the implementation process, and (c) the amount of funds utilised and 
the total project cost. 
RELATIONSHIPS OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND 
PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE: HYPOTHESIS 1 
In this thesis, the researcher posits that programme performance is related to 
the implementation period, the length of time taken in the implementation process, the 
adequacy of funding, the effect of inflation, the interaction of programme 
implementers, and of agencies and actors at the bottom. A hypothesis-testing approach 
will be conducted by making comparisons of programme performance between the 
three five-year plans and amongst the seven states and three types of agencies which 
assisted the states in implement projects. 
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Hypothesis 1 
Implementation is a process involving the refinement and translation of a policy 
into specific actions or programmes directed at putting policy intentions into effects, or 
the forging of subsequent links for achieving desired results. This suggests that it is 
important to examine what is happening to policy at these various stages of the 
implementation process. 
In analysing successful implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) called 
for fewer steps because innumerable steps and numerous activities caused 
'implementation deficits'. Besides fewer steps, Cleaves (1980) proposed a shorter 
duration for implementation.. He believes that longer programmes are more 
problematic, stating that:-
'~ .. the greater the duration of sequential steps involved in the implementation 
stage, the greater the possibilities for existing actors to alter their goals, for 
leadership to tum over, for new actors to enter the scene, or for unintentional 
consequences to take their toll." (Cleaves, 1980; p.289). 
Several people have pointed out that delay in obtaining clearance for housing 
development approvals was one of the difficulties in Malaysia's housing 
implementation process. This difficulty is associated with a long approval process, 
administrative delays and bureaucratic red-tapes (Hong, 1991; p.8; Rachagan, 1992; 
p.26) where the process went through some 40 major steps and passed through several 
government agencies (Johnstone, 1983; p.256; Sen, 1986; p.29; HDAM, 1990; 
MHLG, 1991). There was also no time limit imposed for processing approvals (Yin, 
1993). This was followed by a l~ngthy process for land conversion where, as a result, 
the time taken for obtaining planning approval ranged between three and five years 
(Teo, 1991; p.27). Similarly, PLCHP also faced difficulties in relation to administrative 
delays (Agus, 1992; p.15) and the incapability of agencies at local level of 
implementing public housing projects (Agus, 1992; p.24). Although efforts were made 
to shorten the duration of each step, no attempt was made to reduce the number of 
these steps (MHLG, 1991a; p.2). The time frame given to complete a housing project 
in five years was inadequate because the whole process required more than five years, 
as shown by the large number of houses carried over to the next five year plan 
discussed in Chapter 5. This programme also encountered several implementation 
problems during the planning stage such as inadequate preparation (End an, 1984; p. 
67-68), indecisiveness about projects (MHLG, 1991a), site selection problems (Ooi, 
1983; p.40; Endan, 1984; p. 70; MHLG, 1991a), land problems (Agus, 1992; p.l5) 
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and problems relating to obtaining planning approval (Agus, 1992; p.18-19). Hence, 
this justifies a detailed examination of the process involved with the implementation of 
PLCHP, with special emphasis on the planning stage. 
Davies (1981; p.47) asserted that over-optimistic targets for public 
programmes in the five-year plan were perceived as normal and inevitable by civil 
servants and subsequent deviation from targets were accepted as a usual occurrence. 
When the 3MP was formulated, those involved in the programme formulation knew 
that the shortfall ofPLCHP's targets for the previous plan was 72%. Similarly despite 
64% shortfall of the previous plan, 4MP aimed at building 176,500 houses within this 
plan. About 40% of 4MP's targets were achieved by the end of the plan, while other 
60% (about 104,000 units) were either carried over to 5MP under the same 
programme, transferred to the special low-cost housing programme or were cancelled. 
Finally, when SMP was formulated a moderate target (45,800 units) was set. 
It is predicted that the public low-cost housing programme performance is 
associated with inadequate preparation of schemes during the formulation and planning 
stage, the lengthy implementation process involved and that in itself this varied 
between planning periods, states and implementing agencies. Therefore hypothesis 1 is 
formally stated as the following: 
Hvpothesis 1: "That the implementation performance of the Public Low-cost 
Housing Programme in Malaysia is associated with inadequate of preparation 
of schemes at the formulation and planning stage, the length oj time taken in 
the implementation process, and that this varied between planning periods, 
states and implementing agencies. " 
From hypothesis 1, four detailed statements are developed as instruments to assist the 
testing of this hypothesis as follows: 
Statement 1a: "That a ,large proportion ofpublic law-cost housing projects 
have a completion time of more than five years. " 
Statement 1 b: "That projects where some preparation was made before the 
formulation stage had shorter completion times than projects where 
preparations were made during the formulation stage. " 
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Statement Ie: "That the earlier implementation stage is significantly related 
to the subsequent stages. When a longer time is taken to complete the planning 
stage, then a longer time is needed to complete the whole project 
implementation process. " 
Statement Id: "That the length of time spent on the whole implementation 
process varies significantly between five-year plans, states and implementing 
. " agencIes. 
This hypothesis aims at analysing relationships between the time taken in the 
implementation process as a dependent variable, and the implementation periods (three 
five-year plans) and programme implementors (states and implementing agencies) as 
independent variables. 
In each five-year plan, there were differences in terms of the programme 
setting. The formulation of 3l\.1P was based on the foundation of the New Economic 
Policy launched in the previous five-year plan (2MP, 1970-1975). The 4MP period 
marked further elaboration and refinement of policy measures set in previous plans and 
was also the period during which some of the NEP targets were to be realised (Cho, 
1990; p.76). During 4MP Malaysia's economy performed strongly and more resources 
were devoted to development projects. As mentioned in chapter 5, several measures 
were taken to improve PLCHP, such as adopting 'promotional incentives" in 3MP. 
creating new programme implementation guidelines in 4MP, expediting and 
strengthening implementation capability and adding more funds to the programme in 
each five-year plan (Malaysia. 1978; p.211. 278 and 33; Malaysia. 1983; p.222). Eight 
measures increase housing stocks were introduced by the government (Malaysia. 1981; 
p.36S). Then, during 5:MP, the country experienced a recession; however the 
government's policy still emphasised housing for low-income people. but with a 
smaller allocation of funds and lower targets. 
RELATIONSHIP OF FUNDING AND PROGRAMME 
PERFORMANCE: HYPOTHESIS 2 
Resources are important to any programme and a lack of resources is usually 
cited as reasons for the implementation failure. The literature suggests that resources 
as one amongst other variables that have significant relationships with programme 
implementation (e.g. Chase. 1979; Durant. 1984; Edwards, 1980; Elmore, 1978; 
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Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Hambleton, 1983; Montjoy and O'Toole, 1979; Weimer, 
1983; etc.}. Wolman (1980) recognised that resources must be adequately provided for 
a successful implementation. Van Hom (1979) states that there are two aspects of 
programme resources: the timing of the funds and the size of the funds in relation to 
the size of the community. He argues that the way in which program funds are used 
depends in large part on when they are available for use by state or local government 
officials and whether they represent a significant enlargement of total resources or only 
a small increment (Van Hom, 1979; p.14). Barret and Fudge (1981) suggest that 
putting policy into effect is basically dependent on four factors, of which two are 
related to resources: (1) the availability of the required resources; and (2) the ability to 
marshal and control these resources to achieve the desired ends. The other two factors 
are: knowing what you want to do, and; if others are to carry out the tasks, 
communicating what is wanted and controlling their performance. Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980, p.S42) highlight financial resources as one of the variables for 
policy implementation. Edwards (1984) claims adequate resources are amongst the 
four pre-conditions for successful implementation, where the other three are effective 
communication, supportive dispositions of implementers and an appropriate 
bureaucratic structure. Pressman & Wildavsky also described lack of resources as one 
of the problems in policy implementation. Weimer (1983) identified seven sources of 
implementation failures, each of which is related to some degree of scarcity of 
resources and inflexibility of expertise resources. Hogwood and Gunn (1984; p.199-
200) suggested ten pre-conditions necessary for achieving perfect implementation; 
among others this includes adequate time and sufficient resources being made available 
to the programme and the required combination of resources being actually available. 
Montjoy and O'Toole (1979) proposed an intra-organisational implementation 
theory and cautioned policy makers to ensure availability of resources to an 
organisation and to consider the consequences of issuing mandates without 
accompanying resources. Like Montjoy and O'Toole, Cleaves emphasises the two 
factors of political power and resources, which must be considered by implementers 
and policy makers- for successful implementation. Cleaves concludes that many policies 
formulated in Third World countries are highly problematic and have few resources for 
their execution (1979, p.292). 
In relation to the provision of resources for PLCHP, three major issues of 
project funding were identified. Firstly, there was a financial shortfall in each five-year 
plan because the states were unable to spend the funds within the same plan as the 
result of target shortfall. Secondly, the percentage of expenditure utilised was higher 
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than the percentage of houses completed. Thus, it is suspected, the consequence of 
inflation where increased of project costs over time. It is predicted that delays in 
project implementation led to more time taken, and with inflation this simply increases 
costs (nominal costs). Delays also arise from poor project preparation, where some 
schemes were revised and this led to more resources were used (i.e. higher real costs). 
Thirdly, although increased funds were provided, target shortfalls still persisted. 
Increased allocation of funds to the programme was one of the measures 
adopted to overcome implementation problems (Malaysia, 1976; p.337). For example, 
during 3MP a substantially increased allocation was made where MS640.09 million 
was provided compare to only MS234.8 million for the plan before. During 4MP the 
government anticipated bigger roles in housing provision with the biggest allocation of 
funds and the largest target so far. An allocation ofMSl,712.22 million was provided. 
Attempts to alleviate target shortfall were made through bigger allocations and the 
establishment of revolving fund for each state. However, problems still persisted as 
indicated by target and expenditure shortfalls. 
In this study a hypothesis is developed to examine the issue of programme 
funding and financing as an aspect of programme resourcing. The aims are to examine 
relationships between programme funding and programme performance, and the 
effects of other variables, such as the period of programme implementation, the states 
and implementing agencies as well as the differences arising from these relationships. 
Realising the importance of funding to the programme therefore the following 
hypothesis concerning programme funding is developed:-
Hypothesis 2: "That the performance of the public low-cost programme is 
dependent on the al/ocation of resources devoted to it,' delays in implementing 
projects caused costs to increased in real terms with inflation,' as a result the 
states have to meet project cost from their own funding. " 
Four statements are developed to assist the testing of hypothesis 2 as follows: 
Statement 2a: "That the amount of funds provided by the federal government 
for the public low-cost housing programme varies significantly between five-
year development plans and between states. " 
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Statement 2b: "That the amount of funds provided by the federal government 
for the public low-cost housing programme was lower than the total project 
cost" 
Statement 2c : ''Programme implementation performance is associated with 
the availability of funds,' projects which utilise financial "revolving funds" 
exhibit better performance than projects which do not utilise financial 
"revolving funds. " 
Statement 2d: "That there is an association between the total project costs 
and the length of time taken for project completion,' the longer the time 
needed for the project implementation process, the higher the project costs. " 
Statement 2d is the most important because it attempts to relate project costs to the 
time taken to complete the project. It is predicted that as the result of delays, projects 
were affected by inflation, which caused increase of costs for two reasons: delays 
means projects were affected by inflation and inadequate preparation meant higher cost 
were incurred. 
INTER-ACTION BETWEEN ACTORS AND AGENCIES: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: 
The process of implementation often involves inter-organisational networks of 
(a) different levels of government including federal, states and local agencies; (b) 
public and private organisations; and (c) political and administrative bodies. These 
types of structure thus affect organisations and actors who jointly deal with specific 
tasks and programme objectives. Rein and Rabinovitz (1978; p.327-328) view 
complexity of the implementation process as a function of the number of levels, 
agencies and participants who have a say in the process or are capable of voiding any 
stage along the way. The notion that implementation face difficulties in the realisation 
of intended policy objectives because it requires inter-agency co-operation and co-
ordination is supported by many authors, and both the top-down and bottom-up 
approach. The difference between these two approaches lies in the varying viewpoints 
as to the actors involved in the interaction, and whether the direction of action is from 
the centre to the periphery or at the 10calleveI. 
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In the study of PLCHP it is predicted that interaction between agencies and 
amongst actors at the bottom has a relationship with programme performance. This is 
because, in the attempt to achieve the goal-directed programme targets implementers 
must take into consideration the effect of departmental requirements imposed on this 
programme and the interests of other actors who are connected with the programme. 
Therefore hypothesis 3 is formally stated as follows:-
Hvpothesis 3: "That the interaction between agencies and amongst actors at 
the bottom has a significant relationship with the performance of the public 
low-cost housing programme in Malaysia. " 
In implementing the programme, the state has to deal with a number of agencies and 
actors concerned with the programme and whose agreements and sanctions have to be 
obtained in order to carry out the programme. Some of these actors and agencies are 
not bound by the pressure of achieving the targets, time and cost limit constraints faced 
by the programme, but are more concerned with imposing their own interests. 
Therefore hypothesis 3 also aims to research how the states and implementing agencies 
deal with this interaction of actors and agencies at the bottom. 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
If 'implementation" is defined as '\tction ... directed at the achievement of 
objectives set forth in prior policy decisions" (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; p.44S) 
then the focus of PLCHP' s performance is on measuring how far the programme has 
achieved its intended objectives. In this chapter this researcher posits that programme 
implementation process, adequacy of funding, interaction of agencies and actors at the 
bottom and other project characteristics have a significant relationship with programme 
performance. Programme achievement in this study is expressed in terms of number of 
houses built at the end of the five-year plan, whether projects were completed within 
the same plan or outside the intended plan, the length of time taken for implementation 
and finally the total costs incurred by the projects. 
The method of testing for these first two hypotheses is a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative techniques, whereas hypothesis 3 engages only the 
qualitative approach. Explanation of the research methodology adopted in this research 
is presented in the following chapter. A survey report of the quantitative data analysis 
that examines the general patterns and trends of PLCHP is presented in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 contains the presentation of qualitative data analysis. Chapter 8 and 9 serve 
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to give some indications about hypotheses developed in this chapter. Finally, the 
testing of these three hypotheses and the decisions about them are fonnally presented 
in Chapter 10. 
Finally, as a concluding remark to this chapter, a proposition by O'Toole 
(1986) on an agenda for implementation research may stimulate further insight:-
'The review of empirical literature suggests some implicit agreement on several 
clusters of variables deserving of further intensive investigation. Efforts should 
be undertaken to build systematically and cumulatively on the research that 
focused on policy characteristics, resources, implementation structure, 
implementor disposition, implementor-client relationship and timing." (O'Toole, 
1986; p.203). 
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Chapter Seven: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology adopted for the study and 
describes each step in data collection: preparation of a sampling frame, sampling 
criteria, sample selection, gathering of data into a 'collection roster', conducting 
interviews, transcribing interviews and data analysis technique. Quantitative data were 
collected during three and half months' fieldwork researching the programme's 
"administrative records,,(l) in Malaysia from early February to mid-May 1994. Then a 
second stage fieldwork collecting qualitative data was carried out over almost two 
months in Malaysia during November and December 1994. 
This chapter consist of four sections: section one provides a general overview 
of the study approach; section two discusses the quantitative approach; section three 
discusses the qualitative approach; and, section four discusses general issues, 
constraints and limitations of this study. 
Quantitative and Qualitative approaches 
There are two broad approaches to research: the quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Quantitative research is generally concerned with measurement and is 
characterised by structured and standardised data collection using surveys and 
experiments (Walker, 1985). The quantitative approach is characterised by an emphasis 
on measurement, analysing causal relationships between variables, and inferring 
generalisation found in the samples to the general population. While qualitative 
research emphasises concepts and categories, not their incidence and frequencies. 
Chapter Seven: Research Methodology 176 
Qualitative research also analyses the process and not relationships between variables. 
Qualitative research stresses the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints 
that shape inquiry. 
Bryman and Cramer (1992) propose a model of quantitative research as 
highlighted in Figure 7.1. In this model a research process begins with a theoretical 
domain where problem statements, concepts and hypotheses are derived. Likewise, 
the testing of theory is employed by deducing research hypotheses. A hypothesis 
commonly takes form of a relationship between two or more entities. Concepts in 
hypotheses are translated into operational definitions to determine the variables to be 
measured. The next stage is to find the subjects or respondents to be studied. In the 
model, there are two types of research designs in quantitative method: the 
survey/correlational design and the experimental design. This process then proceeds to 
data collection, data analysis and findings. Analysis of data involves examining 
relationships between research variables and statistical tests to establish their 
significance and finally the decision as to whether, to accept or reject the research 
hypotheses. Finally, research findings are subsequently incorporated into a body of 
theory. 
The second approach is a qualitative research method: an inquiry in the form 
quantities of data in words and ideas rather than numbers and statistics (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984; p.1S, Rudestam and Newton, 1992; p.113)(2). The word qualitative 
also indicates tI, "processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined, or 
measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency" 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; p.4). This approach generally views the individual or 
organisation in a holistic manner, rather than reduced to isolated variables and 
hypotheses. Qualitative research designs are not intended to test a theory, but engage 
the inductive approach whereby theory will emerge once the data are collected and 
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FIGURE 7.1: RESEARCH PROCESS AND HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
Source: BtymaIl and Cramer, 1992~ p.3 
analysed. Pure qualitative research usually emphasises hypothesis generating rather 
than hypothesis testing. Miles and Huberman (1984) describe qualitative data analysis 
as involving three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction applies to the process of choosing. 
focusing, simplitying, summarising and transforming the raw data collected during the 
field work. Data display is an arrangement of information to enable drawing of 
conclusions. Finally. conclusion drawing/verification is involved by noting of 
regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows and 
propositions. 
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Brannen (1992) points out three major differences between these two 
approaches: (a) how variables and the formulation of hypotheses are viewed~ (b) how 
data collection is viewed, and (c) extrapolation and generalizability. The quantitative 
researcher identifies variables and defines variables and variable categories. These 
variables are linked together to form hypotheses before data are collected. In contrast. 
the qualitative researcher begins by defining very general concepts. Then, as research 
progresses, the researcher changes their definitions. For the quantitative method. 
variables are the crucial instrument of the analysis. In contrast in the qualitative 
method, they may constitute the product or outcome. 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) highlight five points of differences between 
quantitative and qualitative research: in terms of the use of positivism, acceptance of 
post modern sensibilities, capturing individuals' points of view, examining constraints 
of everyday life, and securing rich descriptions. These differences are as a result of 
their commitment to the different style of research, different epistemologies, and 
different forms of representation. Quantitative research uses mathematical models, 
graphs, tables, statistical tests, and impersonal (third person prose) when writing about 
research. In contrast qualitative research, among others, uses ethnographic prose, 
historical narrative, first person accounts, still photographs, life histories, fictionalised 
facts, and biographical and autobiographical materials (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; p.6). 
Combined Quantitative-Qualitative Methods 
Why combine research methods? A combination of research methods implies 
rich opportunities for cross-validating and cross-fertilising research procedures, 
findings, and theories (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; p.13). It was diverse methods, 
('multiple measurement' or 'triangulation') to tackle a research problem. It provides 
tools for interpreting convergent and divergent evidence from several sources. It is 
argued that a researcher ought to be flexible and therefore ought to select a range of 
methods, appropriate to the research problem under investigation. 
Despite the advantages of the combining methods, care and precision are 
needed at all stages of the research process, from the design stage to the writing up 
Chapter Seven: Research Methodology 179 
(Brannen, 1992; p.17). Combined methods are not necessarily superior to a single 
method. However, when properly combined, they will enhance the research (Bryman, 
1992; p.33). 
Bryman (1992) suggests three ways of combining multiple methods in the 
research process: (a) qualitative work as a facilitator of quantitative work~ (b) 
quantitative work as facilitator to qualitative work, and; ( c) giving equal emphasis to 
both approaches. The first category, where qualitative work as a facilitator of 
quantitative work serves for: (a) source of hunches or hypotheses to be tested; (b) 
developing and piloting research instruments, and~ (c) interpretation and clarification 
of quantitative data. The next category where the pre-eminence of the qualitative over 
the quantitative serves for: (a) providing quantified background data in which to 
contexualise small-scale intensive studies; (b) quantitative methods to test hypotheses 
thrown up by the qualitative work, and; (c) quantitative work may provide a basis for 
the sampling of cases and comparison groups which form intensive study. Finally, 
when the qualitative and quantitative are given equal weight, they are to link studies 
which are distinct from one another at all stages of the research process. These two 
types of data are treated as complementary to one another. This study adopted the 
third approach of giving equal weight and complementary to one another approach. 
The quantitative data served to provide general pattern about the topic, whereas 
qualitative data accommodated detailed explanations about the problem. The 
quantitative approach also helped the researcher to narrow down the choice of cases, 
guided by the criteria obtained through the quantitative approach 
The process of combining approaches and methods must consider several other 
factors. First, on the issue of the relative importance given to each approach within 
overall research. Second, on the issue concerning time ordering; whether to carried out 
both approaches simultaneously or consecutively. Third, on the issue concerning at 
what stage in the research process, the respective methods come into play. 
GENERAL OVERVIEW ON THE STUDY APPROACH 
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This study is an inquiry into the implementation of the public low'cost housing 
programme in Malaysia. This study focuses factors limiting the achievement of the 
programme's performance. The study aims to describe the prominent features of the 
programme's components and to provide a detailed account of the programme's 
implementation process. 
The study employed quantitative and qualitative methods in gathering 
information to answer the research question. The researcher conducted this study in 
two stages. The first stage was conducted using a quantitative approach, by carrying 
out data collection from project records. The objectives were to study the pattern of 
the projects' implementation process as well as to investigate relationships between 
variables which accounted for the programme's performance. 
The second stage data collection was a qualitative approach, conducted 
through guided interviews with those involved in the programme's implementation. The 
objective was to provide an explanation and detailed description of how the 
programme was implemented through several selected projects initiated in the Third, 
Fourth and Fifth Malaysia Plans. By inquiring into the process of programme 
implementation about these projects, the researcher intended to identify factors limiting 
the programme's performance. 
Research design 
A research design is a plan of attack on what information a researcher needs to 
generate to complete a study (Castetter and Heisler, 1981; p.16). Thus, it is 
emphasised in any scientific investigation must begin with some structure or plan 
(Spector, 1981; p.19). A research design is a plan of study related to the gathering of 
information to enable the researcher to answer questions posed in the statement of the 
problem. The study design is a preconceived notion of what data to generate, why they 
are required, how they are acquired and how they are refined, related to the statement 
of the problem. However, a research design must be practical and is limited by money, 
time and personnel. According to Spector (1981), investigation requires several steps 
to complete. First, by formulating a research question. The question can be in the form 
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of a hypothesis that predicts the occurrence of relationships among variables or it can 
be of asking what kind of relationship among variables exists. Second, is to plan the 
design of investigation. This involves the choice of variables, procedures, control, 
randomisation plan, and where and how to collect data. The third step is the decision 
on the operationalisation of dependent variables, that is the statement of procedures 
used to create their levels. The final step, is to conduct the study or data collection 
itself. 
The approach of this study is to use a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. The quantitative approach will be used to analyse the general 
pattern of the programme and to gain a general overview before selecting cases for 
further detailed studies. The quantitative technique is employed to confirm or reject 
hypotheses about performance" for the period between 1976 and 1990. The qualitative 
research method is used to provide richness of data on the processes of policy 
implementation that was not captured by the quantitative approach. Since the 
quantitative approach collects data based on several pre-conceptions and intervention 
at certain points, it is unable to look into the whole implementation process. The 
qualitative approach seeks to answer the research question from the perspectives of 
programme participants and relevant actors. 
This study adopted the triangulation approach especially for the hypotheses 
testing. The quantitative data provides the background and general pattern on 
programme implementation in the five-year plans, states and implementing agencies. 
Whereas qualitative data provides description of what was going on at the project 
level 
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Data collection method 
The structure of the data collection method for this research is divided into two 
stages as follows:-
Stage One: 
Limited by resources and time, a decision was made to study a sample of about 
20% from the estimated 1,000 public low cost housing projects formulated between 
1976 and 1990. As a result, 215 projects were selected through disproportionate 
stratified random sampling from a sampling frame of 624 projects carried out in seven 
states of West Malaysia. Each project was stratified into four elements:-
(1) the "five-year plan period", 
(2) the "location" (states), 
(3) the "implementing agency" and 
(4) the "status of completion." 
Seven states were selected, enabling this researcher to make comparisons between 
each of the three types of implementing agencies engaged in the programme. 
The next task was to gather relevant data about each project selected. This 
included project resourcing, cost and financing, steps and length of the implementation 
process from inception until completion, and the targeted and actual output of the 
project. This study aims to discover the general pattern and degree of relationship 
between selected variables by statistical methods. Data were collected from 
programme records, files and documents which are available from government 
departments. 
The main source for data collection for this stage came from the programme's 
administrative records, in the form of project files which are kept by related 
government agencies. The majority of these records are kept by the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government (MHLG). In addition, information for the projects is 
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also kept by the Housing Division of the state governments, the implementing 
agencies, the Treasuty, and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) at the Prime Minister's 
Department. These files provided information on the progress of projects from their 
inception until completion. They provide accurate records on cost, time and number of 
houses completed.(3) Detailed information was also sometimes available about who 
were involved and responsible for the projects, who made decisions and how they were 
made, the cost of the programme, the process involved and trends and patterns of the 
process over time. Finally, additional information was obtained from several progress 
reports, project documents, agreements, minutes of meeting, etc. 
Data from programme records were transferred into a "data collection roster" 
which resembled a Questionnaire format. The aim was to input data which were 
systematic, consistent and easy to code for computerised statistical analysis. A pilot 
test was also carried out to check the suitability of this roster for capturing the required 
data. The roster was improved after the pilot test had been carried out. 
Stage Two: 
The focus of this stage was on a qualitative approach, with the aim of providing 
rich data, getting the story from the perspective of the people involved in the 
programme. Information from the quantitative data in the first stage facilitated the 
selection of cases in the Qualitative approach of the second stage. The study of the 
second stage aimed to provide detailed descriptions of programme implementation and 
to understand particular problems or situations in greater depth. It provided answers in 
a qualitative manner to the questions of factors limiting programme achievement. A 
smaU number of projects was selected as case studies from the list of projects sampled 
in the first stage. Information gathering was carried out by guided interviews with 
those involved in the programme implementation. 
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QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
To meet the research objective, testing of hypotheses and to understand the 
implementation pattern of public low cost housing projects, a plan of study for the 
quantitative approach was prepared consisting of six main steps. The first stage began 
with the preparation of a sampling frame of 624 projects based on the four strata, then 
the drawing of cases by disproportionate stratified sampling. followed by gathering of 
data from the programme's administrative records into a data collection roster, 
entering data into the computer, carrying out statistical tests and their interpretations 
and finally writing the results of analysis. The following is the summary of the study 
approach:-
Step 1: Prepare a Sampling Frame 
Step 2: Sample Selection 
Step 3: Data Gathering into a Roster 
Step 4: Data Entry into Computer and Data Checking 
Step S: Statistical Tests and Data Analysis 
Step 6: Writing of the Results. 
Step 1: Sampling Frame 
The first task was to prepare an accurate and valid sampling frame. This 
sampling frame consisted of a list of all projects formulated during the three five year 
plans between 1976 and 1990. (4) Then, a selection of samples was made from this 
sampling frame. 
The initial step in preparing the sampling frame began with searching lists of 
formulated projects in each five year plan. Usually at the beginning of each five-year 
plan, project submissions were compiled by the MHLG after approval by the 
'Economic Planning Unit.' Another project list was also issued during the five year plan 
revision. Searching through files at MHLG assisted in the preparation of a list of 
projects formulated during each five year plan. The next step was to collect progress 
reports prepared by state governments, reporting on the progress of each formulated 
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project. Then, project files were traced and checked. Comparing and assessing three 
sources of information assisted in preparation of a 'tentative sampling /rame'. Working 
on the compilation of a sampling frame required a considerable amount of time in order 
to trace, check and compare all the projects available from the programme's record 
files. The reason for this was that the researcher had to trace each project's progress in 
order to assign its completion status. During visits to state secretariats the list of 
projects in this sampling frame was re-checked once again to ensure its validity and 
reliability. Amendments and modifications to the lists were made once the researcher 
was satisfied with the information gathered about the project. The sampling frame was 
considered finalised once the 'tentative sampling frame', based on records available at 
MHLG was compared with records searched during the visits to states. 
The list of projects in the sampling frame was arranged according to four strata; 
the five year plans, states, implementing agencies and projects' completion status. The 
purpose was to enable selection of cases representing: (a) projects initiated in the three 
five-year plans between 1976 and 1990; (b) projects initiated in the seven selected 
states (see below); (c) projects that were implemented by each of the three type of 
agencies, and; (d) all types of project completion status. This process was a laborious 
task because the searching for files and progress reports that dated back as far as 1975. 
Since this research deals with past projects, searching of records involved investigating 
piles of dusty files, reports and papers in the store rooms. 
One of the most difficult tasks was to find out information about the 'status of 
completion' for each project. This means that the progress of all projects was traced in 
order to assign 'the status of completion' code in the sampling frame. After the 
sampling frame had been completed, the task related to sample selection could be 
carried out. 
Location of the records 
The information on the-PLCHP projects was largely kept in each of the project 
files at the three divisions of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, i.e. the 
Chapter Seven: Research Methodology 186 
Research and Development Division; the Planning and Development Division and the 
National Housing Department. 
(i) The Research Division was given the task of co-ordinating and monitoring 
the programme after the internal reorganisation of the Ministry in 1991. Nearly all of 
the programme files since 1971 are available. These project files were transferred from 
the former Housing Trust (abolished in 1976) and handed over fro files from the 
MHLG's Planning and Development Division. 
(ii) The Planning and Development Division co-ordinated the programme from 
1976 to 1991. Some of the relevant records which were not handed over to the 
Research Division are kept by this division. 
(iii). The National Housing Department, provides detailed records of all 
projects under the responsibility of this Department, including detailed drawings of 
layouts and buildings, tender specifications, communication with states' governments, 
planning and building approvals, etc. However, for the purpose of this study the 
relevant records are mainly for projects in Perak and Johor and in addition, 10 projects 
for Selangor, three projects for Negeri Sembilan, three projects in Pahang and one 
project in Trengganu. 
Since the information was scattered, the task was therefore to get an overall 
picture of each project and to find values related to the "chosen variables." The task of 
linking information from various branches of the Ministry, the Housing Division at the 
State Secretariats and some of the implementing agencies was very time-consuming. 
Some of the documents in the files provided the cross reference number of other 
divisions' files and also file references at the Housing Division of State Secretariats. 
Knowing the state secretariats' files reference numbers in advance helped to speed up 
file searching because those files could be requested before this researcher arrived at 
the state secretariats. 
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Step 2: Sample Selection 
As mentioned above, four major criteria were used in the sampling frame: the 
planning period, states, implementing agencies and project completion status. Detailed 
explanations for the said criteria are as follows:-
Five year planning period 
Three five-year plans became the focus of this research; the 'Third Malaysia 
Plan' implemented between 1976 and 1980, the 'Fourth Malaysia Plan' from 1981-
1985, and the 'Fifth Malaysia Plan' covering 1986 and 1990. Each 'formulated project' 
was assigned according to a particular five-year plan. Only 'formulated projects' were 
taken into the sampling frame. 'Formulated projects' were the housing projects 
proposed by the states government at each five-year plan and approved by the federal 
government. These projects were considered as the approved projects for a particular 
five year plan. 
States 
Seven states in Peninsular Malaysia were chosen in the sampling frame. These 
states were as follows:-
(1) Iohor, 
(2) Negeri Sembilan, 
(3) Selangor, 
(4) Perak, 
(5) Pulau Pinang, 
(6) Pahang, and 
(7) Trengganu. 
The two most important consideration in the selection of these states were that they 
represented all the four regions in Peninsular Malaysia and used all the three types of 
implementing agencies for the programme implementation. In addition, they also 
represented a variety of characteristics of the states in Malaysia such as the size, degree 
of urbanisation, income level, population growth, etc. (5) Due to financial and time 
constraints, five other states in West Malaysia and two states in East Malaysia were 
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not included in the sampling frame. Table 7.1 below shows the distribution of the 
number projects formulated for each of the three five year plans between 1976 and 
1990 in the seven states in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Table 7.1: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS BY PLANS 
AND STATES BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
State Third Fourth 
Malaysia Malaysia 
Plan Plan 
JOHOR 20 49 
NEGERI SEMBILAN 33 64 
SELANGOR 65 74 
PERAK 41 68 
PULAUPlNANG 8 22 
PAHANG 48 52 
·TRENGGANU 18 34 
GRAND TOTAL 233 363 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Implementing agencies 
Fifth 
Malaysia 
Plan 
Total 
2 99 
1 110 
9 109 
28 624 
There were, and still are, three major types of implementing agency engaged by 
state governments, to act on their behalf in project implementation:-
(1) the National Housing Department, 
(2) the State Economic Development Corporations, and 
(3) the Public Works Department. 
Each state is at liberty to appoint these agencies or any other agencies as they wish, to 
assist mostly on technical matters to do with the construction of public housing in 
Malaysia. Most of the states, with the exception of Selangor, engaged a single major 
implementing agency to implement the majority of their projects, although in certain 
circumstances a few projects were also given to other implementing agencies. During 
the period referred to by this research, however Selangor engaged all three agencies to 
implement substantial numbers of its projects throughout all three development plans. 
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Table 7.2 below shows the distribution of projects by states and their implementing 
agencies. 
Table 7.2: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS BY STATES AND Th1PLEMENTING 
AGENCIES 
State! Agencies National State Public ,. Total 
Housing Economic Works 
Department Development Deparhpent 
Corporations 
Iohor 68 2 1 71 
N.Sembilan 3 93 •• ·.: 3:::}: .... 99 : 
Selangor 10 82 47 139 
Perak 105 3 ::: 2 . ;::: no 
P. Pinang 
- -
34 34 
Pahang 4 105 109 
Trengganu 2 60 62 
Total 192 
.' 345 87:.: 624 :': 
Percentage 30.8% 55.3 13.9 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Status of Completion 
Four categories completion status were assigned to each of the projects. The 
categories are as follows: 
1. 'Completed Within Plan' for a project which was formulated and finally 
completed withjn the same five-year plan. 
2. 'Completed in Next Plan' for a project which was started in one of the 
five-year plans and completed in the next five-year plan. 
3. 'Completed in the next two plans' for a project which was started in one 
of the five-year plans and completed in the next two plans or more. 
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4. 'IncompletelUnder construction' for a project which was never 
completed or was still under construction on 1.6.1994. Some of these 
projects were cancelled or abandoned due to a variety of reasons. This 
category includes two projects which are still under construction. 
The distribution of projects in the seven states according to their status of completion 
is shown in the following Table 7.3:-
Table 7.3: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS ACCORDING TO COMPLETION STATUS AND 
STATES 
::: Status/ Completed Completed CompJeted Uncompleted ' ·Total 
:::::: :?:: :::: <':"'::;., :;. 
·:1;;;:: 
State Within the in the Next in the Next .:'{ qf Stip .. : 
, ..: .... 
::::. :::: 
Same Plan Plan Two;plans ,. Under'· .. I·'·', .• ,.,. . .. . '.:. 
Construction .... 
Johor 12 40 4 15 71 
N:Sembilan 42 30 1 :,. 26.: 99 ::::: 
Selangor 47 60 6 26 139 
Perak 20 56 5 29 110 
P . Pinang 11 16 7 34 
Pahang 13 49 16 31 
.•.. 109 . 
Trengganu 26 13 3 20 62 
171 264 35 ·154 ·· ~i4 :.,.,;. Total ,,:; 
Percentage 27.4% 42.3% 5.6% 24.7% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Sample Size and Sample Selection 
Constrained by finance and time, a sample of about 200 projects was decided 
on during the preparation of the research proposal so as to provide a reasonably 
representative selection of projects in the programme between 1976 and 1990. This 
study selected 215 projects as the sample. Since it was necessary to gather scattered 
information on projects from various records at several places and to complete the 
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fieldwork within the three months' constraint set by the sponsor, selection of about 
200 projects would have been the optimum sample size. 
The 'disproportionate sampling technique' was employed as an appropriate 
approach to sample selection. (6) In order to reflect reasonable representativeness of 
projects in the data analysis, each case was given its 'weighting' depending on its ratio 
in the cell. The following approach was adopted by this writer for the 
'disproportionate sampling' of sample selection: 
(1) All the projects in any cell selected if they were less than three. For 
example, if the cell contained two projects both of them were selected as sample for 
that particular cell. 
(2) A minimum of three projects selected If the cell had three or more projects 
but was too small to accommodate a straightforward twenty percent sample, then three 
samples at least were chosen instead. 
(3) About 20%' 0/ the samples selected if the number 0/ projects in any cell 
was large enough to accommodate a 20 percent calculation. The word 'about 20 
percent' here means that the actual number of samples selected was more than 20 
percent of any straightforward calculation. For example, if in the cell there were 23 
projects, a 20% calculation would suggest 4.6 projects, then 5 projects were chosen as 
samples. 
Example of Sample Selection 
This disproportionate sampling approach has overcome the problem of leaving 
some cells which were too small to accommodate the straightforward '20 percent 
calculation'. An Illustration of. how 'disproportionate sample selection' for the States 
of Selangor in the Fourth Malaysia Plan appears in Table 7.4 below. During the 
Fourth Malaysia Plan there were 74 new projects formulated in Selangor. The State of 
Selangor assigned these projects to three implementing agencies; 10 projects to the 
National Housing Department, 37 projects to Selangor's Economic Development 
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Corporation and 27 projects to the Public Works Department. Based on the sample 
selection criteria above, 9 out of 10 projects were selected from projects implemented 
by the National Housing Department. Twelve out 36 projects were selected from the 
State Economic Development Corporation. Finally, 9 out 27 samples were selected 
from the Public Works Department's projects. The total number of samples selected 
for Selangor during the Fourth Malaysia Plan was 30 out of74 projects. 
Table 7.4: 
EXAMPLE OF DISPROPORTIONATE SAMPLING FOR THE STATE OF 
SELANGOR FOR THE FOURTH MALAYSIA PLAN. 
Implementing 
Works 
Department 
Total Projects 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Number of 
The summary of samples selected according to the five year plans and states 
appeared in Table 7.5 below. Out of624 public housing projects implemented by seven 
states which covered the three 'five year development plans' a total of 215 projects 
have been selected for the samples for data analysis. A total of 91 samples were 
selected from the Third Malaysia Plan, 105 samples from the Fourth Malaysia Plan and 
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18 samples for the Fifth Malaysia Plan. Another Table 7.6 below shows the distribution 
of samples according to states, agencies and project completion status. 
Table 7.5: 
NUMBER OF SAMPLES SELECTED FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC 
LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME IN MALAYSIA (1976-1990) 
State 
GRAND TOTAL 
Source: 
Third 
Malaysia 
Plan 
92 
Fourth 
Malaysia 
Plan 
105 
Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Fifth 
Malaysia 
Plan 
18 
Total 
215 
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Table 7.6: DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS ACCORDING TO STATES, 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES AND COMPLETION STATUS 
Completion Status Completed 
Within Plan 
States\ 
Johor 
NHD 3 
SEDC 0 
PWD 0 
3 
Grand Total 
Completed 
in Next Plan 
9 
2 
0 
12 
1 
1 
Completed 
in Ne>..tTwo 
Plans 
3 
0 
0 
14
··'· ::::":"'::.: ... 
::;::;;;. ' 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Uncompleted Total 
and Under 
Construction 
6 21 
0 2 
1 1 
194 
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Step 3: Data Gathering into a Roster 
The gathering of information involved the collection of data from 
'administrative records' at the MHLG in Kuala Lumpur and also visits to 'Housing 
Divisions' of all the seven state secretariats. About one and half months of the 
fieldwork was spent at the Ministry while almost two months was spent on visits to all 
the seven states. On average, about one week was spent in each of the states. The task 
of data gathering involved searching of files, records, progress reports and other 
relevant records. 
The required information was gathered into a 'data collection roster'. The 
'roster' is a form of "questionnaire" administered by the researcher when searching into 
files of selected PLCHP's files. The 'data collection roster' contains five main sections 
as the following:-
Section 1: Project's background. 
Section 2 : Project's preliminary preparation. 
Section 3: Project's resourcing. 
Section 4: Planning approval process 
Section 5: Construction and completion 
Section 1: Project's background 
This section contained- the project's name, district and state, date of project 
formulation, five year plan period, the category of project location, whether inside or 
outside local authorities' controlled areas, whether an extension of a previous project 
(phase of development), the number of houses targeted, the number of houses finally 
built, the type of houses built, and the project's intended aim. 
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Section 2: Information about project's preliminary preparation 
This section included types of land proposed for the project, when the site was 
identified, whether the land report was prepared, any changes to the proposed site, the 
type of changes to the proposed project, justification to a particular chosen site, when 
the land application was made to the land office, when land was made available for the 
project and the land cost. It also included project estimates, feasibility studies and 
reasons for project cancellation. 
Section 3: Project Resourcing 
This section consisted of information about whether the 'revolving fund' was 
made available and utilised for the project, the project's original estimated cost, the 
date of the loan application submitted to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, the date of loan approval by the Technical Committee on Housing Loan 
(TCOlll.), the date and amount of the loan agreed by the Treasury, the date and 
amount of the agreement signed between the State and Federal Government, when 
loan withdrawals were made and whether any additional loan was approved by the 
Federal Government. 
Section 4: Planning Approval Process 
This section related to questions like the types of planning approval required, 
when planning and building approval was granted by local authorities and the date of 
certificate of fitness issued. 
Section S: Construction and Completion 
The information in this section included when construction began and ended, 
amount of construction cost, total costs, when the project was handed over to the 
Housing Division of the State ~ecretariat and the date of occupation. 
Step 4: Data entry into computer and checking 
Data entry was first made into the Lotus 123R23 installed in "notebook 
computer" and then it was converted into SPSS Windows 6.0 of the desk top 
computer. (7) Data entry into computer was entered case by case after variables and 
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coding had been formulated. Entering the value into each cell was time consuming. A 
total of 108 variables was created for 215 cases which mean 23,112 cells had to be 
entered with values. Therefore more than a month was spent on this task. 
After data had been completely entered the next task was to carry out a test run 
and data checking. SPSS provided a means of data checking by the exploration 
method, rechecking frequencies method where the distribution of each value in the 
variable was printed and checked by the box plot method. Any extreme values and any 
suspected values were checked for their appropriateness. Mostly errors occurred due 
to typing errors. In addition the researcher's inside knowledge and experience in 
working with the programme helped to provide hunches and refined the logic of data 
verifications. The data presented from the administrative records were valid and 
accurate. They were not modified or never amended by programme administrators as 
attempt of trying to hide something from this researcher. After all, many of the people 
involved in the programme were not there any more(l). After rechecking and the 
process of going through the data about 90% of the data collected were valid and 
accurate. Another 10% could be due to unintentional human errors such as typing 
errors, wrong entries or due to difficulties reading some of the blurred photo copies 
and some handwriting information from the records. Since long ago the Malaysian 
administrative system has supported and is committed to a project reporting system 
which can be traced back to the Red Book reporting system introduced in 1960s 
(Davies, 1981). Masser praises Malaysia's SETIA reporting system as a successful 
project monitoring system that is due to a healthy and stable organisational climate in 
the administrative system (Masser, 1990; p.14). The systematic record keeping through 
minutes of meetings, checking and various reporting system has enabled data collection 
for this programme to be taken as far as 1975. 
1. The public administration in Malaysia keeps accurate records of programme as these records 
were subjected to auditing. Since this research studied about implementation of PLCHP in 
past five-year plans. many of programme administrators in-charge of these projects were not 
anymore worked at MHLG or State Housing Department. They bad been transferred to other 
departments or somewhere else. Thus, this researcher believed that there was no element of 
biding any infonnation from this researcher. 
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Step 5: Statistical tests and data analysis 
Then several statistical tests were carried out such as engaging the frequency 
distribution, cross tabulation, comparison of means, t-tests and analysis of variance. 
The aim was to analyse patterns amongst variables and to test if relationships occurred. 
Then, statistical tests of correlation and regression were also carried out. 
Step 6: Writing of the results 
The final part of this study approach is to present relevant and significant 
results in writing. These statistical results are presented in this thesis 
SECOND STAGE: QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
The second stage is the qualitative approach which aims at providing richness 
of data, getting stories from the perspective of people involved in the programme and 
adding facts to the first stage of data collection. Through this approach, detailed 
descriptions of programme implementation are obtained that help the researcher to 
understand particular problems in greater depth. It provides answers in a qualitative 
manner to the questions of what factors limit programme achievement. 
Quantitative work implies the application of a measurement and numerical 
approach to the nature of the issue under scrutiny as well as the gathering and analysis 
of data (Bullock et al, 1992; p.85). Qualitative investigation, in contrast, is often 
viewed as intensive or micro perspective and relies upon case studies or evidence 
gleaned from individuals. Qualitative approaches always adopt the non-probability 
sampling strategy. For this stage the cases to be selected are not truly random and also 
do not provide representativeness of data to enable generalisation to the main 
population as in the first stage. In contrast to the first stage, the power of this stage lies 
on 'information rich cases~ Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn 
a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the study. Because we 
are limited by constraints such as time, cost and actors who are willing to participate in 
the study, the gathering of a small number of cases with rich information rather than a 
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large number of cases with little infonnation is a reasonable approach for this second 
stage. 
Sampling Technique 
Twenty four projects were selected for the qualitative study from the sample of 
215 projects in stage one. The selection was based on non-random and purposive 
sampling. Certain criteria were set for the selection of cases. The aim was to 
investigate programme variations across sites, planning periods and agencies. At this 
stage the focus was to provide detailed descriptions of project implementation and to 
examine factors expediting and limiting the programme perfonnance. 
To achieve the objective of extracting a range of cases in a small sample, this 
researcher determined to select several projects around means and median in the 
quantitative data calculation and then to compare them with several cases around the 
first and third quartile. Extreme cases such as those cases which were too fast and too 
slow in the implementation process were not considered in this second stage. Extreme 
cases which were too slow in the whole implementation process were considered 
bound with too many problems whereas the fastest cases experienced very few 
problems in the whole implementation process. The basic idea behind this selection of 
cases is to highlight what was usually happening in the majority of cases. However in 
this process of selection cases should be included with variation among five year plans, 
states and implementing agencies. 
The Selection of Cases 
To select samples of 'about twenty cases' from the list of215 projects the 
process adopted underwent three steps as follows:-
(1) Narrowing the projects only to three states. 
(2) Matching the projects according to the three criteria; the "length of 
time" taken to complete the project, the "project's total cost" based on 
adjusted 1990's price and "target achievement", 
(3) Selecting several incomplete projects. 
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Nan-owing the choice. Only projects in three states were selected in this stage 
two. The states selected were Negeri Sembilan, Perak and Selangor. These states 
represented major projects which were assigned to the National Housing Department, 
the Public Works Department and the State Economic Development Corporations. As 
a consequence of this narrowing process, a total of 111 projects were left in the 
sampling frame from the total of215 projects sampled in the first stage. 
Cases Matching. The III projects for the three states were further re-arranged 
for the selection process based on the criteria as follows:-
(1) A number of projects were selected which had their 'length of time for 
completion' tabulated around median and mean, first quartile and third quartile. 
(2) A number of projects were selected which had their 'adjusted total cost 
according to 1990's price' distributed around median and mean, first quartile 
and third quartile. 
(3) Several cases were which achieved their target, below target and above the 
target. 
(4) Finally, selected cases examined and fair representation of the five year 
plans and implementing agencies was checked. As a result, a total of 19 
projects were selected. 
(5) In addition to the above process a number of 'uncompleted projects' were 
also selected. 
The projects selection at this stage was not purely random but guided by projects 
which the researcher felt could provide rich infonnation and in addition actors involved 
with the projects could be traced and were available to participate in the proposed 
guided interviews. Some of them had promised to participate in this interview when 
they were met them during the first stage quantitative data collection. As a 
consequence of this process, a total of twenty four projects were selected for the 
qualitative data collection as shown in Table 7.7. Out of a total of 24 projects planned, 
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only 20 projects succeeded in collecting 'an almost complete picture " while four 
other projects only obtained partial information. 
Table 7.7: 
PROJECTS SELECTED FOR THE QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION IN THE 
STAGE TWO 
Source: Researcher's Qualitative Data Collection 1994 
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Interview Guide Approach 
The key information gathered at trus stage was done by carrying out in-depth 
guided interviews to extract information based on the perspective from actor's point of 
view. The interview guide approach was chosen where topics and issues to be covered 
were specified in advance, in outline form; and the interviewer decides the sequence 
and wording of questions in the course of the interview. The outline increases the 
comprehensiveness of the data and makes collection more systematic for each 
respondent. Logical gaps in data can be anticipated and closed. Interviews remain fairly 
conversational. The weaknesses of this approach is that important and· salient topics 
may be inadvertently omitted. Interviewer flexibility in sequencing and wording 
questions can result in substantially different meanings and responses by respondents, 
thus reducing the comparability of responses. However, the interviews in this study 
were to seek explanation of different projects from different respondents. Interviews 
were involved mainly with programme administrators at the federal, state and 
implementing agencies for the selected 'case studies'. A set of guided interview 
questionnaires were used as a guidelines for conduct the interview and asking 
questions. This guided interview was carried out to elicit the respondents experiences 
and opinions related to the implementation of PLCHP. The aim of these in-depth 
interviews is to verify certain facts and to capture information which was not available 
or was left out from the programme records. 
This researcher rejected the informal conversation approach because of its 
impromptu nature where there is no predetermination of question topics or wording. 
The approach would be more suitable for the participation observation approach. 
In addition this researcher also felt that another approach of standardised open 
ended interview with the exact wording and sequence of questions determined in 
advanced was also not appropriate approach for this research. This approach asks all 
interviewees the same basic questions in the same order. Although increasing 
comparability of responses (data are complete for each topic addressed in each 
interview) little flexibility occurs in relating the interview to particular individuals and 
circumstances. Standardised wording of questions may constrain and limit naturalness 
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and relevancy of questions to different projects, according to plans, states, agency and 
completion status. 
Respondents 
During stage two data collection, the researcher identified about 30 
respondents, but it was expected that not all would be available for interview during 
the short trip back to Malaysia. However, twenty five people did participate in the 
interview sessions. In order to achieve anonymity the respondents preferred to be 
known by 'nick names'. The list of respondents who participated in the interviews 
appears in Table 7.8 this thesis. 
Second Stage: Fieldwork 
As a strategy to overcome any short comings during the fieldwork, the 24 
projects had been arranged in' order of priority. These possible short comings were: 
time constraints, unavailability of respondents, inability of respondents to recall 
detailed projects narration and other unforeseen circumstances. Information at this 
stage was gathered through guided interviews with those involved in the programme 
implementation. Also searching into project documents was done to verify some of the 
information given, especially related to dates and figures. (Respondents also sometimes 
requested that some of the facts they stated be cross-checked with project documents.) 
This second stage of fieldwork was carried out in a period of about two months 
in November and December 1994. It was accomplished according to the following 
steps:-
Tracing tire respondents: the identified respondents were located. In addition, 
I also checked project documents were checked (files at the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government) to find out who was involved in the selected projects. Tracing 
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Table 7.8: 
LIST OF RESPONDENTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GUIDED INTERVIEW 
Name Connection to the Year/Yean No. Of Notes 
PrQ£nmme Involved Interviews 
1. SHEIK SHO's technician 1982-1994 1 Very experienced technician 
involved in man~ects 
2.AZIZ-l SHO's technician 1992-1994 1 Liaison with the implementing 
~enJ:Y 
3.RAS MHLG's officer 1988-1994 1 Programme co-ordinator 
4.AZIZ-2 MHLG's officer 1978-1981 1 Pro~e co-ordinator 
S.HAMI MHLG's officer 1994 1 Set policy direction for the 
Ministry 
6.ZAKY MHLG's officer 1988-1994 3 ProgrllI!Une co-ordinator 
7.HALO MHLG's officer 1982-1992 2 Programme co-ordinator and set 
policy guidelines for federal 
agencies. 
i.RAWl State Housing Division 1986-1994 1 In-charge of housing in two 
states. 
9. LAN National Housing 1989-1994 3 Design and Planning approvals. 
~ ent 
10.ROHS State Housing Division 1981 to 1986 1 Programme Administrator 
11. NAFIS State Economic Planning 1986-1994 1 Worked in two states' EPU 
Unit. 
12. SHERIF State Housing Division 1978-1980 1 Programme Administrator 
13.RI National Housing 1994 3 Involved in the programme at 
ent district level 1976-1989 
14. VALUE Director General of the 1984-1989 1 Involved in the policy 
Minisby. fonnulation and now adviser to 
housin~ develo~ment. 
IS.KAS State Housing Division. 1981-1983, 2 Programme Administrator 
1993-1994 
16. HAIRY State Housing Division 1980-1984 2 Pr()g!1l!l!tne Administrator 
17.RAFf State Housing Division 1984-1987 1 Progranune Administrator 
I8.HAZE State Housing Division 1980-1985 1 Progranune Administrator 
19.KANIS State Economic 1974-1994 2 Programme hnplementer 
Development 
Corporation 
20. HARDY National Housing 1974-1994 1 Programme Administrator 
~ ent 
21. GEH Public Works 1989-1994 1 Progranune Implementer on the 
~ent, ground 
22. YING Public Works 1980-1994 1 Programme implementer on the 
Depanment, ground 
23.BAKER State Housing Division 1975·1984 1 Programme administrator and c0-
ordinator at district level 
24. CHALI State Housing Division 1982-1995 2 Programme administrator and co-
ordinator at district level 
25. YONG National Housing 1989-1995 1 Structural design for projects 
».._ ....... "t 
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respondents took about a week because it involved searching into 'service records' to 
find where they were working: searching through telephone directories; making 
telephone calls; and making follow-up calls when respondents were not available. 
Making appointments for interviews: once respondents had been located then 
the next stage was to make telephone calls and explain the study. These telephone 
conversations helped to refresh their memories about certain projects and the 
programme as a whole. Appointments for interviews were then fixed. 
Conducting interviews: at the beginning of the interview it was explained once 
again about the aim of the study, the purpose of the interview, the confidentiality of 
information provided and the opportunity to contribute towards improving the 
programme. In most cases interviews would last for about two hours; however in 
several cases they were longer, where two interview sessions were carried out. While 
conducting the interview, the researcher has to ensure all the information required was 
covered by the interview. This was done by 'ticking' the number on the interview 
guide. All interview sessions with respondents were recorded using a tape recorder to 
enable a spontaneous discussion. This researcher dropped the idea of recording 
interviews using the video recorder, due to resentment feel by many of the 
respondents. 
Making notes: short notes on interviews were made immediately after the 
interview session. These short notes contained the main theme, issues and general 
summary of the interview. They were written by hand and usually prepared in the 
evening of the same day. The taped conversations were also used to examine what was 
covered by the interviews and to assess if additional interviews were required. 
Similarly they were used to plan additional questions or modifications of questions for 
subsequent respondents. This strategy helped in many ways such as: (a) to assess 
whether the interview was adequately covered; (b) to improve interview session with 
subsequent respondents; and ( c) to compare certain perspectives or facts with the next 
respondents. 
Conducting second round interviews: second round interviews were carried 
out when additional information was required, clarification about certain statements or 
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issues and also if requested .. by respondents because they believed they would 
contribute and reveal better narration than in the first one. 
Conducting free form discussions: several free form discussions in informal 
manner were also carried out with several respondents especially those who are 
involved with current projects. On comparison there was not much difference in terms 
of problems highlighted by actors of past projects and actors of current projects. 
Transcribing interviews: the final stage was transcribing all the interviews 
and transferring important notes into the computer. This was one of the difficult jobs 
due to several constraints such as:-
(1) Poor speech clarity: sometimes what was being said could not be 
understood clearly. Probably what was said and meant was clearly understood during 
the actual interview session because the researcher could hear and see lip movement 
clearly, also certain narration was aided with facial expression and gestures. Another 
possible cause could be the quality of tapes, recorder or condition of batteries used. 
The best solution found to this problem was to replay using a good quality tape player 
with equaliser or to use a walkman stereo. 
(2) Translating 0/ interviews into English: some of the interviews were 
conducted in the Malay language and some interviews combined both English and 
Malay. It was difficult to transform interview conversations into precise and accurate 
written English. If 100% verbatim was used, the real intention would not be able to be 
understood. 
(3) Transcribing: transcribing :from recorded interview into word processing is 
a slow but worthwhile process. 
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STUDY CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS 
Section three of this chapter explains about problems and constraints faced 
during the data collection of both the quantitative and the qualitative approach. It is 
also mentions the limitations of this study and the two approaches adopted. 
Factors assisting data collection 
As explained earlier, the first stage data collection adopted the quantitative 
approach where searching through programme records was done. Before the work of 
actual data gathering began this researcher had approached the MHLG about the 
proposal to cany out a study and an access requested into the programme's records 
which are available at the Ministry. The same approach was also used to all the seven 
state governments selected in the study. On arrival in Malaysia discussions were also 
held with several senior officials of the Ministry about the proposed research project. 
The Ministry supported this research and in addition they promised to give the 
necessary co-operation to the study. Access to programme records (in forms of project 
files, progress reports, etc.) was granted. The Ministry also informed state 
governments about this and urged them of the necessary help and co-operation for this 
study. A room and facilities were provided at the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. 
Several factors had assisted data collection especially on gaining access to 
records and information of the projects kept by several public agencies. Personal 
experience and knowledge on Malaysian's administrative system and some personal 
contacts helped to gain access to this information. Some of the points are explained as 
follows:-
Know how to gain access to bureaucracy. Knowledge and a working 
experience of various levels of Malaysian public services helped to gain access to 
people and information available at many government departments. 
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Understand how government operates. Data collection can be expedited if one 
knows how government operates. Most records are kept in files, progress reports, 
briefing notes, working paper and minute of meetings. The progress reports of 'five 
year' development projects are usually co-ordinated through several monthly or 
quarterly meetings. Reports on projects' progress and problems are always discussed in 
those meetings. Besides, relevant information is also available from: 
(1) Annual Budget Reports; in many forms (budget performa submitted to 
Treasury, Budget Reports for Parliament or State Legislative Assembly) 
(2) Annual Report 
(3) Malaysia Year Book 
(4) Economic Report 
(5) Bank Negara Report 
(6) Statistics Quarterly and Annual Reports 
(7) Housing Bulletin 
(8) Government and Administrative Circulars 
These reports are usually available at the agencies' library or kept somewhere in the 
book shelves. 
Knuw what vou want. Make the projects list ready with files' reference number 
and cross reference number. Have the list of projects and file references ready. Files' 
reference number available through searching of files at MHLG by referring to the 
correspondence enclosed in the files, copy of agreements and payment vouchers which 
always cited the relevant proje~ts' files. 
Personal contact. Two years working experience in charge of the programme 
assisted gaining contact with people in charge of the programme at federal and state 
level. Some of them are colleagues and acquaintances. The researcher made an effort 
to be introduced by someone if! did not know them. 
Make efforts to see important figures in the State or implementing agencies. 
Courteously call to Chief Ministers, State Secretaries, members of Executive Council, 
head of state economic planning units were made during the fieldwork. As the result, 
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departmental records and related information were made accessible once people 
understood the purpose of this study. 
Quantitative Data Gathering Constraints 
People are less interested in past records/projects. Officials and personnel at 
the Ministry, State Secretariats and implementing agencies were focused and well 
versed about contemporary projects (the Sixth Malaysia Plan) while the researcher was 
looking back into the past; the projects from 1976 to 1990. Therefore discussions with 
personnel were limited to current projects: the 5MP's projects carried over to 6MP. 
Past projects' files are dormant and some are kept in storerooms, rather than in filing 
cabinets. Searching was sometimes difficult, dusty, and some of the photocopied 
documents were difficult to read. Visit to some of the states were made several times 
because the personnel still could not locate the selected project files. This caused 
unanticipated delays in the timetable set earlier for the fieldwork. 
Difficulty in searching records. Records searching at the State Secretariats' 
Housing Division depended on the assistance provided by clerks and technicians. Each 
state has its own system, for example in Perak the researcher dealt only with the chief 
clerk for project files. But, in Johor the researcher had to deal with several personnel to 
obtain infonnation for one project; because the record for one project were kept in 
several files according to sub-headings like physical progress, permission application, 
finance, etc. Delays in data collection occurred because personnel went for fieldwork 
or were on leave. At the National Housing Department we had almost emptied the 
files' store just to search for one of the earliest projects' progress report in 1980's. 
Most of programme managers in charge of projects were not serving in the 
housing division anymore. However since most of them are still working with the 
government, the researcher managed to trace and discuss with some of them, on some 
of the projects. They had also 'promised to participate in the in-depth interviews to be 
carried out in the second stage of fieldwork. 
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Valid and Reliable Data 
Some of these records were sometimes inaccurate and conflicting that caused 
time consuming in verifying them to obtain an accurate value. Comparison of several 
records from various sources' has to be made to reach what was believed to be an 
appropriate value. For example some of the project names were almost similar. Thus 
caused a mix up not only to the researcher, but also to personnel who prepared and 
managed the records in the past 
Sampling frame and samples 
Minor changes to the sampling frame and projects' samples due to the changes 
of project status. Some of the information on actual projects' completion is different 
from the sampling frame when prepared at the earlier stage offieldwork. 
This study focuses on projects began in 3MP, 4MP and 5MP in Malaysia. It 
does not include projects earlier 'five year plan' because records on these projects could 
be difficult to obtain. This study also does not include projects formulated in the Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991-95) because when this research is undertaken the plan still does 
not end. 
QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
Since this research is dealing with past projects which go back as far as 1975, 
the task was to trace the programme administrators and other actors involved in the 
programme is one of the difficulty faced by this researcher. In addition the next 
difficulty is to overcome the problem of how to verity the validity and accuracy of 
statement given by respondents because they might forgot the true story of the project 
poses to them. To overcome the first difficulty, the help of the Public Service 
Department in tracing the respondent was being sought. For the second difficulty in 
dealing with past projects, especially for the 3MP and 4MP's projects, respondents 
were sent with interview guide, to help them to prepare in advance on the topic and 
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recall their memories about the selected projects. Telephone conversation about the 
project before the interview also helped to refresh their memories about the project. 
Other constraints and problems faced by this researcher during the second stage 
data collection are as follows:-
Unforeseen circumstances. Monsoon season and school holidays during 
November affected my fieldwork. Heavy downpour occurred almost every afternoon, 
therefore interviews preferred to be conducted in the morning session only. To 
overcome the heavy down pour problem, when an interview was scheduled in the 
afternoon, I have to arrive in the morning and waited at the respondent's office until 
afternoon. (8) 
Optimising use of time. Interview sessions were unable to carry out every day 
because many people were not available. They went on leave or holidays in 
conjunction with the school holidays in November. 
Time constraints. Given longer time I would have be able to conduct more 
interviews with more respondents and to complete all the 24 cases selected earlier. 
Difficulty to reach respondents. Some of respondents were living away from 
Kuala Lumpur area. To meet them requires more time and money. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter this writer highlighted the research methodology adopted for 
this study by the combination of both quantitative and qualitative approach in 
answering the research problem. Data collection was carried out in two stages. The 
first stage was through quantitative approach by searching data from the programme's 
administrative records. The samples of 215 projects were selected out of a sampling 
frame of 624 public low cost housing projects in three five year plans, in seven states 
which implemented by three implementing agencies. Then, the second stage was 
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carried out through qualitative approach focusing on smaller number of projects which 
were narrowed down through a selection process of "non-random and purposive 
sampling". Guided interviews were carried out with 25 actors involved in these 
projects formulated in three states in West Malaysia and three five year plans between 
1976 to 1990. 
In the following Chapter Eight, this writer shall discuss about the general 
survey of the public low cost housing projects formulated in three five year plans 
between 1976 to 1990 based on data collected by the quantitative approach. Then in 
Chapter Nme there will be a report of data analysis of the qualitative approach. The 
testing of hypotheses will be presented in Chapter Ten. 
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I.Notes: Administrative records are collections of docwnents containing mainly factual infonnation compiled in a 
variety of ways and used by organizations to record the development of and implementation decisions and 
activities that are central to their functions.(Catherine Hakim, Research Design, Routledge, London, 1987 
p.36) . 
2 Hammersley (1992) rejects the notion that the differences between these two methods by the predominance of 
tables and statistical analysis on one hand, and verbal presentation on the other hand. Hammersley asserts that 
the contrast between nwnbers and words are unimportant, but what the two methods attempt are the notion of 
precision. He argues that precision does not necessarily means nwnber. In addition, he posits that accuracy is 
more significant Further he claims that " ... our decisions about what level of precision is appropriate in 
relation to any particular claim should depend on the nature of what we are trying to describe, on the likely 
accuracy of our descriptions, on our purposes, and on the resources available to us; not on ideological 
commitment to one methodological paradigm or another." (Hammersley, 1992; p.43) See Hammersley (1992) 
'Deconstructing the qualitative-quanlitative divide' in Brannen, (1992), Mixing Methods: qualitative and 
quantitative research, Avebury, Aldershot, England. 
3This researcher is confident that data obtained from the administrative record is 95% accurate. This 
is because the Malaysian bureaucracy is well developed where personnel has undergone variety of 
training and courses to enhance their management and record keeping. This PLCHP engaged 
periodical reporting system (monthly and quarterly) to various higher authorities whether at the 
district, state or federal level. Maintenance of an accurate record keeping is a must under the 
provision of office procedures, circulars, manuals and to a certain extent of a legal requirement. 
These records are also subjected to auditing by the Auditor General Department, where 
inappropriate of funds or any action by anyone who is responsible which is not in accordance with 
government procedures or legal requirements, can be subjected to surcharge or disciplinary action. 
Based on these premises, this researcher believed that the information provided from these records 
were reliable, accurate and a valid source. 
""Sampling frames are list used to draw a random sample from a population and should therefore 
theoretically contain every member that population without dupHcation." (pickett, 1974; p.llS) 
5Some of the information on states in Malaysia is presented in the following table:-
Table 7.9: Selected Characteristics of States in Malaysia 
Region/State Urbanisation 
Ratio 1(%) 
NORTIIERN 
Perak: 33.6 
Kedah 16.0 
Pulau Pinang 60.4 
Perlis 11.2 
CENTRAL 62 .8 
SeJangor 55,3 
Melaka 23.1 
N.Sembilan 42.1 
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Wilayab 100.0 1.73 174 1.99 1.68 
EASTERN 
f:: ::;:. :.' ... .;.: ::: Pahang 24'§' , . 0.,75 .· ~~~I~mJiI~~~:: . .: .. .... :;:;:" 
Kelantan 32.2 0.40 
.:.: ..... 
. Trengganu 1.62.: .~:: ... 51.1 
SOUTIIERN 
Iohor 43.7 -:.; 0.91 :~::r' .;.: : ..... ,':'. 
SABAH 25.6 1.02 106 5.69 1.08 
SARAWAK 20.9 0.88 92 2.62 0.96 
Notes: 
1. Urban to rural ratio in 1988. 
2. Per capita gross domestic product in 1990; the ratio to the national average 
3. Per capita income of percentage of the national average in 1988. The average per capita national 
income = M$3857.5 
4. Based on the annual population growth rate between 1980 to 1991. 
6.Disproportionate Stratified Sampling: for the population and composition of total group to some significant 
characteristics is known before the sample is selected. However the size of sample is not proportionate to size 
of sampling unit but is dictated by analytical considerations or convenience. Advantages includes assures 
representativeness, decreased the chance of failing to include members of population because of classification 
process, and characteristics of each stratum can be estimated. In addition more efficient for comparison of 
strata . Disadvantages includes required accurate information on proportion of popUlation in each stratum 
otherwise increases error, also costly to prepare stratified lists. Less efficient to determine population 
characteristics; i.e. more variability for same sample. (Miller, 1991; p.62) 
7 'Notebook computer' was used because part of data entry made during the fieldwork in Malaysia. The 
notebook's limited memory and hard disk capacity required data to be converted into a more powerful desk top 
computer which can accommodate for SPSS Window 6.0. 
8. I was several times soaked to the bone and chilled during the second stage fieldwork because was caught in the 
heavy down pour. I traveled on motorbike because traveling by a car in the afternoon increased the risk of 
getting caught in city's heavy traffic congestion and flash flood! This was also as a mean to cut traveling costs. 
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Chapter Eight 
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of survey results for the selected 215 public 
low cost housing projects formulated in seven states during the three five-year 
development plans between 1976 and 1990. The aim is to provide an overview of the 
public low cost housing projects selected for this study 
First, the chapter brief by describes all key information on all 624 projects 
included in the sampling frame for the study. Second, it analyses for the 215 samples 
projects. The analysis focuses on the key characteristics of projects: their distribution 
amongst five-year plans, states, implementing agencies and their completion status. 
Then there is an analysis of how long is took to complete each stage of the 
implementation process. Third, there is a discussion about project resourcing, which 
includes fund allocation, the amount of loan provided, costs per dwelling and costs 
adjusted to 1990's prices. Finally, there is an analysis of the projects' intended number 
of houses. The survey aims is to analyse variations in time taken and target achieved 
according to plans, states and implementing agencies and to identifY where the delays 
occurred along the stages of the project implementation process. 
Project Distributions 
It was estimated that about 1,000 public low cost housing projects were 
formulated in Malaysia during the three five-year plans between 1976 and 1990. Out of 
that estimate, 624 projects were formulated during that period in seven states of 
Peninsular Malaysia, as shown in Table 8.1 below. The distribution of projects shows 
that: 233 projects (37%) were formulated for the Third Malaysia Plan (3MP), 363 
projects (58%) for the Fourth Malaysia Plan (4l\1P), and only 28 projects (5%) for the 
Fifth Malaysia Plan (5MP). Although there were 28 projects formulated for the 5MP, 
the total number of on going projects in the hands of state governments was larger 
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than that, because it included 157 carried-over projects from the previous two five-
year plans ( or 16,293 units as shown in Table 5.10, Chapter 5). 
Table 8.1 also shows the tabulation of projects in seven states during the three 
five-year plans. Selangor has the largest number of projects (139), then followed by 
Perak (110 projects) and Pahang (109 projects) while Pulau Pinang has the least 
number with only 34 projects. Comparing the plans, we can find that all states have the 
highest number of projects during the 4MP, while having a smaller number of projects 
for the 5MP. 
Table 8.1: 
NUMBER OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS BY STATE 
BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
State Third Fourth Fifth Total Percentage 
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia 
Plan Plan Plan 
IOHOR 20 ' ,49 "".,.,2 ' .;;:: ': :71 .:::: ::\: "": '. 1'1 :4 % "" """ : :::: :-: 
NEGERI SEMBILAN 33 64 2 99 15.9% 
SELAN'GOR 65 74 0 139 22.3% 
PERAl( 41 68 1 110 17.6% 
PULAUPINANG 8 22 4 34 5.4% 
PAHANG 48 52 9 109 17.5% 
TRENGGANU 18 34 10 ':'\"':::" 62::'':.,:':''':'' 9.9% 
GRAND TOTAL 233 363 28 624 100% 
Percentage 37.3% 58.2% 4.5% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The distribution of 624 projects by implementing agencies in the three five-year 
plans appears in Table 8.2. The National Housing Department (NHD) has 192 
projects, comprising 62 projects for 3MP, 127 projects for 4MP and 3 projects for 
5.MP. The State Economic Development Corporations (SEDC) had 345 projects 
consisting of 137 projects for the 3MP, 187 projects for the 4MP and 21 projects for 
the 5MP. The Public Works Department (PWD) had a total of87 projects, of which 34 
projects were in 3MP, 49 projects were in 4MP and only 4 formulated projects in 
5.MP. The percentage of distribution for the three five-year plans for the three agencies 
is as follows : NHD's share is 31 %, SEDC's share is 55% and PWD's share is 14%. 
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Table 8.2: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS ACCORDING TO IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
Plan! Agency NHD SEDC PWD Total 
, 
.'. 
Third Malaysia Plan 62 137 34 233 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 127 187 49 363 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 3 21 ;.;. 
:::; A :::;' 28' :::: ,. 
Total 192 345 87 624 
:; ;:.: ,. .:.; 
L:< ::':: ".:':: .:. Percent 30.8% 55.3% 13 i9o/.~ ::,.::::.:}~:: 100% . :.:.: : . 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.3 below provides a tabulation of projects according to their status of 
completion for the three five-year plans. There are four categories of project 
completion status as follows:-
(1) completed within the plan, 
(2) completed in the next plan, 
(3) completed in next two plans, and 
(4) uncompleted, cancelled or still under construction. 
As shown in Table 8.3, out of the total 624 projects, 172 projects (28%) were 
completed within the same plan, 265 projects (42%) were completed in the next plan, 
35 projects (6%) were completed in the next two plans and 152 projects (24%) were 
categorised as uncompleted, cancelled or still under construction.(l) This table 
indicates that almost half (48%) of the projects were completed outside the targeted 
plan and almost one quarter (24%) of projects were uncompleted. The level of 
progress for uncompleted projects varied. Some of them had only reached the early 
stage of just being formulated and allocated funding, and some had reached the stage 
of loans being approved by the Treasury and sites being acquired, some had even 
reached the stage of preliminary building construction. Reasons for cancellation varied 
from: indecisiveness about the project; indefinite postponement, reconsideration as non 
priority projects; re-routing of funds for higher priority projects; poor response from 
buyers; poor technical and financial viability, and political reasons as well.(2) 
:.:.:.:.:.' 
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Table 8.3: 
THE COMPLETION STATUS OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS 
FORMULATED BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
::: 'Plan! 
·.··: s.tat~s 
.• <:: 
3MP 
4MP 
t· 
SMP 
Completed 
Within the 
Same Plan 
78 
91 
(10.7% 
172 
27.6% 
~Ot~:~:! '. ~Ot~~~~~~ ·::;;i/::::::ln.¢OriiBl~te:; ::= .:{·:!::·:t9:t~ :::i::.:·. 
Plan Two Plan-s': .:.:. "':>;.:: 
129 
(55.4% 
]22 
(50%) 
265 
42.4% 
12 
5.6% 24.4% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.3 also implies that only about one quarter of the projects formulated at 
the beginning of each five-year plan would achieve completion by the end of the same 
five-year plan, while another half required more than five-years to achieve completion. 
Moreover a further analysis of projects completed within the plan period shows that 
their percentages are decreasing from 34% in the 3MP to 11% in the SMP. An 
explanation of this could be that during the SMP a higher priority was given to 
completing the 157 projects continuing from the previous 3MP and 4MP. The number 
of uncompleted projects is high. The percentage of incomplete and projects under 
construction shows an increasing trend from merely 6% in 3MP to 39% in 5MP. 
However, based on the actual number of projects, the 4MP has the largest number of 
incomplete projects (127 projects). 
Information on project completion status according to the three implementing 
agencies is further provided by Table 8.4 below. For projects completed within the 
same plan; NHD has 32 out of 192 projects or 17%, whereas SEDe has 106 out of 
345 projects or 31%, and PWD has 34 out of 87 projects or 39%. For projects 
completed in the next plan; NHD has 103 projects or 54%, whereas SEDe has 128 
projects or 37% and PWD has 34 projects or 39%. Then for projects completed in the 
next two plans the proportion of each agency's total projects is quite small: 5%, 7% 
and 1% for the NHD, SEDC and PWD respectively. The range for the three agencies 
in terms of percentage of incomplete or under construction projects is not large. The 
percentages are 21%, 25% and 26% for each agency, PWD, NHD and SEDe 
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respectively. However, the actual number of projects differs with PWD's 18 projects, 
NHD's 47 projects and SEDC's 87 projects. Amongst the three agencies, NHD has the 
smallest proportion of projects completed within the same plan but it has largest 
proportion of projects completed in the next plan and next two plans. 
Table 8.4: 
COMPLETION STATUS OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS BY 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 1976 AND 1990 
Status / Completed Completed Completed Incomplete ·· . Total Percent 
Agency Within in Next in Next :: ...... {CoL%) .forRow .:: 
Plan Plan Two Plans .. .,: ~::;: ..•. .... :. .. ':':',' :::- .: :: ::.::: . 
NHD 32 103 10 47 192 192 
(16.7%) (53.6%) (5.2%) (24.5%) (100%) (30.8%) 
SEDC 106 128 24 87 345 345 
(30.7%) (37.1%) (7%) (25.2%) (100%) (55.3%) 
PWD 34 34 1 18 87 87 
(39%) (39%) (1.3%) (20.7%) (100%) (13.9%) 
Total 172 265 35 152 .... ·. ":: .. :.::.624<.:: ... .. Q24 ":<·'< 
27.6% 42.5% 5.6% 24.4% 100% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The distribution of 624 projects according to states and status of completion 
are tabulated in Table 8.5 below. Two states, Negeri Sembilan and Trengganu have a 
larger number of their completed projects which fall into the category of within the 
same plan. While other states have a larger number of their projects completed in the 
next five-year plan. Selangor has the largest actual number of projects completed 
within the same five-year plan: 47 out of 139 of its total projects. However based on 
percentages Negeri Sembilan is ahead of other states with 43% of its projects (43 out 
of 99 total projects) completed within the same plan. Trengganu was not far behind 
Negeri Sembilan with 42% of its projects (26 out of total 62 projects) completed 
within the same plan. Pahang h~s the largest number of uncompleted projects among 
all states, 31 out of 109 projects (28%) fell into the this category. Hence table 8.5 
implies a variable performance among states in terms of their apparent capability of 
completing projects. 
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Table 8.5: 
PROJECTS COMPLETION BY STATUS AND STATES 
Completed Complet~tJ , 
Within the in the Nexi 
Same Plan , 'Plan 
12 40 
43 31 
47 60 
·20 56 
11 16 
13 :.:. 49 
26 13 
172 265 
27.6% 42.5% 5.6% 24.7% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The distribution of 624 projects according to the agencies engaged by the 
states to implement their public ' low cost housing projects are tabulated in Table 8.6 
below. This table shows that state governments utilised mainly the service from one 
type of agency for most of their projects with the only exception of Selangor. For 
example, Pulau Pinang only engaged PWD, Johor and Perak mainly used the service of 
NHD, whereas Negeri Sembilan, Pahang and Trengganu mainly engaged their own 
SEDCs. Only Selangor used the larger proportion of service from the three agencies. 
More than half of all total public low-cost housing projects (55%) utilised the services 
of State Economic Development Corporations despite the fact that they charged a 
service fee to state governments. The service fee was about 7% of the total project 
cost. In contrast, only 31 % of the projects were assigned to the NHD, although this 
agency provides free technical and manpower services to state governments. 
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Table 8.6: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS ACCORDING TO STATES AND 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
<;:;:· Status! State 
Iohor 
N:.s~mbilan 
Selangor 
.. ::::=::.:' ...•• 
Perak 
P. Pinang 
Pahang 
Trengganu 
Total 
Percentage 
':':" ",:,::::~, 
\:i 
.... ;. 
.;';;. 
NHD SEDC 
68 2 
3 93 
10 82 
105 3 
o o 
4 105 
2 60 
192 345 
30.8% 55.3% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Col1ection 
".:. 
.",'" .", ·Total · ......... . 
1 71 
47 139 
34 34 
',' .; 0 , "" .;. 
o 62 
. 
87 ;;. ·,·, 624 
13.9% 100% 
The status of completion for the 624 projects according to states and agencies 
appears in Table 8.7 below. For each of state we can make comparison about the 
number of projects and their completion status by the agencies which was engaged by 
the state to implement their projects. Information in this table is an extension of the 
previous Table 8.5 and 8.6. 
Summary on Project Distribution 
A number of observations can be made. First, performance amongst states and 
implementing agencies and between plans varied. Larger numbers of projects (58%) 
were formulated for the 4MP and fewer projects (5%) for 5MP. Second, almost 50% 
of projects were completed outside the intended plan period and almost 25% were 
incomplete. This verifies that the shortfall in programme target was because a large 
number of projects were not completed within the intended five-year plan. For 
uncompleted projects, 4MP has the largest actual number whereas 5MP has the largest 
percentage. Third, a smaller number of projects was given to the NHD than other 
agencies although NHD was formed to assist the states in implementing housing 
construction for this programme. More projects utilised the service of SEDCs (55%) 
than the NHD (31%) or the PWD (14%). Fourth, the performance between the 
agencies was also varied where SEDCs had a larger number of projects (106 projects) 
completed within the same plan than NHD (32 projects) or PWD (34 projects). Finally, 
Chapter Eight: Quantitative Data Analysis 222 
many states were inclined to use. the services of one type of implementing agency, with 
the exception to Selangor. 
Table 8.7: 
PROJECTS COMPLETION BY STATUS AND STATES 
Statusl State Completed Completed Completed . Uncompleted Total " 
Within the in the Next in the Next ::: ::: or Still ...• 
I',: Same Plan Plan Two Plans Under 
Construction 
Johor NHD 12 38 3 15 68 
SEDC - 2 - - 2 
PWD - - 1 - 1 
Sub-total 12 40 4 Y',:J(:::lS ";. . .,., .':q} )\:. 
N.Sembilan - 3 - - 3 
NHD 43 27 1 22 93 
SEDC - 1 - 2 3 
PWD 
Sub-total 43 31 1 24 99 
Selangor NHD 3 4 1 2 10 
SEDC 22 40 5 15 82 
PWD 22 16 - 9 47 
Sub-total 47 60 ': 6 ;. I '" " ·2'6 :.::' .,:,.,., ." 139 
',:0 
.;~: 
Perak 17 54 5 29 105 
NHD 2 1 - - 3 
SEDC 1 1 - - 2 
PWD 
Sub-total 20 56 5 29 110 
P.Pinang PWD 11 16 - 7 34 
Sub-total 11 16 0 .'.; .::. 7 34 
Pahang NHD - 3 - 1 4 
SEDC 13 46 16 30 105 
Sub-total 13 49 16 ::' 31 109· .:::: 
Trengganu NHD - 1 1 - 2 
SEDC 26 12 2 20 60 
Sub-total 26 13 3 20 62 :.: " 
Total 172 265 35 152 :: 624 :,: 
NHD 32 103 10 .. ::.,' .:.: 47 : ..:: .. .::: 1,9~ .,:: 
: 
SEDe 106 . 128 24 '.;. !i:i:::? 87 " ~45 PWD 34 34 :::. 1 :;, 18 ::'·:: :';'::' "87·:, :.: 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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GENERAL BACKGROUND 
This section focuses on an overview of the general pattern of the low cost 
housing projects. The data highlighted here is based on the sample of 215 projects 
collected through disproportion&te sampling, as shown in the Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS SELECTED AS 
SAMPLES BY STATES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS. 
State Third Fourth 
Malaysia 
Plan 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Aim 
Fifth Total Percentage 
8.4% 100% 
The main aim of public low cost houses is to provide housing for low income 
groups. There were five categories of this aims, as shown in Table 8.9. A large 
majority of projects (80%) aimed to provide housing for a variety of lower income 
groups. These groups were defined by monthly household income as set by the MHLG 
and state governments from time to time. Only a small number of projects aimed 
specifically at urban and rural resettlement, fishermen resettlement, housing for factory 
workers in the newly developed industrial areas and also a combination of several 
purposes. Three primary sources were used to verify the aims of housing projects: the 
working papers for project proposals; minutes of progress meetings; and, quarterly 
reports submitted to the MHLO:. 
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Table 8.9: 
ATh1S OF PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION 
BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
"'''''':''Aim . 3MP 
Housing for Low Income Groups 70 16 
Resettlement Programme 7 6 0 
Housing for Factory Workers 3 2 0 
Resettlement for Fishermen 3 2 2 
Combination of Several Aims 9 9 0 
::-.-
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Type of Houses 
224 
172 
13 
5 
7 
18 
Single storey terrace houses were the common type (65%) of dwelling built for 
this programme, followed by single wooden houses and medium rise flats, l3% 
respectively. Other types of houses comprised only a very small proportion. The 
distribution of types of houses according to the three five-year plans appears in Table 
8.10. 
Single storey houses are houses with an area of approximately 700 square feet 
on 1,000 square feet of land . These houses usually have concrete floors, light 
reinforced concrete frames with brickwork or blockwork in-fill for walls, timber roof 
structures and asbestos-cement corrugated roof sheeting. Double storey terrace houses 
have an additional upper floor, which is usually made of timber. (See Plate 8.1) 
The medium rise flats typically have four or five storey structures. These flats 
have two bedrooms with an area of 400 to 500 square feet. They are made of 
reinforced concrete floors and structural frame, timber roof structure and corrugated 
asbestos-cement sheeting. The walls are usually bricks or concrete blocks. The high 
rise flats are usually found in major urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Ipoh 
and Johor Baharu where urban land is scarce and expensive. THey eORsist of aet'Ne8R 
Chapter Eight: Quanti tative Data Analysis 225 
afte:i Johor Baharu whOFe uFbaR land i . . They consist of between 
16 and 17 storeys with about 250 houses per block. The construction is similar to 
medium rise flats. (See Photograph 8.3 and 8.4). 
Single wooden houses and semi-detached wooden houses are usually built in 
areas where a larger tract of land is available and the land cost is not expensive. The 
floors, walls and roof structures of these houses are made of timber with corrugated 
asbestos-cement roofing. (See Photograph 8.5) 
Table 8.10: 
TYPES OF HOUSING DESIGN FOR PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING 
PROJECTS BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
Trpe of Houses \ Plans 3MP 4MP 5.MP T otal ' (Peic~rit) 
I"""," ';:'" 
Single and Double Storey Terrace SS 80 8 143 (66. 5r91 
Semi-detached and Wooden Houses 13 10 6 29 (13.5%) 
Medium and High Rise Flats 16 14 4 34 (15.8%) 
Mixed type 8 1 0 9 (4.2%) 
:T~tal 92 lOS .,' 18 1:::::· 21~· (~ge%} ::, .. :.: . . '. . ... 
(42.8%) (48.8o/~ ' : (8.4%) : .. :::{.)\'-:::::}' :~)~: .:.: . 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Photograph 8.1: Single Storey Public Low Cost House 
Chapter Eight: Quantitative Data Analysis 226 
Photograph 8.2: Single Storey Public Low Cost Houses 
Photograph 8.3: Medium Rise Public Low Cost Houses 
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Photograph 8.4: High Rise Public Low Cost Houses 
Photograph 8.5: Wooden Houses 
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Location 
The distribution of projects according to the location of urban, urban fringes 
and rural areas appears in Table 8.11 below. The majority of projects (65%) are 
located in rural areas, while the urban and urban fringes areas represent only 17% and 
18% respectively. The lesser number of projects in urban and urban fringe areas was 
due to land scarcity. The price of land has become increasingly more expensive, so low 
cost housing construction has become less feasible in these locations. 
Table 8.11: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING PROJECTS BY 
LOCATION BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
Type of Houses 3MP 4MP 5MP Total 
(percen!} 
Urban Areas 16 16 5 37 (17.2%) 
Urban Fringes 18 20 0 38 (17.7%) 
Rural 58 69 13 140 (65.1%) 
Total 92 105 18 215 
(percentage) (42.8%) (48.8) (8.4%) (100%) 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The distribution of projects according to house types and location appears in 
Table 8.12 below. Almost half of these projects were terraced houses in rural areas. 
For wooden houses, the majority of projects located in the rural areas. A bigger 
proportion of high and medium rise flats were located in the urban areas than urban 
fringes and rural areas. 
The location of projects inside or outside statutory local authority areas is 
shown in the following Table 8.13 . The number of projects located inside local 
authorities areas (51 %) is slightly higher than those outside local authority areas (49%) 
although the difference is only very small. The same table also depicts that during the 
3MP and 4MJ> more projects were proposed and constructed inside local authority 
areas, but for the 5MP more projects were located outside the local authority areas. 
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Table 8.12: 
HOUSING DESIGN AND LOCATION OF PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING 
PROJECTS BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
TyPe ofHQuses \ Location Urban Urban ::. :t:Rwal ' :·'7'ofal ·(Percerit) < ~ .', :::: 
" 
Fringes 
Single and Double Storey 13 25 105 143 (66.5%) 
Terrace 
Semi-detached and 1 6 22 29 (13.5%) 
Wooden Houses 
Medium and High Rise 22** 4 8* 34 (15.8%) 
Flats 
Mixed type 1 3 5 9 (4.2%) 
Total 92 105 .,. ". .... 18 .,,':" ", " :215 (100%) 
:;,:, {42.89/02 (48.8%):: 1::; C8.4%) .::-'. I {(;",.: .... ,.; ... ;. ... 
Note: • All projects were medium rise flats 
•• Out of these figures, consisted of 6 high rise flats and 16 medium rise flats . 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.13 : 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING PROJECTS BY LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
Type ,of Houses . 
. ... :: .... , 
Inside Local Authorities 
Outside Local Authorities 
Total 
(percentage) 
3MP 
49 
43 
92 
(42.8%) '. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
53 7 109 
52 11 
(50.7%) 
106 
(49.3%) 
lOS· .::'. ..... Hr:;> 1 <" .::215 '. . 
(48.8) ;(8.4'%) ' (100%) 
Although 65% projects were located in rural areas, 51 % were inside local 
authority areas. This leads to the question whether these projects require planning 
permission from local authorities (see Table 8.14). A total of 41 % of the projects were 
not subjected to planning app~oval by local authorities because when they were 
constructed outside local authority areas. 3 Another 49% were subjected to planning 
approval but were given exemption. This was due to prior arrangements made between 
the state governments and the local authorities. Some local authorities have adopted 
the policy of exempting planning permission for development projects carried out by 
the federal and state governments. This is because of the close relationships between 
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the state and local governments. In addition these authorities depend upon the state 
and federal governments for their financial assistance. Only 10% of the projects were 
subjected to planning approval by local authorities. 
Table 8.14: 
CATEGORIES OF PLANNING APPROVAL REQUIRED FROM LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
'::' 
PlannirigRequiremeI)ts .' 
34 43 10 87 
52 46 6 104 
4 16 2 22 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Land Type 
Public low cost houses were proposed or constructed on four categories of 
land as shown in Table 8.15. A large percentage of projects (77%) was proposed and 
constructed on state land. This was the favourite choice because the land was readily 
available4, there were shorter procedures and the total project cost was assumed to be 
less because the land belonged to the state governments. The other 18% of these 
projects were on private land, while a smaller percentage were of a mixed type 
between state and private land (2%) and institutional land (3%). Institutional land 
involved land owned by local authorities and other semi-government corporations. 
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Table 8.15 : 
TYPES OF LAND WHERE PUBLIC LOW COSTS HOUSING PROJECTS 
PROPOSED AND CONSTRUCTED BETWEEN 1976 AND 1990 
Types of Land 3MP 4MP 5MP Total 
(Percent) 
State land 79 70 14 163 
(76.5%) 
Private Land 9 30 2 41 
(19.1%) 
Mixed; state and private land 1 2 1 4 
(1.9%) 
Institutional land 3 3 1 7 
(3.3%) 
Total 92 105 18 215 
_(l>ercentage) (42.8%) (48.8%) (8.5%) (100) 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN FROM FORMULATION TO 
OCCUPATION 
The overall implementation process of the public low cost housing construction 
includes the stages between project formulation and project completion. The process 
ends with the occupation of houses by buyers and tenants. The data analysis is involved 
with the calculation of the length of time taken between these various stages and sub-
activities of the implementation process. For the purpose of this analysis the process is 
categorised into stages and sub-activities as follows:-
(1) Stage one: the projects formulation and planning stage 
Sub-activities: 
1.1. Projects formulation 
1.2. Loan application to the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government (MHLG) 
1.3. Loan recommendation by the Technical Committee 
of Housing Loan (TCOHL) 
(2) Stage two: the projects financial resourcing stage 
Sub-activities: 
2.l. Loan approval by the Treasury 
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2.2. Signing oftoan agreement 
2.3. Loan withdrawals and payments made to state governments 
(3) Stage three: the projects construction stage 
Sub-activities 
3.1. Construction of projects begins 
3.2. Construction of projects ends 
(4) Stage four: the project completion stage 
Sub-activities 
4.1. Projects completion 
4.2. House occupation by buyers and tenants 
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Table 8.16 provides information on the length of time taken between these four 
implementation stages and their sub-activities. Although 215 projects were selected as 
samples for this study, only 166 cases that completed the construction stage were 
included in this data analysis. The other 49 uncompleted projects were excluded from 
this analysis because they were not completed up to the construction stage. The 
rationale behind this decision of selecting only 166 completed projects was for fair 
comparisons between projects and implementation stages. 
Table 8.16 shows that the mean length of time from project formulation to 
occupation was 83.9 months and up to the step of project completion was 79 months. 
Almost half of this time span was spent on the formulation and planning stage. The 
mean for the formulation and planning stage of 37.7 months was the longest time 
spent. The next longest time span was for the construction stage with a mean of 21 
months. The table also highlights that the median for all implementation stages is 
shorter than the mean. This implies that about 50% of the projects experienced a 
shorter time span than the mean figure at every implementation stage. 
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Table 8.16: 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME: THE LENGTH OF TTh1E TAKEN FROM THE FORMULATION 
STAGE TO OCCUPATION STAGE 
(in Months) 
Stages of Implementation Process Mean Median .;;: Std • 
.. 
Minimum N '·'···· 
(Variables Name) Deviation Maximum cases 
1. Plannin2 Stage: 
From project fonnulation to loan 37.7 32.8 20.1 min: 0.5 166 
approval by TCOHL max: 123.2 
(pLANS TAG) var: 404 
2. ResourcinJ:: Stage: 
From project approval by TCOHL to min: 2.5 
the first loan withdrawal 15 .6 12 11.6 max: 81.6 163 (RES 0 CING) var: 133.9 
3. Construction StaJ::e: min: 5.5 
Duration of project construction 21 18 12.6 max:75.7 166 
(CONSTRUC) Var: 159.6 
4. Com(!Jetion Sta&e: 
From end of construction to project min: 1.5 
occupation 10.7 7.5 9.2 max:58.2 164 
(COMSTAGE) var: 84.6 
5. Overall Process 
5.1. From project formulation to the min: 3.3 
beginning of construction 53.4 50 29.2 max: 146.9 166 
(FORMBEGN) var: 855.2 
5.2. From project formulation to rnin:20 
completion stage 79 75 .2 33 max: 163 165 
(SPAN) var: 1112 
5.3. From project fonnulation to min:24 
occupation 83 .9 80 32.8 max:165.1 165 
(FORMOCC) var: 
1077.3 
The total cases were 166 projects, missing data occurred if the number of projects 
appeared less than this total number. 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.17 compares the mean of time taken on major activities in each stage of 
the implementation process amongst the three five-year plans. This table also compares 
means, standard deviations, variance, minimum and maximum between various 
implementation stages and the five-year plans. The mean of time taken from the project 
formulation until occupation for five-year plans decreased very slightly from 84 months 
during 3MP to 83.4 months in 4MP but finally increased to 85.6 months iJ1 SMP. The 
time taken from the project formulation until the completion stage (before occupation) 
was 79 months with a standard deviation of 33 months. The mean of project 
completion for the three five-year plans increased from 79 months in 3MP and 4MP to 
82 months in SMP. This stage was taken as the point of completion for the number of 
houses constructed at the end of a five-year plan, as discussed in Chapter 4. The 
overall mean of time taken for the planning stage between the project formulation and 
the loan approval is 37.7 months with a standard deviation of 20.1 months and this 
shows variability between the three five-year plans. During 4MP a shorter time was 
spent on the planning stage in contrast to the SMP. For the resourcing stage, the S.MP 
was longer compared to the 3MP and 4MP. However for the 4MP a longer time was 
spent for the construction and completion stage. In summary the information provided 
by this table shows variability' of mean between the stages and sub-stages of the 
implementation process as well as between the five-year plans. 
The data analysis in Table 8.17 implies that almost half of the total time for the 
whole implementation process was spent for the projects' preliminary planning. Taking 
into account that projects were formulated six months before the beginning of any five-
year plan, this suggested that on the average projects completed their planning stage in 
the middle of third year of any five-year plan.· Similarly, on average, project 
construction began in the middle fourth year of the five-year plan. In general the mean 
of time needed to achieve the completion stage and occupation stage was about seven 
years. This implies that the average time needed to complete projects under this 
programme was about two five-year planning periods. The proportion of time required 
for the implementation of a project is about half to be spent on project planning and 
preliminary preparation, about a quarter for construction and another quarter for 
project resourcing and other necessary jobs related to its completion. 
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Table 8.17: 
IMPLEl\.1ENTATION PROCESS OF THE PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING 
PROGRAMME: THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN FROM THE FORMULATION 
STAGE TO OCCUPATION STAGE 
.Stages ofImplementation Process 
(Variables Name) .. 
1:·.:1·;; ,. 
1. Planning Stage: 
From project formulation to loan 
approval by TCOHL (pLANSTAG) 
2. Resourcing Stage: 
From project approval by TCOHL to 
the first loan withdrawal 
(RESOCING) 
3. Construction Stage: 
Duration of project construction 
(CONSTRUC) 
4. Completion Stage: 
From end of construction to project 
occupation 
(COMSTAGE) 
5. Overall Process 
5.1. From project formulation to the 
beginning of construction 
(FORMBEGN) 
5.2. From project formulation to 
project completion 
(SPAN) 
5.3. From project formulation to 
occupation (FORMOCC) 
(in Months) 
37.7 
( 20.1) 
N=166 
15.6 
(11.6) 
N=163 
21.0 
(12 .6) 
N=166 
10.7 
(9.2) 
N=164 
53.4 
(29 .2) 
N=166 
79 
(33) 
N=I65 
83.9 
(32.8) 
N=165 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
38.9 
(17.8) 
N=80 
15.4 
(12.7) 
N=79 
19.6 
(13.9) 
N=80 
9.2 
(7.8) 
N=80 
55.5 
26.6 
N=80 
79 
(32) 
N=80 
84 
(31.9) 
N=80 
34.9 
(20.4) 
N=74 
15.2 
(9.7) 
N=73 
22.7 
(11) 
N=74 
12.9 
(10.7) 
N=72 
50.4 
31.2 
N=74 
79 
(35) 
N=73 
83.4 
(33.8) 
N=73 
47.0 
(29.4) 
N=12 
19.4 
(14.5) 
N=11 
20.1 
12.8 
N=12 
7.7 
(4.7) 
N=12 
57.8 
(34.4) 
N=I2 
82 
(35) 
N=12 
85.6 
(35.2) 
N=I2 
Chapter Eight: Quantitative Data Analysis 236 
Planning Stage: From Formulation to Loan Approval. 
The planning stage is the point between the project formulation and loan 
approval by the Technical Committee on Housing Loans (TCOHL). This stage of 
preparation involves tasks, such as drawing up feasibility studies, investigating the 
proposed sites, preparing project costing and carrying out land surveys, preparing sites 
and building plans, etc. For the purpose analysing the length of time taken, this stage is 
divided as follows:-
• The time taken from the project formulation to the loan application. The 
variable for this point is known as FORMAPL Y. 
• The time taken from receipt of the loan application by the MHLG to when 
the decision is made by the TCOHL to approve the loan of a public housing 
project. The variable for this point is called as APL YTCHL. 
• The time taken from project formulation to the loan approval by TCOHL. 
This covers both the two points above. This variable is called as 
PLANS TAG. 
Table 8.18 provides information on the time taken for this planning stage for the three 
five-year plans. In total the time taken to complete the formulation and planning stage 
shows differences between the three five-year plans. For example the mean of time 
taken between the project formulation and the loan approval between the plans: the 
3MP was 38.9 months with a standard deviation of 17.8 months; then 4MP decreased 
34.9 months with a standard deviation of20.4 months; and the 5MP increased to 47.8 
months with a wider standard'deviation of 30.7 months. An analysis by one-way 
ANOYA for variable FORMAPLY yields an F ratio of 4.8446 and F probability of 
.0090 which confirms that there is a significant difference of mean between the three 
five year plans at the significance level of 0.05(5) The same statistical test for the 
variable PLANS TAG produces an F ratio of 2.1813 and F probability of .1162 
confirms that there is no significant difference between the mean at an alpha of 0.05. 
, This translates that the mean between the plans is similar. The one-way ANOY A test 
for APL YTCHL provides an F ratio of 1.4889 and F probability of .2287 which 
confirms that the mean between the plans is similar at the significant level of 0.05. 
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Table 8.18: 
THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE PLANNING STAGE BY 
THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
(Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) 
fivttyear 'Plans 
,": 
", . 
;::::: "':,,: ... :.:1 .. :~.. :~.:~ .. :~ .. :~.:~.:~ .. :~.. ::.'.:1 ..• ~... :~.':;':";'~;;;~'.;~.;; ...... ;:..• '.' ',' . :.~:'::::~~ ';. <.=- " 
'. . '., .\: ~.~. :. ~~;': 
'.~. :;;;';';';";'., 
3MP (1976-1980) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
4MP (1981-1985) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
5MP (1986-1990) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
Len~h of time: from .... : Lel1gthof!i~~;·:.:<:;: .:: ::·~ength· 9.f tiW#:::fq'r:") 
formulatioh to loan .. betWeenapp1ica.POR ::·: planning stager :frofu: 
application and approvathr;·r:·" formulaiio.njo . 
(FORMAPLY) . TCOHV ><>> approvaIOrXC.O!I1? 
'(APL YTCHL) ?/.: . (PLANSTAG) .• ::;. 
34.5 4.5 38.9 
17.8 6.5 17.8 
.5 .03 1 
90 44.2 90.6 
80 80 80 
27.7 7.2 34.9 
16.9 14 20.4 
.5 0 .5 
112 95 .5 123.2 
74 74 74 
42.9 4.l 47 
29.8 4.7 29.4 
0 .5 .5 
118 18.9 121 
12 12 12 
32.l 5.7 37.7 
18.9 10.5 20.l 
0 0 .5 
118 95.5 123.2 
166 166 166 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.19 compares the time taken for this planning stage by quartiles and 
median. In general the 4MP seems as the shortest amongst the three five-year plans. 
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Table 8.19 
THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE PLANNING STAGE BY 
THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
Five-year Plans 
3MP;(1976-1980) 
("'''::'' ..... ':::: 
4MP (1981-1985) 
SMJl(1986-1990) 
:'. 
Overall Total 
(Median and Quartiles) 
Category Length of time for 
planning stage 
.. First Qtlartile :.::-26:9.-:, 
: Se'cond Quartile/Median ::,.::'::::: . ,!:.: .:::.38:5:::.' 
Third Quartile :' :':':.: •. <:=)( :54:4 
".:" 
N of cases ":.:. 1,:: ': ','. . '. , 80 ': ':.' , '::.::':':.': 
: ........ .;::::::: 
First Quartile 24.4 
Second QuartilelMedian 28.9 
Third Quartile 41.7 
N of cases 74 
, Third Quartile ,~::!:/}:,~:::: ' . 60.2 ::: .... ,,:,,:, 
N of cases . : . ':: :" .'. 12 :':" 
First Quartile 24.9 
Second Quartile \ Median 32.9 
Third Quartile 53 
N of cases 166 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
From the evidence provided by Table 8.18 and Table 8.19, the mean and 
median of the length for time spent for the planning stage varies between each plan. 
However, for the population there are not statistically significance differences between 
plans as proven by the one-way ANOY A test as mentioned above. The overall mean 
and median value of 32.1 and 32.9 months respectively implied that in general this 
public low-cost housing programme completed the planning stage in the beginning of 
the third year of the five-year plan.(6) 
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Financial Resourcing Stage 
The financial resourcing stage involves four main important steps: firstly the 
loan approval by the TCOHL; secondly loan approval by the Treasury; thirdly the 
signing of the agreement between the Federal and various state governments; and, 
finally loan withdrawals by state governments. Data analysis for this financial 
resourcing stage involves calculating length of time taken between these sub-activities 
as follows:-
• The length of time taken for considering loan applications between 
the TCOHL decision and the Treasury approval. This variable is 
called TCHLTSRY. 
• The time taken for the formalisation oftoan agreements after they are 
approved by the Treasury. This variable is called TSRYAGRE. 
• The time taken between the formalisation of loan agreements and the 
first loan withdrawal by the state governments. This variable is called 
AGRE 1 OUT. 
The length of time involved for this resourcing stage is calculated by the difference 
between the date ofTCOHL recommendation and the date of the first Joan withdrawal. 
This variable is named as RESOCING. 
Table 8.20 provides information on the length of time involved at this stage 
according to the three five-year-plans. The overall mean for time taken between loan 
approval by TCOHL and further approval by the Treasury (variable TCHLTSRy) was 
5.4 months with a standard deviation of 5.9 months. The mean of time for the three 
five-year plans was varied: the 3MP with an average of 5.2 months then 5.7 months in 
the 4MP and finally a slight decreased to 5.0 months in the SMP. The mean for the 
variable TSRY AGRE shows a decreasing trend from 3MP to SMP. This indicates that 
the process between the decision by the TCOHL and the signing of agreement became 
shorter towards the 1990s. 
In normal circumstances a project construction begins after the agreement is 
signed between the two parties. This is followed by the first loan withdrawal by the 
state governments. However as depicted in 8.20, some of the minimum time for 
variable AGREIOUT is expressed in negative figures; this means the first loan 
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withdrawal was made even before the agreement had formalised between the two 
levels of governments. The overall mean of time taken between the agreement signed 
and the first loan withdrawal was 4.9 months with a standard deviation of 10.1 months. 
The mean for the variable AGREIOUT showed variability between plans and became 
longer in the SMP. 8.20 also depicts information about the resourcing stage where it 
exhibits an increasing length of time in 5MP (19.5 months) when compared to the 
previous fivewyear plans (15.4 months for 3MP and 15.2 months for 4MP). 
Statistical tests by one-way ANOV A however confirm that there was no 
significant difference for this resourcing stage between the five-year plans. A test to the 
variable RESOCING produced an F ratio of .6380 with F probability of .5297 
confirming that there was no significant difference between the fivewyear plans at the 
significance level of 0.05. Another test to the variable TCHLTSRY produced an F 
ratio of .1655 with F probability of .8476 confirming that there was no significant 
difference between the five-year plans at the significance level of 0.05. Also one-way 
ANOVA result on the variable.TSRYAGRE produced an F ratio of 1.0088 with F 
probability .3669 which confirmed that there was no significant difference between the 
five-year plans at the significance level of 0.05. Variable AGREI0UT produced an F 
ratio of 1. 7690 with F probability of .1738 confirming that there was no significant 
difference between the five-year plans at the significance level of 0.05. 
Construction Stage 
The mean for the overall construction duration was 21 months, with a standard 
deviation of 12.6 months. The mean length of construction time during 3MP was 19.6 
months. This increased to 22.7 months in the 4MP and slightly decreased to 21 
months in the SMP (see Table 8.21). An analysis of variance for the duration of 
construction provided no significant difference of mean between the three five-year 
plans. The test produced an F ratio of 1.2050 with F probability of 0.3024 that the 
mean between plans was similar at the significant level of 0.05. 
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Table 8.20: 
TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE RESOURCING STAGE BY THE FlVE-
YEARPLANS 1976-1990 
PHills 'and Variables The length of 
time between 
.TCOJ-a 'and 
:,,::\::: ",' Treasury 
3MP (1976-1980) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
4MP (1981-1985) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
5MP (1986-1990) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
Overall (1976-1990) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Number of cases 
Notes: 
, approval 
(TCHLTSR 
5.2 
7.2 
0 
56.4 
80 
5.7 
4.4 
0 
15.3 
74 
5.0 
4.3 
.5 
15.1 
12 
5.4 
5.9 
0 
56.4 
166 
Th~ length of ·.·: .. ,TheJ:-~ri~. of. \, 'TheJ~gthof.::n , 
tirrie betweeo ,·::·1ilrieb'etween ::. time forthe ::?' 
Treasury,' . ::Joah agr~rrlent':}:·; ilri~dnii ::, '::: 
appro~l:~(L :', and the first- , ', ',' t~O,urcipg stage 
loan'agreements ' ::'1oariwithdiawali (~SOCING)' 
TSRYAGRE ::':j:( AGkEtbtlT ::;:?::.:\/ .,> :j\:} 
5.6 4.8 15.4 
6.1 11.1 12.7 
0 -21.2 2.5 
35.6 72.1 81.6 
80 79 79 
5.1 4.2 15.2 
4.3 7.0 9.7 
0 -2.3 3.3 
27.5 42.7 55.8 
74 72 73 
3.4 10 19.4 
l.7 16.3 14.5 
.72 -0.6 6 
5.7 46.5 50.6 
12 12 11 
5.2 4.9 15.6 
5.2 10.1 11.6 
0 -2l.2 2.5 
35.6 72.1 81.6 
166 163 163 
(a) 0 for minimum value refers to the same date between two activities. 
(b) Figures in minus signs refer to the first loan withdrawal that was made earlier than 
the date of an agreement fonnally signed between states and federal governments. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.21 : 
THE TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE CONSTRUCTION STAGE BY THE 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN 1976-1990 
Plans and Statistics Third Fourth Fifth Overall 
Malaysia Plan Malaysi:a Plan ' Ma1~ysik Plan ··' Total), 
.~ .0::_' • 
:.:'::""":::/? (1976-80) (1981-85) (1986-90» (1976-90) -::: ::-:-. ::t 
Mean 19.6 22.7 20.1 21 
Standard deviation 13 .9 11 12.8 12.6 
Minimum 5.5 9.9 6.9 5.5 
Maximum 75 .7 63 49.9 75 .7 
Number of cases 80 74 12 166 
ANOV A Between Group 
F-ratio 13.9721 
F Probability .3024 
f\~: 
Decision No difference 
between group 
mean 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Completion Stage 
This stage involves two important steps; the project completion and project 
occupation by buyers or renters. After the building construction ends and the work of 
contractors has been certified as completed by the implementing agency, normally 
some additional work is still required such as for water and electricity supply, 
construction of power sub-stations, additional building and infrastructure work, etc. In 
some states, during the later stage of 4MP and early SMP, a certificate of fitness for 
occupation was imposed by some local authorities. The housing project is considered 
complete when it is handed over to the Housing Division of the State Secretariats by 
an implementing agency. Hence, the roles of an implementing agency ends at this 
stage. After the construction is completed, the next stage is the selection of tenants or 
buyers. The whole implementation process is completed with the handing over of 
house keys to the successful tenants or buyers. The calculation on the length of time 
involved at this stage is shown in Table 8.22. Data analysis for this stage is as follows:-
• The length of time taken to complete additional building and 
infrastructural work, water and electricity supply and to obtain 
certificate of fitness for occupation from local authorities 
(ENDCOMP). 
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• The time taken to finalise arrangements for house occupation by 
house buyers and tenants (COMPOCC). 
• The length of time for the completion stage which is the difference 
between the date of end construction and the date of house 
occupation (COMSTAGE). 
Table 8.22 : 
THE TIME TAKEN FOR THE COMPLETION STAGE BY THE FIVE-YEAR 
PLAN 1976-1990 
243 
·Plans and Variables· The length of time 
between end of 
construction and final 
completion 
(ENDCOMP) 
The length of tiri.'te:;:::: ::t Thefiength oftirnefo{ 
betw~n final :· :;:<;:\. the. co~pl~t.iori :stage :; 
completion and ::::·:=.··:·:"· (COMStAGE).; ::, 
occupation .':' .... .:.: 
(COMPOCC) . ': .. :.5:;; 
3MP (1976-1980) 
Mean 4.5 4.8 9.2 
Standard deviation 5.1 5.8 7.8 
Minimum 0 0.9 2 
Maximum 27 45 51.5 
Number of cases 80 80 80 
4MP (1981-1985) 
Mean 7.8 5.3 12.9 
Standard deviation 10.5 4.83 10.7 
Minimum 0.0 O.l 1.5 
Maximum 55 .6 25 .8 58 .2 
Number of cases 73 72 72 
5MP (1986-1990) 
Mean 3.8 3.9 7.7 
Standard deviation 5 1.9 4.7 
Minimum 0.0 2.0 2.7 
Maximum 19 7.0 20.9 
Number of cases 17 12 12 
Overall (1976-1990) 
Mean 5.9 4.9 10.7 
Standard deviation 8.1 5.2 9.2 
Minimum 0.0 0.1 1.5 
Maximum 55 .6 45.0 58.2 
Number of cases 165 164 164 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.23 in this thesis provides a summary of one-way ANOVA tests for 
several implementation process from the project formulation to the completion stage 
by the three five-year plans for the 166 completed projects. The statistical tests 
confirmed that there were no significant difference for most of the implementation 
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stages and their sub-activities except for three variables FORMAPL Y , ENDCOMP 
and COMSTAGE. 
Similar tests were also carried out for all the 215 projects which consisted of 
the completed and uncompleted projects. The statistical results are shown in Table 
8.24 in this thesis. By calculating the completed and uncompleted projects together, 
the analysis produced a slight different results where only one variable (ENDCOMP) 
was statistically significant difference for implementation process. 
PROJECT COMPLETION ACCORDING TO STATES 
Table 8.25 provides information related to the length of time for the projects' 
implementation stages. Overall the mean implementation stages varied between states. 
For the planning stage, Negeri Sembilan had the shortest mean of25.8 months whereas 
Pahang had the longest mean of 48.7 months. For the resourcing stage Trengganu had 
the shortest mean of 11.1 months, in contrast to Perak with the longest mean of 18.4 
months. For the construction stage, Negeri Sembilan again had a shortest mean of 17.7 
months while Iohor had the longest mean of 28.8 months. Finally for the completion 
stage, Pahang had the shortest mean of 6.1 months whereas Pulau Pinang was the 
longest with 14.2 months. 
The summary for the analysis of variance of various implementation stages for 
the seven states for 166 completed projects is shown in the Table 8.26 in this thesis. 
The statistical tests of one-way ANOVA provided results showing significant 
difference between the states for the planning stage (variables FORMAPLY and 
PLANS TAG), the time between the agreement signed and construction begins 
(AGREBEGN) and the overall implementation process of variables FORMBEGN, 
SPAN and FORMOCC. Similar statistical tests were also carried out for all the 215 
cases and produced similar results. 
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Table 8.23: 
TESTING OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
STAGES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS BASED ON THE 166 C01v1PLETED 
PROJECTS. 
(95% confidence interval) 
I::Iii::'(:' Variable F-Ratio F-Prob 
FORMAPLY 4.8446 .0090 
APLYTCHL 1.4889 .2287 
PLANSTAG 2.1813 .1162 
TCHLTSRY 0.1655 .8476 
N aod :d.f.:. 
N= 165 
d.f= 2 
N= 165 
d.f=2 
N= 165 
d.f=2 
N= 165 
d.f=2 
Signifi.c.~nttllfference; tht!): 
meanl?et:ween plll1lsis npt· 
·sin\.:.:· .... iW~ :::::.:;: .. ·: .. :;· .. : •...•.· ........ :.:/ .. {.; 
.:.; ....... ;.;.;.:-:.; ...... ,.::::::::: 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference. 
No significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
. . .... . .. . .......................................................................................................... . ........................... . ......................... • •••• •• •• ••• •• •• •••• •••••• ••• •••••••••••••••••• • 0 
TSRYAGRE 
.3941 .6749 N= 162 
d.f=2 
No significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
............................................................. ...................................................................................................... ·N~··~i·g~·ifi~~·~t·d·iff~·~~·~~~·; · .. 
AGRE10UT 1.7690 .1738 N= 162 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................................................ -... ...................................................................................................... ·N~·sig~·ifi~;;t··d·iff~;~·~~~·;·· · 
RESOCING .6380 .5297 N = 162 the mean between plans is 
d.f =2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
................................................................................................................................................................... ·N~·sig~·ifi~~;t'd·ifi~;~·~~~;·· 
CONSTRUC 1.2050 .3024 N= 166 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 similar . 
................ _ .................................................................................................. ·········································· .. · ···:~g~ifi.~;·~t'd'ifj~·~~~c.;:'ili;.; 
.. ~~.~~~ ............................................. ~:.~~~ ............... ....... :~~.~.~ ...... ............... ~:~~~ .......... ~r~~;1!0~;~1,~.:~~t:~.~.~:.:ll. 
No significant difference; 
N= 163 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
COMPOCC .4316 .6502 
......................... " ... " ............................................. -.................................. .................................................. i:§i'g;qfl.~i~~:~T~f.i.t~P:iii;th~: 
COMSTAGE 3.7817 .0248 N= 163~eM.·betw.c::eji"pllirisjs : <;;. 
d.f=2 :·ditfe.rent :af051~ve}}:· .:; 
.................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................... 
FORMBEGN .7250 .4859 N= 165 
d.f=2 
No significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
No significant difference; 
SPAN .0367 .9640 N= 164 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................... ~........... . ..................... ...................................................................................................... . ...................................................... . 
FORMOCC .0231 .9771 N= 164 
d.f=2 
No significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0,5 level. 
Note: Analysis based on 166 completed projects and excluded the 49 uncompleted projects. N lesser 
than 166 cases means missing data. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.24: 
TESTING OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
STAGES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS: BASED ON 215 CASES 
(95% confidence interval) 
F-Ratio 
No significant difference; 
FORMAPL Y 2.4299 .0908 N= 188 the mean between plans is 
d.f= 2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
....................... . ..... . .............. ................................................................................................................................. n ........................................... . 
No significant difference; 
APL YTCHL 1.3694 .2569 N= 184 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................ ~ ... -................... -........................................................................................................................................................................ . 
No significant difference; 
PLANS TAG 1.1359 .3234 N=186 the mean between plans is 
d.f =2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
•• .. . ......... . . ........... u ................ . .................................................................. ............................... .............................................. . ........................ . .... .. 
TCHLTSRY .2248 .7989 N=186 
d.f=2 
No significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
TSRYAGRE 1.2295 .2949 N= 179 
d.f=2 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
similar. 
................................................................................................................................................................... .......................................................... 
AGRE 1 OUT 1.7572 .1759 N= 160 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
similar . 
.............................................................. ..................................................................................................... ........................................................ . 
RESOCING .4685 .6267 N= 172 
d.f=2 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between plans is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
No Significant difference; 
N= 168 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 similar. CONSTRue 
1.1670 .3139 
:~;~?~::::~:::3~~~:-:i.~~~:~~i~:]~;Et~~~~ 
No significant difference; 
COMPOCC .4314 .6503 N= 164 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
.............................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................. 
No significant difference; 
COMSTAGE .0428 .9581 N= 163 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
................................................................................................................................................................... ............................... .......................... 
No significant difference; 
FORMBEGN .8413 .4330 N= 169 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
No significant difference; 
SPAN .0364 .9642 N= 164 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
............................................................. ..................................................................................................... ··N~·~ig·~i·fi·~;~·i··di"ii~~~~~~;···· 
FORMOCe .023 1 .9771 N= 164 the mean between plans is 
d.f=2 no difference at 0.5 level. 
Note: Analysis based on the sample of 215 cases which consisted of 166 completed projects and the 
49 uncompleted projects. N lesser than 215 cases means missing data. The large missing data was 
mainly as the result of uncompleted projects which did not achieve certain implementation process. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.25 : 
THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN AT SEVERAL IMPLEMENTATION STAGES 
BY STATES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
(mean and standard deviation in months) 
STATE & five- The Planning The Financial The The Completion 
year plans Stage Resourcing Construction Stage 
(pLANSTAG) Stage Stage COMSTAGE 
(RESOCING) (CONSTRUC) 
Jphor 
. ,', ::::;:: ")m~tf~i~ 
Mean 40.9 14.9 28 .8 9.7 
Std.dev 18.3 9.1 19.2 7.6 
N 19 19 19 18 
:N .Sembilan ~jit!i~t~~~f;;;;~~::~;~~::::·~: .:::::=::.:::. ···::~}~~!i;1~J~1i~·:. ~:: 
Mean 25.8 15.1 17.7 13 .2 
Std.dev 16.2 8.4 5.8 10.7 
N 22 20 22 21 
Selangor ':' ' 
.:. .:.; 
./\ 
Mean 38.9 16 20 1l.3 
Std.dev 16.8 14.9 13.4 1l.9 
N 40 39 40 40 
Perak ,', .l:. ".::;:;::::'.::'.:::::::.: " .;.' .. ::" .. :::: :;:: .. 
Mean 33 .8 18.4 19.7 10.3 
Std.dev 23 .7 l3 .6 l3 6.4 
N 26 26 26 26 
''f) ,Piming ::-:: . .:::: .: ' .'. .",':":':::': 
" 
,-.-.. . , 
.... 
Mean 32.9 l3 .3 23 .6 14.9 
Std.dev 10.1 4.4 13 .5 10.2 
N 16 16 16 16 
'J>ahang 
.... :' ;',' 
';'. :.; 
Mean 48.7 17.7 20.3 6.1 
Std.dev 20.3 13 8.2 2.5 
N 24 24 24 24 
:Trengganu f ...... : .. :. :.: .. : ...... 
. . :~:: ....... 
'" 
: . 
Mean 41.4 11.1 19.7 10.1 
Std.dev 25 .5 6.5 10.2 8.1 
N 19 19 19 19 
All States 
. Mean 37.7 15 .6 21 10.7 ;.', 
::~ Std.dev 20.1 11.6 12.6 
, :::[;:\::?:: 
9.2 
N 166 163 166 :.164 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.26: TESTING OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGES BY STATES 
Variable 
FORMAPLY 
APLYTCHL 
PLANSTAG 
TCHLTSRY 
TSRYAGRE 
AGREBGN 
RESOCING 
CONSTRUC 
ENDCOMP 
COMPOCC 
COMSTAGE 
FORMBEGN 
SPAN 
FORMOCC 
(Based on 166 cases) 
3.1425 .0061 
.7916 .5777 
3.2555 .0048 
1.7557 .1115 
N= 166 
d.f.=6 
N= 166 
d.f.=6 
N= 166 
dJ.= 6 
N= 166 
d.f.= 6 
1.6704 .1315 N=166 
d.f=6 
------------------------
5.0688 
.9839 
1.7459 
2.0504 
.7921 
2.0928 
.0001 
.4381 
.1137 
.0621 
.7921 
0.0578 
N= 166 
d.f.= 6 
N= 163 
d.f=6 
N= 166 
d.f.=6 
N= 165 
d.f=6 
N= 164 
dJ.= 6 
N= 164 
d.f.=6 
5.5547 .0000 N = 166 
__________________ ~f:.=:.6 
2.9945 . 0085 
3.2574 .0048 
N= 165 
d.f.= 6 
N= 165 
d.f=6 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
not similar. 
No-;ig~fic-;~ diff;r;n~e;-
the mean between states is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
similar. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
no difference. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
no difference. 
No-;ig~fic-;~ diff;r;n~~ 
the mean between states is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
No-;ig~fic-;~ dlff;r;n~~ 
the mean between states is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
Sign'fi~~~fdifference: : the ... :. 
;ln~~tweenstates is 'not 
silliilar.:·:· .. 
. s~fic·apt:ditferent;fu;~ 
.• ; ...•...• '.:. ,".' •. ' .••....... :t • 
merui:'l>etWeen statddsnot 
.;.; .' 
_''- ! 1 ~_ . • ' 
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UNCOMPLETED PROJECTS 
There are 49 cases in the samples which categorised as uncompleted projects. 
Out of this 49 projects only 22 projects completed the planning stage and finally only 3 
projects achieved the construction stage however were not completed. Table 8.27 
provides a summary of one-way ANOVA tests for several implementation stages 
during the three five-year plans for these uncompleted projects. The statistical tests 
confirmed that there were no significant difference for all of the implementation stages 
for these uncompleted projects. Similarly the statistical tests between the states 
confirmed that there were no significant difference for all of the implementation stages 
for these uncompleted projects. 
Table 8.27: 
RESULTS OF ONE-WAY ANOVA TESTS FOR FIVE-YEAR PLANS OF 
UNCOMPLETED PROJECTS: 
Variable 
FORMAPLY 
(95% confidence interval) 
F Ratio F Cases and 
.7590 
ProbabilitY Degree of ..... ,. 
.4812 
Freedom . 
N=22 
d.f.=6 
Decision · 
;:.:. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
not similar. 
~--------------~------------------------~-------------No Significant difference; 
APL YTCHL .0994 .9060 N = 17 the mean between states is 
d.f.= 6 no difference. 
~--------------~------------------------r-------------No Significant difference; 
PLANSTAG .4862 .6331 N = 22 the mean between states is 
TCHLTSRY .2488 .7833 
d.f.= 6 not similar. 
N= 15 
d.f.=6 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
not similar. 
f--------------- ~------------------------ r .-------------No significant difference; 
TSRYAGRE .2082 .8152 N = 13 the mean between states is 
d.f.= 6 no difference at 0.5 level. 
----------------------------------------
AGREBGN 1.3640 .5179 
RESOClNG .9421 .4407 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
N=3 
d.f.=6 
N=8 
d.f.=6 
No significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
no difference at 0.5 level. 
No Significant difference; 
the mean between states is 
similar. 
The statistical tests carried out confirmed that only a very little difference 
occurred for the mean length of time taken for the four implementation stages over the 
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three plans. This implied that the programme experienced few changes, despite 
intentions to speed implementation, as expressed in five-year plan documents, some 
policy statements and a number of efforts made to achieve this aim. However, 
comparisons between states showed that were significant differences. These include the 
planning stage, when to begin project construction and the total length of time of 
project completion. 
PROGRAMME PREPARATION 
Project formulation involve a certain degree of preparation, which includes site 
identification, site selection, land report assessment, feasibility studies, land surveying, 
etc. In this section data analysis is made for several implementation stage variables 
such as PLANSTAG, RESOCING, CONSTRUC, FORMBEGN, SP AN and 
FORMOCC. These implementation stage variables are tested against several 
'preparation variables" aimed to find out whether the degree of project's preparation 
affected the project's performance on the length of time to complete a project. The 
preparation variables are as follows:-
• IDENTIFY: when site identification was made 
• EXTEND: whether an extension from the previous project 
• SITECHNG: whether occurred a change of site 
• LANDREPT: when the land report was made 
• FEASmIL: the type of feasibility studies made for the project 
• SURVEY: when the land survey was made for the project. 
Site identification 
Site identification is one of the basic tasks during project preparation. When a 
list of proposed projects was submitted by the state governments to the Mm..G, some 
of the project sites had been identified, while some others were not. Table 8.28 shows 
that 57% of projects had their sites identified before project formulation stage. This 
implies that when projects were proposed for the five-year plans, some of them had no 
preliminary decisions on their proper sites. While the other 13% were never identified 
even after the project formulation stage. These projects were later cancelled because 
the state governments were indecisive about them. 
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Table 8.28 : 
WHEN SITE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE 
WHEN SITE lDENTIFICATION WAS MADE , ;.:. ···· Cases . ::(:. 
1. Before the Project Formulation 123 
2. Within 3 months after project formulation 54 
3. More than 3 months after formulation 10 
4. Never identified 28 
Total 215 
Note: 
1. Analysis based on the all 215 cases of completed and incomplete projects. 
2 missing cases: 0 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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<·Percentage: :::: 
57.2% 
25.1% 
4.7% 
13% 
100% 
Comparison of means by t-test was engaged to find out whether the "site being 
identified before or after the project formulation stage II had any significant difference 
to the length of implementation process. This test produced results that projects with 
sites identified before the formulation stage had a shorter mean, while projects with 
sites identified after the projects were formulated had a longer mean (see Table 8.29). 
The t-test results show that sigriificant differences occurred at the planning stage and 
the overall process but not at the resourcing and construction stage. This is show that 
identification of site before the project formulation stage ensures shorter times for: (a) 
the planning stage; (b) commencing project construction; (c) the time taken from 
formulation to completion of building construction, and; (d) the overall process from 
formulation to occupation of houses by occupants. 
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Table 8.29 : 
ANALYSIS OF WHEN SITE IDENTIFICATION MADE TOWARDS 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGES 
'!mplementation Stage 
, ~Variable) 
:;:::" .... 
Before Project 
Formulation 
(BEFORE) ~: .. ':':::' 
:AfterProject ':: 
Formulation ) 
.(AFTER) 
, : t~tesf and 2 tru} 
. signific:ft!ic~ ' 
1.1 The Planning Stage 
From formulation to loan 
application to MHLG 
(FORMAPLY) 
Mean: 28.4 months 
Std.dev: 17.5 months 
cases (n): 114 
Mean: 40 months F= 1.757 
Std.dev: 19.6 months P=0.187 
cases (n): 52 Significant 
1.2 The Planning Stage 
From formulation to loan 
approval by the TCO~ 
(PLANSTAG) 
2. The Resourcing Stage 
From loan approval by the 
TCO~ the first loan 
withdrawal 
(RESOCING) 
3 . The Construction 
Stage 
Duration of project 
construction 
(CONSTRUC) 
4.1 The Overall Process 
From project formulation to 
beginning of construction 
(FORMBEGN) 
4.2 The Overall Process 
From project formulation to 
project completion 
(SPAN) 
Mean: 34.7 months 
Std.dev: 20.2 
months 
cases (n) : 114 
Mean: 44.4 months 
Std.dev: 18.3 months 
cases (n):50 
Mean: 14.9 months Mean: 17 months 
Std.dev: 10.8 months Std.dev: 13.l months 
cases (n) : 114 cases (n) : 49 
Mean: 20.7 months Mean: 21.5 months 
Std.dev: 12.7 months Std.dev: 12.5 months 
cases (n): 114 cases (n): 52 
Mean: 47.8 months Mean: 65.4 months 
Std.dev: 27.8 months Std.dev: 28.9 months 
cases (n) : 114 cases (n): 52 
Mean: 75 .2 months Mean: 88.3 months 
Std.dev: 32.9 months Std.dev: 32.9 months 
cases (n) : 114 cases (n): 51 
4.3 .. The Overall Process Mean: 79.9 months Mean: 92.3 months 
From project formulation to Std.dev: 32.3 months Std.dev: 32.9 months 
occupation of houses cases (n): 113 cases (n) : 51 
(FORMOCC) 
~ Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
difference of .0000 
at alpha 0.05 
F= 0.046 
P= 0.830 
Significant 
difference of .0004 
at alpha 0.05 
F= 0.509 
P= 0.477 
No Significant 
difference of .276 at 
alpha 0.05 
F= 0.368 
P=0.545 
No Significant 
difference of. 706 at 
alpha 0.05 
F= 0.042 
P=0.837 
Significant 
difference of .000 at 
alpha 0.05 
F= 0.118 
P=0.731 
Significant 
difference of .019 at 
alpha 0.05 
F=O.077 
P=0.782 
Significant 
difference of .023 at 
alpha 0.05 
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The effect of 'extension' on stages of the implementation process 
Extension projects' are projects which were continuing from the previous 
phase. They were assumed to enjoy several advantages over non-extension projects, 
such as prior knowledge about the site (in some cases sites and infrastructure facilities 
were already available). Therefore, it was presumed that the length of time for certain 
stages of implementation would be shorter than the non-extension projects. Statistical 
tests were carried out to perceive if 'extension' and 'non-extension' projects have any 
effect on the length of time of projects' implementation process. The mean for the 
planning stage (variable PLANS TAG) for extension projects was 36.4 months with a 
standard deviation of 24.1 months while non-extension projects had slightly a longer 
mean of 3S.1 months with a standard deviation of 18.8 months. The mean for the 
length of time from the 'formulation stage to the completion stage" (variable SPAN) 
for extension projects was 76.6 months with a standard deviation of37.S months while 
non-extension projects were with a longer mean of SO months and a standard deviation 
of 32 months. Chi-square test and t-test confirmed that there were no significant 
difference between theses two types of projects. 
Change of Project Site 
During the course of the implementation process, changes of site from the 
originally intended location to another location sometimes occurred. Statistical tests 
comparing means were carried out. Table 8.30 below provides a summary of 
tabulations for projects showing whether a change of site occurred or not. During the 
three five-year plans' periods about 19% to 30% of projects had experienced a change 
of site. During the 4MP about 30% of projects experienced changes of sites. The 
overall mean for changes of site is 27%. This implied that in general about one quarter 
of projects involved a change of site. 
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Table 8.30: 
CHANGE OF ORIGINAL PROJECTS SITE BY FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Plan Never Change Change of Site Total 
Site Occurred 
(NO) (YES) 
Third Malaysia Plan 63 17 , 80 (48.2%) 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 61 13 74 (44.6%) 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 10 2 .:/" :~\ 12 (7.2%) . 
134 32 166 (100%) 
Total (80.7%) (19.3%} 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Information of site changes of sites amongst the seven states is presented in the 
Table 8.31 . The percentage of projects which change site amongst the states ranges 
from 12.5% to 47.1 % with Pu)au Pinang not changing its projects' sites at all. Iohor 
has the lowest percentage (12.5%) while Pahang has the highest percentage (47.1%) of 
all the states. 
Table 8.31: 
CHANGING OF ORIGINAL PROJECT SITE BY STATE 
States Percentage of Projects 
Changing Site 
Pulau Pinang : .. 0% 
'.'" 
Perak 12.1% 
lohor 12.5% .,::: .< 
Negeri Sembilan 20% 
Trengganu 
" 
,;·;;{;::tf 
...... ' 30.8% .. :.:':. 
Selangor 43 .5% 
Pahang 47.1% .\. :.,::~.: 
Overall total 27% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.32 below shows the mean of time taken to reach several stages of the 
implementation process by comparing projects without a change of site and projects 
experiencing a change of site. It is evident that projects without a change of site 
~~~ 
::~~ 
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experienced a shorter length of time at several stages of the implementation process 
and their mean is statistically significant from those were there was no site change. 
Table 8.32: 
MEAN LENGTH OF TIME BY CHANGE OF SITE TO SEVERAL POINTS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS. 
Implelrientation Stage ' 
,(ya'~iable) No Ch(~~)~f §ite ;-: ·:'::S,h:~:~~~~:~:~'~~'·:':'j·i:::;:!:::t~~~~k~:a~i~r .( 
:",:,::.:{,:, ... ,..' ::'>.,::':(., :'::/:'<'" . ",. "..): ,,::':::: 
1. The Planning Stage: 
From formulation to loan 
approval by the TCOHL 
(PLANSTAG) 
2.1. The Overall Stage: 
From formulation to the 
beginning of construction 
(FORMBEGN) 
2.2 The Overall Stage: 
From formulation to houses 
occupation 
(FORMOCC) 
Mean: 36.3 months 
Std.dev: 20.1 
months 
cases (n) : 134 
Mean: 50.4 months 
Std.dev: 28 .1 
months 
cases (n) : 134 
Mean: 80.1 months 
Std.dev: 31 months 
cases (n): L33 
Mean: 43 ,5 months F= l.161 
Std.dev: 19,2 P= .283 
months No Significant 
cases (n) :32 difference of .071 at 
alpha 0.05 
Mean: 66 months F= 4,074 
Std.dev: 30,8 P=,O,26 
months Significant 
cases (n):32 difference of .0000 
at alpha 0.05 
Mean: 99,6 months F= l.939 
Std.dev: 36 months p= 0.l66 
cases (n) :32 Significant 
difference of ,002 at 
alpha 0,05 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Amendment to Projects 
Besides changes of site, some of projects also experienced other amendments. 
These modifications occurred after projects had been formulated, Table 8.33 below 
shows types of amendments which occurred to projects throughout the three five-year 
plans 31 % of the total projects sampled experienced some modifications, 
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Table 8.33 : 
TYPE OF AMENDMENTS TO PROJECTS 
rype of Amendment 
.... 
;-Percent · :.' :.C~~~::!if :::::: '. 
.:\ .... : ... :.:, .. ':':". :.: 
Amendment ofProiect's Tar~et Units 4.2% 4.2% 
Amendment of House Type 13.1% 17.3% 
Relocation to Another Location but Within the Same District 4.7% 26.6% 
Amendment of Project Target, Type & Location 4.7% 26.6% 
Relocation to Another District 9% 27.8% 
Cancellation or Postponement of the Project 3.3% 30.8% 
Projects Without Amendment 69.2% 100% 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.34 provides information on the length oftime taken at several points of 
the implementation process by comparing projects without any modification and 
projects that have experienced a modification . The analysis based on comparing means 
shows that projects without modification have shorter means. For example the length 
of time taken from the project formul ation until completion of building stage (SPAN), 
the mean for projects without modification of 76.6 months is shorter by 15.9 months 
than the mean of projects with modifications of 92.6 months. The time taken to 
complete planning stage (pLANST AG) and to reach beginning of construction 
(FORMBEGN) has no significant difference between projects with or without 
modifications. However the time taken to reach completion of building construction 
(SP AN) and project occupation (FORMOCC) shows significant differences between 
these two type of projects. 
When the land report was made 
An analysis was also carried out to find whether 'when the land report was 
made' has any significance to the time taken from formulation to the completion of 
building construction (variable SPAN). The data analysis showed that projects where 
the 'land report was made before the project was formulated' had the shortest mean of 
74.3 months with a standard deviation of 34.8 months. This is lower than the mean of 
projects with the land report made after project being formulated of 82 months. The 
analysis shows that the longer the time made for preparation of the land report the 
longer the time spent from formulation to building completion stage. The results of the 
analyses are as in Table 8.35 . 
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Table 8.34: 
MEAN LENGTH OF TllvfE BY PROJECT AMENDMENTS TO SEVERAL 
POINTS OF IMPLE?v1ENTATION PROCESS. 
Implementation Stage No Amendment Amendment to t-test and 2 tail 
(Variable) (NO) Projects 
' .. . :. 
significance 
(YES) 
I '" 
···f.,.·' ,.: ... , 
',," : ..... : 
. . . .... , ........... 
1. The Planning Stage: 
From formulation to Mean: 36.4 months Mean: 44 months F= 1.378 
loan approval by the Std.dey: 19.4 Std.dev: 22.5 P=0.242 
TCOHL months months No Significant 
(pLANS TAG) cases (n) : 139 cases (n): 27 difference of .073 
at alpha 0.05 
2.1 . The Overall Stage: Mean: 52.4 months Mean: 58.3 months F= 2.974 
From formulation to the Std.dev: 28.2 Std.dev: 34.2 P=.086 
beginning of months months No Significant 
construction cases (n): 139 cases (n):27 difference of .341 
(FORMBEGN) at alpha 0.05 
2.2 The Overall Stage: 
From formulation to the Mean: 76.6 months Mean: 92.6 months F= 10.090 
completion stage Std .dey: 30.5 Std.dey: 43.2 P=.002 
(SPAN) months months Significant 
cases (n): 138 cases (n): 27 difference of .023 
at alpha 0.05 
2.3 The Overall Stage: 
From formulation to the Mean: 81.2 months Mean: 97.4 months F= 10.090 
houses occupation Std.dev: 29.9 Std.dev: 43.2 P=.002 
(FORMOCC) months months Significant 
cases (n): 138 cases (n): 27 difference of .023 
at alpha 0.05 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.35 : 
THE TIME TAKEN BETWEEN FORMULATION AND BUILDING 
COMPLETION (VARIABLE SPAN) BY WHEN LAND REPORT WAS 
PREPARED 
258 
When Land Report Made I Mean Std.Dev I Cases 
(Months) (Months) 
Before Project's Fonnulation 74,3 34.8 
Within 3 Months After Fonnulation 77.6 30.5 
Between 3 and 6 After Fonnulation 102.3 30.4 
More than 6 Months After Fonnulation 113.7 133.7 
t-test for indeuendent samules 
land report prepared before project formulation 74.3 34.8 
land report prepared after project formulation 81.97 32.4 
F= .780 
P= .78 
2-tail significant .156 at alpha 0.05 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Feasibility studies 
Searching through records of PLCHP one can find that feasibility studies were 
prepared for projects. Three types of feasibility studies made. The first category was a 
'working paper' which contained brief proposals of 'three to four pages report' prepared 
for the proposed project. Next, was a 'technical report' which was a comprehensive 
report containing detailed technical information on the proposed project. Finally, there 
was 'the technical and financial report' which contained comprehensive infonnation on 
technical matters and the financial viability of the proposed projects. This type of 
report was usually prepared by a team of consultants. However about 14.5% of the 
completed projects were found not to have any feasibility studies. The statistical 
analyses show that 'well-prepared projects' have a shorter time span for completion. 
Projects with 'detailed technical and financial studies' proved to take the shortest time 
to reach completion stage of 56.5 months with a standard deviation of 33.3 months. 
However, projects where feasibility studies were not available have the mean of 75 .6 
months with a standard deviation of 29.7 months. Results of the statistical tests are as 
in the Table 8.36:-
58 
92 
12 
3 
58 
107 
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Table 8.36: 
TYPE OF FEASffiILITY STUDIES AND PROJECTS' COMPLETION TIME 
(mean in months) 
Type of Feasibility Studies Made The Planning From 
Stage Formulation to 
(PLANS TAG) the Completion N 
(SPAN) 
Feasibility studies were not available 33.6 75.6 25 
Working paper 38.5 80 120 
Technical report 40.5 81.8 18 
Detailed technical and financial studies 13.8 56.S 2 
Overall samples 37.7 79.3 165 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
missing case = 1 case 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
When the land survey was made for the project. 
The next data analysis was to see whether a land survey being carried out had 
any effect on projects' completion time. In some of the projects, land surveys were 
carried out before the project was formulated and in some projects it was done after 
the projects had been formulated. The purpose of the land survey was to provide 
precise information about the size of land, exact boundaries and it topographical 
information. It helped in the preparation of a site plan, the calculation of project 
density, the estimate of the number of houses that can be built and to a certain extent 
with project costing. The statistical analysis shows that projects where land survey was 
carried out before the project was formulated had a shorter mean of completion period 
of 68.4 months with 34.3 months standard deviation. On the other hand, projects 
where a land survey was carried out after the project was formulated, had a longer 
mean of length of time for completion which was 78.4 months and a standard deviation 
of28.8 months. The result of analysis appears in Table 8.37 below:-
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Table 8.37: 
WHEN THE LAND SURVEY MADE FOR THE PROJECT AND PROJECT 
COMPLETION. 
Was Survey Carried Out Before Project Mean Std.Dev Cases 
Formulation? (month) (month) 
Yes 71.0 37.9 36 
No 81.5 31.7 129 
Mean difference/total -10.5 165 
t-test for egualia of means: 
F= 1.971 
p= 0.162 
2-tail significant = 0.095 at alpha 0.05 
Note: Analysis based on the 166 completed cases and exclude the 49 incomplete cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Conclusion on Project Preparation: 
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The statistical tests show that projects prepared before project formulation, 
without site change and without modification took a shorter time to implement. For 
projects to achieve a short completion time it seems necessary to have done adequate 
preparation before project formulation. 
PROJECTS' FINANCIAL RESOURCING 
This section looks at financial resourcing, including: allocation of funds made 
for the programme; the amount of loan approved for the projects; construction costs; 
total project costs; and, project costs adjusted to 1990's price. The analysis also 
compares plans, states and implementing agencies. 
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Allocation of Funds 
When projects are formulated they are appropriated with project finance. The 
amount of funds approved by central agencies is based on project estimates put 
forward by state governments and matched with policy on maximum loan limits set by 
central agencies. Tabulation of projects according to the amounts of funds allocated, 
appears in Table 8.38, where 34% of projects were allocated with funds below 
$1,000,000 , another 30% were between $1,000,000 to $1,999,999 and 13% were 
between $2,000,000 to $2,999,999. All these make up a total of 77% of projects were 
with allocation of funds below $3,000,000. The average allocation of funds per project 
for each five-year plan was: $1,867,541 for 3MP; $2,648,468 for 4MP; and, 
$1,924,032 for the 5MP. 
Table 8.38: 
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR PLCHP PROJECTS 1976-1990 
Note: 1 missing cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.39 provides information on the allocation of funds provided for 
PLCHP projects according to states and five-year plans. A higher amount of funds was 
allocated for 4MP while the 5MP had the lowest. During 5MP Selangor was not 
provided with allocation of funds, because no new projects were initiated in this state. 
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Table 8.39: 
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR 215 PLCHP PROJECTS 1976-1990 
State ' 3MP 
.... ; 4Mp:.·::: ::::~:r [::{:;:;":'.\}SMP·::·::.:'··:·' : 
Johor $76,131,667 $58,457,536 $5,528,785 
Negeri Sembi1an $20,244,877 $21,019,921 $2,675,000 
Pahang $14,676,500 $39,581,281 $8,460,000 
Perak $10,094,025 $31,926,400 $3,120,000 
Pu1au Pinang $14,676,500 $38,048,864 $5,325,000 
Selangor $25,292,218 $64,149,400 -
Trengganu $11,808,000 $22,257,281 $9,523,800 
lz •.• •• .;.: Total $171,813,787 ...•.... .$275,440;683',. j i"i:':;)/$3;4;632';585}' 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Allocation Per Dwelling. 
Table 8.40 below provides infonnation on allocation per dwel1ing. For the 
whole three five-year plans the mean was $11,319 per unit with a standard deviation of 
$5,209. The mean of allocation per unit increased as the five-year plan headed towards 
the 1990s. During 3MP the mean of allocation was $8,137 per unit, then in 4MP it 
increased to $13,526 per unit and finally to $16,361 per unit during 5MP. 
Table 8.40: 
PROJECT'S ALLOCATION PER UNIT ACCORDING TO STATES AND FlVE-
YEAR PLANS 
State 3MP ,.,::. 
Johor $9,598 $17,721 $16,690 
Negeri Sembilan $8,001 $13,724 $18,865 
Pahang $7,261 $12,611 $15,208 
Perak $7,835 $10,935 $15,000 
Pulau Pinang $9,970 $20,314 $14,812 
Selangor $7,795 $10,831 $0 
Trengganu $8,735 $12,177 $17,662 
Total 
I ::: •• y : ... ' .. $8,137 mean 
(standard deviation) ($2,090) 
number of cases N=90 
Note: missing cases = 6 or 2.8 per cent 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data ColJcction 
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Loans Approved 
Loan applications for public low-cost housing projects are submitted by state 
governments through the MHLG. The loan application process is finalised through 
signing agreements between states and federal government. The amount of loan 
approved by the federal government for projects in the seven states during the three 
five-year plans is exhibited in Table 8.41. When this Table 8.41 is compared with the 
earlier Table 8.39 we can see that the total amount ofloan approved is generally higher 
than the total amount offunds allocated. 
Table 8.41: 
LOAN APPROVED ACCORDING TO STATES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
State ".; 
.... . ..:."::",:: .. :: 3MP 4MP·.U.?? ::;:::: .. 5MP:/::: .. ·i::: ... :::' .:.,; ••.... :.'" ... .::> • 
Johor $82,556,823 $53,973,702 $8,145,412 
Negeri Sembilan $22,027,322 $17,839,564 $2,675,000 
Pahang $18,611,578 $33,904,283 $10,410,000 
Perak $11,427,031 $29,956,672 $2,093,800 
Pulau Pinang $14,124,400 $37,873,859 $5,325,000 
Selangor $26,366,117 $68,318,686 0 
Trengganu $17,545,409 $33,461,691 $9,558,895 
: ......... ?\,: 
' :.W'· " .. '::,-,:; 
:'. $275,543;;24 ' t:·; Mi' ·'!'::::: $38 ,208 ;io'f::: : ":"':::~ ~:.:' \:.- :.: .. Total $192,658,680 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The amount ofloan approved for projects per unit is shown in Table 8.42. The 
table shows that the amount of loan approved per unit in four states (pahang, Perak, 
Pulau Pinang and Trengganu) for the 4MP projects is higher than the 3MP and 5MP 
projects. 
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Table 8.42: 
APPROVED LOAN PER UNIT ACCORDING TO PLANS AND STATES 
State 3MP 4MP 5MP 
Iohor $14,177 $19,815 $24,166 
Negeri Sembilan $9,289 $17,533 $18,152 
Pahang $11 ,943 $22,351 $15,000 
Perak $9,627 $16,960 $10,263 
Pulau Pinang $8,450 $26,442 $16,406 
Selangor $8,909 $17,545 0 
Trengganu $11 ,073 $20,551 $23,954 
Total 
mean $10,335 $19,388 .. , $18,152 
(standard deviation) ($4,364) ($5,525) ($7,349) 
number of cases N=89 N=78 ,.N= 14 , 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Additional Loans 
Inadequate loans approved for the project led to requests for additional loans 
by state governments to meet projects' financial requirements. Table 8.43 below shows 
that 60% projects utilised no additional loan while 30% required one additional loan, 
8% required two more additional loans and 2% required three more additional loans. 
Table 8.43 : 
ADDITIONAL LOANS APPROVED TO PLCHP'S PROJECTS 1976-1990 
Number of Additional 3MP 4MP 5MP ,', Total 
Loan Approved '(percentage) 
;.:," 
... :.: :S 
No Additional Loan 43 48 9 100 (60.2%) 
One Additional Loan 23 24 3 50 (30.1%) 
Two Additional Loan 12 2 0 14 (8.4%) 
Three Additional Loan 2 0 0 2 (1.2%) 
Total 80 74 12 166 (100%):: 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Construction cost 
Project's construction costs incorporate all the costs incurred for earth work 
and site preparation, infrastructure and building, but exclude the land costs, water and 
electricity supply and other costs incurred during the completion stage. The mean of 
-:.; 
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construction cost per unit appears in Table 8.44. The mean of construction cost shows 
variations between plans and states with an increasing trend from the 3MP period to 
the SMP period (except Pahang in SMP). Comparing Table 8.44 with the previous 
Table 8.42, shows that the mean of loan approved per unit is lower than the mean of 
construction cost per unit in each plan and state. Therefore, state governments had to 
seek their own funding in meeting with the balance of this finance. 
Table 8.44 
AVERAGE PROJECT CONSTRUCTION COST BY STATES AND FIVE-YEAR 
PLANS 
State >:: 3MP 
Johor $13,803 $14,375 $21,420 
Negeri Sembilan $10,230 $11,607 $20,885 
Pahang $10,783 $20,109 $14,981 
Perak $9,404 $16,578 $23,334 
Pulau Pinang $10,936 $28,769 $27,432 
Selangor $11,534 $17,158 -
Trengganu $11,613 $18,832 $21,945 
Total 
mean $11,062 
(standard deviation) ($4,145) 
Number of cases 
." .: 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitatjve Data Collection 
TOTAL PROJECT COST 
Total project cost incorporated all costs, including earth work and site 
preparation, infrastructure and building cost, land cost, (1) water and electricity supply 
and other costs incurred during the project implementation process. The mean total 
cost per unit is shown in Table 8.45 . Comparison of Table 8.4S with the previous 
Table 8.40 and 8.42, shows that the mean total project per unit is higher than the mean 
of loan approved per unit and the mean of funds allocated per unit in every plan and 
states. 
1 Land cost was included in the total cost if payment made to it such as for compensation of 
compulsorily taking of private land. Land cost was not taken into the total cost if state land 
was used. 
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Table 8.45 : 
PROJECT' S TOTAL COST PER UNIT OF HOUSE BY STATES AND FlVE-
YEAR PLANS 
State 
Johor 
Negeri Sembilan 
Pahang 
Perak 
Pulau Pinang 
Selangor 
Trengganu 
Total 
mean 
(standard deviation) 
total cases 
N = 166 cases. 
Note: 
3MP 
$14,628 
$11,073 
$13,007 
$10,500 
$11,468 
$13,513 
$12,394 
$12,431 I·': 
($4,586) 
N=80 
4MP 5MP 
$18,911 $22,018 
$17,749 * 
$25,539 $16,750 
$18,271 $23,334 
$29,699 $32,689 
$19,725 
-
$22,312 $23,730 
." .. ',' ",. '::: 
$20,481 $24,653 
($6,326) ;::: .:. ($7,3$0)/ 
. N=74 .. .: .. ' NF12 
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• missing data for Negeri Sembilan because (he calculation for the project's total cost was not yet 
finalised by the State Housing Department when fieldwork was carried out by this researcher. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Comparisons of Project Costs 
The following Table 8.46 provides comparison (1) allocation of funds per unit; 
(2) project estimate per unit; (3) loan approved per unit; (4) construction cost per unit; 
and (5) total project cost per unit. This shows several patterns. First, the mean total 
cost per unit was higher than any other four means (with the exception of estimate per 
unit and cost per unit in 4MP). This implies that the funding provided by the federal 
government was lower than the total project cost in most cases. Consequently, state 
governments had to bear whatever differences there were between the total cost and 
the amount ofloan provided. Second, the mean project estimates per unit were higher 
than the mean of funds allocated and the mean of loan approved per unit. This implies 
that projects were inadequately provided with sufficient financing right at the start. 
Third, the mean project estimate was lower than the mean total project cost for 3MP 
and 5MP, but not for the 4MP. A time lapse between when the estimate was made and 
the beginning of construction could be associated with this pattern. The time lapse 
between this two period was about 53.4 months (variable FORMBEGN) which could 
explain why the project estimate was no longer accurate. Finally, the mean of project 
costing and financing show an increasing trend from 3MP to 5MP. Delays in starting 
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the construction caused the project estimates were no longer valid and the result of 
inflation caused the project cost increased from 311P to 511P. 
Table 8.46: 
C011P ARISON OF PROJECTS FUNDING AND COSTING BY PLANS 
3MP 4MP 5MP Total Cases 
jJfmissing) 
Allocation Per Unit 
mean $8,137 $13,257 $16,361 215 
standard deviation $2,090 $4,953 $7,879 (6) 
cases (90) (101) (18) 
Estimate Per Unit 
mean $11,347 $22,760 $22,016 215 
standard deviation $8,009 $27,517 $7,415 (31) 
cases (89) (80) 1151 
Loan Approved Per Unit 
mean $10,355 $19,389 $18,152 215 
standard deviation $4,364 $5,425 $7,349 (34) 
cases (89) (78) (14) 
Construction Cost Per 
Unit $1l,062 $17,142 $21,971 215 
mean $4,145 $6,048 $5,876 (52) 
standard deviation (79) (71) (13) 
cases 
Total Project Cost Per 
Unit mean $12,432 $20,482 $24,653 215 
standard deviation $4,586 $6,327 $7,331 (49) 
cases (80) (74) (12) 
N = 166 cases. 
Note: Missing data in this table become larger because of the incomplete projects. This is due to the 
progress of incomplete project were varied and only a small number reached the construction stage. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.47 below shows comparisons between project estimate, construction 
cost and total costs by five-year plan and their completion status. This table reveals 
that in 311P and 411P, projects completed within five-year plan had lower construction 
cost and total costs than the estimated cost. However in 511P, projects were under-
estimated their total costs. Also, in 3MP and 411P, projects completed within the same 
plan had a smaller difference between the construction cost and total costs than 
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projects completed outside the five-year plan. This implied that, a large additional costs 
will be incurred if delays in completing the projects. 
Table 8.47: 
COMPARISONS OF PROJECT ESTIMATE, CONSTRUCTION COST AND 
TOTAL COSTS BY FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
COMPLETED WITHIN COMPLETED OUTSIDE 
PLAN PLAN 
Five-year Project's Construction Total Costs Construction Total Costs 
Plan Estimate Cost Cost 
3MP $11,347 $8,045 $8,718 $12,543 $14,088 
4MP $22,760 $16,309 $18,945 $17,690 $21,321 
5MP $22,016 $25,000 $32,000 $21,631 $23,412 
Sourte: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Total Project Costs and Preparation Variables 
The foIIowing Table 8.48 shows result oft-tests between preparation variables 
and the total project cost in nominal price. Three variables IDENTIFY, LANDREPT 
and SURVEY, show no significant different to the total project cost whether they were 
done before or after the project formulation. The other two variables EXTENT and 
SITECHG, (2) also show no significant difference to the total project cost, whether 
extension of previous projects or any changes to project sites were made. Variable 
AMEND shows that projects without amendment have total projects cost per unit 
lower than projects involved with any amendments. This different is statistically 
significant because AMEND involved with major changes to projects such as with 
increased or decreased of project targets, amendment to the house type or relocation 
to another district, etc. (Refer to Table 8.34 earlier on modifications to projects). 
2 The difference between SITECHG and AMEND is where SITECHG involved the decision to 
change or relocate project site to nearby to the original proposal. Variable AMEND involved 
broader amendment to projects included relocation to another location within the same 
district or to another district. (See also Table 8.34). 
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Table 8.48: 
T-TEST ON PREPARATION VARIABLES WITH TOTAL PROJECT COST 
(in current price) 
[::: .. Variable Nof Mean F~Value<"" ' ~robability :!::: .' Decision ' .... 
. _,) Cases .... . .......... :-:.' .'< ... ' ....... .. ":' . .... ) .. :' 
IDENTIFY Before 114 $16,710 6.424 .012 Not Significant 
After 52 $16,923 
LANDREPT Before 58 $17,884 5.842 .017 Not Significant 
After 108 $16,182 
SURVEY Before 36 $17,791 7.644 .006 Not Significant 
After 130 $16,496 
EXTEND Yes 38 $17,804 .279 .598 Not Significant 
No 128 $16,413 
SITECHG No 134 $16,758 5.464 .021 Not Significant 
Yes 32 $16,855 
AMEND Yes 27 $20,047 l.474 .227 Significant 
No 139 $16,142 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Total Project Costs and Completion Time 
Table 8.49 below shows comparisons of total project costs in current prices 
and completion time according to quartiles. Data analysis from this table produced 
three findings: (a) total project costs increased over time from 3MP to 5MP, (b) all the 
project costs classified by quartiles increased from 3MP to 5MP, and (c) projects 
formulated for 3MP and 4MP show increased in costs by quartiles that implied the 
longer to complete the project the higher the total costs. However, for 5MP, projects 
completed below the first quartile had the highest total costs. 
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Table 8.49: 
COST PER UNIT (CURRENT PRICE) BY QUARTILE OF CO:MPLETION TIME 
ACCORDING TO FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Quartile 3MP .. 4MP ·· . 5MP 
.. \ .. ::. .':: 
Below First Quartile 
Mean $8,466 $18,474 $32,000 
standard deviation $3 ,316 $5,694 $0 
cases 22 16 3 
First Quartile $12,456 $19,564 $20,218 
Mean 
standard deviation $3,864 $8,072 $4,866 
cases 19 20 2 
Second Quartile 
Mean $14,017 $19,988 $24,078 
standard deviation $3 ,479 $6,735 $1,657 
cases 22 17 2 
Third Quartile 
Mean $15,067 $22,935 $21,379 
standard deviation $4,154 $3,601 $9,471 
cases 17 20 5 
Overall 
Mean $12,431 $20,481 $24,653 
standard deviation $4,586 $6,326 $7,330 
cases 80 73 12 
Notes: Missing cases = lout of 166 cases 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Analyses on the total project costs confirmed that total project cost in current 
price increased over time during the period of study. This increased was related to the 
time, where delays in implementing projects involved with higher total project costs. It 
is also related to preparation, where the estimated costs not valid and additional costs 
incurred to the total costs. 
COST PER UNIT ADJUSTED TO 1990'S PRICE 
Table 8.50 below provides the mean cost per unit adjusted to 1990's price. The 
calculation of adjusted price is based on CPI's index and calculated for the year when 
the project was completed. During 3MP the mean adjusted cost per unit was at 
$18,476 then for 4MP it increased to $21,345 and finally in 5MP it increased to 
$23,550. Comparing states and plans, Pulau Pinang has the highest mean of$33,563 in 
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4MP and $33,208 in 5MP. Perak has the lowest mean of $13,540 in 3MP, followed by 
Negeri Sembilan with $14,064 also in 3MP. 
Table 8.50: 
ADJUSTED COST PER UNIT ACCORDING TO PLAN AND STATE 
J!!ased on 166 Completed Projects) 
Plan State Mean Std.Dev Cases 
Third Malaysia Johor $16,812 $4664 8 
Plan N.Sembilan $14,064 $2,953 11 
P.Pinang $14,899 $3,086 6 
Pahang $15,854 $6,425 14 
Perak $13,540 $3,708 13 
Selangor $15,892 $5,487 18 
Trengganu $15,592 $5,345 9 
Total3MP 118,476 $6,803 79 
Fourth Malaysia Johor $19,312 $3,560 9 
Plan N.Sembilan $19,125 $5,514 9 
Selangor $21 ,067 $6010 22 
Perak $18,424 $4,344 11 
P.Pinang $33,563 $7,918 4 
Pahang $22,787 $7,523 7 
Trengganu $23,541 $8809 8 
Total4MP 121,345 $6,800 70 
Fifth Malaysia Iohor $19,867 - 1 
Plan N.Sembilan - 0 
Selangor - - 0 
Perak $19,413 - 1 
P.Pinang $33,208 $2,085 4 
Paha~ $14,223 $6,957 3 
Trengganu $22,121 $765 2 
Total $23,550 $8,824 11 
All the tbree $18,476 $6,803 .: .. , .::: 160 'It:· 
plan!! : : .: ::: 
Note: Missing: 55 cases or 25 .6% where 49 cases (22.8%) because of incomplete projects 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.51 below provides the mean cost per unit adjusted to 1990's price 
tabulation according to five-year plans and type of house constructed. The type of 
houses constructed is divided into four groups: (1) single and double storey terraced 
housing; (2) wooden house; (3) medium and high rise flats; and, (4) the mixed type. 
Table 8.51 shows that the mean adjusted cost per unit increased from 3MP to SMP. 
During 3MP the wooden houses were more costly than the three other types of 
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housing. While the mean for three other types of housing showed only a small 
differences. During 4MP the mean of adjusted cost per unit for single and double 
storey terraced housing was higher than other types of housing. But during 5:MP the 
mean for single and double storey terraced housing was lower than other types of 
housing. 
Table 8.51: 
ADmSTEn COST PER UNIT ACCORDING TO 1990'S PRICE FOR TYPE OF 
HOUSE AND FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Type of Houses \ Plan 3MP 4MP 
,;:.:.: 
5MP 
.. 
. ... 
Single and Double Storey Terraced $15,004 $20,024 $20,647 
Wooden Houses $20,457 
- -
Medium and High Rise Flats $15,291 $18,932 $34,377 
Mixed type $15,627 $18,932 $34,377 
fu!!!m: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.52 below provides the mean of cost per unit adjusted to 1990's price 
according to five-year plans and the location of houses was constructed. There were 
three categories projects location: urban areas; urban fringes; and rural areas. During 
3:MP the mean adjusted house price for urban fringes was lower than urban and rural 
areas but in the 4MP and 5MP the mean adjusted cost for houses in rural areas was the 
lowest. 
Table 8.52: 
ADmSTED COST PER UNIT ACCORDING TO LOCATION AND FIVE-YEAR 
PLAN 
Location \ Plan 3MP 4MP 
".::::::;':';::;:r'· 
5MP " 
:.:. 
Urban areas $15,515 $32,483 $30,540 
Urban fringes $13,805 $22,279 -
Rural areas $15,573 $19,586 $17,752 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Table 8.53 below highlights adjusted total cost per unit by the quartile of 
completion time. The table shows that, in 3MP the longer the time to complete the 
project the higher the real cost. Then for 4MP the first quartile was the lowest but cost 
fluctuated for other quartiles. In 5MP the shorter to complete the project the higher the 
adjusted total cost per unit. The table also shows that project real costs increase for 
each quartile and five-year plan e.g. projects completed below first quartile were 
M$12,608 in 3MP, $20,655 in 4MP and $34,230 in SMP. 
Table 8.53: 
ADmSTED COST PER UNIT (REAL PRICE) BY QUARTILE OF COMPLETION 
TIME ACCORDING TO FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Quartile 3MP ;.: . 4MP sMP .. 
. :::::::::-:::.":::.: ,':' :.::.::-::.:. 
Below First Quartile 
$12,608 $20,655 $34,230 
Mean 
standard deviation $4,477 $6,524 $512 
cases 22 16 3 
First Quartile 
$15,470 $21,834 $22,612 
Mean 
standard deviation $4,808 $8,660 
-
cases 19 20 2 
Second Quartile 
$16,591 $20,933 $21,899 
Mean 
standard deviation $4,075 $7,482 
-
cases 22 17 2 
Third Quartile 
$16,430 $21,863 $18,634 
Mean 
standard deviation $4,478 $3,563 $7,584 
cases 17 20 5 
Overall 
$15,228 $21,388 $23,550 
Mean 
standard deviation $4,665 $6,748 $8,825 
cases 80 74 11 
Notes: Missing cases =1 out of 166 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
.. :.;:: 
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Total Adjusted Project Costs and Preparation Variables 
Table 8.54 below shows results of t-test between preparation variables and the 
total project cost in real price. Five preparation variables (IDENTIFY, EXTEND, 
SITECHG, LANREPT and SURVEy) show no significant difference to adjusted total 
cost similar to the test~ in Table 8.47 earlier. AMEND is the only variable with 
significant difference to the real price. Projects involved with amendments ($21,194) 
incurred higher costs compare to projects without amendments ($18,062) or about 
17% higher than non-amended projects. 
A crucial finding from the analysis of total project costs in nominal price and in 
real price confirmed that project costs rose over the period of study from 3MP to 
5MP. 
Table 8.54: 
T -TEST ON PREP ARATION VARIABLES WITH ADmSTED TOTAL COST IN 
1990'S PRICE 
(real price) 
1< Variable N of Mean F~Value :::: : }lr~habilitY\. : ::;:Recision ::: " ... ;.;..... . ... ' .... Cases ::::. :>::.: "':," . 
IDENTIFY Before 114 $18,642 4.805 .030 Not Significant 
After 52 $18,419 
LANREPT Before 58 $19,720 6.455 .012 Not Significant 
After 108 $17,953 
SURVEY Yes 36 $19,638 6.118 .014 Not Significant 
No 130 $18,277 
EXTEND Yes 38 $19,169 .117 .73 Not Significant 
No 128 $18,394 
SITECHG No 134 $18,614 3.534 .062 Not Significant 
Yes 32 $18,395 
AMEND Yes 27 $21,194 1.335 .250 Significant 
No 139 $18,062 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND COST BY AGENCY 
The length of time taken by the three implementation agencies from the project 
formulation stage to the beginning of construction (FORMBEGN), the completion 
stage (SPAN) and occupation of houses (FORMOCC) is presented in Table 8.55. The 
mean for variables FOR1v1BEGN, SPAN and FORMOCC shows that they are different 
=:.: 
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between the three agencies where PWD has the shortest followed by SEDC and NHD 
has the longest mean. Statistical tests by the one-way ANOV A on variable 
FORMBEGN produces an F-ratio of 8.6972 and F-probability of .0003 which 
interprets as a significant difference of means between these agencies. Similarly 
variable SP AN and FORMOCC provide results showing that their means are 
significantly different at alpha .05 . 
Table 8.55: 
LENGTH OF TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS BY AGENCY AND 
FlVE-YEAR PLAN 
:;t;9F~!H?li;:\~lah ...... .; 
::::)}) ..... -. ".-. . .... 
From project formulation to 
construction (FORMBEGN) 
From project formulation to 
completion stage (SPAN) 
From project formulation to 
NHD 
SEDC 
PWD 
NHD 
SEDC 
PWD 
houses occupation (FORMOCC) 
NHD 
SEDC 
PWD 
64.1 
57 
44.6 
87.2 
77.7 
72.4 
91.7 
81.6 
79.8 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
59.6 
52.8 
26.2 
85.8 
80.2 
59.3 
92.6 
82.8 
63.7 
67.5 
73.3 
32.9 
100 
98.9 
46.7 
104.5 
102.4 
50.8 
Comparison between agencies is made for project financing and costing, which 
appears in Table 8.56. The table shows a different amount of allocation, amount of 
loan approved and project costing between the three agencies. Projects assigned to 
PWD were allocated a highest amount allocation per unit. The SEDC estimated project 
cost were higher than the other two agencies, but projects under NHD had the highest 
amount of loan. PWD's projects had the highest construction cost per unit and 
similarly projects handled by this agency had the highest average total project costs per 
unit. Finally, as to the adjusted total project cost per unit based on 1990's price, PWD 
had the highest mean of$20,853 followed by SEDC with $18,235 while NHD was the 
lowest with $17,346 per unit. Although these means were difference, statistical tests by 
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one-way ANOV A produced results that they were not statistically significant 
difference. For example the adjust cost to 1990's price produce an F-ratio of 2.5132 
and F-probability of .0843 which interprets as no significant difference between the 
agencies at the alpha 0.05. 
Table 8.56: 
PROJECTS' FINANCING AND COSTING BY AGENCIES 
Project Financing and Costing NHD SEDC PWD 
Project allocation per unit $11,750 $10,725 $12,190 
Project estimate per unit $13,488 $18,835 $18,520 
Project approved loan per unit $15,584 $14,425 $14,808 
Project construction cost per unit $14,393 $14,022 $16,414 
Project total cost per unit $16,439 $16,582 $18,543 
Adjusted Cost to 1990's price $17,436 $18,235 $20,853 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.57 below compares between project estimate, amount ofloan approved 
and total costs according to the completion status by agencies and five-year plans. This 
table shows that: (a) NHD has the lowest estimates but was approved higher loans, 
whereas SEDC and PWD have higher estimates but were approved lower amount of 
loans; (b) loans approved would be adequate to cover total costs if projects completed 
within the same plan in many cases, but loans were inadequate if projects completed in 
other plans; (c) NHD has a lower total project costs than SEDC and PWD. 
Thus, it can be summed as analyses of performance between agencies for 
project costing show variability between implementing agencies. 
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Table 8.57: 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN ESTIMATES, LOAN APPROVED AND TOTAL 
COSTS BY AGENCIES AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
Agency\Plan Project Loan Completed Completed 
Estimate .. Approved Within Plan Outside Plan 
NHD 
3MP $9,197 $12,459 $8,102 $13,657 
4MP $16,761 $17,480 $14,502 $20,336 
5MP $17,276 $19,531 $23,121 $21,130 
SEDe 
3MP $12,297 $9,926 $9,037 $14,235 
4MP $26,310 $19,356 $19,355 $22,204 
5MP $19,878 $18,560 $19,542 
PWD 
3MP $11,730 $8670 $8,251 $14,224 
4MP $24,928 $22,816 $24,721 $2t,996 
5MP $29,848 $16,406 $32,000 $33,378 
.. 
Sou~e: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
HOUSING TARGET 
At the beginning of each five-year plan a target of the number of houses to be 
built project fonnulated. The aggregate of all projects at the beginning of each plan 
became the housing target for each state. Consequently the aggregate total of states' 
targets became the target of each five-year plan. The distribution of housing targets 
based on the number of newly fonnulated projects for each five-year plan is depicted in 
Table 8.58 below. The table highlights that the majority of housing projects were 
clustered around projects below 200 units. The total number of projects below 200 
units is 160 out of 215 total projects or 74%. This indicates that the majority the 
PLCHP projects were small. Only 8 projects (3.7%) were above 500 units. The 
smallest project in this programme was 13 houses while the largest aimed for 2,016 
houses. The mean for the ovenin targeted unit was 197, the mode was 100 and the 
median was 120 houses. 
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Table 8.58: 
HOUSING TARGET: PROJECTS' SIZE ACCORDING TO FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
Number of 3MP 4MP 5MP Total 
houses per (1976-80) (1981-85) (1986-90) 
pro.iect 
50 and less 23 7 3 33 
51 to 100 28 24 8 60 
101 to 150 19 22 4 4S 
151 to 200 5 16 1 22 
201 to 250 2 10 1 13 
251 to 300 4 7 1 12 
301 to 350 0 3 0 3 
351 to 400 3 7 0 10 
401 to 450 2 4 0 6 
451 to 500 0 3 0 3 
more than 500 6 2 0 8 
Total 92 105 18 215 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
As shown in Table 8.59 the number of houses approved by the TCO& was 
lower than the target set at the beginning of each five-year plan. Furthermore the 
number of houses built were also lower than the approved figure. As a result in most of 
the five-year plans there was a shortfaU of housing target. 
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Table 8.59: 
THE NUMBER OF HOUSES TARGETED, APPROVED AND BUILT 
(based on 215 projects) 
Plan & State Number of Number of Number of : Target· 
Houses Houses I: Houses: Built 
:::::::::. 
Shortfalls 
.... Targeted Approved 
3MP (1976-1980) 
Iohor 7,531 5,887 5,128 2,403 
.f}1.9%) 
Negeri Sembilan 2,423 2,260 1,379 1,044143%) 
Selangor 3,382 3,251 2,862 520{J5.3%) 
Perak 1,178 1, 191 1,161 17 (1.49/'!l 
Pulau Pinang 1,503 1,503 1,405 981.6.-U 
Pahang 1,891 1,853 1,538 353J!8.7%) 
Trengganu 1,377 1,405 1,392 + 15 (1.19/'!l 
;" .. Total 19,225 17,350 14,8p5· 4,360 .:. 
... ::::;;;' . ,':. (22.7%) 
4MP (1980-1985) 
Iohor 3,588 2...1.788 ~295 1,293.f}6%) 
Negeri Sembilan 1,600 1,450 1,000 600 (37.-U 
Seiangor 5,990 4,628 4,019 1,971.f}2.9) 
Perak 2,946 2,737 1,788 1,158 (39.3) 
Pulau Pinang 1,840 1,780 1,362 478 (269/01 
Pahang 3,121 2,608 1,405 1,716155%) 
Trengganu 1,938 1,862 1,267 671.f}4.6%) 
Total 21,032 17,853 : 13,156 7,876 
(37.4%1 
5MP (1986-1990) 
Iohor 343 341 337 6fl·7%) 
Negeri Sembilan 150 150 100 50f}3.3%) 
Selangor 0 0 0 0 
Perak 204 204 204 0 
Pulau Pinang 263 235 235 28 (10.6%) 
Pahang 546 534 534 12 (2.29/1!l 
Trengganu 553 339 247 306(55.39/1!l 
Total 2,059 1,803 .. 1,657:::;. 
..cC . 402 (19.S%) .. 
GRAND TOTAL 42,316 37,006 29,723 13,593 
(32.1%) 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 8.60 below demonstrates that the number of projects completed was 
mostly lower than the approved number by the TCOHL and also lower than the 
number of projects targeted at the beginning of each five-year plan. 
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Table 8.60: 
THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS TARGETED, APPROVED 
AND BUILT 
Plan & State Number of Number of Number of Projects 
1:,:::.-
Projects Projects Projects B,uilL: • Shortfalls 
Targeted Approved :::" ::: 
IMP (1976-1990) 
Iohor 10 8 8 2 (20%) 
Negeri Sembilan 14 14 11 3 (21.4%) 
Selangor 19 19 18 1(5.3%) 
Perak 15 15 14 1 (6.7%/ 
Pulau Pinang 6' 6 6 0(0%) 
Pahang 18 18 14 4 (22.2%) 
Trengganu 10 10 9 1710%) 
.•.. : ... 
Total 92 90 80 
, .
12 (13%) ::, •... 
4MP (1980-1985) 
Iohor 12 11 10 2 (16.7%) 
Negeri Sembilan 14 13 10 4(28.6%) 
Selangor 30 23 22 8 (26.7) 
Perak 17 16 12 5 (29.4) 
Pulau Pinang 9 9 7 2 (22.2%) 
Pahang 12 10 6 6 (50%) 
Trengganu 11 11 8 3 (27.3%) 
Total 105 93 -". 75 ' 30728.6%) _. 
SMP (1986-1990) 
Iohor 2 2 2 0(0%) 
Negeri Sembilan 2 2 1 1 (50%) 
Selangor 0 0 0 0(0%) 
Perak 1 1 1 0(0%) 
Pulau Pinang 4 4 4 0(0%) 
Pahang 4 4 3 1(25%) 
Trengganu 5 3 2 3 (60%) 
Total 18 16 . -. ::';:~ .. 13 ' ::: ",': .. _5 (27.8%): ~"" 
GRAND TOTAL 215 199 168 47 (21.9%) 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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CONCLUSION 
The are four important results produced by the data analysis in this chapter: (a) 
comparison of the time taken in the implementation stages by five-year plans, states 
and implementing agencies (b) confirmation of the targets' under-achievement, (c) the 
relationship between programme preparation and programme performance, and (d) 
comparison of the amount of funding provided for five-year plans, states and 
implementing agencies. These findings are related to the prediction that the shortfall of 
the public housing programme performance is partly because of the inadequacy of 
preparation of the scheme at the formulation and planning stage, that in itself may be 
affected by the planning period, states and implementing agencies. These results have 
implications for the formulated hypotheses as further clarified in the following 
paragraphs. 
First, data analysis on Jh.e time taken for the implementation stages from 
programme formulation until occupation confirmed that was no significant difference 
between the five-year plans. This implied that the programme was not improving over 
the three five-year plans between 1976 and 1990. This confirmed that the time spent on 
the implementation process was still the same in each plan despite intent and measures 
to expedite the process. However, when comparing states and implementing agencies, 
there were significant differences. For comparison between the states: Negeri Sembilan 
had the shortest planning stage and construction stage; Trengganu had the shortest 
resourcing stage, and: Pahang had the shortest completion stage.(7) Similarly, 
comparison between agencies found that there was a significant difference in the time 
for commencing construction, achieving building completion and achieving the 
occupation stage. This suggests that the implementation performance of PLCHP is the 
result of relationships between the time involved in the implementation process, the 
states and the implementing agencies assigned to help state governments, but not the 
five year plans. 
Second, the analysis confirmed the programme's under-achievement in each of 
the five-year plans where out of 624 projects only 28% were completed within the 
intended five-year plan. An analysis was made where a large number of projects (73%) 
took more than five years to complete and a large number of projects (66%) were also 
completed outside the intended plan. However, data analysis by chi-square test 
revealed that there was neither association between the five-year plan periods and 
successful project completion within those five years, nor with projects completed 
between the same plan or outside the intended plan. In addition, the analysis has shown 
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that the number of houses brought for approval by TCOHL was lower than the number 
targeted. Finally the number of houses built was even lower (see Table 8.59 and 8.60). 
This target shortfall occurred despite the fixing of targets in each plan, determining 
from both the "bottom-up" and with the approval from the "top-down". 
Third, data analysis also suggests that there is relationship between programme 
preparation and programme performance. This implies that poor performance was 
partly associated with inadequacy of preparation at the scheme's formulation and 
planning stage. This gives an early indication on the statement " ... that projects where 
some preparations have been made before the formulation stage have shorter 
completion times than projects where preparations are made during the formulation 
stage". Furthermore, it was found that the formulation and planning stage was the 
longest amongst the implementation stages 
Finally, data analysis also showed that the amount of funds provided by the 
federal government for the public low-cost housing programme varied between five-
year plans and between states. Also th~ amount of funds provided by the federal 
government for the public low-cost housing programme was lower than the total 
project cost. In other words projects were inadequately provided with sufficient 
financing and as a result, the states had to meet this shortage of funds from their own. 
The analysis on the total project costs suggests there was a relationship between the 
increased in total project cost and the length of time taken for project completion 
where the longer the time taken for project completion, the higher the total project 
costs. When delays in implementation occurred, the project estimate was no longer 
valid because of the gap in time lapse and as a consequence of inflation. Therefore for 
a number of projects the total cost was more than the original estimated cost. 
In contrast to the quantitative data analyses in this chapter, the next Chapter 
Nine presents qualitative data analysis from the perspectives of persons who were 
involved in the programme along with detailed investigation at the scheme level. 
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Endnotes 
I. Only two projects were still under construction and have almost reached the stage of 
completion on 1.6.94. The other 150 projects were incompleted because they were cancelled, 
postponed indefinitely and their funds were transferred to other projects. 
2 Reasons for projects cancellation derived from the survey result showed that: indecisiveness 
about the project (5 projects); indefinite postponement (3 projects), reconsideration as non 
priority projects (11 projects); re-routing of funds for higher priority projects (8 projects); 
poor response from buyers (2 projects); poor technical and financial viability (12 projects), 
and political reasons (2 projects). 
3. Some of these projects are now included in the local authorities areas because the 
expansion ofloca1 authorities areas. 
4 The state land belongs to the state governments. Although utilisation of state land requires 
certain procedures and formalities, their approvals are can normally be arranged with related 
~ovemment agencies. In general it can be assumed that the land would readily be available if 
It did not involve illegal squatters. 
S Note on ANOVA: within-groups mean square is based on how much the observations 
within each of the groups vary among themselves. The between groups mean square is based 
on how much the group means vary among themselves. If the null hypothesis is true, the two 
numbers should be close to each other. Ifwe divide one by the other the ratio should be close 
to one. The statistical test for the null hypothesis that all of the groups have the same mean in 
population is based on computing such ratio. If the value F-prob printed as .0000 you reject 
null hypothesis that the mean between the group is the same. Refer Marija Norusis(l986), 
The SPSS Guide to Data Analysis, SPSS Inc. Chicago page 262 
6. On the assumption that the programme formulation. preparation and planning in each of 
the five year plan starts about 6 months earlier than the beginning of3MP in 1976, 4MP in 
1981 and 5MP in 1986. 
7 Negeri Sembilan required sites to be identified and land reports to be produced before the 
formulation stage which helped to shorten these two stages despite the problems faced by its 
two projects at the planning (Upper Canal) and construction stages (Risefield project) which 
are discussed in the following Chapter 9. Pahang produced comprehensive and clear 
guidelines to be followed by everyone involved in the completion stage. especially criteria for 
occupant selection and guidelines on the roles and responsibility of Committee members in 
the occupants selection process. Trengganu provided details of project costing and frequent 
commumcation with the central agencies for obtaining funding. 
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Chapter Nine 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
Summary of Findings 
The main findings of this chapter are:-
• The qualitative data confirms that delays occurred at every stages of project 
implementation with longer and more frequent delays during the formulation and 
planning stages. 
• Implementation problems occurred at the formulation and planning stage because 
of vague guidelines and criteria for proposing projects, the inadequate time 
provided when proposing project, the inadequate preparation time, inability to 
identify sites, delays in making decisions about site selection and findings sites had 
problems, such as being occupied by squatters. 
• Fast projects experienced fewer problems and were completed within the intended 
plan period. Average moving projects were affected by implementation problems, 
but slow projects surrounded by many problems and were carried over to next 
plan. Uncompleted projects were affected by so many problems at the formulation 
and planning stage that they were cancelled. 
• Delays also caused an increase in project costs where a number of schemes cost 
more than the amount of Joan provided due to increase in construction land costs 
resulting from inadequate preparation and also inflation during the delay. The 
government's funding arrangements were slow to adapt to these problems. Delays 
in commencing construction made project estimates problems valid and, as a result 
states requested a higher loans or made their own funding arrangements. 
• Inadequate preparation and proposals made in the hurry caused projects faced with 
problems at the planning stage. 
• Federal agencies were inclined to approve lower Joans than the amounts requested. 
• Although the construction stage had fewer delays and problems than other stages, 
the success of the programme was dependent on the selection of capable building 
contractors. Four factors caused delays (a) incompetent contractors (b) delays in 
evicting squatters and delays in making payments to contractors and project 
amendments, (c) technical departments and utility agencies, requiring projects to be 
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amended to suit additional requirements they imposed, and; (d) external factors, 
such as the economy and weather. 
• Two main problems were faced during the completion stage: difficulties in 
obtaining certificates of fitness and delays in selecting occupants. Delays in making 
decision about occupants arose because of (a) applicants exceeded the number of 
houses built, (b) majority of applicants had similar backgrounds and, (c) the 
selection process involved politicians. 
• There were problems of inter-agency relationships including strained relationships 
between the state and federal governments especially the issue of loan withdrawals; 
projects also had to conform to other agencies requirements. 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the qualitative data from the in-depth 
interviews with officials involved in twenty-four projects in three states. The aim is to 
elucidate what happened to the projects from those who were closely involved with 
them. Detailed descriptions of what happened to the four categories of projects 
selected (uncompleted, slow, average and fast projects) help to understand the process 
of project implementation more clearly. 
This chapter consist of six sections. First, it has a brief background on data 
collection, methods and steps in data analysis. Second, it describes programme 
preparation and the planning stage (project identification, site selection, land, 
programme formulation). Third, describes what happened to projects during the 
resourcing st~ge (project allocation, loan approval, project cost, loan withdrawals). 
Fourth, there is a discussion about what was happening during the project 
construction. Fifth, the description about project completion focuses on: the occupant 
selection process and certificates of fitness for occupation. Sixth and finally, a 
concluding section provides a summaI)' and interpretation. 
PROJECT SELECTION 
The qualitative data analysis in this chapter is based on detailed descriptions of 
twenty-four projects initiated in three states (Perak, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan) 
during the three five-year plans between 1976 and 1990. The justifications and 
selection process for these projects have been discussed in Chapter 7 on the research 
methodology. For the purpose anonymity, these projects are identified with fictious 
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names, as shown in Table 9.1 below. This table also provides information on projects' 
locations, planning periods, implementing agencies, performance categories and level 
of information obtained. There are four performance categories assigned to these 
projects: uncompleted projects; slow projects; average projects, and; fast projects. 
Table 9.1: 
SlTh1MARY OF PROJECTS INVESTIGATED FOR A DETAILED STUDY 
UNDER THE QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION 
Project's Name State Five Agency Time Performance Level of 
Year Taken to Category Infonnatlon 
Plan Complete Obtained 
Project 
(Months) 
1. Muddy Canal '{:i{ :,,, Ng.Scmbilan 4MP SEDC Uncompleted Full 
2. Lancott 2 '. :.:'\!: Pcrak 4MP NHD :: Uncompleted , Partial 
3. Black River Selllngor 4MP SEDC ' .':.:,""" : Uncompleted Full 
4: Broken Mound Perak 4MP NHD Uncompleted Partial 
5. Three Mile Thoms Selangor 4MP NHD Uncompleted Full 
6. Bamboo Splinters Selangor 4MP SEDC Uncompleted Full 
7. Risefield Ng.Scmbilan 4MP SEDC 147 Slow Project Full 
8. Trunkville Sclangor 3MP SEDC 162 Slow Project Full 
9. Gingling Ng.Scmbilan 3MP NHD 115 Slow Project Full 
10. Swampy Village Ng.ScmbilCln 3MP NHD 116 Slow Project Full 
11 . Blind Pheasant Scheme Sclangor 4MP NHD 133 Slow Project Partial 
12. Pumpkinville Ng.Scmbilan 5MP SEDC 77 Average Project Full 
l3. Hotville Ng.Sembi lan 3MP SEDC 74 Average Projecf "Full ' 
14. Lakesland Village Sclangor 3MP SEDC 98 Average Project Full 
15. Whiteville Pcmk 4MP NHD 92 Average Project Full 
16. Barkings Pcrak 4MP NHD 66 Average Project Full 
17. Coralville Sclangor 4MP NHD 74 A verageProject ' Full 
::.' 
:: 
18. Stony River Housing Sclangor 4MP SEDe 80 : 'Average Project Full ::.r 
19. Golden Hope Selangor 4MP SEDC 82 Average Project Partial 
10. Ficuswoods Sclangor 4MP SEDC 92 Average Project .Full 
Resettlement 
2l. Lumber Junction Selllngor 4MP PWD 60 Fast Project Full 
22. Knee Lie Ng.Scmbi lan 3MP NHD 51 Fast Project Full 
23 . Manor Pcrak 4MP NHD 59 Fast Prqiect Full 
24. Long Sand Ng.Scmbilan 4MP SEDC 42 Fast Project Full 
Source: Researcher' s Qualitative Data Collection 1994 
The respondents 
The approach adopted for the second stage data collection was by in-depth 
interviews with 25 respondents. Each of these respondents was involved in a number 
of projects the whole programme, ranging between two and 20 years. They were (1) 
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programme administrators who served the central agencies, (2) programme 
administrators who worked in the state housing divisions, and (3) a range of personnel 
at the implementing agencies level. They were intensively interviewed concerning their 
knowledge and experience of the selected 24 projects. 
Restricted by a shorter time-scale for fieldwork during this second stage and 
also by limited resources, a strategy was devised which targeted interviews with 10 key 
respondents for 12 priority projects first. However the researcher later managed to 
conduct interviews with 25 respondents and obtained almost a complete picture of 20 
projects. Interviews ranged between one and five hours and two interview sessions 
were held with some respondents. This was dependent upon factors like their length of 
experience with the programme, the number of projects they were involved with and if 
put forward additional infonnation and opinions about improving the programme. 
All the interviews were conducted at the respondents' offices. Interviews were 
guided by the interview questionnaires which were prepared in advance. Interviews 
were tape recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
The interview focus 
An interview guide was prepare to answer research question, hypotheses and 
also to gain further explanation on the findings of the quantitative data analysis carried 
during the first stage of data collection. The main focus of the interviews was on 
programme preparation and project formulation, allocation of resources, project 
construction, project hand over and selection of occupants, inter-agency relationships, 
implementation processes and structures, lessons learned from the projects and 
opinions on how to improve the programme. 
Interviews were largely conducted in Bahasa Malaysia (Malay language) and 
then notes were prepared and translated directly into English. As a result of this 
process, excerpt of interviews cited in this chapter have lost their colloquial style 
although the writer has tried to turn these excerpts as accurately as possible into 
colloquial English. 
Method of analysis 
The purpose collecting of qualitative data is to produce answers to research 
question such "", why was there unsatisfactory performance in implementing the 
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public low cost housing programme in several five-year development plans? II 
Interviews were held with people who were involved in programme and aimed at 
obtaining first hand information, experiences, and opinions. The challenge for the 
researcher was to present respondents' responses in a convincing fashion which 
integrates the great variety of experiences. Transcribing of taped interviews resulted in 
massive piles of data. The fundamental task of the researcher is to reduce the data, 
analyse it and to draw conclusions. Patton has pointed out that:-
"The challenge is to make sense C?i massive amounts of data, reduce 
the volume of information, identify Significant patterns, and construct 
ajrameworkfor communicating the essence of what the data reveals." 
(patton, 1990,· pp.372-373) 
The major purpose of the analysis is to organise respondents' responses in such 
a way that overall implementation process patterns would become clear. Several 
activities are involved in the qualitative inquiry: analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of findings (Patton, 1990; pp.372-373.) 
Steps in Data Analysis 
The following approach was adopted for data analysis:-
(1) Data reduction: by reducing the large amount of data into a smaller 
number of analytic (synthesising) statements. This was done by reading the transcribed 
notes and assigning information into a pre-determined coding, making marginal notes, 
cross referencing and synthesising paragraphs into shorter sentences. 
(2) Data transfer: a large and lengthy 'tross-site meta-matrix" table was 
prepared and synthesised data was transferred into it. Synthesised information was 
categorised according to variables which were developed earlier in relation to the 
implementation process of the public low cost housing programme, from inception to 
completion. While doing the synthesising, coding and assigning of information into the 
categories, several new variables and sub-vari,ables were also created. The aim is to 
observe trends, grouping and clustering among variables and also discover issues 
which occurred more frequently and which responses deviated from the usual answers. 
The cross-site matrix is a table which displays synthesised information based 
on responses by identifYing each particular selected project. The information was 
r , 
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assigned into the pre-determined variables. As Miles and Huberman (1984) point 
out:-
" ... one of the first tasks in moving from a single-site to a cross-site 
analysis is determining how many sifes share similar characteristics. 
In the simplest form, the analyst fakes the original matrix for the 
single-site cases and fries fa generate a cross-site matrix that gets all 
the data in. " 
(Jvfiles & Huberman, 1984;p.158) 
Steps involved in preparation of the cross-site matrix are as follows:-
i. Prepare the single site analysis matrix display. 
ii. Prepare a 'cross-site analysis' matrix display. Try to get all the synthesised 
data into a cross-site matrix. Identify any characteristics that appeared more 
than once in each of the cross-site displays and note them. 
iii. Group all the sites that look promising- this will help us to understand the 
structure of data, across all sites. 
(3) Data analysis; by studying this meta-matrix table the researcher attempts 
to search for patterns, build cognitive maps, and look for 'metaphor', 'grouping' or 
'clustering of data'. Data analysis is an exercise in generating meaning from the data 
displays. For example, counting occurrences of events, activities or responses for 
particular projects, respondents or planning periods. For example, land problems were 
often identified as one of the constraints of project implementation; the researcher 
counted how many projects encountered squatter problems and how many respondents 
mentioned or discussed this problem. In addition the researcher also counted how 
many projects suffered from squatter problems in each of the three 'five year plans'. 
By doing this the extent of land problems on the programme can be discovered as well 
as the extent to which sites for projects become more difficult and scarce as the 
programme progressed from one five year plan to the next. 
Data analysis is designed for data reduction and pattern finding. Miles and 
Huberman (1984) suggested twelve tactics for generating meaning from data displays. 
They are-: 
(1) counting the occurrence or seeing what is in the matrix. 
(2) noting patterns and themes such as "repeatable regularities" 
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and "pattern codes". 
(3) seeing plausibility, drawing meaning based on feeling, sensing 
and belief. 
(4) clustering, a method of grouping characteristics into certain categories. 
(5) making 'metaphors', by judging characteristics which appear in the 
matrix that are related to or bear resemblance to certain groupings. 
(6) splitting variables, by developing additional variables. 
(7) subsuming particulars in the general, a tactic to generalise 
characteristics in the display. 
(8) factoring, by factoring into smaller unobserved, usually hypothetical 
variables. 
(9) noting relations between l'ariables. 
(10) finding inten'ening l'ariahle.f. 
(11) building a logical chain of elJidence, and 
(12) making conceptual/theoretical coherence. 
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The researcher also summarised each project's strengths and weaknesses. 
factors causing delays and factors contributing to the success of projects. These factors 
are compared between projects with the aim of generalising common experiences. 
(4) Interpretation of tlata; is the next stage after the data has been analysed. 
Interpretation of data leads to finding and confirming conclusions. Qualitative data 
significance is based on logical interpretation. creativity and seeing the 'plausibility" of 
what feels right. It is an art of understanding data, interpreting. analysing and reaching 
conclusions.(l) Unlike quantitative data analysis, where there existed specific rules and 
formula for data significance. Patton, notes that:-
There are no formulas for determining significance. There are no ways 
of peifectly replicating the researcher's analytical thought processes. 
There are no straightj01ward tests for reliability and validity. In short. 
there are no absolute rules except to do the very best with your full 
intellect to fairly represent the data and communicate what the data 
reveal given the purpose of the study (Patton, J990;p372) 
(5) Linking qualitative and quantitative findings. The final stage of data 
analysis is to compare the quantitative analysis with the qualitative analysis and to 
detect linkages between the two. That is to discover what sort of questions were 
answered by the two approaches and what conclusions can be made. For example if 
the statistical test of the quantitative data analysis confirmed that projects with sites, 
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identified before the formulation stage had shorter time spans (mean 67.9 months) 
when compared with other projects whose sites were identified after the formulation 
stage. The qualitative data provides further explanations of this e.g. vague guidelines, 
and rushing deadlines, projects were carefully prepared or prepared by junior staff and 
not checked senior officers, and projects submitted in the belief that they could be 
rectified later. 
The approach adopted in data analysis is to compare and contrast between the 
24 projects selected in this detailed study. The aim is to find out if certain patterns 
existed among the various categories of projects: uncompleted projects, slow projects, 
average projects and fast projects. In addition, comparisons are to be made between 
projects which complied with cost limits, projects which violated cost limit, and those 
which achieved their targeted number of houses. 
PROGRAMME PREPARATION 
Issues covered under this section include project formulation, site 
identification, site selection, land matters, project guidelines and inter-agency 
relationships. Data collection and analysis for this stage attempted to answer questions 
like 'Was any preparation been made for the programme?': 'what sort of preparation 
was made?" and 'how far did the programme preparation vary between the three five 
year plans and between stat esT' Those questions are to detect, if meaningful linkages 
existed between the programme preparation and programme performance in relation to 
the prediction that project preparation has a significant relationship with programme 
performance. 
Respondents were asked to describe ".. the process of a project submission 
from the beginning until it reached acceptance as an approved project for the five 
year plan?" The following are excerpt of actions and comments regarding projects 
submission for the five-year plans:-
"Project proposal was prepared in accordance with the general call circular 
issued by EPu, but it was a general circular for all public development 
projects before the starting of each five year plan. " [Ras} 
"When received the directive from the Ministry, ... the state's housing division 
then instructed district and land offices [at the district level} to put up the list 
of propose low-cost hOUSing projects for the district... some districts also 
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included projects which they had already proposed in the past plans which 
they were tuned down before due to the allocation constraints or decided by 
the state as not a priority project... A list of projects for the state then 
compiled and forwarded to the MinistfY. " {Kas] 
"When we received proposal from states, we conducted projects evaluation ... 
we went on the ground to states and visits sites if they were available. Ideally, 
visits must be before we prepare recommendations for the five-year plan's 
budget... but sometimes we made visit after this stage. We accepted and 
recommended for the five-year plan the 'non-suspect' and the clear cut cases 
put forward by the slales. We gave the states opportunity to amend the project 
list before we finalised ollr recommended projects to EPU. " (Halo] 
The process of projects formulation begins with the issuing of a 'call circular' 
by the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister's Department (EPU) before the 
beginning of any five year plan. Irrespective of the performance categories of projects, 
whether they were uncompleted, average, slow or fast projects, all underwent the same 
formulation process. In general there were no major significant differences between all 
categories of projects in relations to the process undertaken from the submission to the 
acceptance stage. 
Although most of projects were formulated at the beginning of the five-year 
plan, several projects were added later which were formulated during the middle of the 
five-year plan. To strengthen the five-year plan, a revision was carried out after the 
second year of each plan. The implementation of the plan would be revised and 
assessed in terms of physical progress, financial capability and also revisions to the 
approaches and policies. The aim was to strengthen the plan. During this review 
process, new projects were formulated and added to the list of existing projects in the 
five-year plan as the consequences of increased budget allocations. Therefore, there 
were slight differences amongst the twenty four projects selected for the in-depth 
study; although most of the projects were formulated at the beginning of each five-year 
development plan, two of the projects were formulated during a mid-term review. 
In normal circumstances, when new projects were approved they would be 
implemented in that very plan; but two of the projects in Negeri Sembilan, although 
approved during the 3MP Review, were assigned as 4MP projects. These projects 
were presented for consideration by the central agencies. However they were 
considered too late for the mid-term review projects of 3MP. These projects enjoyed 
the advantage of possessing a longer time to plan besides being guaranteed a financial 
allocation by the Estimate Sub-Committee ofNDPC.(2) 
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When the Ministry received the call circular, it wrote letters and forwarded the 
same call circular to the State Housing Divisions (SHD) in each of the State 
Secretariats. The Ministry requested SHDs to submit a list of public low cost housing 
projects for the state be returned to the Ministry by a certain dateline. The programme 
administrator at the State Housing Division, then forwarded the call circular to all of 
the District Offices requesting them to submit public low cost housing projects for 
their districts. Onee proposals from district offices were compiled, the SlID referred 
them to the state's housing committee for consideration. Next, the proposals were 
forwarded to the State's Executive Committee (Exeo) for further scrutiny. 
The list of projects from the states were later forwarded to the Ministry. At this 
stage, the Ministry compiled a list of the public low cost housing projects proposed for 
the plan. The Ministry assessed all the projects received. Assessments were based on 
criteria such as the plan's underlying approach, the states' past performance, the size 
of projects, the cost estimates, and sites either identified or available. After that the 
Ministry made further recommendation to the EPU. One of the programme 
administrators explained that:-
"After the state assessed the list proposed by the districts and matching with 
the states' needs. they [the states} forwarded their proposals to us [MHLGj. 
After evaluating these projects' viability, the states' capability and readiness 
in implementing them, then we proposed and made recommendation to £PU" 
[ZakyJ 
The assessment of projects by the EPU was based on recommendations put 
forward by the Ministry, but was also dictated by the amount of funding allocated for 
the housing sector and the distribution of funding for each state. 
The next stage was for the EPU to present the projects proposed to the 
Estimate Sub-Committee of the National D.evelopment Planning Committee (NOPC). 
This sub-committee was responsible for the application of annual and five year project 
allocations. The subsequent process was to go through the National Development 
Planning Committee (NOpe). NDPC deals with programme formulation and detailed 
considerations of projects. This committee then made a recommendation to the 
cabinet. After the cabinet had made a decision, the housing programme together with 
other programmes were finally presented for the approval of Parliament. 
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After the programme was approved by the Parliament, once again an 
assessment was made of the list of projects proposed by the states. The states had to 
provide details to central agencies which included the Ministry, EPU, the Treasury and 
the Implementation and Co-ordination Unit. Only then was the list of projects together 
with recommended allocation finally approved for the states. The process illustrated 
here seems lengthy and explains why the states learned about the approved project list 
for the five year plan only about between six months and one year after the five year 
plan began. 
PROJECT IDENTIFICATIONS 
Respondents for each project were asked the questions "Which organisation 
identified this project?" and "When was the project identified?" The following 
describes the project identification process. 
When the call circular and instruction from the SHD was received by the 
District Offices a list of projects was then prepared as requested. Since the call circular 
provided only general guidelines for the project proposal, additional clarification was 
given in a covering letter from the SHO. The letter emphasised such criteria as the 
location of projects, the status of the land intended, the availability of 'off-site 
infrastructure'3, the estimated cost, the size of the project and the type of house 
proposed. In relation to this, one of the respondents explained:-
"Little preparation and planning work were done for the proposed housing 
projects because little guidance provided besides too general criteria were set. 
Initiative on project proposal was entirely left to the district officer and his 
assistants to lise their best discretion to decide whatever suitable criteria , 
technical matters and assessment on housing demand The identification of 
project site was left to the decision of district officers (D.O) because we 
believed that the D. Os knew better what to plan for their districts ... " {Baker J 
Due to shortage of time, the project list was prepared in a hurry. The proposed project 
list consisted of newly proposed projects as well as some past projects which had been 
turned down, cancelled or were not considered during the past five year plans. At this 
stage site identification for some of these projects had not been made, while some had, 
especially those projects which had been cancelled in the past plans. One of the 
respondents explained:-
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UFor the projects submission, only one month was given [to the state 
governments} to came lip with list (if projects to the Ministry .... the states in 
tum were dependent 011 dis/riel and land offices which were given two weeks 
for the proposals ... Just Imagine what quality of a proposal can be expected 
within this two weeks time period? As a result, projects were not adequately 
prepared and dependent en/irely to what ever sites proposed by tracers or 
settlement officers at the land office. " fRas] 
Uncompleted Projects 
Sites for all the six uncompleted projects were never identified at this stage but 
were identified later after the project approved for the respective five year plans. In 
contrast some completed projects, some were identified during the project formulation, 
while others were identified after the project had been approved for the particular five 
year plan. 
Slow Projects 
Only three out of five slow projects had identified their sites when these 
projects were proposed to the state and federal government. The sites for two slow 
projects (Gingling and Risefield) were not identified because they were not in the list 
of priority projects for the state at the early stage of3MP. 
Although sites were identified projects, they could be subjected to changes, as 
demonstrated by one of the slow projects (Tl1.Inkville project). This Trunkville project 
had been planned since 2MP in 1971. However, due to indecisiveness in deciding the 
priority of projects in the state, this project was indefinitely postponed. Later the 
project was approved for the 3MP and completed in early 6MP. The site for the 
project was to be located adjacent to the previous two phases. Later the state 
requested the Federal Government to reconsider the implementation of this project. 
Limited by the allocation of funds, the central agencies requested the state to cancel 
other less important projects to accommodate the transfer of allocation for the 
Trunkville project. In a meeting with the central agencies, the state representative was 
unable to confirm which projects would be replaced by this project. Only about two 
months later the state confirmed that three projects would be dropped from the state's 
approved project list and would be replaced by the TrunkvilIe project. 
Indecisiveness about the priority of the project, together with the site issue 
forced this project to be carried over into the next plan. Early during the next plan 
(4MP) a decision was made by the programme administrator and the district officer to 
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modify the manner in which the project was to be implemented. They agreed that only 
100 houses were to be built adjacent to the phase 1 and the other 100 houses in 
another location nearby. However, until its eighth year of project formulation there 
was no firm decision made on the issue of where to locate the project. Up to a certain 
point it was proposed that this project be cancelled. Finally a concluding decision was 
made when a site was selected. This site was capable of accommodating a total of 178 
houses instead of the 200 houses intended. Soon afterwards earthwork for the 
construction of houses on the site began. This project illustrates how indecisiveness 
and an inability to make a firm decision about the site lengthened the time required for 
the project. 
Average Projects 
Six out of nine average projects had identified their site at this formulation 
stage. Three projects (Knee Lie, Hotville and PumpkinviIle) in Negeri Sembilan during 
the 3MP identified their sites after the projects had been approved for the five year 
plan. In fact Hotville project was not in the original list of priority projects. In contrast 
to the Pumpkinville project which was initiated in 5MP, it site had been identified and 
the land report was made available to SHD one year prior to the formulation stage. 
Fast Projects 
Three out of four fast projects had identified their sites in the list submitted to 
the state and federal government. Knee Lie and Manor 3 projects were parts of 
extension projects from the previous phase. The site for Lumber Junction was 
proposed and identified as site for a public low-cost housing by the district and land 
office. Only Long Sand project was not identified the site at this stage, however the 
respondent explained that:-
U{Although] site was not identified at the proposal stage [but] decision of site 
selection was made soon later on a state land, adjacent to a road frontage 
with water and electricity supply... The land office provide a land report and 
prepare an index plan showed the location of the proposed site to SEDC { .. 
the implementing agency} which immediately carried out a perimeter survey 
and soil investigation. .. because the site was state land, it always available at 
any time to do sllnJey works or to begin constmction. .. " {Baker] 
A few respondents have pointed out that as a result of 'vague guidelines' and 
'rushing to meet the datelines', some of these projects were not carefully prepared. 
They were prepared by junior staff and sometimes were not checked by senior officers. 
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Projects were submitted in the belief that errors could be rectified later. One of the 
programme administrators at the state level who was involved in six projects during 
3MP to 6MP explained the following:- (4) 
Since the Ministry was operating under a tight schedule in 
preparing the low cost housing proposal for a further submission, it 
had requested the state to put forward its proposal as early as 
possible. To prepare the list, the SHD had to depend on proposals 
forwarded by the district offices. This process took a long time. In 
order to meet the dateline, the SHD had to submit proposals 
hurriedly. For example, without verifying project detailed 
descriptions whether the lands were suitable or otherwise jor the 
projects. When projects have to be implemented the proposed sites 
might be full of squatters, or might have no access to utilities or 
might even have been allocated for other purposes. " [Kas] 
SITE SELECTION 
The next process following site identification is site selection. Site selection is 
the decision which confirms the identified site for the proposed project. The difference 
between this site selection and the previous site identification is where site selection 
involves a commitment to acquiring land, carrying out surveys and drawing lay-out 
plans for approval. Whereas site identification is a tentative decision or 'ear marking" 
of the location of the project by marking it in the land office's map. Site identification 
also includes preparation of a land report for the state government. The discussion on 
site selection focused on the question of how decisions were made about locating 
projects. Counting the projects, only a small number had made site selection before the 
beginning of five year plans, while the great majority made decisions after the projects 
had been approved for the five year plan. Site selection was focused heavily on 'state 
land' while acquiring 'private land' was considered as the last alternative when 'state 
land' was not more available. Various patterns of site selection were observed for all 
categories of projects. 
Uncompleted Projects 
Six uncompleted projects (Muddy Canal, Lancott 2, Black River 3, Broken 
Mound, Three Mile Thorns, and Bamboo Splinters Settlement) were compared to find 
out if any relationship existed between the issue of site selection and the fate of these 
Chapter Nine: Qualitative Data Analysis 298 
projects. Three projects (Muddy Canal, Black River 3 and Bamboo Splinters 
Settlement) show indecisiveness, delays in making decisions and often a change of 
mind about their sites. One project (Lancott 2) had chosen an inappropriate site due to 
a lack of state land, while another project (Three Mile Thorns) was cancelled to give 
way for a medium cost and high density project. One project's incompletion (Broken 
Mound) was not related to site selection but to the building contractor's problem. 
Muddy Canal Project was formulated in 1981 (4MP) and until 19945, had not 
reached the construction stage. OriginalIy before the project formulation, the site for 
this project was identified as on private land. When the project was approved for the 
4MP, evaluation of the suitability of the site was made with the assistance of technical 
services from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The proposed site was 
found suitable and the state proceeded with actions to compulsorily acquire the land 
under the Compulsory Land Acquisition Act, 1960. However a decision was later 
made to look for another location. This occurred because the land owners had made a 
protest to their state legislative councillor about the compulsory land taking. The SlID 
then looked for an alternative site. Another site on private land was proposed by the 
district office and later agreed by the SHD. The land was then acquired by the state 
government by enforcing the power provided under section 3 of the Compulsory Land 
Acquisition Act, 1960. There were a number of houses on the land occupied by nine 
families. 
The Deputy Minister of Housing and Local Government, who was also the 
parliamentary councillor for that area, directed the SHD to execute the project as soon 
as possible. SlID took the necessary action and promised to start construction of the 
project within six months of that directive. However the project did not progress very 
far, as local politicians interfered and requesting the project to be located another site. 
Delays to this project continued because of the searching for another site. In a dilemma 
and unable to solve the issue of site selection, the state finally left the decision of 
whether to proceed with this project entirely to the state legislative councillor for that 
constituency. After the 1990's election a new state legislative councillor was elected. 
Finally he made a decision about the site for this project in early 1993. The programme 
administrator, who is in charge of this project mentioned that the project is still facing 
problems because a more difficult site was finally selected and the lowest bid offered 
for the construction was far beyond the limit of maximum loan of M$25,OOO per house 
allowed by the central agencies. If the state had to proceed then additional costs for 
this project must be come from state funds. This Muddy Canal project demonstrated 
how indecisiveness and delays in making decisions about the project site caused delays. 
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Black River 3 Project was formulated in the 4MP and planned as an extension 
to two previous low cost housing projects. A piece of private land adjacent to the 
previous phases had been selected. To avoid longer time and incurred cost when 
acquiring private land, the district office had proposed to the SlID another site which 
was on a piece of state land. The new site was also closer to the town centre. In 
addition, the intended aim was also to evict illegal squatters on the land. Therefore the 
land office had a strong reason to serve notices to the squatters. However, the 
squatters put up strong resistance to this scheme. Unable to solve this problem, which 
had delayed the project to the end of five year plan, the state finally decided to cancel 
it. 
The site for Bamboo Splinters Projecl had been proposed by the district office 
adjacent to the previous two phases of a low cost housing project. The site was agreed 
by the state government and the lay-out plan was approved by the Department of 
Town and Country Planning. In'early 1979, the state councillor for the area requested 
the state government to re-consider and look for an alternative site because the 
squatters refused to move from the land. The District Office and SlID had to search 
for another suitable site nearby. The process took a long time because of the need to 
obtain agreement between several agencies; the District and Land Officer, the SlID, 
the Department of Town and Country Planning and the state councillor for the area. 
Finally a site was selected and agreed by various parties. It was adjacent to the site of a 
public corporation's housing project. Confirmation about this alternative site was 
received by the implementing agency in September, 1982. This site was also occupied 
by squatters but fewer in number than the first site. The Land Office took a long time 
to solve the squatter problem on the land. Finally, the earthwork for this project began 
only in early 1985. Then in June, 1986 the implementing agency directed the 
contractor to stop the work although it had progressed about 35%, due to problems 
concerning confirmation of the amount of land required and certification of boundaries 
for this project with the neighbouring housing project. Burdened with these problems 
the state lost time and was unable to solve them until 1994. Finally the state decided to 
cancel this project in 1994. The site of this project was transferred to the privatisation 
programme. 
Lancott 2, another incomplete project, was cancelled because of inappropriate 
site selection. Due to the limited availability of suitable state land in the area, a football 
field was selected for the low cost housing project. At first the state was determined to 
proceed with the project and all necessary preparation was made so as to obtain 
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approval for the layout plan from the Department of Town and Country Planning, 
secure financing from the Treasury and finally call tenders for construction. Before 
making an award to a successful contractor, the state re-considered its decision to 
proceed with the project. The state concluded that the site was inappropriate and 
instructed SlID to find an alternative site. Unable to find an alternative site, a 
'powerful figure in the state' finally decided to cancel the project and requested 
funding for the project to be channelled into other more important projects. 
Three Mile Thorns Project was proposed on valuable state land which was 
surrounded by housing and industrial development. The state decided that this piece of 
land would be appropriate for a higher density medium priced housing development. 
Furthermore, the state was of the opinion that its SEDC's low cost housing projects 
would cater for the demands of the low income people in the area. After the project 
was cancelled, this proposed site was handed over to the state's own housing 
development company to proceed with higher density and medium price housing. 
One of the uncompleted projects (Broken Mound) had no association with the 
problem of site selection. The project was not completed because the building 
contractor appointed failed to construct the project due to its internal problems. The 
state was reluctanted to revive this project by re-appointing another contractor, as is 
the usual practice, because the state was unable to cope with the increased cost and 
also there would be a lack of demand for low cost houses in the area if the project was 
completed. 
Slow Projects 
Five projects (Risefield, Trunkville, Gingling, Swampy Village and Blind 
Pheasant Scheme) are categorised as slow projects because they were completed 
within two or more of the five-year plans period. Amongst the five projects only 
Risefield projects was subjected to several changes to the selected site, while four 
other projects were delayed as a result of indecision about when to start because the 
states were giving priority to other important projects. Thus, delays in making 
decisions about the selection of site had occurred. 
Trunkville Project underwent three five year plans. It was initiated in the 3MP 
and completed towards the end of 5MP. The time taken from project formulation to 
completion was 13 years (160 months). Delays occurred because of indecisiveness in 
making decisions about where to locate the project. Several changes of decisions on 
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the issue of the site occurred. A site for this project had been identified by the District 
Office before the project was formulated. The site was not agreed by the SHD because 
there were many squatters on the proposed site. Then another alternative site was 
proposed by the Land Office similarly with squatters, although with a lesser number. 
The Land Office justified that H ••• only a portion of the land was occupied by squatters 
[and] a better site was not available because there was a lack of suitable state land in 
the area. " To overcome the squatter problems, the state agreed, on the advice of the 
SlID and its implementing agency to construct only 100 houses on the portion which 
was not occupied by squatters. Meanwhile there was a plan to relocate these squatters 
to another site. When the squatters could be resettled, the construction of the 
remainder 200 houses would proceed. 
The responsibility to relocate these squatters to another area was given to the 
Land Office. But, no progress was made to overcome the squatter problem. It was 
reluctant to implement the decision because the office was constrained by lack of 
resources, lack of a concrete resettlement plan and inadequate backing by the state 
government. Instead the Land Office requested SHD to search for another site. The 
searching and obtaining agreements from various parties wasted additional time. Later, 
they agreed to locate the project on private land. Therefore, a new project lay-out plan 
was submitted to the Town and Country Planning Department for consent. The Land 
Office also prepared actions for compulsory purchase of land under the related law. 
Concerned with the amount of compensation involved in acquiring the land and 
the increased cost of the project, again SHD directed the Land Office to attempt to 
find another alternative site. Several sites were proposed, but still a firm decision was 
not achieved. For example in the middle of 1982 a decision was made by the District 
Officer and the programme administrator to carry out the construction of 200 houses 
in two locations: one consisting of 100 houses adjacent to phase one, and the other 
100 houses at another location nearby. This issue of the project's site was discussed in 
the meeting of the State Action Committee for Public Low Cost Housing on 20.7.846• 
Unable to find an alternative site, the representative from the District Office suggested 
SlID cancel this project and its allocation of funds be transferred to other projects. The 
suggestion was rejected by the committee and the decision was taken to proceed this 
project. Until 1984 no firm decision was made about the site for this project. 
Finally after an exhaustive searching for alternative sites a final decision was 
made to carry out this project on the same land where they had built the first 100 
houses. Instead of the 200 houses originally intended, the project settled for only 178 
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houses. This was partly because the land still was occupied by squatters. Then the 
earthwork for this project's second phase began in late 1984, after being planned for 
10 years. 
Gingling Project was not included among the list of priority projects at the 
beginning of 3MP. The state was undecided when to start implementing this project 
because the approach adopted at that time was to concentrate on a few priority 
projects. When these projects were completed only then would the state arrange 
another priority projects list. The selection of the site was made during the second year 
of the 3MP. The compulsory land acquisition process for this project was completed in 
the fourth year of 3MP which was followed by a request to prepare the project's lay 
out plan. In contrast the Swampy Village Project (another project in the same state 
and the same IMP), site was decided and included among priority projects, but was 
programmed to begin construction in the fourth year of3MP. 
Uncertainty of whether to proceed with the project or not had caused delays to 
two other slow projects and Blind Pheasant Scheme. These projects did not face 
problems of change of site and squatters. There was no resistance or appeal made by 
the land owners although private lands were selected. This was because no existing 
residential house were involved on the proposed sites. 
Two of the five slow projects (Risefield and Swampy Village Project ) were 
not related to site selection. Readily available state land was selected. Delays to these 
projects occurred as they began only in the fourth year of 3MP, because the state 
concentrated on more important projects. Delays also occurred at the end of the 
completion stage, because the project (Swampy Village) faced on difficulty of getting 
electricity supply. For project Bamboo Splinters Settlement additional time was 
required to comply with the compulsory land acquisition process and delays occurred 
during the construction stage. 
Average Projects 
There are nine low-cost housing schemes categorised as average projects. They 
are as follows:-
( 1.) Pumpkinville, 
(2.) Hotville. 
( 3.) Lakesland Village, 
( 4.) Whiteville, 
( 5.) Barkings, 
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( 6.) Coral Cape Housing, 
(7.) Stony River Housing, 
(8.) Golden Hope Scheme, and 
( 9.) Ficuswood Resettlement. 
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One of the peculiar characteristics of these average projects is that for nearly all of 
them (except one), state land had been selected as the site for the projects. In addition 
finn decisions were made with no change to the sites selected despite some of the sites 
( no.3, 6, 8 and 9 ) being affected by squatter problems. 
How was proper site selection made for these average projects? An analysis of 
when the decisions were made about the site of the projects reveals that they were 
made during the first year of the five year plan. In addition the SHD and the District 
Office did not face any difficulty in obtaining land because land was abundant. 
Two projects (Lakesland Village and Ficuswood Resettlement ) were involved 
with squatter problems which were solved by taking them on as occupants for the 
project. Therefore, as explained by the programme administrator, " ... the squatters did 
not pose any threat or protest when the sites selected." In contrast to one of 
uncompleted projects (Bamboo Splinters Settlement) and two other projects 
(Trunkville and Black River 3) the squatters refused to move and protested their 
eviction to state councillors. For the Lakesland Village project, the housing 
construction was implemented through several phases which started first on the empty 
land. After the squatters had moved to the completed houses then the next phases of 
development took place. A land problem for Stony River project was solved by 
payment of compensation to occupiers; this enabled the site to be cleared of any 
occupiers who might cause constraints on the project construction. 
Sometimes project location was determined by the chief minister of the state as 
demonstrated by projects Pumpkinville and Lakesland Village. The chief minister 
become an advocate for the projects and created an environment of more co-operative 
inter-agency relationships. As one respondent at the implementing agency level for 
project Lakesland Village pointed out:-
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..... the top figure in the state himself made the decision on the site of 
project where evelyone involved had to go ahead with the project 
without ever thinking of shifting 10 another site. One of the reasons 
was probably because whoever was involved in advising about the 
site had made a proper study and careful selection. We also had very 
good co-operation with various agencies especially the technical 
departments. These departments gave priority to this project, because 
they knew the 'Menleri Besar' (chief minister) was very concerned 
about the project. We made them answerable directly to the 'Menteri 
Besar' if any problem arose alld couldn'l be resolved. [Rosly, 
8.11.1994] 
The fast projects 
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Four projects were considered fast projects because they were completed 
within less than 60 months; a time frame which was equivalent to the actual time 
frame of the five year plan. Three of these projects (Lumber Junction, Manor and Long 
Sand) were the 4MP's project and one project (Knee Lie) was 3MP's project. Fast 
projects all shared a common characteristic in which site selection was made early 
during the beginning of the five year plan and firm decisions were made without any 
change to other locations. In fact, for Lumber Junction project, the site selection and 
land had been acquired even before the resourcing stage. Thus, it showed the 
commitment of the state to implement this project. Financing for the purchase of land 
utilised the revolving fund; a fund created to assist the state government to make 
necessary advance payments for the public low cost housing projects. 
For Manor project, after it was approved for the five year plan, a visit to the 
site was made by representatives of the SHD and other technical agencies. The 
purpose was to make an assessment and to verify the suitability of the site proposed. 
Through this approach utility agencies (electricity and water supply) were informed 
about the project. Then, these agencies responded to the SlID and confirmed if utilities 
could be supplied to the intended project. 
Site Selection: Overview 
Site selection is important criterion related to project performance. Average 
and fast projects have demonstrated that sites were selected early as well as the state 
making a firm stance on decisions. In contrast, uncompleted and slow projects revealed 
changes of sites and delays in making decisions about the site. A number of 
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respondents at the implementing agencies questioned why they came into picture only 
after sites had been selected? They argued that better sites would have been selected if 
their advice had been sought. One of the respondents emphasised that "... housing 
development needs projessionalundertakings starting jrom its initial planning stage 
to the completion stage. The practice oj leaving site identification to junior staff at 
the Land Office, then making decisions on site selection without further checks by 
senior officers would jeopardise the fate of project '.'I achievement. II Few respondents 
expressed they knew that there were some sites not properly identified and selected 
during the early stage of programme preparation but just to accommodate the list of 
projects to be submitted to the central agencies. Site selection was done without 
proper feasibility studies. Respondents from the central agencies also stated that 
sometimes the state identified the wrong site. Someone even put a very blunt statement 
" ... the state was not careful in making site selectionjor the project." 
Land matters 
The selection of sites for projects basically involved two types of land; 'state 
land' and 'alienated land'. (7) State land is the land that belongs to state governments, 
whereas alienated land is private land. In general, as stated earlier, state land has 
become the main focus of this programme when proposing sites; it is an effort to 
control project costs and to save time. The state has the power to acquire alienated 
land by force through the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1960, but the process 
is lengthy and implies additional costs to the project, because of legal procedures and 
payment of compensation to land owners. The main reason for focusing on 'state land' 
was because it was basically available at any time. This was explained by a respondent 
involved in Risefield and Pumpkinville projects :-
" ... By right, state land virtually is available at any time. 
The implementing agency may enter the land as and when 
they wish without any restrictions. But if the project would 
have to acquire alienated land, the process would have been 
longer . .. 
Another respondent for Coral Cape project also expressed that:-
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" ... certain procedures must be followed to secure the stale 
land Blit J perceived this was 110t a major constraint 
because this project was one of the government projects. The 
traditions have been set by the administration to give 
priority to government projects. The implementing agency 
may enter the land first, apprOl'al to procedures can always 
be obtained later. " 
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In addition also for Hotville, Knee Lie, Long Sand and Swampy Village projects, it 
was pointed out that; 
'~ .. The land was not a crWcal issue because state land was 
plenty in those days. n1e role fa provide appropriate land 
for projects was carried out by the Land Office. We just 
accepted whatever proposed by the said Land Office because 
we believed that they knew better what and where the land 
was. The co-operation of the Land Office was good. " 
Alienated land (private land) only became an alternative when state land was 
not available. Three reasons were voiced why there was reluctance to choose alienated 
land: additional time, the question of priority and increased cost. Fulfilling legal 
procedures of acquiring alienated land under the provision of Compulsory Land 
Acquisition Act, 1960 requires at least six months. For the slow project of Rise field, 
one respondent explained that, iI •• the site involved was private land where the land 
acquisition with its long complicated procedures had to be carried out; this was 
partly the reason/or the delay in the completion of projects. " Another respondent also 
stated the same " ... the practice is more common in the land administration where a 
process to acquire land for development proposalr; can involve lengthy administrative 
steps and legal requirements. It has been hlamed and used as an excuse for non-
implementation of many government's projects. " In explaining the effect of this land 
acquisition on the project's cost and priority he also added:-
"We also have to depend on the land office, of which this 
office's priority is far beyond our control. The Land Office has 
its own priority. Although we can shorten the time span for the 
land acquisition by issuing the cert(fiCale of urgency, it would 
cost additional money. " 
Several programme administrators (Baker, Chali, Halo, Haze, Kas, Raft and 
Ras) were in agreement that site selection became more difficult because the state land 
has become scarce and private land more expensive; in contrast in the past state land 
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was abundant so projects could be easily sited on them. easier land. Chali mentioned 
that:-
liTo obtain a suitable site which is close to the main road and 
other facilities has become more difficult ifwe have to depend on 
the state land To obtain land by compulsory acquisition then we 
have to spend on extra time to the whole project's 
implementation process. Although we can overcome the shortage 
of state land through c0111pulsmy acquisition, we must face the 
question of additional costs incurred to ollr projects. II 
Has state land really become scarce and difficult to obtain? One respondent raised his 
doubt in the following way:-
"The Land Office always reported land was not available to 
cater for government projects. A lthough we were in doubt and 
questioning the truth, we took the stance that we should not 
cross their jurisdiction We assume that they know their 
districts better. But, why the land suddenly available for other 
projects? Especially if there were certain important figures 
pushing behind the project?" [Hairy] 
Five projects (Coral Capes, Trunkville, Lakesland. Bamboo Splinters and 
Ficuswood) were involved with squatters' problems. Short-sightedness about squatter 
problems caused several projects to experience delays and also cancellation. Actors 
involved in programme implementation were misled when they assumed that squatter 
problems were easy to solve. Black River 3 project was finally cancelled when the 
Land Office was unable to evict squatters on the proposed site. One of the slow 
projects (Trunkville) was originally proposed on a piece ofland occupied by squatters. 
One of the respondents at the implementing agency involved with four of these 
projects commented " ... The state [government} seemed not to be serious and not 
committed to implementing the programme. When they proposed low cost housing 
projects, there were squatters occupying the land. By right the state should have 
solved this problem first before they handed over projects to us. II However, there 
were cases (Lakesland and Ficuswood) where squatters' problems were solved 
effectively and at the right time by the joint effort of the state, implementing agency 
and land office. 
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Comparison between Projects 
A comparison between the uncompleted projects and other projects showed 
that uncompleted projects (except Broken Mount) were faced with land problems 
which caused project delays and lead to their cancellation. On Upper Canal project the 
respondent informed that:-
'The necessary action to process compulsory land acquisition was made ... but 
changes of site caused a wasting of lime and another delays ... When the loan 
application received by the MinistlY, we were ensured that the proper 
procedure to acquire Ihe private land would be carried out. Later, the state 
informed [liS} aboul shifting fo another site and the Land Office was taking 
actions to cancel the (previOl(sl gazette notification of acquisition. Finally, 
another piece of land was compulsorily acquired in mid-1992" [Chali] 
Lancott project was cancelled because it was proposed on a football field due to a lack 
of state land in the area and the SHD was reluctant to acquire private land in order to 
cut down project costs. Black River project was proposed on state land but occupied 
by squatters. The Land Office was unable to enforce squatters eviction and this finally 
led to project being cancelled. As for the Bamboo Splinter project, one of the reasons 
for cancelling it was because the site's boundaries were not properly identified. Three 
Miles Thorn was proposed on high value land which was considered more appropriate 
for higher value housing. Only one uncompleted project, the Broken Mount, did not 
faced any land matter problems. 
In general, the majority of slow and average projects were not faced with land 
problems slowing their progress, with the exception of three projects (Trunkville, 
Ficuswood and Golden Hope). Tmnkville had difficulties in finding a suitable site. 
Both Lakesland and Ficuswood. projects were for squatters resettlement programmes 
but Lakesland project had the advantage of ample space to start without displacing the 
existed squatters' houses. Whereas at Ficuswood, it was impossible to relocate 
squatters temporarily somewhere else. Fast projects (except Long Sand), had the 
advantage of already having available land planned for low-cost housing. 
Guidelines 
The call circulars issued by the EPU provided guidelines for project submission 
in which the main criteria were related to the approach adopted for each of the five 
year plans. For example, during the 5MP, the approach adopted was to generate 
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economic growth and to create employment opportunities as measures to overcome 
initial signs of economic recession in the country. Since the guidelines issued prior to 
the beginning of the five year plan were for all projects in general, comparisons 
between categories of projects were not made. The analysis provided here only reflects 
all categories of projects in general. 
The majority of respondents mentioned 'the usual guidelines', 'the general 
guidelines' or 'the standard guidelines' when they were asked the question, '~ .. were 
there any guidelines provided when formulating projects for the five year plan?" These 
guidelines were the call circulars isslIed by the EPU prior to the beginning of any five 
year plan. 
Many respondents viewed the circulars as being too general. These circulars 
were intended for all types of project submissions and were not just for the housing 
programme. One respondent pointed out that, " We received the guidelines, but I 
think the guidelines were not clear enough 10 those who were involved in this initial 
housing implementation process. " The programme administrator at the Ministry level 
also confirmed, liThe five year plan circulars and gUidelines were too general, not 
detailed and not very clear specifically regarding the public housing programme 
submission. The criteria used stated that the project must be viable and land must be 
identified" He also added that, " The criteria used by the Ministry was that the 
project must not exceed the cost limit oj M$25,000; the site must be available and 
close to infrastructure/aGilities; and, there must be a demand/or such houses. lfthe 
project costs more than M$25, 000 then the state has to top up the difference. In short 
the main responsibility to propose all appropriate project rested with the state. " 
The interview responses on several projects imply that five criteria were used 
as the guidelines for project proposal which consisted of the folJowing:-
(1) the project must not exceed the cost limit allowed by the central agencies, 
otherwise the state must make up the difference 
(2) the project must be viable 
(3) the land for the project must have been identified 
(4) the proposed site must be close to infrastructure facilities 
(5) there must be a demand for such hOllses 
In general these criteria should have been used by the District Offices and the SIms 
when they propose and justified for a list of projects. However, as described earlier, 
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site identification, site selection and land matters indicated that not all projects 
conformed to these criteria. 
Almost all projects when proposed were put near to the pre-determined cost 
limit in order to gain approval from the central agencies. According to one of the 
respondents, when the list of projects was submitted to the Ministry, the tactic 
employed by the states was to produce more projects than they intended to carry out. 
When the central agencies scrutinised the list and cut a number of the projects, the 
states secured a number of projects close to what they had originally desired. 
'The project must be viable" was one of the criteria imposed by the guidelines 
and by the central agencies when they were assessing the projects. However, the 
meaning of 'viable project' remained vague, many respondents using it interchangeably 
with 'implementable project'. One respondent stated that, /I ••• the project would be 
considered viable if the site had been identified and proposed in a suitable location. " 
He further explained that " ... a suitable location was one close to infrastructure 
facilities and where there were demand., for s1Ich a project. II 
'Demand for low cost houses" was also a criterion imposed by the guidelines. 
Demand for houses in proposed projects was based on information provided by the 
District Office. This occurred because: the state was lacking a housing master plan; the 
state assumed that the District Officers knew their districts better than the state on 
matters relating to housing demand and availability of land; and to encourage 
'participation from district level from the initial planning stage'. Almost all projects 
proposed were reported as being in demand. However, during the later stage, delays 
and changes made to the projects affect the issue of demand. This implies that when 
the projects were proposed, whoever was involved conformed to the guidelines. 
When six uncompleted projects were analysed, it was found that three projects 
had some degree of relationship with the issue of demand. Lancott 2 project was 
cancelled because the state believed that the low rise flats proposed in the rural area 
were unsuitable and they would be unable to obtain buyers. Broken Mound project 
was also cancelled; there were demands when the project was proposed but delays had 
caused its target group to opt for other housing projects. In spite of the demand for 
Three Mile Thoms, it was cancelled because the state believed it could be catered for 
by its SEDC's low cost housing projects in the area. In contrast amongst slow 
projects: only Risetield project demonstrated that it had very little demand. This 
project was proposed as a measure to implement a fair distribution of projects in the 
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district. Lack of demand from buyers was one of the reasons why the decision was 
made to slow down the project. Finally, for average and fast projects there was 
evidence of demand for such low cost houses. 
What was the effect of having general and unclear guidelines on the 
programme? A programme administrator at the state level explained " ... the site 
selection Uor the project] by some people was not cautious due to lack of clear 
guidelines. They sometimes made selection just by looking at the plan available at 
the land office [without really checking it on the ground] or sometimes did not 
understand what type oj land was suitable jar the housing development." And in 
addition to this " ... the assessment on the site proposedjor the housing development 
was not the main consideration; they just named the area, andjrom this they hoped to 
find a suitable site laler . .. 
Should the central agency have provided better guidelines? Although many 
respondents agreed that better guidelines would help to improve project proposals, one 
respondent stated that:-
"They [the states] should know the guidelines set hy liS considering 
that it has been going on since the Second and Third Malaysia Plan. 
Although the gUidelines were very general because similar call 
circulars were used by the Economic Planning Unit as by other 
public agencies, these were the same guidelines which were issued in 
the last 10 to 15 years and we managed to obtain the list of projects 
proposedjrom the states "[Zaky) 
Inter-agency relationship 
Many respondents highlighted the fact that during the 3MP inter-agency 
relationships were good. The stance adopted by many government agencies was to 
give full co-operation and top priority to government projects, especially the PLCHP 
aimed at housing low income people. As one of the respondents emphasised " ... there 
is a tradition of giving priority to government projects. We could carry out projects 
first, and rectify certain procedures later." Setting the standards for low cost houses 
was entirely at the discretion of implementing agencies. Most of the implementing 
agencies were using the Public Work Department's standards for government projects. 
Projects were also not referred to the local authorities for planning approval. However, 
since the beginning of the 4MP gradual changes have been taking place in inter-
departmental relationships, including the imposition of standards and planning 
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approvals. Towards the end of SMP government projects were given similar treatment 
to that given to private sector projects, and most projects were also subjected to local 
authorities' approval. All these added to the time span to complete the project. Many 
respondents explained that the shift of stance was due to the higher priority given to 
privati sed and private sector projects .. 
Variations between plans 
There were some variations in the five year plans from state to state. Negeri 
Sembilan made better programme preparation for the 3MP and 4MP, but submitted 
only a few projects for the 5MP because several of its projects from the past plans 
were still in the process of implementation and needed to be carried forward to the 
SMP. During the 3MP Negeri Sembilan had prepared lists of projects and estimate of 
costs. This was made possible by a study carried out for the state by a consulting firm. 
Selangor made better preparation in the 3MP and 4MP but did not submit any new 
project for the SMP. The state decided to implement low cost housing through joint 
venture projects with the private sector under a programme known as 'the special low 
cost housing programme.' Only during the 5MP Review did the state accept the 
PLCHP but with modifications into a 'site and services' approach. As infonned by a 
programme administrator, it was not clear to him why Selangor accepted this 
programme which was proposed by the Ministry. During 3MP, Perak came up with a 
list of projects, but many of the sites were not identified and so many of its projects 
existed on the list only. 
Summary of programme formulation 
This section highlighted initial project planning, covering project fonnulation, 
site identification, site selection, land matters, guidelines and inter-agency relationships. 
The programme preparation was a lengthy process which involved actors from district 
level to the federal level. The project formulation process was similar for each project. 
The initial programme implementation process for this programme (which included site 
identification and site selection) involving various parties, mainly at the district and the 
state level. Their actions and decisions affected the programme performance at a later 
stage. Indecisiveness and delays at this stage caused some projects to be cancelled or 
slowed down. The problems faced at the initial project planning stage described in this 
chapter further explain the finding of the previous chapter that the average length of 
time taken from project formulation to completion was about seven years. 
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Evidence obtained from interview responses of comparison between projects 
indicate that some degree of preparation was made for the public low cost housing 
programme during each five-year plan. Before the launching of any five year plan, the 
states were requested to submit project proposals to the central agencies. The states 
then in tum directed the District Offices to prepare a list of projects. The list of 
projects was prepared on the basis of guidelines in the call circulars. The project list 
was scrutinised and went through several stages, at both state and federal level, until 
the list was approved for the five year plan. 
Evidence about site identification show that sites were identified for aU 
uncompleted projects and the majority of other projects after they had been approved 
for the five-year plan. Similarly, sites were identified for some of the completed 
projects, before the project had been approved for the relevant five year plan. 
Identified sites indicate that adequate preparation was made for the plan (although they 
could be changed at later stages). 
Only a small number of projects had made the selection of their site prior to 
the five year plan. Several projects completed in an average or short period of time 
made the decision early in the five year plan, in contrast to the uncompleted projects 
where they were indecisive about site selection. State land had become the main focus 
of this programme because it was available with fewer restrictions (if not occupied by 
squatters) and was cheaper than alienated land. There would be benefits if the site had 
been identified early, before the project had been formulated and a decision on site 
selection made at an early stage of the five year plan. In this way, the state could make 
fast decisions, arrange the priority of their projects and move to the next stage of 
implementation. Projects with a strong commitment from the state proceeded with 
fewer problems during the initial planning stage. 
The call circulars were concerned mainly with general criteria and deadlines for 
submissions. The time given to prepare the list of projects was inadequate for anyone 
concerned with meeting deadlines. During the 4MP the SHD was given only one 
month to resubmit proposals to the Ministry; as a result, the SHD instructed district 
offices to produce a list of projects within only two weeks. Many respondents 
commented on this issue, which was "made ;n a hurry with a sacrifice of quality. " 
and believed that it somehow caused some of the later problems. 
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One programme administrator at MHLG who was involved with the 
preparation of two of the five year plans pointed out that preparation of the projects 
had been done in a hurry and adequate time had not been given.8 That was why, when 
the Ministry questioned the priority of the projects and asked for detailed information 
about sites, the states were always unable to furnish adequate information. This 
respondent suggested that the central agencies must inform state governments early 
and they should be given ample time to prepare their project proposal. For example, 
instead of three months, the central agencies should give one year. He explained 
further, that to overcome problems and to improve project implementation, during the 
6MP the central agencies had visited some of the proposed sites which were near 
urban areas. However, since the central agencies had limited time, visits to all sites 
were not made. 
During project submissions, the state governments were given merely one 
month to come up with proposals to the Ministry. This length of time was not 
adequate, because the states had to depend on district and land offices. These offices 
were given two weeks to make project proposals to the state governments. It is not 
difficult to imagine what type of proposal could be expected from the two week time 
period. As a result, projects were not adequately prepared. 
Several issues during the planning stage have been highlighted in this section, 
including those of site identification, site selection, land matters and guidelines. These 
issues seem to be inter-related which imposed constraints on the programme 
implementation and cause delays of project implementation at this formulation and 
planning stage. These factors all contributed to poor preparation for the list of projects 
proposed for each five year plan. 
PROJECT RESOURCING 
INTRODUCTION 
Funding for this programme is in the form of loan from the federal to the state 
governments. An interest of 4% per annum is charged to the states and repayable to 
the federal government within 30 years. The payment of the loan is made in the form of 
an 'annuity' to the federal government. The states in turn then sell the houses to buyers 
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and charge 5.5% interest and collect monthly payments. Before the money can be 
provided to the state government. fund allocation must be made, loans must be 
approved, agreements must be signed and finally the amounts of loan withdrawn is 
based on the rate of project progress. 
The issues covered in this section on project resourcing include the allocation 
of funds, project costs, loan approvals and loan withdrawals. Questions posed cover 
as, 'How was the process on the allocation of funds made for the programme?': 
'What were the procedures involved for financing the programme?': 'How far were 
the loan approval and loan withdrawal associated with the project implementation 
process?" and "What was the project cost against the loan approved." 
Project resourcing is the second stage in implementation. Project resourcing is 
concerned with obtaining financing for the projects: it begins with the application for 
the allocation of funds under the five year plan and the allocation of the annual budget. 
Then, project costing is prepared and a loan approval is applied for from the central 
agencies. This involves two steps: the loan assessment by the Technical Committee for 
Housing Loans (TCOHL), and the 'final say' by the Treasury after the 
recommendation of TCOHL. State governments consider this step critical, ..... because 
a project is not considered secured unless the loan has been approved by the federal 
government" (9) and also because of " ... the limitation that loan applications have to 
be submitted on time, because the committee at the Treasury meets only twice 
annually. ,,(10) After the loan has been approved, the next step is to proceed with the 
signing of an agreement between the state and the federal government. Once the 
agreement is formalised, the state may apply for a loan withdrawal. The number of 
withdrawals and the amount for each instalment to be made are dependent on the 
financial projection and prediction of construction progress which are detailed in the 
agreement. Certain procedures are involved in the loan withdrawals; the state has to 
make applications for the payment which is usually based on the financial requirements 
and construction progress of the project. The summary of funding, estimate and 
project costing for these projects can be seen as in Table 9.2. 
Project Allocation 
Project allocation involves two activities: the process for the allocation offunds 
under the five year plan; and the process for obtaining the annual budget. The 
allocation of funds under the five year plans consists of estimates for each project, 
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whereas the annual budget is to make fu nds available when loan withdrawals are made 
to finance the project. (II). The annual allocation is roughly about one fifth of the total 
allocation for the five year plan projects. 
Table 9.2: SUMMARY OF PROJ ECTS FUNDING AND RESOURCING FOR A 
DETAILED STUDY UN DER TIlE QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION 
Project's Name Allocation Estim(l(c Loan Constructi Total Cost Adjusted 
orFund Per Unit Approved on Tender Per Unit Total Cost 
Per Unit Per Unit Per Unit to 1991's 
Price Per 
Unit 
L Muddy Canal $21.960 $22,500 $2 1,960 $33,000 
- -
2 . Lancott 2 SI1,OOO $12,500 $12,500 - .. - -
3. BlackRiver $11.000 - - - - ", 
-
4. Broken Mound $11,000 $17,502 $4,767 $17,139 
5. Three Mile $11,000 - - - - :::';:' 
Thoms .: 
6 . Bamboo $6,2'+8 $1-1,897 $9,687 $23,897 - -
Splinters 
7. Risefield $17,200 $19,'+ 19 $23,10 1 $21,533 $23,150 $20,078 
8. Trunkville $5,333 $1-1.568 $]4,004 $9,554 $11,554 S12,649 
9. Gingling $·U35 $10,000 $8, 146 $11,420 $11,483 $13,144 
10. Swampy $1 ] ,000 $ 16. 100 $ 15,654 $14,200 $15,654 S17,297 
Village 
11. Blind Pheasant $9.866 $1-1.069 $20,702 $10,309 $20,702 $19,830 
12. Pumpkinville $15.770 $20,1 10 $ 15,770 $20,885 $25,000 $23,850 
13. Rotville $8,000 $8,000 $7,500 $8,000 $9,000 $11,465 
14. Lakesland $7,223 $7,624 $4,625 $5,095 $11,609 
.. $12,828 
Village . ,", 
15. Whiteville $12,500 $12.658 $12,658 $13,515 $15,827 $14:322 
16. Barkings $13 ,462 $14,327 $ 13,676 $12,932 $13,676 $15;792 
17. Coralville $11 ,000 $13.500 $14,558 $14,128 $14,558 $15,980 
18. Stony River $8,000 $17,500 $15,985 $18,l45 $18,485 $20,144 
19. Golden Hope $16,706 $19454 $14, 126 $]8,281 $19,727,. .', $21,466 
20. Ficuswoods t $11,000 $40.859 $28,333 $30,781 $40,029 $42,488 
21. Lumber $11.000 $12.636 $ 14,340 $13,500 $14,340 S15,845 
Junction 
22. Knee Lie S10,633 $7.729 $11,909 $11,675 $13,009 S15,022 
23. Manor $11.000 $ 17,-162 $ 14.473 $13,162 $14,473 $15,922 
24. Long Sand $10,000 $15,249 $ 14.873 $10,216 $14,339 $16,588 
Source: Researcher's Qualitativc Data Collcction 1994 
In general, the process of proj ect allocation for the five year plan was almost 
similar for all projects: the state submitted the list of projects to the central agencies for 
further consideration, then allocation of ntnds for each projects are approved and 
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provided. At this stage the state is informed of the Jist of projects approved and the 
amount of funding available for each project. However, an irregularity occurred in the 
case of the 3MP project allocation which was approved directly by the Ministry and 
only the loan application was approved by the Treasury. But, at the beginning of 1977, 
the Technical Committee on Housing Loans (TCOHL) was formed by the central 
agencies. The function of this committee has been to evaluate and make 
recommendations for all loan applications to the Treasury. During the early 3MP, the 
project resourcing process was shorter. After that, with modifications of the resourcing 
procedures, the process has become longer. 
During the revision of the five year plans, additional allocations of funds for all 
the states increased as a result of a number of projects that were added to the list of 
approved projects for the plan (refer to the discussion in Chapter 5). In certain 
instances, new projects were also proposed by the state in addition to the approved list 
of projects. To accommodate this requirement, some other unimportant projects were 
dropped from the list. 
The Ministry recommends that projects for each state are based on the state's 
past performance, its capability to implement projects for the plan and the readiness to 
implement the projects. Then the Ministry recommends the list to the EPU. How the 
Ministry assesses the list of projects proposed by the states can be described as 
follows:-
" .. the criteria were costing and the readiness to implement the 
project. The decision about the location and priority of the project 
were decided by the slate. They Imow their priority better than us. 
The main concern of the Minis/,), is that proposed projects would be 
able to be completed withill the plan period. They must tell us 
whether the land is ready or 110t and whether the costing is not more 
than $25000,,(12) 
The allocation of funds for this programme is also determined by the EPU in 
relation to other programmes and is distributed among the states. Guided by the ceiling 
determined by the EPU, the Ministry work out the amount to be allocated for each 
state. The Ministry assesses the proposal by, "scaling down the allocation requested 
by the states according to the capability of the states based on past trends, and the 
Ministry is also guided by the housing needs studies carried out in each of the plans. " 
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The Treasury, together with the central agencies, form a committee to approve 
the annual budget. The state or programme administrators at the SlID are not 
consulted in the process of annual budget preparation because administrators at the 
Ministry level had obtained adequate information which was supplied during project 
formulation and in addition information provided through the quarterly progress 
report. One of the programme administrators at the Ministry who is involved in two of 
the five-year plans explained the annual budgetary process as follows:-
"The responsibility of the A4inistlY W(1S to look into the yearly allocation 
requirement, the number '?! loll' cost hOl/ses needed every year. Normally 
the budget requirement was straighf forward at that moment, we just 
estimated the average price for those five years. We knew that the 
maximum price was $25, 000, even though in one [particular] year the 
average was $22,000. Ifwe decided how many units were to be built/or 
the country then we jllst calculated the total cost. Simple arithmetic. Then 
we got the budget for the low cost hOllsing for that particular five year 
period." [Halo} 
Besides the total allocation of funds for the five year plan, the process also involved 
annual budgetary by: (a) MHLG to enable the funding of project and withdrawal of 
loans by state governments;(I3l (b) state governments to enable borrowing as required 
by their financial procedures, to allocate funds under the state's annual budget and to 
pass legislation authorising them to borrow money from the federal government to 
finance the low cost housing projects. 
Almost all of the sample projects investigated had been allocated with funds 
with the exception of the Trunkville and Gingling projects. Restrained by a limited 
financial allocation to accommodate the Trunkville project, the central agencies had 
requested the state to cancel its other less important projects. In a meeting with the 
central agencies to decide this, the programme administrator who represented the 
state, was unable to confirm which projects were considered to be of less importance. 
Two months later the state confirmed that three projects were to be dropped from the 
state's approved project list and ·replaced by the Trunkville project. Similarly, although 
this happened in a different state and in an earlier five year plan, a project from the list 
of approved projects was postponed in order to accommodate the Gingling project. 
According to financial procedures the funding for a project lapses, if its 
financing is not utilised within the plan period. The funding was withdrawn from the 
uncompleted Black River 3 project due to a lack of progress when the state failed to 
evict squatters. 
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Allocation for the Bamboo Splinters project was made available under the J:MP 
and was then carried through to the SMP. The allocation was subject to revisions and 
was increased in each five year plan. 
Slow Projects 
An analysis on the issue of allocation of funds for slow projects indicate that 
these projects did not experience problems in obtaining funding, because all projects 
were funded by the central agencies. Increases to the amount of funding were 
requested to the Treasury because of delays to commence the project as well as the 
effect of inflation. 
Risefield project: the central agencies allocated funds for this project when the 
state confirmed that this project was one of its priority projects for the five year plan. 
Although, during 1984-85 this project had been rescheduled as a non-priority project 
by the state, funds were still available for this project. 
Trunkvi1le project: Funds were allocated to this project during the 3MP 
review. Knowing that the project could not be completed within the same plan, only a 
portion of aUocation was made available in 3MP; whereas the balance was made in 
4MP. The allocation for Gingling and Swampy Village projects had been approved by 
the Ministry to the state. This was because, during 3MP period, the Ministry was 
provided with the power to approve funding for projects. Only at the beginning of 
4MP was the power then reverted to the Treasury. The state government had spent 
MS1,OOO,OOO in advance on earth works for the Blind Pheasant project even before the 
loan was approved by the central agency. 
Average Projects 
All average projects were assigned with an approved budget at the beginning of 
the five year plan. However, some of the projects required bigger amounts of funding 
than were allocated. This was the case in PumpkinviJIe, Hotville, Lakesland, Stony 
River and Ficuswoods projects. To meet the project funding the states cancelled other 
projects, added money from their own coffers and utilised the allocation of funds from 
other programmes. 
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A lower funding was initially allocated for project Pumpkinville, by the central 
agencies which forced the state to ask for an additional funding to meet the project 
cost. The programme administrator explained, " .. the state had to 'drop' a project 
from the list of approved projects of fl I'e year plan, in order to accommodate funding 
for this project. The stale had requesled fUlId .. of M$2 million, but the Ministry only 
recommended M$l. 6 million to the central agencies. " The programme administrator 
further explained " ... al/hough the central agencies always accommodated additional 
allocations when requested. this showed that the project lacked accurate costing. The 
estimates did not comider cost increases during the plan. The cost limit set by the 
Ministry was not realistic because it )1'aS hased on the estimate made at the beginning 
of the five year plan. When COllstruc/ion of projects look place during the middle or 
towards the end of the plan, the project cost had then increased, therefore, additional 
allocation of funds had to be requested from the central agencies. " 
Hotville Housing project was formulated in 3MP where allocation of funds 
was approved directly by the Ministly. Its loan application was made directly to the 
Treasury without going through the TCOHL. This was the practised procedure during 
the early 3MP. To meet the shortfall of funding for this project, aUocation to other 
programmes were used, from the state's own fimding and from the rural development 
funds. 
Lakes/and project was one of the important urban squatters resettlement 
programme in the Klang YaIley where the state was fully committed to implement this 
project. This project was estimated to cost about M$13,OOO,OOO. However, an 
allocation of funds of M$9,OOO,OOO was made in 1976 by the federal government, 
which later in 1979, only approved M$5,400,OOO in the form of a loan to the state. 
Since the state government was committed to this project, the state was ready to meet 
the project cost from its own means. Two factors assisted in meeting the financing of 
this project: 'the most important figure in the state' was pushing this project for 
political reasons. The state was in a favourable financial situation at that time. A similar 
situation also occurred in two other projects, the Stony River and Ficuswoods, where 
the state utilised its own funding to meet the project cost. Compensation of 
MSl18,202 was made to occupiers on the land for the Stony River Scheme by utilising 
the state's own funding.14 
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Fast Projects 
Allocation of funds for four fast projects was made available at the beginning of 
the five year plan when these projects from were approved for the plan. The funds of 
MSl,OOO,OOO was approved for the Long Sands project by the MHLG in early 4MP. 
The basis of calculation was based on the average estimate of S11,000 per house. 
Funding for the Knee Lie project was made during the mid-term review of3MP where 
MS1.2 million was allocated. Two other projects, Lumber Junction was provided with 
MS1.4 million and Manor with M$1.64 million. Although these projects were 
considered fast projects, their total cost were higher than the funds allocated. As a 
result a higher amount of loan was required for each ofthese projects. 
Conclusion on Allocation of Funds 
The process involved in the allocation of funds proved to be lengthy, as 
described in this chapter. It dealt with applications of funds for the five year plans 
which underwent several stages, starting from the SlID to the Ministry then through 
the central agencies such as the EPU and finally being approved by the Treasury. The 
annual allocation of funds were then made to the Ministry in the form of annual budget 
to enable the payment of loan to finance the projects. The state governments were also 
required by their financial procedures to provide these projects with the allocation of 
funds under the state's annual budget. Moreover, the states also required to pass 
legislation authorising them to borrow money from the federal government to finance 
the low cost housing projects. 
In general allocation of funds were made available for each of the projects 
formulated in the five year plans. If new projects were proposed which were not 
included in the approved list, the state might propose to drop other projects and utilise 
their allocation of funds for these new ones. The problem with the allocation of funds 
was that they were sometimes inadequate to meet to total project cost. This occurred 
because the estimates were made in the beginning of the five year plan without taking 
into the consideration the cost increase during construction which was taking place 
several years later and also as the result of delays. 
The federal government had also set the project cost limit funded from the loan 
money to MS7,500 per house during the 3MP, then to M$14,OOO in the 4MP and 
increased to M$25,OOO during 5MP. To meet the higher total project cost the states 
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had to provide additional funding. Although in 1982, the government had approved the 
maximum selling price for low cost houses at l\1$25,000, the fund allocated for the low 
cost housing project was still at M$14, 000 per house. One of the respondents at the 
implementing agencies commented, " ... in the situation where basic construction 
criteria were fulfilled alld the prC?ject did not face any difficulty then it would possible 
to build within the cost limit. Bli/ sel'eral prC?}ecls were facing problems where this 
cost limit had constrained the project implemelltation." 
LOAN APPROVAL 
In relation to this, respondents for each projects were asked a series of 
questions such as:-
(a) What factors determined when to make loan application for 
the project to the central agencies?" 
(b) Was the state government informed the basis of the loan approved? 
(c) What were criteria used by the committee to consider loan application? 
(d) Was the loan provided adequate? If the loan was inadequate, how was 
this problem overcome? 
(e) What were alternatives available to overcome the project's financial 
inadequacy? 
Loan approval is the next step in the project resourcing process. It involves 
preparing project costing, submission pf loan application to the Ministry, evaluation 
and approval of the loan by the central agencies and finally the completion of loan 
agreement between the federal and the state governments. The states may then apply 
for loan withdrawals for the project. 
The process of how the Ministry assessed the loan application by is described 
as follows:-
Hardy, 'The state government submits an application in two types of form. 
One is related to a general socia-economic background information 
surrounding the location of the proposed project. Another one is related to 
the project's detailed costing and financial requirements. The state also 
forwards a site plan and a building plan together with the application. After 
that, the Ministry seeks "professional" comments from the NHD on the plans 
and project costing. Then, the Ministry prepares a short loan application 
paper. This paper is prepared at least one week before the committee meeting. 
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Next, the /0011 application is presented to the technical committee 
[TCORL} by a programme administrator who is in-charged of the state. 
Representativesfrom the stale and ils implementing agency are also calledfor 
the meeting. Their roles are 10 clarify questions and some other matters ask by 
the committee members. When the loan is approved, the Ministry informs the 
states and the Treaswy. 7hen, a loan committee at the Treasury also assess 
and has a final say all (he loan application. Generally the Treasury will 
approve the loan as has heen recommended by the technical committee 
[TCORL] because the Treasury's representative is also a member of the 
technical committee. The Treasury will convey the decision to the state which 
finally follows by the signing of loan agreement. 
The Minisl1y also checks whal projects have yet not submitted to the 
committee for a particular year. the Ministry will persuade the state to 
expedite other loan applications and request to submit them on time. " 
The above description is the process adopted during 3MP. However other respondents 
who were working with the Ministry during 4MP, 5MP and 6MP also verified that the 
above descriptions are generally tme of the loan application process in general. 
Uncompleted Projects 
Three of the five uncompleted projects achieved the loan approval stage before 
they had been cancelled. While one project, the Three Miles Stone, never achieved at 
this stage because it was cancelled during the first year of the 4MP. 
The funds for Black River project was lapsed when the project did not progress 
from the initial planning stage by the end of the 4MP. Loan applications for the Muddy 
Canal, Lancott 2 and Bamboo Splinters projects were approved by the Treasury and 
formalised with signing of agreements between the federal and state governments. A 
certain percentage of the loan was paid to the state governments. 
The loan application for the Muddy Canal project was submitted to the 
Ministry in 1983 but on the request of the state it was withheld until the middle of 
1985. Delays occurred because the state was unable to make decision on the selection 
of site. This loan was approved when the five year plan had reached almost its end. 
One of the respondents involved with the project in the 4MP and 5MP described as 
follows:-
Halo, "Loan application for this project was made in October 1983. 
The state appliedforlvf$91l,OOO or $18,220 per unit. This average cost per 
unit asked was higher thal1 the m'erage loan approved at that time, which was 
about MSJJ,OOO to 111$14,000. When the Ministry received the application, 
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one of the officers in charge qf the programme assessed the application. She 
called the officer in charged at the Stale Housing Department for further 
clarification. The officer in-charged informed that {(the proper procedures" 
to acquire the land for project had been carried out. The land had been 
gazetted under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1960. The land was 
estimated to cost a total qf AIS250,000 or about M$50,000 per acre. In 
addition, the officer also assured that construction works would begin after 
the loan have been approved hy the central agencies. 
But later (he slale requested the Ministry to withhold the loan 
application for a while. This was hecause the state wanted to change its 
decision 011 the proposed sileo The state was looking for another site as the 
alternative. Once this issue is solved then the state will request the Ministry to 
proceed with the loan application. 
In middle of 1985 the state I'e-submitted another loan application to 
the Ministry. The state requested MS1.2 million for the project. The state had 
been advised by the implementing agency that the increased amount applied 
for was because a new site. 777C prqjc>ct cost was also taking into consideration 
the rapid development in constructio" industry at that time. The Technical 
Committee [TCOHI,/ thel1 approved a lolal loan of $1.1 million for the 
project or the average cost (?f about $22,000 per unit. 
Three criteria were considered by the Technical Committee. First, the 
state government confirmed the land was available. Second, the pledge to 
begin conslMlction .'10011 after loan was made available. Finally, the 
implementing agency certified that initial planning preparation was completed 
and the project was ready for cOllstmclion. First payment of $128,000 was 
made on 12.3.8610 the state. This was 017 the same date when instrument of 
loan agreement completed by the Tr<?(1sllry and State government. " 
Despite the assurance to begin construction after the loan approved, it did not start 
until 1994. 'Rawi', one of the programme administrators in charge of the project at the 
state level provided information to complete the narration about the Joan application of 
this project as fo)]ows:-
Rawi, iI ... in early 1992 (he implementing agency estimated that the total cost 
for this project was ahout $3,300,000 or the average of $33,000 per unit. This 
was because the l1umher of houses proposed to built has been increased from 
50 to 100 units. Because the loan approved in 1985 was far lesser than the 
new estimate of project cost, then an additional loan has to be made to the 
federal government. Also, during thaI period, there was a proposition to revise 
the maximum selling price of low cost h01lsing. Re-application for an 
additional loan was made the Ministry on 11.7.1994. Instead, the state still 
stick to the original targel of 50 houses. The total project cost was estimated 
about $1.6 million or the Gl'erage C?f A1$32,OOO per house. Therefore, an 
additional loan of $500,000 was needed. A [though the additional loan has yet 
not approved by the cenlral a~encies, the state proceed with the advertisement 
of tender. When the state closed the construction tender bid in September 
1994, the lowest hid received was S 3 3,000 per unit. " 
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'Chali' who was the programme administrator for this project between 1991-
1995 concluded :-
Chali, 'The main problems C?! this /J/'C?jecl were indecisiveness of the state 
about the site due to political inteljerence, wrong choice of site and the SHD 
was weak to influence politicians. So far, the state can't proceed with this 
project because the Ministry had decided not to revise the low cost housing's 
maximum selling price. Therefore, the maximum loan can be obtained is only 
M$25,OOO per house. the state has to find funds from its own sources if to 
proceed with this project . .. 
The Bamboo Splinters project had achieved the loan approval stage. Its loan 
application was approved on 22.4.1980 by the TCOHL.(l5) However, this approval 
was made almost at the end of the 3MP, therefore the project had to be continued to 
the next five year plan. A sum of$I,249,688 was approved for this project, but only 
$349,912 (28%) were made for the 3MP while the balance of $899,776 were to be 
spent during the 4MP. Since the project did not achieved much progress, only a small 
portion of the loan was spent in 3MP. 
Slow Projects 
The loan application for the Risefield project was submitted to the Ministry at 
the end of 1982. The SEDC (who acted as the implementing agency for this project) 
advised the SHD to apply for M$I,941,925 (an average M$19,419 per house). NHD, 
the agency who advised the Ministry, recommended a loan of $18,200 per house. 
However, when the TCOHL met in early 1983, only $1,720,000 was approved or an 
average of MS17,200 per house. The amount of loan approved for this project was 
therefore lower than the amount requested by the state. 
Only six years later, in January 1989 did the construction began. But, another 
problem arose; construction progressed very slow. Dissatisfied with the contractor's 
performance, the state ref1.ised to renew the contract when it ended in September 1990. 
Another contractor had to be appointed to complete the project and certain procedures 
had to be followed. As the consequences, the time spent on this project become longer 
and the cost a]so increased. An additional M$700,000 was needed to meet the project 
cost. To overcome the shortfall, the state requested an additional loan in 1992. The 
TCOHL only recommended M$600,OOO for this project. Constrained by the policy of 
the maximum selling price of M$25,000 per unit, a lower amount of loan about 
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M$23,000 per house was therefore approved for this project. The programme 
administrator for this project explained: 
Chali, It ••• To overcome inadequate of funding for this project, the state 
has to utilise its own funding. But the state can't go on like this. If more 
projects to he like this, the state 'will end up with financial burden. 
Although the construction cost lor this project is about M$23, 000 per 
house, the fatal cost has exceeded more than M$25,000. Yet, we can't sell 
houses more than A1S25, 000 hecause of the current policy. (16) What 
makes the project cost cxceec!.,' 111S25, 000 is because the land cost is 
expensive, (17) the infrastructure costs are also high and in addition we 
have to make contrihution fees to the utility agencies. Although this is a 
low cost housing project - where we expected only minimum planning 
standards and minimum requirements. In opposition to our expectation, 
the standards set by the technical agencies are high. They imposed almost 
the similar standard .. as other prqjecls (private housing and non low-cost 
housing). " 
Loan application for the Tnmkville project was made in June 1979 but rejected 
by TCOHL because an allocation of funds for this project was not available. This 
project was not in the list of newly approved projects for the 3MP Review. To 
accommodate the project, the state cancelled its three other projects under the 3MP. 
When the TCOHL re-considered the loan application, the state was asked to bear the 
jnfrastructure and supervision costs for this project from its own funds. 
The loan approval process for the Blind Pheasant project was irregular because 
it was approved in advance prior to a forma! application to the central agencies. The 
loan was 'approved in principle' by the Deputy Minister of Housing and Local 
Government when she visited to the state in 1984. Later, when a fonnal application 
was submitted to the Ministry in July 1985, a loan ofM$4,SOO,OOO was approved for 
this project. This loan approval was made towards the end of 4MP, and thus, the 
construction had to be continued to the SMP, The loan was adequate to cover the total 
project cost because construction has began immediately after the loan was approved 
although this was higher than the estimated project cost set early in the plan. 
The loan application for the Swampy Village project was forwarded by SlID to 
the Ministry on 18.7.79. The state government applied for a loan of $1,741,500. The 
loan was based on the estimated project costs of an average of MS9, 165 per house. 
This amount excluded costs for water and electricity supply, and the cost for road and 
drainage since these costs were to be borne by the state government. One month later, 
the TCOHL approved and recommended to the Treasury the amount requested. 
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Finally, a loan of $),74 J ,500 was approved by the Treasury and the decision was 
conveyed to the state government on 18.10. 1979. (18) The criteria used to consider for 
the loan was explained to the state government' representative who attended the 
meeting, when the case was presented before the committee. One of the main 
considerations was an assurance from the state representative that the project would 
start soon after the loan approved. Then, an agreement was formalised and the first 
instalment of $300,000 from the loan was made by the Federal Government in 
February 1980. 
Examples from the Swampy Village and Blind Pheasant projects show that as 
the consequences of delays in loan applications, their approvals being made towards 
the end of the five year plan. Thus, the projects had to be continued into the next five-
year plan. 
Average Projects 
An analysis of loan application and approval for the average project shows that 
six projects had secured their loans during the second and third year of the five year 
plan. While one project, the Coral Capes obtained loan during the fourth year and two 
projects, Barkings and Ficuswood, attained this stage during the final year of the five 
year plan. 
Hotville project (formulated for the 3MP) had loan approval in 1978 when the 
central agencies were given an assurance that the site for the project was available and 
the project could start immediately when the loan was approved. The state went on 
with the advertisement to call for construction tenders, without waiting the approval 
from the Treasury and completing loan agreement. When the loan agreement 
completed, the state immediately continued with award of tender to a successful 
building contractor. The construction of project began immediately after that. This had 
shortened the time at the resourcing stage. 
The Pumpkinville project was formulated In the 5MP and secured loan 
approval in 1988. The M$I ,600,000 loan approved for this project was inadequate to 
cope with the construction tender of M$2,088,000. Despite the shortage of funds the 
state went ahead with the project and utilised <the revolving funds' to finance the 
project. 
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For two average projects of 4MP (J\,1anor and Whiteville) "applications were 
made on time. ,,(19) Loan application for Manor was made in October 1982 and was 
approved at $1,500,000, Three months later, the state's tender board made a decision 
on the tender application of $1,400,000. The amount of loan provided for this project 
was adequate to cover the construction cost and other payments. In addition also, the 
loan withdrawal was given in the 'lump sump' of MSl,SOO,OOO to the state 
government. Another project, the Whiteville proposed to build 237 houses on the ex-
mining land. After the technical feasibility studies and consultation with various 
technical departments only ) 97 houses were found feasible. The loan application of 
MS3,000,000 was made in late 1982. Since the NHD was the implementing agency for 
this project and the agency advised the Ministry on project costing, the full amount 
was approved. When constmction began in early 1983 and was completed in early 
1986, only 194 houses built with the total cost of M$3,200,OOO. The state has to 
absorb the cost about MS200,OOO for the of contribution fees and other payments. 
SEDC which was the implementing agency for the Ficuswood project 
estimated that M$14,OOO,OOO needed to constmct 400 houses for this project. 
Application for a loan was made to the Ministry in 1984. The Ministry evaluated the 
application and recommended to the TCOHL a loan of MS9,700,000 only. This 
amount was lower than the requested put forward by the state. Considering the stable 
financial situation of the state, the TCOHL was in the opinion that the state could cope 
with the M$4 million shortages. (20) 
The Barkings project received better attention and support because it was the 
first project involving co-operation between the newly established NHD and the state 
government. In contrast to the Ficllswood project, its first phase development had 
been started even before the loan being approved by the central agencies. 
Fast Projects 
The times when fast projects reached the stage of loan approval, ranged from 
before the launching of the plan to the early fourth year of the five year plan. Long 
Sand project had loan approval even before the starting of 4MP. Loan application for 
Manor project was approved during the second year of the project implementation. 
For the Lumber Junction project it was in the third year while for Knee Lie it was in 
the fourth year of the 4MP. 
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The application for loans for the Knee Lie project was made in 1978 for 
M$772,OOO. But the l\1inistry only recommended $750,000. The TeOm... rejected the 
application because adequate information was not provided to the committee and in 
addition the state did not agree with underestimate of the project costing. Between 
1978 to 1980, Malaysia experienced a property boom and as a result construction 
costs escalated rapidly. Another estimate was submitted to the Ministry in early 1979 
and then a loan ofM$825,200 was approved for this project. When bidding for tenders 
after that, the construction cost was higher than the amount of loan had been 
approved. To accommodate the increased project cost, an additional loan was 
requested in 1981. The total loan provided for this project was almost MS1.2 million. 
In addition, the state also used its funding for the payment of land compensation and 
contribution to utility agencies. The factor that pushed this project towards completion 
within the plan was because it was among the few projects of the newly formed NHD 
for Negeri Sembilan. 
Loan approval prior to the beginning of a five year plan was given to the Long 
Sand project. A respondent involved in this project described as follows:-
Baker, "This project was olle of the 10 projects proposed by the state of 
Negeri Sembilan to be included in the approved projects list for the 3MP mid-
term review in 1978. Because of the submission was late, the Estimate Sub-
Committee of NDPC21 ) decided projects from Negeri Sembi/an were to be 
included in the 4MP rather than the mid-term review of 3MP. The sub-
committee gave their green light to the state to go ahead with this project by 
taking necessary aclions 10 initiate the initial implementation for this project. 
A funding of $1 1,000 pel' lI/1it was made by the committee. About six months 
before the launching of the -IMP the state submitted loan application for 
$15,000 per ul1il. The state was aCling on the advice by its implementing 
agency that the proper total estimated cost for this project was about M$1.5 
million. 
The stale was illformed about the criteria for loan approval. In fact 
when the technical committee [TCOHL] met, the state representative was 
attending to present loan application and to defence the project costing. As 
usual the loan approved by the commillee was lower than the amount asked 
Later it was found out Ihal the financing lI'as inadequate. The lowest tender 
bid received from contractor li'as J)J, 021, 600. This did not include 
contribution fees for eleClrici~y and water. " 
When asked why the loan approved was lower than the amount requested, another 
respondent explained as follows:-
Halo, liThe states usually jacked the costing higher so that when the loan was 
trimmed down through Ihe process, they got close to the amount they intended 
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for. Another reason was aimed to maximised the usage of federal government 
funds, so that more projects could he accommodated" 
But why additional loan later needed? 
"Delays ill project lake f?f( cal/sed Ihe approved loan burst because of the 
cost increase. COl1lractors also added in element of extra percentage to 
absorb their losses hecause government was also considered a bad 
paymaster. " 
Although the Long Sand project is one of the projects categorised under the fast 
projects it also faced difficulties in getting the right amount for financing. This project 
was estimated to cost about $ I ,530,000 but the amount of loan approved was only 
M$1,490,OOO. 
General Remarks on Loan Approval 
Several respondents were the opinion that the policy on cost limits such as the 
maximum loan of M$25,OOO per house, constrained the programme.(22) This was 
because the average cost per houses was usually more than the cost limit set by central 
agencies. They pointed out that this was why many projects in the past had to request 
an additional loan. In relation to this, one respondent described as "over controlled but 
short-sighted of the problems on the grolllld. ,,(23) Another respondent, who is a 
programme administrator at the implementing agency, pointed out " ... 0// problems 
include tailoring to the cost limit .'leI hy the amount of loan approvedfor a project is 
passed to the implementing agency to solve it. II (24) This problem had occurred over 
several plan periods as a respondent pointed out " ... the similar problem had a/so 
occu"ed during the pas/five year plans projects, if was of course, the loan provided 
by the federal government was lower thall the aclual total project cost, because of 
there was an understanding that a certain amount of cost had to be provided by the 
state government. Also certain project components were to be borne by the state 
government, such as the land and infrastructure costs. ,,(25) 
On the other hand, respondents from the central agencies, viewed the state 
governments as apathetic to this programme. This was demonstrated by the initial 
planning problems such as site selections, squatters problems, changing of project 
scopes and priority and weaknesses in command of departments under the state 
contro1.(26) These respondents were in the opinion that this problem could have been 
overcome by the states. 
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'Ras' a programme administrator at the Ministry, whose responsibility was 
monitoring project progress and liaison with state governments pointed out that:~ 
"The State governments feel very sensitive when federal Treasury imposed 
that before fund could he withdrml'l1 Ihey hm'e 10 verify the project's progress 
through making visits. To slale government this indicates as 'distrust' feeling 
of the federal government alld senses as over control. This was because the 
fund was provided ill form of 'loan '; whatever happen, the state has to pay 
back. Therefore the states should he given a more freedom like in the pasts. 
Although in the past plans federal agencies had made visits, but they were not 
the prime emphasis when to make payment for loan withdrawals. It was 
adequate just hy certification of the superintending officer [project's 
engineer} in charge of the pnlject. Illfact in the past there were many projects 
where 'advance payments' made by the federal Treasury. Certain amount of 
the loan can be It'ilhdrm1'l1 while wailing for the agreements between the two 
government being formalised. 
In 4MP there were several projects which loans were disbursed even before the 
agreements were signed (e.g. Tnmkville project). The justification for this act was 
because some of the projects were called for tender even before getting loan approval 
from the TCOHL at the MHLG. That was why the committee made the statement in 
1982 it was very upset with this practice and warned states not to call for tenders 
before the loans were approved by the committee. 
PROJECT COST 
The amount of loan approved is related to project cost. This is because project 
financing is dependent on the money obtained from the loan provided by the federal 
government. Under this sub-topic the researcher attempted to investigate whether 
there was relationship between constnlction cost and the approval process. During the 
research formulation stage the researcher believed that the programme implementation 
performance is influenced by the procedures of development approval process; longer 
approval process causes higher construction cost. 
'Chali', one of the key respondents at the state level described that the pre-
determined project cost is only valid if the project fl1lftl most of 'favourable criteria'~ 
'Chali's' point of view was also shared by other respondents who were involved in the 
(27) programme 4MP, SMP and 6MP. 
Chati, " ... ill terms of the amount loan approved for the project is varied 
from one project to another. 111 the ideal situation, where we do not face 
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site problem, change of site, change the type of house to be built, when 
the site is close to main road alld close to other injrastnlcture facilities, 
then the amollnt of loall provided is always adequate. In the case where 
site is not favourable; hilly or .\1I'ampy, where it needs a lot of filling or 
cutting, it cause increases to (he cost for site preparation. This a/ways 
occurred to the state land. Because state land is now limited Sometimes, 
we have to pay compeJlsalion if we acquire the private land In general 
the maximum 10(111 of $25,000 per hOllse allowed hy the federal 
government is inadequate to cover the total cost of low cost housing 
development. Based on these projects [Risefield and Muddy Canal] they 
had costed us for more than $25,000. This was happened because the 
increased cost all site preparation, additional cost due to improved 
standards imposed by technical departments and increased payment on 
contribution money to utilities agencies. 
Uncompleted Projects 
Three ofthe uncompleted projects (Muddy Canal, Broken Mound and Bamboo 
Splinters) were facing problems of higher project cost than the amount of loan 
approved, while reasons for cancellation of two other projects (Three Mile Stone and 
Black River) have been described in the discussion on the programme preparation. 
Acted on the advice of the implementing agency, the SHD applied a loan for 
project Muddy Canal Project in 1983 for $18,200 per house.(28) This project costing 
was considered on the higher side than the cost per unit that was normaJly approved by 
the central agencies (between $11,000 and $14,000). In 1983, the total cost estimated 
for this project was about $1,200,000. It was planned that construction works would 
begin soon after the loan was approved by the TCOHL. However, delays had 
occurred, due to the problem of site selection for this project. When tenders were 
received in 1994, the project cost increased to M$33,000 per house. 
Broken Mound project had reached the construction stage but was cancelled 
and transferred to the 'Special Low Cost Housing Programme' in 1990. The project 
was facing delays in construction because of the building contractor was incapable of 
finishing the project. After the state terminated the contract, the state was not capable 
of meeting the additional project cost to complete it and decided to cancel this project. 
The project costing for project Bamboo Splinters was made during the 3MP, 
when the SHD submitted application for a loan approval. Delays occurred to this 
project due to the problem of site selection. Therefore the project costing and the 
amount ofloan approved were not valid when construction work was to begin. It was 
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realised that funding was inadequate because the cost of earthwork contract was a 
substantial amount. For this project the earthworks contract was made by a negotiated 
tender. This practise differed from the usual. The implementing agency was negotiating 
with the contractor on the amount of contact price and the estimated project cost. 
Finally a tender of $2,394,768 was awarded to the contractor for earthwork of 60 
acres which included the implementing agency's own project, out of that, about 12 
(29) 
acres were for PLHCP's project. 
Slow Projects 
The awarded tender for the Risefield project was higher than the amount of 
funding approved. Increased in cost was due to slow project 'take off. The 
construction for this project only began in 1989 but progressed very slowly and was 
almost abandoned. Delays in starting and completing the project caused the project 
cost increase because the contribution costs to the utility agencies had increased. 
The original costing for the Trunkville project was made during the 3MP. 
Delays in implementing the project caused an increased in project cost. To meet the 
project cost an additional loan was requested to the central agencies. The central 
agencies also directed the state to bear half the infrastructure cost and a quarter of the 
supervision cost. 
Estimated costs for Swampy Village were prepared by its implementing agency 
during the 3MP. It was prepared in accordance with the cost limit of $8,000 per house 
which was the effective cost limit at that time. The provision for water and electricity 
supply was not included in the cost because, in the past, these costs were absorbed by 
the utility agencies. The loan provided by the federal government was not adequate to 
meet the project cost. The actual tender was higher than estimated cost because of 
delays in calling tenders and at the time the construction industry was experiencing a 
boom. In addition utility agencies changed their policies and imposed fees for 
electricity and water supply. 
The cost for project Blind Pheasant increased from the original estimate 
because the construction had took place beyond the original five year plan period. The 
state was indecisive on the question of when to implement and which implementing 
agency to be appointed for this project. 
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Average Projects 
Pumpkinville project " ... whell we suhmitted 10011 application in 1988, we 
requested a loan of aho1ft $20,000 per unit. The project costing was prepared by our 
implementing agency. But it was approved ahout 1111$1.6 million or M$16,OOO per 
unit. ''30 When asked why a lower figure \vas approved, the programme administrator 
'kuspected" 31 that, " ... prohah(v he cause we JI'ere still influenced by the recession. We 
did not anticipate that recession elided SOOI1 hy the following years which the 
economy was picking lip l'elY well. It has impacts on the constroction industry in 
general, and specifically increased enst to this project. When the loan was approved, 
construction was not taken place there and then, of course there was some times 
lapsed because we have 10 call tender alld fUlfil certain [administrative and 
financial] procedures." As the result, the lowest tender bidding from a building 
contractor for the project was about M$2, 1 00,000 or the average of $21,000 per unit. 
Apart from the constmction cost, some other costs were added to the total project 
cost such as contribution fees to. utility agencies, management fees to the implementing 
agency and extra costs because of additional requirements imposed by technical 
departments. Total cost for this Pumpkinville project, which was completed in 1993, 
excluding land, was about M$2.3 millions, the average of M$23,OOO per unit.(32) To 
overcome inadequate funding the state applied for an additional loan after the project 
was completed. The additional loan was approved because the total loan was still 
below the maximum limit ofM$25,000 per unit. 
During the 3MP, when the state's financial situation was stable and much of 
the state's focus was on this programme, the state was ready to use its own funding 
when the project faced difficulties with inadequate funds. This was illustrated by the 
Rotville project . 
.. This project was estimated hy the SRI) to cost about M$8,OOO per unit in 
1978. When the prqject costinx was prepared hy the implementing agency, the 
estimated cost was ahout illS 14,000 per l1nit. The state proceed with the 
construction, alth01lgh (he tender price was Mgher than the amount of loan 
approved The funding still inadequate to cover the total cost, even after the 
state asked for additional loan. The slate was capable to make up difference 
because the slate was ill a strong financial position during that time. 
Moreover, the slate's policy of giving priority for the low cost housing. " 
[Baker,5.12.1994J 
A similar stance was adopted by another state in the same 3MP, as illustrated 
by the Lakesland project. This project was among the few large scale housing 
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development project in the programme. The project aimed to build more than 1,000 
houses, constructed in three phases of development. The estimated average cost per 
house was about M$8,OOO. The loan approved by the central agencies was about 
M$4,600 per unit. The lower amount of Joan was approved because timber houses 
were thought to be cheaper and in addition also the state was to bear all infrastructure 
costs (from it own sources and also utilising allocation from other programmes). The 
construction tender price was about $5,600 per unit. The original allocation of funds 
was M$9,000,OOO, but the loan approved was only M$S.7 million. 
Fast Projects 
When application for loan was made for the Lumber Junction project, the 
estimated cost was put higher than the amount approved by the Treasury. The Ministry 
trimmed down the cost approved after the advice by the NHD. When the project was 
constructed, the constmction cost was higher than the amount of loan allocated. As 
the result the state had to submit an application for an additional loan to the central 
agencies through the Ministry. Similar problem was also occurred to the Knee Lie and 
Long Sand and where the estimated project cost was higher than the actual loan 
approved by the central agency. Although these projects categorised as fast projects, 
they too faced difficulties on shortage offunds where the state had put up requests for 
an additional loan to settle the remainder payments to the contractor. 
Issues raised on project cost 
1. Central agencies were inclined to approve lower funding than amounts 
requested; as a consequence, projects faced financial difficulty because of higher 
construction cost and inadequate funds. To overcome this, additional loans had to be 
requested from federal government or the states have to bear the cost from their own 
funds. 
2. The amount of loan provided were adequate if projects had immediately 
proceeded to the constmction stage. Delays in commencing construction made the 
amount of loan provided no longer adequate to cover project costs. This implied that 
slow projects had higher project cost increases when compared to fast projects. 
Therefore, good estimate and proper preparations were important to fit within the 
constraints set in this programme. 
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3. The Federal government controlled the amount of loan for the programme 
and states had to build houses conforming to the amount approved, 
4. The states ran the risks of having to find additional funds if the loan provided 
was inadequate, 
LOANWITHDRA'VAL 
Project resoufcing involves obtaining finance for the projects. After the loan 
application is approved by the Treasury, and when the agreement is formalised, the 
state may apply for loan withdrawal. Withdrawals are based on progress and the 
amount of money is paid according to the progress achieved for the project. The 
difficulties faced at this stage can be described from an interview extract as follows:-
tIl have the feeliflK Ihat slate are reltlctant to do housing projects because of 
the strict procedures illl'Oh'ed in prC?ject financing. They are very concerned 
about loan withdrm1lals. For example like( states) has requested that all loan 
withdrawals due for 0/1 prC?jects are fa he made immediately to the state's 
Treasury. But the federal TreaSlfl)' refused to make any payment until the 
provisions in the agreement revised hetween the two parties. This is in view of 
the loan extension period has heen expired This is one of the items contained 
in the agreement. Although the state KOl'emment may be allowed to extend the 
duration, but its lip fa the period of 6 months only. The amount of 
withdrawals are depending all the prr?jecf progress. Therefore, many projects 
stuck in getting the withdrml'als; ullless these project completed within six 
months or the federal is willillX to negotiate amendment to the provision in the 
agreements, It is importolll thaI the programme administrators understand 
and investigate the COlllell1 of the agreement. A Ithough this (states) will not 
facing much problems to flmd its prC?jects if the balance of loan withdrawals 
are not to be paid, this is more than enough to discourage the state to proceed 
with this PLCHP in the fltfw'e. "rRAS, t 4.11.1994] 
Discussions about the same subject with the programme administrator at the state level 
has provided perspectives about loan withdrawals from the state's point of view. 
"This state is capah/e 10 fund its projecls because the state does not entirely 
depending on loan allocatiO/1 from the federal government. The state also has 
allocated funding for each year fa advance project financing. The finance 
obtainedfrom the loan withdrawals serve to pay the revolvingfunds advanced 
for the project. The two implementing agencies used by the state, the PWD 
and NHD depended on this hudge! a1/ocated by the state government. But for 
projects implemented by SEDC did not face financing difficulty 33. The SEDC 
has advanced from its 011'11 Jllncl.\ 10 pay projects' progress payment to 
contractors, and later submit claims to the slate government, SEDC imposed 
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7.5% service charge Oil lop of Ihe WllOllll1 paid In general projects did not 
face problems through {his arrangefllC-'flt. 
However in general J've seen that the process of loan withdrawal now 
is becoming more difficult. 111 my opinion, this is occurred because procedures 
involved become more slricl. This slale currently has loan instalments about 
M$JO,OOO,OOO which are sli/l unable 10 withdraw from the federal Treasury. 
When the loan lI'ithdrmJlals hecome d([ftcult, the money receive by the state 
will be slower and also it has reach the end of the "extension period". This 
makes the loan lapse alld a re-liegotiation be/lveen the state and federal is 
reqUired This lI'il/ req1lire a sigllillg (!!new loan agreements. 
Many detailed illformalion are required by the Federal Treasury when 
the state submits applications for loan withdrawals. In the past loan 
withdrawals involved jusl hetween the State Financial Officer and the 
Treasury. Now, this process is involved the application to be submitted to the 
Ministry who will make further recommendations to the Treasury. The 
Treasury checks by l'isiting the prf?/ecl and in addition checks on the payment 
of cu"ent annuity from the slale to Ihe/ederal government. 
Except il1 (he case where we h(ll'e personal contact, then the process is 
less tediolls. Previously the qflice,. who ;'1 charge payment for the loan 
withdrawals, was the officer who had the involved in the programme at the 
district level. He ullderstood the problems and issues of this programme. It 
helped in expediting approvals of loan withdrawals and payment to the state. 
But this is not the normal circumstances, because this circumstances not 
always the case. 
When making application for loan withdrawal the officer in charge at 
the Treasury insists for eve!), detailed informalion which sometimes they are 
not with liS. This in/ormalioll is only available with the implementing 
agencies. When additiollal ill/ormation required by the Treasury, we have to 
contact and rely 011 the implementillg agencies. This additional steps in the 
process caused additional time in the implementing process. 
Although the Treasury made visits to the projects before making 
payment to loan withdrcnl'a/s hilt I fhink that the person in-charged at the 
Treasury does not have enough time to do thisfor all projects. He has to deal 
with withdrawal applications not only from this state but also from thirteen 
other states. This has caused delays in loan Withdrawal process. '134 
Although the preparation of the annual budget was based on the assessment by 
the central agencies, the annual allocation was always adequate to meet loan 
withdrawals. One respondent clarified that, " ... the annual allocation of funds provided 
by the Federal government were always more than adequate because the amount of 
loan withdrawn every year was lesser Ihan the amOllnl of annual allocation."He cited 
an example in 1983, where a total of M$900 million loan was approved but less than 
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50% was utilised by the state government, through loan withdrawals. This occurred 
because: (a) it was difficult to claim the approved amount; and, (b) delays in project 
implementation caused lesser expenditure of project allocation. 
Uncompleted Projects 
Four out of six uncompleted projects had made loan withdrawals and some of 
the payments were made by the Treasury to the state governments. The first payment 
for loan withdrawal of All1ddy Canal project was made on 12.3.86 and amounted to 
M$127,718. This payment was made on same day when the instrument of loan 
agreement was completed between the Treasury and the state government. The First 
Joan withdrawal for Lancott 2 project was approved by the Treasury and payment was 
also made because the project was ready to take off and tenders for work had been 
received from building contractors. Broken Mound and Bamboo Splinters projects 
were provided with a certain amount of payments through a number of loan 
withdrawals before these projects being cancelled by the states. Bamboo Splinters 
project had withdrawn almost $1.15 million from the total amount of $1.2 million loan 
approved. 
Slow Projects 
Two loan withdrawals for the Risefield project were made in 1984 and 1985, 
which were used to pay for the cost of land compensation. After that there was not 
any withdrawal until 1989, because the project had been 'slowing down'. Delays also 
occurred to loan withdrawals in 1989, due to calculation errors put up by the SlID. 
Although the state requested a higher sum, only a lower amount released by the 
Treasury, because the project progressed very slowly. Towards late 1991 the state 
requested the balance of the loan, but, this was refused by the Treasury on the grounds 
reason that 'the extension period allowed was lapsed': Therefore, a supplementary 
agreement had to be signed to enable further loan withdrawals. 
Withdrawals of loan for Blind Phea.mnt project were made every year after 
the agreement had been signed by the two parties. Adequate cash flow for the project 
was made by the central agencies. 
Other Projects 
The following excerpts, illustrate loan withdrawals for the average projects. 
For PumpkinvilTe project " ... withdrawals never faced any diffiCUlty, the money 
requested is always available. ,,(35) On another project, the Lakesland Village; ..... the 
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first withdrawal of $600,000 was made afier the loan approved, in spite of loan 
agreement was not signed. 7his showed the jlexihi/ity on the procedures adopted by 
Treasury in 4MP. A year later ({I/oth('/' lI'IS-I,200,000 was paid to the slale. All the 
M$5, 600, 000 loan money was paid to the slate by the end of the plan . .. (36) Another 
average project, the FiclIswoo(/ " .. the loan approved for this project was 
M$9, 700,000 but because the project involved three phases of development where two 
phases completed al the end of 5111P. Also fhe 10al1 extension period has expired in 
1992. Therefore 0111y 111$5,800,000 lI'as withdrawn from the tola//oan approved by 
the middle of 1992. "e7) 
Fast projects also did not face diftlculties with loan withdrawals. Knee Lie 
Housing " ... although additional 10011.'1 H'ere requested from the federal government, 
they were approved in time with the constmction progress. The project did not face 
much difficulty with withdrawal. Payments a/most received on time as requested 
Therefore, we ought to pay the cOlltractor as the project progressed . .. (38) For Manor 
project, the payment was made in one lump sump of M$l,SOO,OOO. It was found out 
that in certain cases, the payment was mnde in a single lump sump because the 
construction had been completed when the application for withdrawal was made. 
A few respondents pointed out that the state governments feel 't:lissatisfied, 
very sensitive and embarrassed" when the Federal Treasury required officers must 
verify the project's progress through making visits to the projects before a loan 
withdrawal can be paid by the Treasury. In the past loan withdrawals were progress 
certification by the project engineer and programme administrator at the state level. 
They pointed out that projects were financed by loans and that state were required to 
pay back the loan. Thus freedom must be given to the state. The state governments 
observed this new imposition as a 'sense of distrust attitude" by the federal 
government towards the state governments. In addition, they saw the Treasury is 
playing a role as not only as financier but, also as controller. This ruling also meant 
additional time was needed for withdrawal of loans. 
When this issue was put to one of the officers at the central agency, he 
explained that the new ruling aims to protect the federal government's interest as the 
project financier of the programme. A clause in the agreement and other government 
circulars allowed such practice. He further clarified, that central agencies were not 
'very happy" after a visit to few projects which progressed very slowly, were not 
completed on schedule and not progressed as promised. Hence, Treasury has imposed 
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a more strict conditions to the payment of loan withdrawal application by the state 
government. 
A programme administrator at the MHLG commented that, the Ministry was in 
a difficult position as a consequence of this new ruling about loan withdrawals. This 
was because the ministry serves as a 'co-ordinator and middleman" to the projects 
being implemented by the state. It was on difficult to impose condition on states and at 
the same time ask for payment. But, the Federal government is view this is the role that 
the MIll..G to play; the federal agency must visit and certifY projects before allowing 
any loan withdrawals 
SUMMARY ON PROJECT RESOURCING 
As described in this chapter, projects' fund alIocation was usually granted to 
states at the beginning of the five-year plan, based on average estimates of project cost 
per house for each of the plans. Allocation of funds to each state was made on criteria 
such as: the state's past trend in implementing the programme, their willingness to 
implement projects, and the availability of land for their proposed projects. Then, 
during the five-year plan's mid-term review additional projects and funds were 
considered by the states. However, problem arouse because ofthe following:-
• First, the imposition of the 'lop-down" perspective programme resourcing, where 
there was project cost limit set by the federal government which determined the 
amount of loan approved and the maximum selling price imposed on the low-cost 
housing. Violation of the cost limit by a higher project cost than the permitted 
selling price resulted in the states bearing the differences from their own funding. 
• Second, the federal agencies were inclined to approved lower amount of loan than 
the amount requested. Based on the cases analysed, difficultyarosed as the result of 
lower amount ofloan approved. 
• Third, inadequate fimding was the result of delays in completing the planning stage 
and these caused delays in starting constnlction. Delays in starting construction 
resulted in increased project costs because of inflation. The amount of loan 
approved for the project became inadequate because of the escalating costs. 
• Finally, the provision of the PLCHP funding in the form of loans was considered 
'tliscouraging and burdening", when comparing with other grant allocations. 
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Project financing in the form of loan was considered difficult because of the lengthy 
procedures involved besides 'the hassle to collect payments from buyers." In 
addition, the loan withdrawal process had increasingly become more difficult 
because of added steps and strict procedures imposed by the federal Treasury on 
the loan withdrawals requested by the states. 
Overall the main theme involved in this resourcing stage is that of a lengthy process, 
tighter procedures and inadequate funding provided by the federal government. 
THE CONSTRUCTION STAGE 
Introduction 
The major activities in the construction stage includes the construction work 
from the beginning until completion. In addition, it involves a variety of other sub-
activities such as the preparation of tender documents, advertisement of tender, 
evaluation of tenders submitted by contractors, decision on the tender by a tender 
boards, the appointment of contractors, supervising and monitoring the construction, 
making progress payments to contractors, making amendments to the project, and 
finally the certification of job completion. 
It is generally true that project 'take off, or the beginning of construction, 
usually takes place immediately after the 'resourcing stage'. However, in order to 
expedite the process project construction had sometimes started earlier, as explained 
by one respondent:-
"Usually this department {.s'IIDI do!!s not wait IIntil the release 0/ funds 
from Treasury to start works. alice the project loan have been approved we 
will commence project cons/me/ion l-I'hile application are made to Ministry 
for the loan to be released. If it was to wait for the agreement stage cleared, 
delays in project take olf 111ay OCCU/'. We can commence the project bi 
utilising the mOl1eyfl'Om 'he rel'o/ving.fimd<; while waiting for the release 0/ 
funds. When the /oal1 withdrml'{{/ is released by the Treasury it be recouped 
to the revolvingfllndfl" {K(lsl 
When the loan has been approved by the central agencies, the SHD and its 
implementing agency will begin to appoint contractors. First, the implementing agency 
prepares the tender documents and then contacts at least two newspapers to advertise 
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the construction job. Contractors interested in the job will purchase detailed tender 
documents from SHD or the implementing agency as specified in the advertisements. 
The document of tender consist of the following items:- (39) 
(1) Form of tender 
(2) General specifications 
(3) Project's specifications 
(4) Schedule of rates 
(5) Project drawings 
Contractors who apply for the project must complete and return these 
documents to the SHD within the specified date and time. When the state receives 
these bids, it requests the implementing agency to evaluate offers. The implementing 
agency will recommend a contractor or contractors who offer the contract price within 
'the appropriate price" that is assessed by the implementing agency. The state tender 
board then makes a decision and selects a contractor. After the contractor is appointed 
a contract is signed between the state government and the contractor. Construction 
begins when the site is handed over by the state government. It is the responsibility of 
the SlID, with the co-operation of the District and Land Office, to clear all land 
matters and evict squatters before they hand the site over to the contractor. Unsolved 
land matters may cause delays in starting construction. 
To help readers understand this process, Diagram 9.1 illustrates the general 
process adopted by the National Housing Department. 
In Malaysia, almost all of construction of public projects is conducted by 
private contractors. The main role of the implementing agency is to supervise the 
contractor. Many respondents pointed out that at this stage the implementing agencies 
have more direct control over the project and the outcome is more predictable than at 
the previous stages in the whole project's implementation process. When reaching the 
construction stage the project is considered secure . However, several problems also 
arise during this stage. From the implementing agencies' point of view, two factors 
cause delays in construction: the capability of the contractor~ and unpredictable 
changes to project specifications. 
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To appoint a capable contractor is cmcial for a project to be completed within 
time. There were several cases of contractors who were unable to complete their work 
on time and who had to ask for extensions. Also, there were a number of cases where 
contractors abandoned their projects, requiring the appointment of new contractors. In 
some cases, government agencies were also responsible for delays in making progress 
payments which caused problems for contractors in meeting payrolls and in the 
purchase of building materials. 
Unanticipated changes to project specifications occurred, in the instances 
where technical departments imposed nev.' requirements or changes to planning 
standards. These changes mean that additional time was needed to complete the 
project due to the dismptions or waiting for further action involving new drawings, 
amendments to the contracts known as 'variation orders to project specifications' and 
re-negotiations of tender prices with contractors. 
Uncompleted Projects 
Broken Mound is the only uncompleted projects which reached the 
construction stage, but had to abandoned halfway by the building contractor. The 
normal practice in reviving an abandoned project is to appoint another contractor to 
complete the job. For this the state government had to comply with certain procedures 
and this meant that additional time was needed and there was also an increase in cost. 
To overcome this cost increase, the state had to apply for an additional loan. The 
programme administrator for the project reported that the state government was 
reluctant to revive this project, in view of the procedures involved. This project was 
later transferred to 'the special low cost housing programme', a privatisation 
programme which involved a joint-venture between the state government and the 
private sector. When the project become privati sed, it escaped the usual bureaucratic 
red tapes and was not required to conform to the usual procedures. The programme 
administrator explained:-
"After faced with construction failul'e this project was transje"ed to the 
special low cost hOl/sing programme. This is a privalisation programme of 
the low cost housing project. Under this arrangement, the state provides land 
whose current value ;s capitalise into the project cost. The private sector 
undertook development for lhis scheme was responsible to obtain financing 
to revive the project. Under this, the slate government did not worry about 
project funding hecause the pri\'ate developer will take care of it. The state 
government also do nol have to wo"'y ahout collection of repayments from 
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house buyers. Under Ihe pl'imlisec/ project. hOlfses are directly for sale 
where buyers have 10 hOl'l'Owji'om financial ins/ilulion. .. 
Slow Projects 
Four of the five slow projects faced some problems during the construction 
stage. Delays that occurred during the project preparation had caused further delays a 
the beginning the project construction. In contrast the Broken Mound project, as has 
been described above, two of the slow projects, the Risefield and Gingling projects 
appointed new project contractors, when their first contractors failed to complete the 
construction job. 
For Risejield prf?iect in early 1989, the state government appointed a 
construction company to carry out project construction. The construction was 
intended to be completed within 14 months. The construction progressed very slowly 
and not to the satisfaction of the implementing agency who supervised the project. 
Considering appeals from the company and the promises to expedite construction, the 
state twice agreed to extend the project construction for eight months. When the 
contract period expired in March 1990, an extension was granted until June 1990 and 
then another extension until November 1990. Despite several extensions the contractor 
failed to complete the project. Unable to tolerate such delays and poor performance, 
the state decided not to renew, when the contract period expired in November 1990. 
Attempts to overcome the contractor's poor performance were made through meetings 
between the implementing agency, the state financial officer and the contractor 
concerned. The effort seem ineffective because the contractor was merely 'buying time 
and engaging in delay tactics,,(40) in the attempt to hide an inability to execute this 
project. The project was lying idle for a quite sometime while awaiting actions to 
appoint another contractor. After fulfilling the necessary procedures, the state 
appointed another contractor to complete the construction. This cost the state an 
additional MS713,000 by the time the project was finally completed in the middle of 
1993. 
Trunkville pr~;ect experienced a 'sluggish" progress according to a 
respondent who monitored of this project. 11 This was because the project faced 
squatters problem. To overcome the squatter problem, the project construction had to 
be implemented in two phases of development. One hundred houses were constructed 
in the first phase, while in the second phase only 178 houses were built instead of the 
200 houses intended. The constmction tender award for the first phase had to be 
cancelled by the state tender board, after the contractor selected was found to be 
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inadequately registered with the state's tender board. Following that, another tender 
process had to be carried out. When the contractor was appointed, delays occurred as 
a result of waiting for plan amendments by the implementing agency to be agreed by 
the SlID and other technical agencies. Therefore, the target date to complete the first 
phase was not achieved. Preparation for the constmction of the second phase was also 
time consuming. The constmction tender was only advertised 1986, almost four years 
after the completion of the first phase. Several intermptions occurred during 
construction due to several amendments such as 'variation orders" to the contract by 
the SlID and amendments to the project details which were imposed by the technical 
departments. For example, while constructing the project the Water Department 
requested the water supply pipe for this project to be amended from a 200 mm to a 
300 mm type. These type of changes required amendments to the contract, which 
significantly increased the cost and required an extension of the construction period. 
For Ging!ing project, a contractor was appointed in May 1980 by the state 
government. But work started much later, only in January 1981. After that the 
construction had progressed very slowly. The construction was scheduled to be carried 
out within 14 months but failed to be completed on time. The contractor applied for an 
extension of contract from the state government. Delays in starting the project were 
given as a reason for the failure to complete in time. The state government granted an 
extension of four months (from 8.7.81 to 10.11.81) (42) to the contractor on the 
recommendation of the implementing agency. However, the four month extension was 
not adequate because several changes to the detailed project design requested by the 
SlID. Then another three months of extension were considered and allowed by the 
state government (from 11.11.1981 to 6.2.1982), but the project was still not 
completed. At this time, inclement weather was blamed as the main excuse for the 
delays- a heavy monsoon downpour between November and December interrupted the 
construction work. (43) A meeting between the SHD, the implementing agency and the 
contractor was held which discussed approaches to overcome the construction 
problems which were behind schedule. The contractor requested another extension and 
pledged to complete the project. Finally a third extension of seven months ( from 
7.2.82 to 13.9.82) was given. Although a total period of28 months was given to this 
contractor instead of the 14 months intended, the construction was still not fully 
completed when the contract terminated on 13th. September 1982. However, progress 
payment on the constmction amounting to 1\1$295,OOO~4 was paid to the contractor. 
The contractor abandoned the project and informed the state government that the 
company faced difficulties in obtaining building materials and in addition was facing 
'internal problems." The contractor paid a compensation of M$21,OOO in lieu of his 
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failure to complete the project. Finally, the contract terminated when the contract 
period expired on 13.9.1982. 
The process of re-advertising tender of works for the Gingling project was 
made on 17th. December, 1982. There was a good response from local building 
contractors, the state received a total of 21 applications. Immediately after this, 
another contractor was selected and appointed by the state for a contract of 
M$375,400. Finally this project was completed in July, 1984. Delays also occurred 
when the construction was carried out by the second contractor. However, these 
delays were the result of the longer time needed to overcome the poor quality building 
construction of the first contractor. About fOLlr years were spent on this project. When 
the project was completed, no electricity and water were provided which further 
delayed occupation by house buyers. 
Blind Pheasant project also experienced delays in construction, similar to 
those of the three other slow projects. The loan application to built 223 houses was 
approved by the central agencies but this project accommodated only 218 houses when 
its layout plan was approved by the Department of Town and Country Planning. The 
shortage of 5 houses was due to an insufficient land area. The state government agreed 
a construction price ofM$ 2,247,420 (45) and the project was to be completed within 
18 months (15.7.85 to 15.1.87). When the contract expired the project had was only 
half finished. Eight extensions were needed for the construction to be completed on 
31.10.1989. The state government allowed these extensions despite the fact that the 
implementing agency had recommended the termination of the contract. 
Swampy Village project began the construction works in April 1979 when the 
earthwork was carried out by a government's subsidiary company. Then another 
construction company was appointed to complete the project which involved works 
related to buildings and infrastructures. This construction was carried out in 1981 and 
completed on 19.3.1982. However, after the constmction was completed, electricity 
supply could not be provided because the electricity power sub-station was not built. A 
respondent involved in this project explained'-
..... to our understanding, the electricity supply for this project would directly 
come from the nearby main cahle. We had conslIlted the power agency on this 
matter before the project slar/ed. We also never had the experience before that 
a sub-station required for the govemmellt low cost projects. This change of 
requirement was something l1ew and OI1(v imposed after construction was 
completed. We thought thaI, we could gellhe electriCity supply for the houses as 
usual or even considered under the r1lral electrification programme. After all, 
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the nation's largest power slalioll iSjlfsl nearby. We had also a strong support 
from the district (?[(icer who was ollce the programme administrator for this 
programme. HOH'el'er, Ihe 1IIi/i(v agency still insisted on a sub-station despite 
several appeals made 10 reconsider /his requirement. We had to follow a certain 
procedures to appoint another cOn/rae tor to build the sub-station building. 
There was also time loss dlfe /0 /his procedure. Altogether for this project about 
four years were spellt 011 COlis/ruction [1979-1983). Had we not faced the 
electricity supply prohlem, this project would have been completed earlier. " 
Descriptions of project construction from the four slow projects showed that 
delays in the implementation process occurred during the construction stage when the 
fault was mainly that of the contractor. At this stage the project performance is mainly 
dependent upon the capability of the contractor. However changes in technical 
requirements imposed by utility agencies can also cause delays. 
Average Projects 
Whiteville project built only 104 houses instead of the targeted 237 houses 
intended, because of technical feasibility. The site for Whiteville was proposed on an 
ex-mining land. Although the land proposed by Land Office during project formulation 
stage was more than adequate, the technical survey later found that only a portion was 
suitable for housing construction on the site proposed. Its construction was delayed as 
a result of some technical problems and the time spent waiting for approvals from 
technical departments. The construction for this project was intended to take place 
within 18 months (from 3.1.1983 to 3.7.1984), but the work was disrupted and 
stopped for a number of months while waiting for a decision on whether the use of an 
underground electricity cable would be allowed by the utility agency. The state granted 
two extensions to the contractor between July 1984 and January 1986, because the 
delays which occurred were not its fault. The problem occurred because of the utility 
agency; the agency felt it must be consulted and it's consent must be obtained when 
dealing with matters related to its area of jurisdiction or area of its specialisation. The 
application to build a sub-station for the project's electricity supply was rejected by the 
utility agency. Representatives of the SHD and the contractor went to consult with the 
utility agency about the approval and they were informed that the plan they submitted 
was out dated. These representatives complained to the state government that what 
was wanted by the utility agency was not clear. The state government directed SlID to 
solve this problem by calling various parties involved to a meeting to settle the 
problem. A compromise was achieved when the tone of the meeting's resolution used 
language which sought co-operation from the utility agency. As a result, the utility 
agency agreed to constmct the sub-station. This was foHowed by a transfer offunds to 
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meet the construction cost from the implementing agency to the utility agency. This 
case shows how problems might occur if all parties involved were not consulted, 
especially when the party concerned could impose restrictions. 
Fast Projects 
A majority of respondents involved in 'fast projects" stated that, to a certain 
extent, these projects engaged more capable contractors than other types of project 
categories. 
Knee Lie and !llanor 3 projects used 'tapable contractors" who had good 
track records with other NHD projects. (46) Construction was completed within the 
time as planned. One important feature of Knee Lie project was that special attention 
was given to this project. This was the first project of the newly established NHD in 
Negeri SembiJan. Another first project (Barking scheme) of the newly established 
NHD in Perak also showed an outstanding construction performance when this project 
was completed two months earlier than the expected. 
Manor 1 project. The constnlction of this project was completed on time 
within the intended 12 months. This project did not encounter serious problems 
because it was built on the site planned for a housing development and as an extension 
from two previous phases. Two other projects, Lumber Junction and Long Sand were 
constructed within time as planned because they too were built by '~xperienced and 
capable contractors." 
One respondent pointed out that NHD had the advantage of more choices of 
building contractors nation-wide. This was because contractors registered with the 
department from all over Peninsular Malaysia. In contrast projects implemented by 
other two agencies engaged building contractors registered only with these agencies 
within each state. Therefore, it is said that NHD had a wider choice of more capable 
contractors. 
INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In general, implementation process during the construction stage is more 
controlled by the state than other stages in the programme. The project construction is 
carried out by the contractor, under the close supervision of the implementing agency. 
Monitoring of the project progress is carried out through regular meetings between the 
contractor, the implementing agency, the technical departments and the SlID. 
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Problems and issues on the project were discussed and solved through these meetings. 
Most implementing agencies were confident of handling of projects through this 
arrangement. There may be differences in details, but Ying's description fits with the 
accounts of several others on the constntction stage in general. 
"The construction oj the loll' cost hOllses does not face so many problems 
because the implementing agency can really control the construction pace at 
this stage. Once the t(!/lder is mmrded the contractor can start the work. 
Normally at this stage the laml problem has already been solved The practise 
of this department is to pllt jour personnel ill-charge of the project. One 
engineer who slfperl'ises the Ol'era/! jlJ'(?ieCI progress, one technical assistant 
and two technicians slfpen'ise directly the construction work. We have the 
established project monitorillg .\ystem, Regular site meetings are also carried 
out with representatil'es of ('OlltroclofS, lechnical departments and SHD. Any 
problems and shor1/alls ill the cons/mction can he fixed during these site 
meetings. 
Squatters on the sile sometimes can cause the delays if they were not 
solved earlier hefore the cons/mctioll tender was awarded This needs co-
operation from the SHD al/(i land office to evict them. It needs also co-
ordination to ensure the proh/em solved when the construction was about to 
start. Delays in evicting sqllallers may calise liS to pay compensation to 
contractors hecause (l holding hack their work. This eventually added cost to 
the whole project, 
However prohfems /ike all incapahle contractor and weather may 
delay the construction. 771e tender hoard should make a proper selection of 
contractor and to consider someone who has experience and a good track 
record 
Payments 1101 receil'ed on time also may hit the contractor. Recently, 
contractors purchase hllildillf; materials jrom suppliers on a cash basis. This 
causes difficulties to coli/me/oJ's if he has a weak financial position. This is 
especially true tf he does reech'" pmgre.u payments on time ffrom the state 
government j. 
The wrong choice (?f contractors can calise the project delays. If the 
first contractor was 110t capable thell we have to terminate his contract and 
appoint another contractor, Appointment of another contractor must follow 
procedure. This would add up to a longer time to complete the project and 
add the cost oj completing ahandoned work hy the first contractor. 
Amendments on project reqllirements can also cause delays because 
we have to modify the pn?ject spec~ficalioJ1s, For example some departments 
have increased their re(jllir(!mel11ji'om jllst il1dividual septic tanks or imhoJl 
tanks to group septic tanks OJ' (Til oxidalion pond. Alteration to this caused 
redesigning the pn?jec/, added ex/to lime as well as extra cost." -[Ying, 
29.11.1994] 
Several respondents pointed out that the main problems during this 
construction stage are where the contractors are unable to complete the job on time. 
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This occurred due to financial incapability of certain contractors, internal problems 
(management) and difficulty of getting building materials, Three respondents pointed 
out:-
tiThe project implementation process achieving the construction stage should 
be fairly easy. The implementing agencies acting for the state have the 
capability - they hm'e the expertise, experience and the right people to 
supervise the construction work. the low cost buildings are simple and not 
complicated. The huilding design ;.'1 almost standardised and tender 
documents used are simple. lhe important element to ensure construction 
success is for the tender hoard fo he careful in making selections and to 
appoint the 'right contractor', If the tender board makes the right chOice, the 
project could be implementr.'d with liffle problem. Therefore. the assessment 
and advice by the implementing agency in (his matter is important. " Baker-on 
Long Sand and Swamp), Vii/age projects. 
"The construction performance is dependent on the contractor appointed for 
the job. In general, experienced contractors would be able to overcome 
construction problems easiz)', Problems always occurred to the inexperienced 
contractors and those Icontractors! who depended very much on sub-
contractors. COllfractors ahandoned projects half way, because they did not 
get profit from the projecl. 7Ms was happened because they underestimated 
the project cost during tender hiddillg. ff they continue to go on they would 
face bigger losses. 717at is 1I'/~v they stop constructing the project. " - [KAS, 
18.1l.1994] 
"In general there is 1101 much d~fference in terms of contractors performance 
due the small size of the PLCHP projects, the average cost about RMJ million 
and the highest cost ahoul RM5 millions. In terms of projects they were 
ranging between 50 to 200 units, o/' at the most about 300 units. It was very 
rare that this programme implemented projects mote than 500 units of houses. 
Although it is small, some (?f the contractors faced problems of financing and 
expertise. Financing prohlems were hecause the contractors were too greedy. 
For instance they were handling too many projects on one time, or doing 
projects here alld there fil1c1l1dil1~ hoth the public and private sector's 
projects). Finally they have to victimise certain projects. Unfortunately 
government projects hecome the victilll. (47) [Chali, 2.11.1994] 
What happened jfthe appointed contractor did not perform well for the project? 
"Usually, the implementing agem.y would try first to overcome this by , 
meeting with the cOlltrac/or,\'. 7 hen. lake stem action, if the faults were clearly 
contractors. Fil1a/~I', as a last resort, if it call't be aVOided, after complying 
with the proper procedures, the slale If'ould terminate the contract. However, 
the procedures are difficult, and the government must be careful. A new 
contractor will be appointed Qf course, this has to follow a certain procedure 
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and usually will calise addiliOlw/ increased cost and additional time spent on 
the project. " - [LAN, 17. J 1.1994] 
Several respondents agreed that the appointment of a capable contractor is crucial 
during the construction stage. One of the respondents related his experience of 
appointing a capable contractor. 
"This was especially tme hased 011 my experience during my service in the 
district last time. Normally at the end of the year, say during October, funds 
were allocated hy the State Del'e/opmellt Officer, but the time given was too 
shorl. I am 110t lI'illil1K to Ril'e projecI construction to unreliable contractors 
who don't have a Kood peljol'JJ1al7ce record. B1ft on the other hand relying too 
much on those with good r('cord" makes them the highest risks/or bum out. " -
[KAS, 18.] 1.1994] 
Four elements were pointed Ollt as the reasons for delays:-
• The contractors; these were faults of the contractors; when the contractors were 
incompetent, lacked experience, faced internal and financial problems, and other 
problems 
• The state; delays in evicting squatters, making amendments to the project in terms 
of detailed building design or the number of houses to be built, and delays in 
making payments to contractors, affecting contractors' cash flow. 
• Technical departments and utilities agencies; these agencies interrupted by 
imposing new standards and requirements on the projects. In coping with these, 
several actions had to be taken such as re-drawing some project's detailed designs, 
amending contract agreements, calculating new costs, fulfilling certain procedures 
and seeking additional loans if the funding was inadequate. Apart from cost 
increases, imposing new standards implied that the state would have to pay 
damages to contractors if work was not carried out as the consequence of actions 
resulting from directives from the state government or the implementing agency to 
the contractor. 
• External factors; stich as weather and economic factors. Weather was the usual 
factor blamed for the construction delays especially the heavy downpour during the 
monsoon season which upset the construction schedule. One respondent raised a 
question as to why heavy downpours were not taken into consideration when 
scheduling construction. Economic factors were related to the increased building 
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materials and labour costs and also shortage of building materials and labour 
supply. 
Introduction 
The completion stage is a final stage in the implementation process of the 
PLCHP. This stage follows the completion of the construction stage. The main 
concern of this stage is to expedite occupation of the completed houses. Analysis from 
the projects revealed that two factors delayed this completion stage: the occupant 
selection, and the issue of cer1ificates of fitness. 
Occupant Selection 
Occupant selection is one of the sub-activities under the completion stage. The 
tasks related to occupant selection arc carried out by the District and Land office. In 
general the process is as follows:-
• In some states applicants must be first registered with the State Housing Division 
before they are allow to submit application to any scheme. This system of 
registration helps the state to be informed about demand for housing from low-
income groups. 
• Application forms for a scheme open for application are submitted to the District 
and Land Office within a specified time period. 
• District and Land Offices then forward these application forms to the SHD. 
Processing of these application forms are computerised. During this stage certain 
criteria may be used shortlist applicants. 
• The selected applicants are then interviewed by the District Land Selection 
Committee chaired by the District Officer and an officer from the State Housing 
Division serves as secretary. Other members also include state councillors. 
After the interviews, SHD will process the applications and set the ranking based 
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on the point system determined by the state. Once again this processing is made 
through the use of computer . 
• After the points and ranking were set this committee will meet again to make 
decision about successful applicants. Usually there are more eligible candidates 
than the number of hOllses a\'ailable. The committee will recommend a list of 
candidates for up to 90% of the total number of houses in the scheme. Whereas 
another 10% is reserved to 'Menteri Besar" (Chief Minister) of the state to give 
consideration to appeals by unsuccessful interviewees, other applicants or to any 
other persons so long as they meet the guidelines adopted by the state. Delays in 
processing normally occur as a result of this 10% quota. 
• List of names (sometimes also photographs) of these successful applicants will 
be posted at the District and Land Otllce notice boards. This is to heJp any 
members of the public making complaints about the eligibility of those successful 
applicants. 
• Then the Committee will meet again to check complaints and make further 
verification on the successful candidates. 
• A Jist of recommended applicants is then submitted to the State Executive 
Committee for approval. The sllccessfi,l applicants will then be informed by 
letter. 
• This selection process take place after construction has progressed between 40% 
to 90%. The faster the selection process completed the faster these applicants 
can move into the project once it finished. 
• Successful applicant are then required to a deposit. The amount of deposit was 
varied, as little one month's rental or the maximum of 10% of the house price 
plus other charges. Tn 1994 it was estimated that this deposit ranged between 
MSSOO and MS2,5000. 
Although comprehensive guidelines exist to assist the selection process, 
problems arise because too many applications are received from applicants with very 
similar backgrounds and needs. Usually a points system is used and the criteria for 
selecting house buyers include the household income, family size, the number of years 
domiciled in the area or district, the distance !loom the present house to the project, etc. 
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Delays occurred at this stage bec.ause of the time spent in the process of obtaining 
agreement from various members of the selection committee who represented political 
parties or ethnic groups. One respondent described the problem from his experience of 
handling projects in 3MP and 4MP:-
"Selection of occupants was difficult. Too many applied and short listing was 
difficult because varia/iolls (/!l/ong applicants were so few. Whoever we chose 
made no difference to those II'ho were not chosen. How could the committee 
shortlist the applicathms ?f 500 people obtained similar paints for 100 
houses? This creales room for criticism. Occupant selection involved the 
inteiference of politicians. 7here were state counc;//ors in the selection 
committee. Although, there were g7lidelines on occupant selection made by the 
state, it won 'f so!l'e the proh/em because evelyone has his own interpretation. 
The politicians had difficulty coming to an agreement on who to choose. Many 
committee meelings had to he held to make decisions on applicants. Then this 
list was fonmrded to the state E.-ceo for endorsement. This also sometimes was 
returned to the district office who were asked to revise the applicants. This 
selection process eJl(,lltll(1/~)! hecame longer because the District Officer, who 
should chair the selection committee. had other johs fa do also . ., - Baker for 
the Swampy Village and Long Sands projects. 
The above description explained why some projects were left vacant although they had 
been completed and were ready for occupation. Delays in settling occupants into the 
project caused increased costs for maintenance, security patrolling services and repairs 
due to vandalism. In addition, the state was also losing revenue because rental 
collections would only begin from when the houses were occupied by occupants. 
Risejield project: the occupant selection for this project, which seemed to have 
been carried out by a selection committee headed by the district officer, in actual fact 
was entirely made by the state councillor as 'il one man show". There was a great deal 
of conflict between this politician and the district office. One of the respondents, 
'Rawi', pointed out this had caused delays because the state councillor did not put any 
sense of urgency into the selection. SHD had to remind the councillor many times to 
come up with the Jist of recommended applicants. The basic problem was that the 
district and land office and SHD were unable to put pressure on the state councillor to 
expedite the selection process. On the part of the councillor, he faced a dilemma 
selecting occupants because of pressure fi-om party members and from the general 
public. 
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The Stony River project is another example of a 'Strong interest" by a state 
councillor in the list of occupants recommended by the selection committee to the 
state government. In September 1987 the state councillor for the constituency where 
the project was located wrote " .. .f I/(>/ slrollg~)' protested about the list of successful 
applicants prepared by the se/ectioll con1l111Ifc>e hecause he was not consulted by the 
committee ... [He} requested the SliD to callcel the list, othenvise [he} threatened to 
protest directly 10 the chief millister alld this would create a bigger problem. ,,(48) 
In some projects, a longer time was taken to complete this selection process. 
Too many applicants had requested to purchase houses and this made the selection 
process a difficult one, as shown by the Coral Capes project. The selection committee 
for this project interviewed about 1,400 applicants for the 122 houses built for the 
scheme. These interviews were conducted in September 1986. When the construction 
of this project was completed three months later, the selection committee had not 
completed the interviews. At last, after a lengthy time span the process was finalised in 
early 1988. The houses in the scheme were occupied only in May] 988. 
The Golden Hope scheme was also faced with a large number of applicants for 
the 300 houses built. In contrast to Coral Capes project which spent an almost two 
years on selection, this project spent a shorier time of only 10 months. Delays still 
occurred, despite the intention to expedite the occupants selection, as explained in the 
following statement:-
'The selection of the first two-tMrd applicants for this scheme began when 
the project's construction reached ahout 70% completion. The objective was 
get occupants for the houses as SOOIl as the project completed Despite that 
delays occurred at the District I,and Selection Committee's level. This 
committee took a 10llger time ill fino/ising their selection of candidates after 
all inten'iews for the firsl two thirds' f?! the applicants completed This was 
because diffiCUlt to gel all l/7e polilical representatives meet together. When 
they met a/.'IO d([ficu/f to decide Oil {he list of applicants. Then, for the 
remaining one-third, (he selection process was stretched after the project had 
been completed. The District (md Land Office had to wait for the decision by 
this committee hefore suhmittingfor approval and endorsement by the State 
Executive Committee. The overall selection process was only finished several 
months after the project completed. " - [Kas, 18.11.1994] 
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Certificates of Fitness 
Certificates of fitness for occupation are issued by the local authorities 
according to their planning and building bye-laws. In some states and under some five 
year plans, certificates of fitness 'vere not required for the government's projects, 
when the end financing of hOllse purchase was provided by the state government. 
Recently, local authorities have imposed planning approvals to be obtained before 
projects start and, as a result, a certific<lte of fitness must be obtained before 
occupation. However, in Negeri Sembilan, all government projects are still exempted 
from planning approval and they are not issued with certificates of fitness. This was 
because of the understanding reached behvcen the state and the local authorities to 
shorten the process under this programme. In contrast, starting from the 4MP, several 
projects in Selangor were required to obtain planning approvals and certificates of 
fitness. In Perak, these requirements were only imposed for projects completed from 
the beginning of the 5MP and onwards. 
Only five Ollt of 19 completed projects needed a certificate of fitness for 
occupation from local authorities. Those projects were Blind Pheasant, Coral Capes, 
Ficuswood, Golden Hopes and Lakesland. 
Blind Phemmnt and Coral Cape ... : planning permission was not granted by the 
district councils for these two projects earlier because the authorities relaxed 
requirements for government projects during their planning stage. Similarly before the 
beginning of project constntction, approval for building plans was not sought from the 
district council. As a consequence of the imposition of building regulations on 
government projects, SHD or it implementing agencies had to seek planning and 
building approval from the local authorities. This created friction between the SlID 
and the local authorities because the SHD was under pressure to expedite occupation 
by house buyers. In addition also, SHD felt that it should not be subject to approval by 
a lower level of government. On the other hand, the local authorities felt that they had 
the power in this matter. They also felt they were being forced to approve applications 
and issue certificates of fitness. 
The Ficuswood and Golden Hope projects also faced difficulties in obtaining 
certificates of fitness despite planning applications being approved by the local 
authorities. The Ficuswood project failed to obtain the certificate of fitness until late 
1994 even though meetings were held between various parties to solve the problem. 
The local authorities were reluctant to issue the certificate of fitness despite their 
promise at one of the meetings to issue the certificate immediately. 
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In contrast to the difficulties faced by the four projects highlighted above, 
Lakes/and Village project did not facC' any difficulty in obtaining a certificate of fitness 
from the local authority. This happened because the project was implemented through 
the joint efforts of several agencies in the state, after they were directed by the Chief 
Minister. 
General Remarks on the Completion Stage 
The selection of occupants proved to be a difficult and lengthy because: (a) the 
number of applicants were more than the number of houses built, (b) the majority of 
applicants had the similar background and criteria, ( c) the process of selection involved 
political representatives. The requirement for a certificate of fitness also created 
problems because of the increased role of local authorities in regulating all 
developments within its jurisdiction. 
"Jabatan Peruma/7all ,"'L'Rota I NI J DJ faces difficulty with obtaining 
certificate of fitness fo!' occupation from local authorities, partly because 
changes of condilions imposed hy the local authorities. These usually take 
place in urban areas where the local authorities have their own technical 
departmel11s and therefore are more demanding in their requirement. 
Additional and sometimes, riKid conditions imposed would cause undue delays 
in the projects and increased the cos! '-?f development. " 
"When the project is completed and handed over to the state government, it 
will call a mee/inK f?f the technical committee which includes a site visit and if 
the constructioll has heen ca,.ried Ollf i/1 accordance with the plans, the state 
will request for a clearance .l0" occupancy. So long there is water, electricity 
and proper drainage (he state government would allow the houses to be 
occupied Sometimes, the design of houses may not conform to the local 
building by-lm11s and or other departmental's requirement [e.g. Fire 
Department 's and Health Department '.'I requirements), but in order to reduce 
cost, the slale government would allow the houses to built and without the 
needfor the cert!ficate offilnc,\:\·, the problem of delays in occupancy [due to 
the need of cfl does not arise al all inlhis stale. This state's main concern is 
to reduce cosl and compromise to OI7~V conform to an acceptable standards. " 
One of the issues raised by a number of respondents was the competence of the 
persoMel at local authorities, compared with the implementing agencies' staff. The 
implementing agencies claimed that they had a number of engineers, architects and 
planners who prepared plans and supervised projects, whereas the local authorities 
were dependent on advice given by technical assistants in the planning section. (49) 
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SECTION SIX: II\1PLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
What bas been attempted? 
This chapter describes the detailed implementation process of the public Jow-
cost housing programme at the scheme level The projects were categorised according 
to their performance: the 11I1COtl1pleted; slow; average, and; fast projects. The 
implementation process was divided into four stages; formulation and planning, 
resourcing, constmction and completion. Detailed descriptions were made of each 
stage by looking into all the sub-stages involved. 
The process and issues involved in the planning stage seemed inter-related with 
each other. The pattern of site identification shows that projects' sites were usually 
identified after the list of projects were approved by the central agencies for each five-
year plan. However, even when sites were identified, they were often subject to 
change. Similarly, delays occurred in site identification because states were indecisive 
about implementing the projects. implementation process of this of delays in one stage 
of the implementation process causes further delays at other stages. For example, 
delays in deciding the project's site calise delays in application for resourcing and 
eventually delays in starting the construction. Similarly delays in the completion of 
construction causes delays in handing over the project to SHD which finally delays 
occupation by house buyers. 
Problems also occurred during the resourcing stage where the project must be 
accurately estimated, properly budgeted and timely implemented otherwise there 
would be inadequacy of funds to cover the total project costs. As described in this 
chapter, projects' allocation of funds was usually granted to states at the beginning of 
the five-year plan, based on the average estimated project cost per house in each of the 
plans. Allocation offunds for each state was made on criteria such as: the state's past 
trend in implementing this programme, their willingness to implement these projects, 
and the availability of land for the proposed projects. Hence allocations offunds were 
always made available to the proposed projects. 
Four resollfcing problems were highlighted which affect the programme's 
performance. First, the imposition of project cost limit determined the amount of loan 
approved and the maximum selling price of the low-cost housing. Violation to this 
Chapter Nine: Qualitative Dma Anillysis 360 
resulted to utilisation of additional funding from the state. Second, the federal 
government usually approved a lower amount of loan than requested. Difficulty arose 
as the result of the shortage of funds to cover the total project cost. Third, delays in 
starting project construction caused increased project cost inflation. Finally, the 
resourcing arrangement was 'tliscollraging and burdening': increasingly difficult, 
lengthy and involved "the hassle to collect payments from buyers." 
Construction is after the resourcing stage. Many programme administrators felt 
this stage was more controlled than other stages in this programme. This is because the 
project construction was carried out by the contractor under close supervision from 
the implementing agency. Monitoring of the project progress was carried out through 
regular meetings between the contractor, the implementing agency, the technical 
departments and the SHOo Problems were solved during these meetings because were 
are representatives from various technical departments. The main problems appointed 
contractors being unable to complete the job on time due to financial incapability, 
internal management problems or difficulty in getting building materials. 
Two issues has heen pointed out in relation to the completion stage: occupant 
selection and obtaining building's certificates of fitness from local authorities. Delays 
occurred in occupant selection process because a longer time taken for obtaining 
consent from the selection committee. This committee consisted of various members 
representing political parties or ethnic groups. The selection of occupants is difficult 
and lengthy because: (a) the number of applicants are more than the number of houses 
built, (b) the majority of applicants have the similar background and criteria, (c) the 
process of selection involved political representatives. The requirement for the 
certificate of fitness imposed on some project s also caused delays of occupation. Local 
authorities have changed their stance in regulating development in their areas,. In the 
past, this programme would have on expedited implementation process and cut costs 
by adopting a minimum standards. With this change of stance, additional time was 
needed to get clearance and higher cost arose because the same standards as in other 
housing were imposed on this programme. 
Reflection and Implication 
Implementation is a learning process, rather than a straight-forward process of 
carrying out decision, as intended. Implementation implies actions related to execution, 
carried out, fulfilled and brought to completion. The execution process involves not 
only achieving the end goal, but proceeding through a large number of detailed 
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processes, going through separate levels. inter-agencies, converging at times and 
places, and conforming with reqllirell1~nL; and procedures. Executing a directive 
involves a number of people and ac!i','ities before the desired result can be achieved. 
To a certain extent, implementation can be like a game, but without fixed rules of how 
the game is played, and without a fixed number players. New rules can be added and 
new players may chip in. In this respect, implementation is a learning process, where 
implementers learn to deal with these players and adjust to the rules in order to achieve 
policy goals 
Implementation of the public low cost hOllsing programme in Malaysia 
involved co-operation and concerned various level of government and agencies. This is 
because the bureaucratic tradition of 'consulting" each other. Each agency has their 
own 'territory" to look after which can be in the form of legislative or traditional 
power, holding resources, or providing services and expertise 
In general it is a realistic and workable programme and its implementation can 
be improved through learning of what has happened to projects where some were fast 
and completed within a specific five-year plan, while some were slow and completed 
outside the intended five-year plan, and some were also not completed at aU. However, 
the same problems repeatedly occurred in each plan. Therefore did the agencies and 
people involved in this programme learn from the implementation success and failure 
aspects of the programme? 
Adequate preparation was not made to projects during the formulation stage. 
There were. vague and generalised guidelines, list of projects were prepared in a hurry 
due to time constrains, it was difficult to frnd suitable land, poor site selection. All 
these contributed to poor project appraisal for each five year plan. Projects can be 
improved if adequate preparation made as shown by some of average and fast projects. 
To overcome this problem, it is suggested that the central agencies must inform states 
government early and they should be given ample time to prepare their project 
proposal. 
Implementation involved a bottom-up process where by site selection, location, 
size of project and occupants selection was carried out at the local level. What 
happened at the bottom in implementing the programme, involved interactions between 
a range actors and agencies. To achieve harmony, everyone who has interests and 
jurisdiction over this matter must be properly informed or consulted. This is standard 
norm and practice in the Malaysian bureaucracy to guard against any sudden 
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unforeseen problems from other agencies. Requirements for all parties involved must 
be made clear at the beginning, and all parties mllst be held to honour their 
commitments. When a programme involve's two levels of government and various 
'actors', the basic implementation problem is the problem of co-ordination and the 
assembly of resources from the two levels of government and agencies operating in 
this programme. In this programme, there arc three key players; the Ministry, the states 
and implementing agencies. In addition the programme's scope extends to other 
central agencies such as the EPU, lCU and Treasury. At the state level agencies like 
the District and Land Office, the Town and Country Planning Department, Health 
Department, Public Works Department, Fire Department and the Water Supply 
Department are involved and at the independent level other agencies, e.g. electricity 
supply and the local authorities are involved. Finally politicians, for good or bad, may 
exert their influence on variolls stages of the project. There are many constraints 
despite the objective of the programme "10 hllild quantities of cheap houses within the 
five year plan. 11 
Squatters eviction mllst not be viewed from the perspective of land law only. 
Evidence from a few cases proved that their resistance can cause project delays or 
even cancellation. However, if they were promised to legal houses, they co-operated 
and produced very little resistance. 
Another emerging question arose of why agencies and actors at the bottom 
were able to co-operate when the 'top politician in state is behind the project''? 
Similarly why councillors and politicians at local level produced negligible interference 
with some projects? Does this mean programme implementation need strong 
leadership? 
There was attempt to shorten implementation time by giving directives to 
government agencies to expedite the process in every step. For example, the land 
acquisition process must be settled within six month. However, there was no attempt 
to shortcut the procedures by shortening the steps. 
1 A researcher must be careful and cautious on making conclusion. He should give a pause for 
some thought to avoid pitfalls and errors in making conclusion. Miles and Huberman 
suggested 12 tactics for testing or confirnling findings; (1) Representativeness; that the 
researcher must check representativeness of samples selected for the study to avoid mistakes 
in appropriate generalisation. Pitfalls of sampling. A researcher may run risks of falling into 
generalising pitfall by sampling from non-representative events or activities; generaJising 
from non-representative events or activities; (lnd drawing inferences from non-representative 
process. (2) Checking the researcher"s effect; to eheck bias against; what is the researcher 
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effect to site and what is the site effect to the researcher. (3) Triangulation; across data 
sources and methods to support a finding by showing that independent measures of it agree 
with it or, at least, do not contradict it. (4) Weighting the cvidenec- deciding what kind of 
data are most tntstablc. (5) Contrast and comparisons; looking for the difference. (6) 
Checking the meaning of outliers: is a good :1pproach to test the strength of basic findings 
and to protect against self selecting biases. (7) Using the extreme cases; similarly like the 
outliers, this is as another \Vay of weighting evidences. (8) Ruling out spurious relations; 
avoid hurrying into the conclusion if two variables seemed associated, pause a while to 
consider a third variable might be present and causing the two variables. (10) Replicate a 
finding; to repeat the fieldwork by collecting new information's from new informants, new 
settings and new events. (10) Check Ollt rival explanations; check for the "next best" 
explanation as the one you preferred at the end of a fieldwork. (1) Looking for negative 
evidence; to find out is there an~' data opposed or inconsistence with the conclusion. (12) 
Feedback from infonnants: is to Icarn marc about the site, not only about the feedback. 
2 Estimate Sub-Committee fom1ed under the National Development Planning Committee 
(NDPC). NDPC is the highest decision making body at the official level in the Malaysian 
development planning system. It deals with the formulation and detailed consideration of 
development plans, programme and projects. The committee is chaired by the Chief 
Secretary General of the government and consisted of hvelve members representing key 
federal agencies like the Implementation and Co-ordination Unit (JCU), the Public Service 
Department (PSD), the Ministry of Primary Industries, Trade and Industry, Education, the 
Federal Treasury, the Science's adviser to Prime Minister's Department, the Public Works 
Department National Bank Ministry of Agriculture and the Economic Planning Unit who 
serves as th~ secretariat for the committee. The Estimate Sub-Committee is responsible for 
the annual and fivc years financial and budgetary allocation. 
3. Off-site infrastructure according to the SHD's letter of instruction means the availability of 
electricity and water supply, feeder road and drainage adjacent to the proposed site. 
4 He was involved in the fomllliation and implementation of six projects in Selangor as follows: 
(1) Black River 3, (2) Three Mile St~ne, (3) Ficuswood Settlement, (4) Lumber Junction, 
(5) Lakesland Village, and (6) Coralville. 
s. Until December 1994. 
6 Continned by investigation to the minutes of said meeting. 
7. The types of land that wcr~ lIs?d for the pu~lic hou~j!",g as revealed by the 9uantitative data 
collection, also involved institutIOnal land 111 additIOn to the two categones as stated out 
above. Institutional land means land which owned by the public corporations, 
I Interview with Kas; a programme administrator at the state level in charge implementation 
and co-ordination of projects in the state in Si\1P and 6MP. 
9. Interview with one of the programme administrators at the Ministry level. 
to. Interview with 'RAS' one of the programme administrators at the Ministry level. 
II, Refer to discussion on project resollrcing to this programme in Chapter 4. Refer Table 4.2 
for the amount of annual budget allocation to the MHLG for housing programme from 
1976 to 1990. 
t1. Interview with one of the of!1cers in-charge of the project at the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government. He was JI1volved 111 thc programmc formulation before the launching of 
the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) and the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) and is now 
involved in the preparation of the Seventh Mabysia Plan (1996-2000) 
13 Annual budget allocation for the. Lo\\' Co.S! Housing Programme under the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Govemment dlscllss~d In the Chapter 4 related to the Background and 
Development of Public Low Cost HousJIlg Programme in Malaysia (refer Table 4.2, page 
131). 
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14 Detailed information shown by the programme administrator and extracted from the project 
file. This amount was requested by the District Office in a letter dated 5.1.82, payable to 18 
occupiers of the proposed site of the project. The state Treasurer utilised the state's own 
funding for the payment of the said amount on 18.3.82 
IS All figures were verified through project's records at the request of a respondent who 
involved in the interviews. 
16 Maximum selling price for low cost houses is not exceeding 1\1$25,000. 
17 As the result Ofpa)111ent for the compensation because an alienated land was acquired for the 
project. The compensation made by the government for this land was originally only 
M$141,725 in 1982. When the land owner contested the amount of compensation, the court 
directed the state to pay an additional compensation ofM$160,OOO. 
18 Figures and dates presented here were verified through the project record. 
19 Interview with 'Haze' a programme administrator at the state level who was in-charged of 
the two project during 4MP. 
20 As explained by 'Halo' where the stat.e was in a favourable financial situation. The state 
received a large amount of compensation from the federal government for taking a portion 
of its area as a federal territory. 
21 The National Planning and Development Committee. 
22 Interviews with Ras, Zaky, ChalL Kas, Rawi <1nd Sheik. 
23 Interview with Ying. 
24 Interview with Kani 
2S Interview with Chalj 
26 Interview with Ras, Zaky, Ross and Hami. 
27 Chali: is currently js serving as pro~ramme administrator at the state level since 1991. 
Before 1991 he was also involved wlth few projects when he served the District and Land 
Office 1979-1991. KAS, KAN, YING, HARRY and LAN agreed with the point of view. 
'KAS' is currently is serving as programme administrator at the state level from 1992. He 
was also served the same post, as programme administrator during 4MP. Then was 
transferred as head of the District and Land Office from 1985 to 1992. He was also 
involved with PLCH~ in his dist~ict. K.AN is chief co-ordinator ~t the i~plemen~g agency. 
She was involved wIth PLCHP s projects slflce 1974. YTNG IS a project engmeer at the 
implementing ~gency and was invo~vcd in similar proj.ects throughout his career. HARRY 
was involved In tins programme 1I1 1980 to 1983 m one of the states. Then he was 
transferred to one of the utility agcn~ic~. From ~ 993 he is again re~m to this programme 
but in another state. LAN, one of bUlldtng quantIty surveyor who estImates project costing 
at the implementing agency. 
28 This narration was presented to this interviewer with the help of reading the project's record 
for an accurate accollnt offigurcs highlighted. 
29 Notes· to add latcr the description of the seven reasons put forward by the SHD to the State Fin~cial Officer, recommended that this project to be cancelled. Among the reason because 
the SHD was 'fnlstratcd" \vit~ the long .delay in project implementation, the project 
conflicted with the state own pr.J\!a~lse~ P~oJccts, the state preferred the end financmg for 
this project obtained from financIal JI1stltutlon. 
3O.Interview with Aziz-2. 
31.The respondent used his own terminology as 'suspect' rather than words like 'guess', 
'assume, 'believe' etc. 
32 Note: Actual figures read by respondent from project's file. The figures presented have been 
rounded. 
33 The intonation by respondent indicated that he is so confident with this sort of arrangement 
for projects implemented by the SEDe. 
34Excerpt from interview notes with Kas. 
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3sInterview with 'Rawi'. 
3636Interview with 'Kas'. 
37Interview with 'Kas' 
38.Interview with 'Baker' 
39 These documents are based on the offcr of tender for the Gingling project. 
40 Interview with 'Rawi' 
41. Interview with 'Kani' 
42 Dates verified from the pr~jcct record. 
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43 Another respondent raised his doubt when 'weather' as said the main excuse for project 
delays. Knowing the local weather, a problem such as heavy downpour should be 
anticipated and taken into considerations when scheduling project's construction. He 
suggested the implcmen.ting agencies to check the contractor~s record of works and compare 
with weather report which can be obtaIned from Meteorological Department. 
44 Note: Two conflicting figures were obtained from two respondents. The figures of 
M$295,OOO obtained from a respondent at the implementing agency whose involved in the 
project. His figures was verificd from hiS department's record. To the contrary investigation 
from the administrative record (thc loan additional application paper) was said as 
MS494,492 were paid to the first contractor when the project terminated. 
45 Verified through project records. 
46 These contractors had constructcd a number of projects for this programme since 2MP 
(1971-1975) under the supervision of the HOllsing Tnlst. The National Housing Department 
took over the roles of Housing Tmst when the Trust was abolished in 1975. All personnel 
of Housing Trust was absorbed into the new establishment. Similarly, the list of registered 
contractor used the registration prepared by the previous Housing Trust. 
47 Sheriff also expressed that government is a bad paymaster. 
48 Could this be an examplc of a I.ack of un~~rstandi~g of the guidelin~s or did he purposely 
protest to show disagreement With the deCISion achlcved by the commIttee? 
49. From interviews with several respondents: Ying. Ri, KAN, Lan and Sheik. 
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Chapter Ten; 
Testing the Hypotheses 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters, reported the analysis of the quantitative and 
qualitative data focusing on the four stages of the implementation process, the length 
of time taken, programme funding and costs, and programme targets. In Chapter 6 
three research hypotheses were developed about project planning. funding and 
resourcing and the interactions between actors and agencies involved in the 
programme. This chapter tests these hypotheses. 
Chapter 8 provided an overview from the quantitative survey of the pattern 
that occurred in three five-year plans in seven states and the three types of 
implementing agencies. Analysis of the average time taken to complete projects 
shows that the mean of time taken was longer than the five year plan period itself. As 
a result a large number of projects had to be carried over to the next plan. Comparison 
between plans confirmed there were no significant differences. This implies that there 
were few changes in the implementation process and that little learning occurred in 
improving the programme performance in terms of shortening the time taken. By 
contrast, comparison between implementing agencies shows significant differences in 
the time taken for the implementation process. Similarly significant difference existed 
between states in the length of time taken. 
Chapter 9 has provided a detailed account of the implementation process 
through qualitative analysis. The key findings showed that there were problem of 
delays in completing the projects. These delays were mainly associated with problems 
during the formulation and planning stage. As a result, the total project cost in a 
number of schemes escalated because increased construction costs. However the 
government was slow in changing the funding arrangements. Slow moving projects 
were carried over to the next plan. and eventually cost more, as the result of these 
delays. Also by the end of the five-year plans, the number of houses built were less 
than the intended target. 
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Outline of the Chapter 
This chapter is divided into four parts: three parts on hypotheses testing and 
one part on summary and conclusion. The first part deals with the hypothesis on 
project preparation and planning stage. The second part is about programme funding 
and resourcing. The third tests on the interaction between various actors, agencies and 
levels of government at the bottom in the programme implementation process. This 
chapter aims to test hypotheses formulated in Chapter 6. 
Both sets of data (quantitative and qualitative) are used in the testing of these 
hypotheses. The quantitative data used statistical techniques for the analysis such as 
chi-square tests, t-tests, analysis of variance (ANOV A), correlation coefficient and 
multiple regression analysis. Analysis of the qualitative data used several qualitative 
tactics in generating meaning from the data display such as counting, noting pattern 
and themes, seeing plausibility, clustering and noting relationship between variables. 
Thus triangulation was used in hypotheses testing. 
SECTION ONE: PROJECT PREPARATION AND PLANNING: 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
The Hypothesis 
This section sets out to test the first research hypothesis on the significance of 
preparation and planning of project on the subsequent implementation process and the 
overall programme performance. This hypothesis predicts that the shortfall of 
programme is partly because of inadequate preparation at the formulation and 
planning stage, the length of time taken in the implementation process and was itself 
affected by the planning period, states and implementing agencies. Four statements 
are developed to assist testing the hypothesis as follows:-
Statement 1a.· "That a large proportion of public low-cost housing projects had a 
completion time of more than five years. " 
Statement lb.' "That projects where some preparations were made before the 
formulation stage had shorter completion times than projects where 
preparations are made during the formulation stage. " 
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Statement Ie.' "That the earlier implementation stage is significantly related to the 
subsequent stages. When a longer time is taken to complete the planning stage, 
then a longer time is needed to complete the whole project implementation 
process. " 
Statement ld.· "That the length of time spent on the whole implementation process 
varies significantly between five-year plans, states and implementing 
agencies. " 
There are four major stages involved in the implementation of public low-cost 
housing projects. Sequence and the average time taken for these implementation 
stages can be seen in Diagram 10.1. A list of summary for variables discussed in the 
hypotheses testing is found in the appendix to this chapter. 
PROJECT COMPLETION MORE THAN FIVE YEARS 
In each of the five-year plans the programme failed to achieve the intended 
target. A large proportion of these projects were completed over five years: 73% (121 
out of 166 projects) completed in more than five years, compared with only 27% (45 
projects) completed in less than five years. 
The chi-square test produces only a small chi-square value of .213 where no 
significant association exist between the five-year plan period and the project 
completion time at an alpha of .05 is established. This chi-square test confirms that in 
the population as a whole there was no association between any of the five-year plan 
periods and the length of time of project completion, whether less or more than five 
years. 
In summary, a large proportion of projects were completed in more than five 
years, however. there is unlikely to be any relationship between this length of time. 
whether less or more than five years and any of the five-year plan periods. This 
analysis confirms that the average length of time taken to complete the projects' 
implementation process would be longer than the five-year plan's time period. 
Diagram 10.1: Length of Time for the Implementation Process of the Public Low Cost Housing 
in Malaysia (mean in months) 
~ Assume that fonnulation stage begin six month before the beginning of five-year plans 
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Target 
Target shortfall occurred at the end of each plan because a large proportion of 
projects were not completed within the intended plan. There are several reasons for 
this:-
• First, there was a shortfall in the number of houses built. In some projects, lower 
targets were reconsidered after. taking into account the size of - available site, 
planning requirements and the suitable lay-out plan for the schemes. Data analyses 
on the 166 completed projects shows that 57% of projects built the number of 
houses as targeted, 30% built lower than the number targeted, and 14% built more 
than the target. 
• Second, the number of houses at approved during loan approval by TCOHL were 
lower than the original target in some of the schemes. A number of projects 
proposed by states had lower targets to accommodate the smaller allocation of 
funds provided. Similarly, TCOHL also cut down the size of a number of projects 
in order to accommodate them within available funding. 
• Third, target shortfall also occurred because a number of houses were carried over 
to other five-year plans and a number of projects were never completed. The 
number of houses completed within the same plan was smaller than those 
completed in the next plan. Data analysis from 215 projects showed that out of a 
total 42,316 houses targeted: only 6,950 houses were completed within the same 
plan (16%); 15,529 houses completed in the next plan (37%); 6,722 houses 
completed during next two plans (16%); and 13,135 houses were not built at all 
(31 %). Another data analysis from the 166 completed projects showed that there 
was a short fall of 3,785 houses out of 33,343 originally targeted. This occurred 
because the number of houses built in some of the projects was smaller than their 
original target. 
PROJECT PREPARATION AND PERFORMANCE 
Statement 1 b set out to test the relationships between project preparation and 
project perfonnance. The aim is to find out whether preparations made before the 
projects' formulation and planning stage had any effect on the length of time taken to 
complete the project. It is predicted that projects where some preparation was made 
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before the formulation stage had a shorter completion time than projects where 
preparations were made during the formulation and planning stage. 
The relationships between components of project preparation and programme 
performance have been discussed in detail in Chapter 8 covering the variables listed 
below:-
• IDENTIFY: when site identification was made 
• EXTEND: whether the project is an extension from the previous phase of 
development 
• SITECHG: whether a change of site occurred 
• LANDREPT: when the land report was made 
• FEASIBLE: the type of feasibility studies made for the project 
• SURVEY: when the land survey was made for the project. 
The analysis in Chapter 8 examined the differences which occurred between these 
variables in several programme implementation stages. One-way ANOV A tests have 
been carried out between the variable IDENTIFY and six implementation stage 
variables (FORMAPLY, PLANSTAG, RESOCING, CONSTRUC, FORMBEGN, 
and SPAN) which produced statistically significant results at an alpha of .05 but with 
small F values. This could be interpreted as being due to the sampling fluctuations. 
The test on the variable FORMOCC produced result of no significant difference at an 
alpha of .05 but with a small F value. (Refer to table 8.29 in Chapter 8.) The t-test on 
variable EXTENT produced no significant difference over the length of time for 
project completion. Two more preparation variables LANDREPT and SURVEY have 
been tested on the project completion time by t-tests and they produced statistically 
significant differences results but small F-values. Also analyses have been made on 
variables AMEND and SITECHG and they found that significant differences occurred 
to several implementation stages. (Refer Table 8.32 and 8.34 in Chapter 8.) 
The testing of project preparation hypothesis engaged cross-tabulations and 
chi-square tests on a series of independent variables IDENTIFY, EXTENT, 
LANDREPT and SURVEY with a series of dependent variables FOROCSYR, 
STATUSIN and FOROCQTL. Variable FOROC5YR is the project completion time 
which categorised whether it was below five years or more than five years. Variable 
STA TUSIN is the variable on the project completion time; whether the project was 
completed within the same plan or outside the intended plan. However, FOROCQTL 
is the time taken for project completion which is divided into the four quartiles. (Refer 
Chapter Ten: Hypotheses Testing 372 
also table 8.19 in Chapter 8). The time of project completion according to quartiles is 
as follows:-
Below First Quartile: projects completed in less than 59 months 
First Quartile: projects completed between S9 to 79.8 months 
Second Quartile: projects completed between 79.8 to 103 months 
Third Quartile: projects completed more than 103 months. 
Table 10.1 shows the results of statistical tests between four preparation variables 
(EXTENT, IDENTIFY, LANDREPT and SURVEY) and whether project completion 
time was below or more than five years. On the variable EXTENT, the researcher had 
assumed that the extension projects from previous phase of development have 
experienced some degree of preparation. On the other hand, the non-extension 
projects do not have this advantage. For variables IDENTIFY, LANDREPT and 
SURVEY, they are divided into whether preparation is made before or during the 
formulation and planning stage. 
The results of chi-square in Table 10.1 show that there existed relationships 
between variables IDENTIFY and SURVEY, and the dependent variable 
FOROCSYR at the significant level of .05. However there is no relationship between 
FOROCSYR to EXTENT. Variable LANDREPT provided a value of 0.053 that can 
be accepted as significant at an alpha .06. 
Table 10.1: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT PREPARATION AND COMPLETION 
TIME OF LESS OR MORE THAN 5 YEARS (FOROCSYR) 
Variables D.F. Chi-square Significant Phi 
Value Level 
EXTENT 1 .084 .7715 .0225 
IDENTIFY 1 7.14 .0076 .2073 
LANDREPT 1 3.73 .0533 .1500 
SURVEY 1 9.41 .0021 .2381 
Source: Researcher's Fust Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 10.2 below shows results of statistical tests between four preparation 
variables and project completion status of whether completed within or outside the 
intended plan (STATUS IN) . The results of chi-square provide that relationships exist 
between variables IDENTIFY, LANDREPT and SURVEY to the dependent variable 
ST A TUSIN but there is no association with the variable EXTENT. 
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Table 10.2: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT PREPARATION AND COMPLETION 
WITHIN OR OUTSIDE INTENDED PLAN (STATUS IN) 
Variables D.F. Chi-square Significant Phi 
Value Level 
EXTENT 1 .000 .9851 -.0015 
IDENTIFY 1 9.74 .0018 .2422 
LANDREPT 1 4.35 .0369 .1619 
SURVEY 1 6.93 .0085 .2044 
Source: Researcher's FIrst Stage/Quantitative Data CollectIOn 
Table 10.3 below exhibits the results of chi-square tests of preparation 
variables with the time spent for project completion which is categorised by its 
quartiles. Chi-square results in Table 10.3 below provides statistical significant values 
for variables IDENTIFY and SURVEY. This explains that there are significant 
relationships between IDENTIFY and SURVEY variables, and the projects' length of 
completion time categorised by its quartiles. This implied that the relationships exist 
between site identification and survey being done before the formulation and the 
planning stage, and project completion. The other two preparation variables, EXTENT 
and LANDREPT fail to yield relationships with the dependent variable. 
Table 10.3: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT PREPARATION AND COMPLETION 
TIME BY QUARTILES 
Variables D.F. Chi-square Significant Phi 
Value Level 
EXTENT 3 .173 .9818 .0324 
IDENTIFY 3 8.29 .0404 .2242 
LANDREPT 3 5.22 .1567 .1771 
SURVEY 3 10.1 .0179 .2471 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Decision on project preparation 
On testing this statement, four preparation variables are tested against three 
performance variables by chi-square tests. The variable EXTENT consistently shows 
no significant association with the three performance variables. This implies that there 
is no advantage to a proposed project whether it is an extension from the previous 
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phase or a new site. The variable LANDREPT shows a relationship with performance 
variables of FOROC5YR and STATUS IN but fails to provide a relationship with 
variables FOROCQTL. The other two preparation variables IDENTIFY and 
SURVEY consistently produced statistically significant values for the performance 
variables. Since all the preparation variables do not produce the same results therefore 
this statement is considered as "partially support" because not all the project 
preparation before the fonnulation stage variables have a statistically significant 
association with shorter completion times. 
PLANNING STAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The quantitative data analyses in Chapter 8 confirmed that the time taken for 
the planning stage was the longest of the four implementation stages. The mean and 
median value of 32.1 and 32.9 months respectively implied that in general the 
planning stage was completed during the beginning of the third year of the five-year 
plan. Also, the average time taken for this stage was almost half of the total time spent 
for the implementation process. Comparisons of the mean and median times taken for 
the planning stage between the three five-year plans, showed variations occurred 
between plans (see Table 8.18 and Table 8.19 in Chapter 8). However, the statistical 
test by one-way ANOV A implied that these were not statistically significant. 
In relation to the whole implementation process, it was predicted that the 
planning stage was significantly related to the subsequent stages; and that when a 
longer time was taken to complete the planning stage, then a longer time was needed 
to complete the whole project implementation process. Correlation and multiple 
regression analyses are used to test this statement. 
Correlation analysis measures the strength and direction of the relationship 
between two variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1992; p.162-163). The test produces 
Pearson's r value between -1 and +1 which indicates a perfect relationship, whether 
negatively or positively between two variables. Similarly, the test would indicate a 
strong or a weak relationship between variables in question by the Pearson's r value 
produced. As a guideline. Cohen and Holliday (1982) propose that the value can be 
interpreted as: between 0.0 and 0.19 is very low association; 0.20 to 0.39 is low 
association; 0.40 to 0.69 is modest association; 0.70 to 0.89 is high association, and; 
between 0.90 to 1 is very high association (from Bryman & Cramer, 1992; p.168).(l) 
However. as Bryman and Cramer (1992; p.168) clarify further, these values rules of 
thumb only because there is hardly any substantial consensus on the guidelines. 
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Two planning stage variables, FORMAPL Y and PLANSTAG were correlated 
against six other implementation variables of subsequent stages as can be seen in 
Table lOA. The results show that the FORMAPLY variable has a substantial 
association with FORMBEGN, SPAN and FORMOCC. In contrast, the FORMAPLY 
variable shows negligible association with the resourcing and construction stages 
(RESOCING and CONSTRUC variables). This FORMAPL Y variable shows a strong 
association with the PLANSTAG variable which produces a correlation value of 0.86. 
This is because the completion of the planning stage is closely related to when the 
loan application is submitted to the TCOHL at the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. The FORMAPL Y variable shows modest association with FORMOCC 
of .52. The PLANST AG variable shows a strong association with FORMBEGN 
variable with a correlation value of 0.72. This implies that the time when projects 
reached the stage of starting construction work had a strong association with the 
planning stage. The same PLANSTAG variable produced a substantial association 
with SPAN and FORMOCC variables. This implies that there is a substantial 
association between the planning stage and the subsequent project implementation 
stage of completing the project construction (SPAN) and achieving the house 
occupation stage (FORMOCC). However the PLANSTAG variable produced a 
negligible association with the resourcing and construction stage (RESOCING and 
CONSTRUC respectively). The same Table 10.4 also provides correlation between 
six other variables. A strong association can be seen between variables as follows: 
FORMBEGN and SPAN (0.86); SPAN and FORMOCC (0.99), and; TCHLBEGN 
and FORMBEGN (0.71). Substantial associations produced between variables are as 
follows: TCHLBEGN and SPAN (0.65), and; TCHLBEGN and FORMOCC (0.64). 
Two variables, RESOCING and CONSTRUe show low and negligible association 
with other variables. 
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Table 10.4: 
CORRELATION BETWEEN SEVERAL IMPLEMENT A TION PROCESS 
VARIABLES 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. FORMAPLY 
From project formulation 1.0 
to loan application 
2.PLANSTAG .86 1.0 
The planning stage 
3. RESOCING -.01 -.02 1.0 
The resourcing stage 
4. FORMBEGN .63 .72 .3 1.0 
From formulation to 
starting of construction 
5. TCHLBEGN .08 .07 .47 .71 1.0 
From TCOHL's approval 
to the starting of 
construction 
6. CONSTRUC -.1 -.03 .02 .04 .11 1.0 
Duration of construction 
7. SPAN .53 .63 .28 .86 .65 .45 1.0 
From project formulation 
to the completion stage 
8. FORMOCC .52 .61 .27 .84 .64 .48 .99 1.0 
From project formulation 
to the occupation of 
houses 
Mean 32.1 37.7 15.6 53.4 15.6 21 79.3 83.9 
Standard deviation 18.9 20.1 11.6 29.2 11.6 12.6 33 32.8 
N2t.e..;. Correlation of .05 or greater are significant when two-tailed are used. 
Soyrce; Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
A simple bivariate regression analysis was carried out between PLANSTAG 
and FORMOCC. This aimed to test the degree of association and linearity between 
the planning stage (PLANSTAG) and the total length of time taken to complete the 
project (FORMOCC). The following Table 10.5 provides a selected summary of 
. . . d f SPSS l' . (2) statIstIcs obtame rom mear regresslOn. 
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Table 10.5: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PLANNING STAGE (PLANSTAG) AND 
PERFORMANCE BY LENGTH OF TIME (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Completion Time (FORMOCC) 
Multiple R .63290 Analysis of D.F. Sum F-Value 
Variance Square 
R Square .40056 
Adjusted R .39688 Regression 1 69045.3 108.9 
Square 
Standard 25.17768 Residual 163 103328.2 Significant 
Error ofF 
.0000 
Variable B Beta Standard T Significant 
Error ofT 
Planning 1.020038 .632895 .097738 10.436 .0000 
Stage 
Constant 44.872917 4.184177 10.724 .0000 
Data analysis based on 165 completed cases where case no.6 (the outlier) was 
excluded from this analysis. The multiple-R value has increased slightly to .63 in this 
table as compared to .61 in the previous Table 10.4. 
Source: Researcher 's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
The multiple R value of .63 from the Table 10.5 above indicates that there is a 
substantial positive association between an independent and a dependent variable 
where the value of the R square indicates that 40% of the variation in total projects' 
completion time (FORMOCC) is explained by linear regression on the planning stage 
variable. The table above also indicates that constant is equal to 44.9 and 
unstandardised B is equal to +1 .02. In other word this tells that the predicted score on 
total projects ' completion time (FORMOCC) is 44.9 months when the planning stage 
is O. To obtain a predicted total projects ' completion time (FORMOCC) = Y' for any 
given length of planning stage (X) , the linear equation is as follows:-
y' = 44.9 + 1.02X 
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Therefore if a project planning stage is completed within 18 months as assumed 
during the programme formulation, then the predicted time taken for the whole 
implementation process would be:-
Y' = 44.9 + 1.02 (18) =63.3 
This regression implied that the formulation and planning stage must be about 20 
months if the project to be completed within the same plan. Therefore if the project is 
to be completed within the intended five-year plan (66 months after taking into 
consideration the fact that the formulation began 6 months earlier) then the planning 
stage (x) would be completed as follows:-
66 = 44.9+ 1.02 (x) 
Therefore x = 20.7 months 
Another regression analysis was carried out between FORMAPL Y variable 
(the time taken from project formulation to loan application) and FORMOCC as 
shown in Table 10.6. This analysis produced the multiple R value of .53 which 
implies a modest association between an independent and a dependent variable. (3) The 
value of the R square indicates that only 28% of the variation in total projects' 
completion time (FORMOCC) is explained by linear regression on the FORMAPL Y 
variable. This FORMOCC's multiple R value of .53 is lesser than the earlier 
PLANSTAG value of .63 implies that other factors at were work between the 
FORMAPL Y and the completion of planning stage. The other reason is when the 
stage is closer to the completion stage then the higher would be the value of the 
multiple R. 
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Table 10.6: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PART OF PLANNING STAGE (FORMAPL Y) 
AND PERFORMANCE BY LENGTH OF TIME (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Completion Time (FORMOCC) 
Multiple R .52867 Analysis of D.F. S.S. F-Value 
Variance 
R Square .27950 
Adjusted R .27508 Regression 1 47532.3 63.23069 
Square 
Standard 27.41766 Residual 163 122531.6 Significant 
Error ofF 
.0000 
Variable B Beta Standard T Significant 
Error ofT 
FORMAPLY .898638 .528674 .113011 7.952 .0000 
Constant 54.511057 4.209086 12.951 .0000 
Data analysis based on 165 completed projects where case no.6 (the outliers) 
was excluded from the analysis. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
It is predicted also that total project's completion time (FORMOCC) has 
relationship with all the four implementation stage variables; the PLANSTAG, 
RESOCING, CONSTRUC and COMST AGE. Data analysis was carried out aimed to 
determine the degree of linear dependence of FORMOCC on the four independent 
variables operating jointly. The multiple regression analysis was employed to test this 
hunch and the results are shown in the Table 10.7. This analysis produced a strong 
correlation of .87 and the R-square's value of 0.75 which can be interpreted that 75% 
of the variation in the total projects' completion time (FORMOCC) is explained by 
the four implementation stages (PLANS TAG, RESOCING, CONSTRUC and 
COMSTAGE). 
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Table 10.7: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PLANNING STAGE AND OTHER 
STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std.Deviation Label 
FORMOCC 83.5 33.1 Length of time: the whole process, from 
formulation to occupation of houses. 
PLANSTAG 37.6 20.3 Length of time: the planning stage from 
formulation to TCOHL approval. 
RESOCING 15.6 11.6 Length of time: Resourcing stage, from 
TCOHL approval to 1st. withdrawal. 
CONSTRUC 20.9 12.8 Length of time: the construction stage. 
COMSTAGE 10.8 9.3 Length of time: the completion stage. 
.. CorrelatIOn, I-taded SlgntfIcant: 
FORMOCC PLANSTAG RESOCING CONSTRUC COMSTAGE 
FORMOCC 1.000 .617 .273 .475 .221 
.000 .000 .000 .002 
PLANSTAG .617 1.000 -.016 -.041 -.107 
.000 .420 .303 .088 
RESOCING .273 -.016 1.000 .026 -.042 
.000 .420 .373 .298 
CONSTRUC .475 -.041 .026 1.000 .178 
.000 .303 .373 .012 
COMSTAGE .221 -.107 -.042 .178 1.000 
.002 .088 .298 .012 
Multiple R .86718 Analysis of D.F. Sum Square F-Value 
Variance 
R Square .75201 
Adjusted R .74565 Regression 4 131601.48 118.26 
Square 
Standard Error 16.6792 Residual 156 43398.42 
Variable B Beta Standard F 
Error 
Planning Stage .998331 .613224 9.942 
Constant 46.195111 
Variable B SEB 95% Interval Beta T- Sig. Of 
Confiden B Value T 
ce 
Interval 
PLANSTAG 1.083146 .065476 .953812 1.212479 .6637 16.543 .0000 
RESOCING .800353 .113495 .576169 1.024538 .2816 7.052 .0000 
CONSTRUC 1.180764 .105159 .973044 1.388484 .4552 11.23 .0000 
COMSTAGE .798073 .145522 .510626 1.085520 .2236 5.48 .0000 
(Constant) -3.006778 4.267245 -11.43581 5.422258 -.705 .4821 
Total Cases = 166 
Durbin-Watson Test = 1.8 
Source: Researcher'S First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Multiple regression can be used to determine the statistical significance and 
strength of association for the overall regression and individual independent variables 
(Poister, 1978; p.S39). A mUltiple linear regression model postulates the dependent 
variable as a linear combination of a number of independent variables. It predicts the 
association and simultaneous effects of two or more independent variables on a 
dependent variable, such that: 
Therefore, the multiple regression from Table 10.7 is as follows:-
Y = -3.006778 + 1.083146 (PLANSTAG score) + .800353 (RESOCING score) + 
1.180764 (CONSTRUCT score) + .798073 (COMSTAGE score) 
Suppose that we want to complete the project within the same intended plan at the 
maximum 66 months time span, the predicted combination of the length of time taken 
for the four implementation stages would be as follows:-
66 months = -3.006778 + 1.083146 (24.5 months) + .800353 (13 months) + 
1.180764 (20 months) + .798073 (12 months) 
The multiple regression estimate from Table 10.7 suggests that all the variables are 
statistically significance where each produces a significant t-value of less than alpha 
0.05. Variable PLANSTAG appears to be the best predictors because it has the 
largest t-value of 16.543 amongst the dependent variables. 
In Table 10.8 is another model of multiple regression analysis, testing the 
relationships between the planning stage (pLANSTAG) and dummy variables for 
three agencies and seven states with the time of project completion. The test result 
revealed a moderate association between independent variables and dependent 
variable with a multiple-R of .65, R-square of .42 and F-value of 12.8 which was 
significant at an alpha .05. Variable PLANSTAG produced t-value of 8.9 and 
significant t-value of .0000. Whereas, dummy variables for states and agencies did not 
produce significant t-value. This implies that the planning stage is very significant to 
the project completion time. 
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Table 10.8: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE LENGTH OF TIME (FORMOCC) WITH 
PLANNING STAGE, AGENCIES AND STATES. 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Completion Time (FORMOCC) 
Multiple R .65122 Analysis of D.F. S.S. F-Value 
Variance 
R Square .42408 
Adjusted R .39086 Regression 9 74925.85 12.76 
Square 
Standard 25.53927 Residual 156 101751.68 Significant 
Error ofF 
.0000 
Variables B Beta Standard T Significant 
Error ofT 
PLANSTAG .942381 .578856 .105038 8.972 .0000 
NHD 7.147231 .101613 6.107047 1.170 .2437 
PWD -5.557616 -.067200 7.699509 -.722 .4715 
JOHOR 8.495401 .082904 8.128671 1.045 .2976 
NSMBILAN -1.114211 -.011580 7.219925 -.154 .8776 
PERAK 1.703009 .018972 7.468088 .228 .8199 
PENANG -4.685593 -.042386 9.160442 -.512 .6097 
PAHANG 6.793004 .073226 7.093338 .958 .3397 
TRENGANU .0015525 1.042E-04 1.076675 .001 .9989 
Constant 45.514708 6.404284 7.107 .0000 
Note: Variables not in the Equation: 
SEDC and SELANGOR because reached limits of minimum tolerance. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection. 
The following Table 10.9 is another model of multiple regression analysis that 
testing the relationship between the planning stage (PLANST AG) and the time taken 
to complete the project implementation with four other variables. The four other 
variables are: 
(a) TARGET is a variable on the number of houses intended to be build; 
(b) NHD is a dummy variable for implementing agencies (where 1 is assigned 
to NHD and 0 is assigned to other agencies); 
(c) ST A TUS3 is a dummy variable for project completion within plan or 
outside the intended plan (where 1 is assigned to "completed within plan" and 
o is assigned to "completed outside the intended plan"), and: 
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(d) PAHANG is a dummy variable for the state (where 1 is assigned to state of 
Pahang and 0 is assigned to other states) . Pahang was the state with the longest 
time taken for the planning stage. 
The test result revealed a high association between independent variables and 
dependent variable with a multiple-R of .79 and R-square of .63. The test produced a 
large F-value of 54.9 and significant t-value at an alpha .05 (except variable 
PAHANG with .18) . This test showed that 63% of the regression slope for completion 
time explained by PLANSTAG and four other variables above. Variable STATUS3 
(completion within five-year plan or otherwise) produced a large t-value of 7.7 and 
significant t-value of .0000. This implies that the completion time is very significant 
to the project completion status. 
Table 10.9: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PLANNING STAGE AND PERFORMANCE 
BY LENGTH OF TIME (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Completion Time (FORMOCC) 
Multiple R .79478 Analysis of D.F. S.S. F-Value 
Variance 
R Square .63167 
Adjusted R .62016 Regression 5 111602.72 54.88 
Square 
Standard 20.16724 Residual 160 65074.81 Significant 
Error ofF 
.0000 
Variable B Beta Standard T Significant 
Error ofT 
PLANSTAG .650205 .399388 .088460 7.350 .0000 
TARGET .02485 .209714 .005857 4.245 .0000 
NHD 7.02034 .099809 3.487107 2.013 .0458 
STATUS3 29.483113 .429121 3.827404 7.703 .0000 
PAHANG 6.312824 .068050 4.683454 1.348 .1796 
Constant 31.859883 3.669105 8.683 .0000 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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A series of other analyses was also conducted by using other variables with 
other states and agencies' dummy variables. These tests produced similar results and 
nearly the same multiple R. R-square. F value and significant level. However these 
tests produced different t-values for states and agencies' dummy variables. 
Decision on Relationships of Planning Stage and Implementation 
Process 
Results of analysis described above support that the planning stage is 
significantly related to subsequent stages. Results of regression analysis from Table 
10.7 showed that relationships between the planning stage (PLANSTAG) and the time 
taken for project completion (FORMOCC) became stronger when other variables of 
subsequent implementation stages were included in the analysis. Also in Table 10.9 
the analysis showed strong relationships of the formulation and planning stage with 
tbe project completion time when other variables of project target (TARGET), the 
National Housing Department (NHD) and the project completion status (STA TUS3) 
were included in the regression analysis. 
VARIATION OF TIME TAKEN IN IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS 
Statement Id proposes "that the length of time spent on the whole 
implementation process varies significantly between five-year plans. states and 
implementing agencies." As discussed in Chapter 8, there is no significant difference 
between the three five-year plan in relation to the time taken to complete the housing 
projects. Analysis of variance comparing the four implementation stages and the states 
is shown in Table 10.10. Analyses were for the sample of 166 completed projects and 
the sample of all 215 projects. Table 10.10 shows that there are significant difference 
between the states in completing the planning stage (PLANSTAG variable) and the 
time taken to complete the project (FORMOCC variable). While there is no 
significant difference for the resourcing stage and construction stage. This analysis 
produced similar results either the sample of 215 projects or the 166 completed 
projects. 
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Table 10.10: 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE TIME TAKEN AT THE 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGES BY STATES 1976-1990 
(95% confidence interval) 
Variable F-Ratio F-Prob Nand Decision 
d.f. 
PLANSTAG 3.2555 .0048 N= 165 Significant 
difference 
3.4780 .0028 N= 186 Significant 
difference 
RESOCING .9839 .4381 N= 163 Not 
Significant 
385 
Notes on 
Samples 
(a)* 
(b)** 
(a)* 
...................................................... ······Lz9ii····_·······:i63ir····-····N··;;··17i··· .. NoT····························· ········ ··(b)**·········· 
Significant 
CONSTRUC 1.7459 .1137 N= 165 Not (a)* 
Significant 
...................................................... ·····"i·:607S······_·······:i48i"······_····N··;;··16S···· ··Not······························ ····· ·····(b)**········· 
Significant 
COM STAGE 2.0928 .0578 N=165 Not (a)* 
Significant 
...................................................... ····· "i ·ji~i"8··· ·· · -·······j·56i"·· .. ·-.. ··N ..;; .. 16S ...... ~i'ot .. · ............ · .............. · .... · .... (b)** ...... .. · 
Significant 
FORMOCC 3.2574 .0048 N = 165 Significant (a)* 
difference 
............................................................ 3':zS·74 ...... _ ...... ·j)·04S .. · .... _ .... N .. ;;··16S .... ··s·ig·~ifi'~ant ........ · .. · .... · .... (b)** ...... .. ·· 
difference 
Notes: 
(a) * samples are based on 166 completed projects 
(b)** samples are based on 215 projects which included uncompleted projects. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Variation Between States and Plans 
Data analysis by ANOV A test was carried out to test the relationship between 
FORMOCC and two independent variables, PLAN and STATES. The result of this 
analysis is shown in Table 10.11 which confinned that variability occurred to the time 
taken in the implementation process by the five-year plan and states. The variable 
STATES produced an F-value of 2.652 and significant of .018, whereas the PLAN 
variable produced a small F-value of .227 . These two variables interact and produced 
the main effect's F-value of 2.012 and significant at an alpha of 0.05. 
Chapter Ten: Hypotheses Testing 386 
Table 10.11 : 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PROJECT COMPLETION TIME BY STATES 
AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
FORMOCC Completion time from project formulation to occupation 
by PLAN plan 
STATE State 
UNIQUE Sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Source of Sum of D.F. Mean F-Value Significant 
Variation Squares Square ofF 
Main Effects 15959.677 8 1994.960 2.012 .049 
PLAN 451.108 2 225.554 .227 .797 
STATE 15780.464 6 2630.077 2.652 .018 
2-Way Interactions 
PLAN 12476.760 11 1134.251 1.144 .332 
STATE 12476.760 11 1134.251 1.144 .332 
Explained 31880.153 19 1677.903 1.692 .044 
Residual 144797.371 146 991.763 
Total 176677.524 165 1070.773 
~ 166 cases were processed. 0 cases (0 pct) were missing. 
Variations Between Agencies 
There were significant difference between the three agencies in relation to the 
time taken on some of the implementation processes and to complete the housing 
projects. There were significant difference between these agencies for the starting of 
construction (FORMBEGN), completion of building construction (SPAN) and the 
total time taken to complete the project (FORMOCC variable). PWD had the shortest 
time taken completing these stages, followed by SEDC, while NHD was the longest. 
However, analysis of variance comparing between agencies and the four 
implementation stages (the planning, resourcing, construction and completion stage) 
produced results of no significant difference. 
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Table 10.12 below compares project completion time by implementing 
agencies. This table shows that each of the agency has a lower percentage of projects 
completed in less than five years, while a larger percentage of their projects completed 
in more than five years. However, comparing between the three agencies, PWD has 
bigger percentage (44%) of projects completed within less than five years. The chi-
square test produced a value of 8.14 where interpreted as there is a significant 
association between variables at an alpha of .05. This chi-square test confirms that in 
the population as a whole there was an association between the agency and the length 
of time of project completion of more than five years. 
Table 10.12: 
CROSS-TABULATION BETWEEN PROJECT COMPLETION TIME AND 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
Agencies 
NHD SEDC PWD Total 
Projects' Completion 
Time 
N 8 23 14 45 
Completed less than 5 Expected 14.1 22.1 8.7 
years Row % 18% 51% 31% 
Column 15.4% 28% 43.8% 27.1% 
% 
N 44 59 18 121 
Completed more than 5 Expected 37.9 59.8 23.3 
years Row % 36.4% 48.8 14.8% 
Column 84.6% 72% 56.2% 72.9% 
% 
N=52 N=82 N=32 N= 
31.3% 49.4% 19.3% 166 
100% 
Chi-square =8.14 Sig. P>.05 
Minimum expected frequency 8.7, cell with expected frequency <5 = 0, missing 
observation = 0 
Table 10.13 below shows that each implementing agency has a larger 
proportion of projects completed outside the intended plan. The chi-square test was 
used to examine the existence or absence of a relationship between implementing 
agencies as an independent variable and the project completion status as a dependent 
variable. The test provides a chi-square of 5.34 and significant value of .06928 which 
interpreted as significant association between variables at an alpha of .07. This chi-
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square test rejects that no association is true. However, PWD had a larger proportion 
(47%) of projects completed within the same plan than two other agencies. 
Table 10.13: 
CROSS-TABULATION BETWEEN STATUS OF COMPLETION AND 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
Agencies 
NHD SEDe PWD Total 
Projects' Completion 
Time 
N 12 30 15 57 
Completed Within Expected 17.9 28.2 11 
Same Plan Row % 21% 52.6% 26.3% 
Column % 23% 36.6% 46.9% 34.3% 
N 40 52 17 109 
Completed Outside Expected 34.1 53.4 21 
Intended Plan Row % 36.7% 47.7% 15.6% 
Column % 77% 63.4% 53.1% (65.7%) 
52 82 32 166 
(31.3%) (49.4%) (19.3%) 
Chi-square 5.34 Sig> .07 
Minimum expected frequency 10.9, cell with expected frequency <5 = 0, missing 
observation = 0 
Further, another ANOV A test was carried out to find the difference of five-
year plan (pLAN) and implementing agency (AGENCY) toward the dependent 
variable, the time taken to complete the project (FORMOCC). The result showed 
there was interaction between the two independent variables (see Table 10.14). The 
main effect showed a significant difference between the independence variables and 
the dependent variable. The agency's variable produced a larger F-value of 5.731, 
whereas the five-year plan's variable (PLAN) produced only a small F-value of .401. 
This implied that agency variable is very significant to the completion of the project. 
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Table 10.14: 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PROJECT COMPLETION TIME AGENCY AND 
FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
FORMOCC Completion time from project formulation to occupation 
by PLAN Five-year Plan 
AGENCY Agency 
UNIQUE Sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Source of Sum of D.F. Mean F-Value Significant 
Variation Squares Square ofF 
Main Effects 12153.551 4 3038.388 2.972 .021 
AGENCY 11718.359 2 5859.179 5.731 .004 
PLAN 819.316 2 409.658 .401 .671 
2-Way Interactions 5632.872 4 1408.218 1.377 .244 
PLAN STATE 5632.872 4 1408.218 1.377 .244 
Explained 16162.044 8 2020.256 1.976 .053 
Residual 160515.480 157 1022.392 
Total 176677.524 165 1070.773 
Nruel166 cases were processed. 0 cases (.0 pct) were missing. 
Another analysis was carried out by combining all the three variables: the five-
year plan (PLAN); the states (STATES), and; the implementing agencies (AGENCY). 
The result of this analysis is shown in Table 10.15. Two-way interaction amongst 
variables was not produced by this test. These three variables have cancelled their 
interaction amongst themselves. However, the result show a significant difference 
with the result of significant F at .016 which is smaller than alpha .05. Finally, 
regression analysis tests were carried out to examine relationships of total completion 
time (FORMOCC) with PLANSTAG, FORMBEGN and SPAN with all agencies and 
states dummy variables. The tests produced results from moderate to strong multiple 
R values with large F-values and significant t-value of .00005 for PLANST AG, 
FORMBEGN and SPAN variables. However these tests did not produced significant 
t-value for any of agency or state's dummy variables. (4) 
Chapter Ten: Hypothe es Testing 390 
Table 10.15: 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PROJECT COMPLETION TIME BY STATES 
AND FIVE-YEAR PLANS 
FORMOCC Completion time from project formulation to occupation 
by PLAN Plan 
STATE State 
AGENCY Agency 
UNIQUE Sums of squares 
All effects entered simultaneously 
Source of Sum of D.F. Mean F-Value Significant 
Variation Squares Square ofF 
Main Effects 22653.843 10 2265.384 2.280 .016 
PLAN 230.434 2 115.217 .116 .891 
STATE 12124.671 6 2020.778 2.034 .064 
AGENCY 3250.451 2 1625.225 1.636 .198 
Explained 22653.843 10 2265.384 2.280 .016 
Residual 154023.681 155 993.701 
Total 176677.524 165 1070.773 
~ 166 cases were processed. 0 cases (.0 pet) were missing. 
The results of these ANOVA tests confirmed that variations occurred between 
states and implementing agencies. However, there was no significant different 
between the three five-year plans. 
Summary of results 
In this quantitative data analysis four statements were tested as to an approach 
to assist hypothesis testing. The summary of the results of the statements as folIows:-
• Statement la: confirmed that a large proportion of projects were completed in more 
than five years time span whereas a smaller proportion of projects were completed 
in less than five years. 
• Statement 1b: partially supported since not all the preparation variables did not 
produce the same results. It is clear three variables SURVEY, IDENTIFY and 
LANDREPT have relationship with project completion time. 
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• Statement Ic: confirmed that there is relationship between earlier stage and 
subsequent stages and also planning stage to the whole implementation process. 
• Statement Id: confirmed that there was variation in the time taken in completing 
the projects amongst five year plans and states because there was interaction 
between plans and states, however there was no significance between five-year 
plans. There were variations of the time taken in completing the projects amongst 
the implementing agencies. 
These results confirmed that the shortfall of the public low-cost housing programme 
performance was associated with the inadequacy of preparation and problems 
occurred at the planning stage. Some projects performed better because preliminary 
investigation was conducted earlier even before the formulation stage. The 
performance of this programme is also affected by other variables such as the states 
and implementing agencies. Programme performance was affected by the project 
delays because of inadequate proposal preparation, inadequate planning and not 
working as planned. The implementation of this programme has undergone several 
five-year plans but it is unlikely that strong evidences existed of the learning process 
influencing performance improvement. 
QUALITATIVE DATA ON THE PLANNING HYPOTHESIS 
After analysing the hypothesis based on the quantitative data, the qualitative 
data set is now used to examine it. 
Respondents'View 
Analyses from respondents views about what happened to schemes indicated 
that the preparation of projects was faced with inadequate guidelines for project 
formulation and that proposals for sites were not made cautiously. Proposals for 
projects were then made in a hurry as a result of inadequate time during the 
preparation stage. Then, during the planning stage problems of site and land selection 
occurred, which affected programme performance. A selection of views from 
interview excerpts explain problems at the formulation and planning stage, as 
follows:-
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(1) Chali, mentioned over-simplification of project appraisal and summed up 
the root of the problem:-
«Projects were not cautiously selected by certain people, in addition to lack of 
clear guidelines... They did not understand what type of land was suitable for 
housing development ... , the root of the problem was because of no proper 
planning. II [Chali, 2.12.1994] 
(2) Another respondent, Ras, was of the opinion that project preparation was 
done in a hurry and based on inadequate information:-
" ... the project preparation was done in a hurry, adequate time was not given, a 
proposal was not made based on housing demand and also it was also subjected 
to too many weaknesses ... when the Ministry questioned them about the projects 
priority and detailed site information, the states were always unable to furnish 
us with adequate information. "[Ras, 14.11.94] 
(3) Kas, mentioned that the problem faced at the formulation and planning 
stage was in relation to inadequate time and inadequate preparation for project 
proposals :-
" ... when received the directive from the Ministry, the state's housing division 
instructed further the district offices at the district level to come up with the list 
of projects. Since the time was too short therefore some districts proposed 
projects which they already had proposed in the post plans which were turned 
down due to the allocation constraints and rescheduling of priorities in those 
pastplans. II [Kas, 18.11.1994] 
(4) Zaky said that inadequate project appraisal was inter-related with other 
problems:-
"The trouble was that the state did not properly check the proposal but just 
accepted whatever proposal was forwarded even by the most junior staff. .. 
Selection of site was not carefully done... This in fact affected the overall 
planning very much. This was the main problem because the projects lacked 
viability and readiness besides the states themselves lacked capability.... In 
addition, what was lacking was also a blue print of housing development for the 
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state which in a way could tell the appropriate housing demand for certain 
localities. ,. [Zaky, 14.11.1994] 
(5) On the other hand, Halo who was another respondent, believed that 
projects must be flexible to adapt to changes in the overall planning scenario. 
"Problems occurred when the states failed to revise their projects. They were 
still proposing and proceeding with the projects for the next plan, although 
there wasn't anymore demand or adequate anticipated popUlation to support 
the projects. The projects were also not flexible enough to adjust to changes in 
the surrounding areas or changes with other policies ... the housing project still 
proceeded as planned although there was a decision to cancel the proposed new 
township development plan... this has resulted in the project being faced with 
implementation problems. "[Halo, 23.11.1994] 
These issues of project preparation and planning, can be clustered into the 'thinking 
units'(S) as follows:-
(a) unclear guidelines, 
(b) site identification, 
(c) selection of site, and 
(d) land and site selection. 
First, inadequate project preparation occurred as a result of unclear guidelines 
and of rushing to meet the deadlines. As a result, some of these projects were not 
carefully prepared. Some were inadequately prepared and submitted in the belief that 
errors could be rectified later. The time given to preparing the list of projects was 
inadequate for anyone concerned to meet deadlines. Many respondents commented 
that project proposals were "made in a hurry with a sacrifice of quality, " and believed 
this caused some of the later problems. 
Second, the problem related to site identification. Sites for the majority of 
projects, when proposed to the state and central agencies, were not identified. The list 
usually consisted information about locations, the numbers of houses proposed and 
approximate allocations required. Selection of sites was usually made after these 
projects had been affirmed as approved projects for the five year plan. It seems that 
projects with problematic site selection were the uncompleted or slow projects. For 
example, during the 4MP the SHD was given only one month to resubmit proposals 
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to the Ministry. As a result, the SHD instructed district offices to produce a list of 
projects within only two weeks. 
A large majority of projects identified their sites after they were approved for 
the particular five year plan. Only six of completed projects (Trunkville, Stony River, 
Manor 3, Lakesland, Ficuswood and Pumpkinville) had identified their sites during 
the project formulation stage. For example. the site for Pumpkinville had been 
identified where a land report was made one year prior to the formulation stage. For 
another project, Stony River, the land was confirmed and ready for this project. In 
contrast, indecisiveness occurred for the Trunkville project, although its site had been 
planned since 2MP in 1971. Project sites for all the six uncompleted projects were 
never identified at this stage. They were identified later after the project had been 
approved for the respective five year plans. 
Third, site selection for projects is one of the important criteria associated with 
the project performance. Site selection is the decision on the site identified for the 
projects. Average and fast projects demonstrated that sites were selected early as well 
as the state taking a firm stance on their decisions. In contrast. uncompleted and slow 
projects showed indecisiveness, change of sites and delays in making decisions about 
the site. A number of respondents at the implementing agencies questioned why they 
only came into the picture after sites had been selected. They argued that better sites 
would have been selected if their advice had been sought. A few respondents argued 
that site selection was not properly done during the early stage of programme 
preparation; they were just to accommodate the list of projects to be submitted to the 
central agencies. Site selection was done without proper feasibility studies. 
Fourth, the issue of land and site selection are inter-related. A few programme 
administrators view of the problem of site selection as becoming progressively more 
difficult, because state land has become scarce, while private land has become more 
expensive. Rapid development in some of the districts caused competition for land 
between public low cost housing development and other uses. 
The common consensus among respondents was the difficulty which occurred 
at the formulation and planning stage where the root was the land problem: difficulty 
in getting state land, difficulty in selecting suitable land, the lengthy process of 
acquiring private land, the high cost of compensation for land, the high price of 
private land, the high cost of developing unsuitable state land, squatters on the land, 
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competing use of land and land becoming increasingly scarce, especially in the urban 
areas. 
Wby was suitable land not always available for projects? Analysis from the 
responses by respondents showed that the problem began because of the 'vague and 
too broad guidelines' provided during the preparation stage. At this stage the decision 
on site selection was purely a task given to the District and Land Office. Only at later 
stage did this involve other actors and agencies in the form of sanction, reporting or 
consultation with others, such as local authorities and councillors. The actions related 
to overcoming problems of land acquisition and squatters was dependent upon action 
and priorities set by the District and Land Office. The problem become worse when 
the states were indecisive and changed decisions about sites selected. Examples from 
several schemes showed that this land problem caused delays in project 
implementation so that, projects were unable to complete within their intended plan 
and the total project costs increased. 
Analysis from the qualitative data also noting that there were difference at the 
preparation and the planning stage adopted by the states. Negeri Sembilan requested 
that land report for identified sites be prepared by district and land offices. This report 
was discussed at the state level committee at which representatives from the state level 
agencies were presented. Until 1995, all government projects in this state were 
exempted from obtaining planning permission from local authorities. In contrast, 
during 4MP, Perak sought other agencies comments when site selection was made. 
This enabled better site selection. In Selangor, projects were discussed at the district 
level inter-agency meetings. Thus, more co-operation and less resistance to this 
programme were obtained by its two implementing agencies. However, NHD faced 
difficulties because it was not represented at the district level meetings. During 4MP 
all proposals for public low-cost houses in the state first went through the State 
Liaison Committee before they were submitted to MHLG. This committee was 
chaired by the "Menteri Besar" or Chief Minister of the state and was responsible for 
ensuring the smooth implementation of all low cost housing projects in the state. 
Conclusion 
Evidences from the quantitative data showed that the preparation and planning 
stage has significant relationships with programme performance. The preparation and 
planning stage produced a strong relationship with the time taken for the completion. 
Qualitative data analysis confirmed this, especially with respect to planning guidelines 
and site identification. 
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SECTION TWO: PROGRAMME FUNDING AND RESOURCING -
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
The Hypothesis 
Resources are important and must be provided adequately to ensure 
programme success. As discussed in Chapter 5, the provision of more funds was one 
of the measures to overcome increased of project costs and to cater for a bigger 
housing targets. However, funds were still inadequate because: (a) the funds allocated 
to finance each project was lower than actual project costs, and; (b) project estimates 
were lower than total costs when completed, and (c) delays in starting constructions 
caused the project costs increased due to inflation. The government's funding 
arrangements were slow respond to project cost increases. Although the states asked 
for additional funding from the federal government, they finally had to use their own 
funding to cover additional costs for land, building construction, infrastructure, 
contribution fees and other costs for the projects. 
Realising the importance of financial resources for programme success, the 
following hypothesis concerning programme funding is developed:-
Hypothesis 2: "The performance of the public low-cost programme is 
dependent on the allocation of resources devoted to it; delays in implementing 
the projects caused cost increases and the programme was also affected by 
inflation; as a result the states have to meet project cost from their own 
funding." 
This hypothesis predicts that there are relationships between implementation 
performance, funding, the length of time taken, states and implementing agencies. The 
above hypothesis will be tested according to the statements as follows: 
Statement 2a~ "That the amount of funds provided by the federal government 
for the public low-cost housing programme varies significantly between five-
year development plans and between states." 
Statement 2b: "That the amount of funds provided by the federal government 
for the public low-cost housing programme was lower than the total project 
cost. " 
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Statement 2c ; "Programme implementation performance is associated with the 
availability of funds; projects which utilise financial "revolving funds" exhibit 
better performance than projects which do not utilise financial "revolving 
funds." 
Statement 2d ; "That. there is an association between the total project costs and 
the length of time taken for project completion; the longer time needed for the 
project implementation process, the higher the project costs. to 
Statement 2d is the most important where it attempts to relate the amount of project 
cost and the time taken to complete the project. When delays occurred in project 
implementation then the project costs would increased as the result of inflation. Thus, 
project estimates were no longer valid and as a consequence large proportions of 
projects had their total cost more than the estimated project cost. 
VARIATIONS IN ALLOCATION OF FUNDS 
Funds provided by the federal government for the public low-cost housing 
programme varies significantly between five-year development plans and between 
states. Recalling the discussion of the same subject in the previous Chapter 8 we 
found that the amount of funds allocated (per unit) to this programme varies between 
plans and amongst states. (Refer to Table 8.40 that provides information on means 
and standard deviations of housing allocation per unit for the 215 cases.) For the 
whole of three five-year plans the mean was $11,319 per unit with a standard 
deviation of $5,209. This mean of allocation per unit increased as the five-year plan 
headed towards the 1990s. During 3MP the mean of allocation was $8,137 per unit, 
then in 4MP it increased to $13,526 per unit and finally to $16,361 per unit during 
5MP. 
Table 10.16 below provides information regarding the mean of project 
allocation per unit of house by states and plans based on the sample of completed 166 
projects. This table shows that the amount of funds allocated to this programme is 
increasing from the average of $8,194 in 3MP to $13,942 in 4MP and finally to 
$15, 766 in 5MP. The allocation of funds per unit of houses shows variations between 
states in each plan. For example in 3MP, the lowest was Pahang with $7,264 and the 
highest was Pulau Pinang with $9,970 per unit. Similarly within the states and 
between plans show variability; for example, Johor was allocated with $9,598 in 3MP, 
then $17,959 in 4MP and slightly reduced in 5MP with $15,557 per unit of house. In 
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general the amount of funds allocated per unit to states shows the increased of 
allocation from the 3MP to 5MP with the exception to lohor in 4MP and Pulau Pinang 
in4MP. 
Table 10.16: 
PROJECTS' MEAN ALLOCATION OF FUNDS (PER UNIT OF HOUSE) BY 
STATES, AND PLANS 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
States 3MP 4MP 5MP Total 
(Average 
for State) 
JOHOR $9,598 $17,959 $15,557 $14,312 
NEG. SEMBILAN $7,733 $15,180 $15,770 $11,484 
SELANGOR $7,881 $11,140 - $9,674 
PERAK $7,924 $11,201 $15,000 $9,583 
PULAU PINANG $9,970 $24,586 $14,813 $16,662 
PAHANG $7,264 $13,340 $17,778 $10,350 
TRENGGANU $8,817 $11,389 $15,140 $10,350 
TOTAL (Average for $8,194 $13,942 $15,766 $11,304 
Plan) 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 10.17 below shows that the amount of funds allocated to this 
programme varied for each states and between plans for projects completed within the 
plan and projects completed outside the intended plan. In general, allocation per unit 
is higher when projects are completed outside the intended plan. This is because when 
projects were not completed within the same plan states asked additional allocation to 
cover the anticipated cost increases, from the federal government. 
Chapter Ten: Hypothese Tc ting 
Table 10.17: 
PROJECTS ' MEAN ALLOCATION OF FUNDS (PER UNIT OF HOUSE) BY 
STATES, PLANS AND STATUS OFCOMPLETION~ 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
States/Status 3MP 4MP 5MP Total 
JOHOR $9,598 $17,959 $15,557 $14,312 
Completed Within Plan - $14,731 -
Completed Outside Plan $9,598 $19,343 $15,557 $14,234 
NEGERI SEMBILAN $7,733 $15,180 $15,557 $11,484 
Completed Within Plan $6,488 $13,857 $15,770 $11,101 
Completed Outside Plan $8,445 $16,504 
SELANGOR $7,881 $11,140 - -
Completed Within Plan $7,929 $11,502 - -
Completed Outside Plan $7,851 $10,890 - -
PERAK $7,924 $11,201 $15,000 $9,583 
Completed Within Plan $7,505 $12,734 -
Completed Outside Plan $8,238 $10,761 $15,000 $9,823 
PULAU PINANG $9,970 $24,586 $14,813 $16,662 
Completed Within Plan $8,560 $25,000 $14,125 $16,116 
Completed Outside Plan $11 ,380 $24,172 $15,550 $17,207 
PAHANG $7,264 $13,340 $17,778 $10,350 
Completed Within Plan $4,754 $11,355 -
Completed Outside Plan $7,949 $12,520 $17,778 $10,350 
TRENGGANU $8,817 $11,389 $15,140 $10,350 
Completed Within Plan $8,451 $11,355 -
Completed Outside Plan $9,000 $11,423 $15,140 $10,831 
TOTAL $8,194 $13,942 $15,766 $11,304 
Completed Within Plan $7,376 $14,028 $14,673 $11,028 
Completed Outside Plan $8,588 $13,889 $16,130 $11,448 
Source; Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection. 
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An investigation was also carried out in relation to a number of cells that have 
a lower allocation per unit when projects were completed outside the intended plan as 
in Table 10.17. These projects were initiated in 4MP (1981) and delays in the starting 
of the construction had occurred. Their construction began in 1984 to 1987 and 
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completed between 1985 and 1990. During 1985 to 1988, Malaysia had experienced 
an economic recession that resulted in a cut of public spending. Thus, additional 
allocation to cover the increased cost of these project was not provided by the federal 
government. This explains why projects completed outside intended plan for 4MP had 
a slightly lower of allocation of $13,889 when compared to projects completed within 
plan with the mean allocation of $14,028. 
To test whether variations in the allocation of funds were statistically 
significant, the ANOVA test was utilised. In the test, the allocation of funds per unit 
was used as a dependent variable against plans and states as the independent variables 
(see Table 10.18) . The result of the test provided the main effects of variable plan and 
states with a large F-value of 19.7 and the level of significance of .00005.(6) Each of 
this variables (PLAN and STATES) individuall y also produced a statistical 
significance to the dependent variable of .00005. We can notice this by the large value 
of sum squares contributed by both variables PLAN and STATES. The test further 
showed that there wa interaction between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable on the allocation of funds per units. The explained source of 
variations between groups produced an F-ratio of 11.03; a value which is significant at 
the level of .00005. This interpreted as the dependent variables PLAN and STATES 
jointly explained the differences in the dependent variable allocation of funds per unit. 
Therefore we can confirm that the amount of funds provided by the federal 
government for the public low-cost housing programme varies significantly between 
five-year development plans and between states. 
Table 10.18: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALLOCATION OF FUNDS (PER UNIT) 
TO THE STATES AND PLANS 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Dependent Variable: Allocation of Funds (Per Unit) ALL$UNIT 
Source of Variation Sum of D.F. Mean Square F-value Significant 
Squares ofF 
Main Effects 2082214433 8 260276804.083 19.715 .000 
PLAN 1541066878 2 770533439.185 58.365 .000 
STATES 389338231 6 64889705.085 4.915 .000 
2-Way Interactions 582073721 11 52915792.808 4.008 .000 
PLAN STATES 582073721 11 52915792.808 4.008 .000 
Explained 2766732792 19 145617515.383 11.030 .000 
Residual 1927489203 146 13201980.841 
Total 4694221995 165 28449830.273 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data CollectlOn 
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Another ANOV A test was carried out to examine whether the said statement is 
still valid if one more variable, the project's completion status (STATUSIN) is 
introduced in the analysis (see Table 10.19 below). Although the analysis shows no 
interactions between three variables (PLANS, STATES and ST ATUSIN), the result 
still shows significant differences by the joint effect of the three independent variables 
to the dependent variable. 
Table 10.19 : 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALLOCATION OF FUNDS (PER UNIT) TO THE 
STATES, PLANS AND STATUS OF COMPLETION 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Dependent Variable: Allocation of Funds (Per Unit) ALL$UNIT 
Source of Variation Sum of D.F. Mean Square F Significant of 
Squares F 
Main Effects 2201078950 9 244564327.813 15.303 .000 
PLAN 1343524179 2 671762089.736 42.033 .000 
STATES 660276782 6 110046130.296 6.886 .000 
STATUSIN 16419879 1 16419878.925 1.027 .312 
Explained 2201078950 9 244564327.813 15.303 .000 
Residual 2493143045 156 15981686.184 
Total 4694221995 165 28449830.273 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST ALLOCATION OF FUNDS, LOAN 
APPROVED AND PROJECT COST 
After examining variations in the allocation of funds to states and plans, this 
section examines the amount funding allocated by the federal government in relation 
to the total project cost. It is predicted :-
"That the amount of funds provided by the federal government for the public 
low-cost housing programme was lower than the total project cost." 
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Data analysis for this testing is based on the comparison of: (a) projects completed 
within the same five-year plan, and; (b) projects completed outside the intended plan. 
Table 10.20 below shows the amount of funding based on the three five-year plans 
and categorised into (a) the average allocation of funds per unit of house; (b) the 
average project estimated cost per house; (c) the average amount of loan approved per 
house; (d) the average amount of construction tender price per house; (e) the average 
total project cost per house; and (f) the average total project cost house adjusted to 
1990's price. 
Table 10.20: 
COMPARISON OF PROJECTS FUNDING BY PLANS 
(Based of 166 Completed Projects) 
3MP 4MP 5MP 
Allocation Per Unit $8,194 $13,978 $15,766 
Completed Within Plan $7,376 $14,129 $14,673 
Completed Outside Plan $8,588 $13,889 $16,130 
Estimate Per Unit $10,683 $19,706 $21,238 
Completed Within Plan $9,381 $19,427 $25,370 
Completed Outside Plan $11,310 $19,670 $19,861 
Loan Approved Per $10,396 $19,258 $17,291 
Unit $7,689 $17,450 $16,298 
Completed Within Plan $11,700 $20,360 $17,622 
Completed Outside Plan 
Tender Price Per Unit $11,106 $17,001 $22,130 
Completed Within Plan $8,045 $16,182 $23,628 
Completed Outside Plan $12,579 $17,500 $21,632 
Total Project Cost Per $12,342 $20,353 $24,291 
Unit 
Completed Within Plan $8,718 $18,945 $26,925 
Completed Outside Plan $14,088 $21,210 $23,412 
Project Cost Per Unit $15,268 $21,311 $23,132 
Adjusted to 1990's 
price $12,801 $21,049 $29,095 
Completed Within Plan $16,456 $21,471 $21,144 
Completed Outside Plan 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Total Cases 
(missing) 
165 
(1) 
162 
(4) 
166 
(0) 
166 
(0) 
166 
(0) 
166 
(0) 
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Analysis from this table shows a pattern of project funding and resourcing. 
Firstly, there are differences between projects completed within the same plan and 
projects completed outside the intended plan. In general, projects completed outside 
the intended plan cost more than those completed within the same plan. Secondly, the 
projects were allocated with inadequate funding where the amount of funding 
allocated and the amount of loan approved were lower than construction tender price 
and total project cost per unit. As a result, the state governments had to bear the 
differences between the total cost and the funding provided by the federal 
government. (7) About 51 % of these projects had their total cost more than the amount 
of loan approved, while another 36% with total cost equal to the amount of loan 
provided, and 13% with total cost lower than the amount of loan approved. Thirdly, 
the mean of project estimate was lower than the cost of construction tender and total 
project cost. About 59% of projects had their total cost above the estimated cost. (8) 
Also 40% of the projects required one or more additional loan to meet the total project 
cost (see Table 8.43 in Chapter 8). This occurred because there was a lapse of time 
between when the estimate was made and when the actual construction was carried 
out. The mean time lapse between these two periods for the three plans was almost 
four years (47.8 months). This explains why project estimates were no longer 
accurate. Table 10.21 below provides information on the time taken between when the 
project estimates were made and the time of project completion by plan and by the 
project completion status. Finally, the project cost more as the project progressed from 
3MP to 5MP. This can be seen where the average total project cost was increasing 
from $12,342 in 3MP to $20,353 in 4MP and finally to $24,291 in 5MP. A similar 
increasing pattern also occurred when the mean for total project cost per unit is 
calculated into 1990's price: $15,268 in 3MP, $21,311 in 4MP and $23,132 in 5MP. 
Table 10.21: 
THE TIME TAKEN BETWEEN PROJECT'S COST ESTIMATE MADE AND 
PROJECT COMPLETION 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Plan 3MP 4MP 5MP 
(months) (months) (months) 
Mean For the Plan 44.7 51.6 42.1 
Complete Within Plan 27.8 29.1 16.2 
Complete Outside Plan 53.1 65.7 50.8 
Number of Cases 78 70 12 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection. 
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Based on the comparisons of programme funding and resourcing between the 
three five-year plans and the project completion status (completed within or outside 
plan) we can summed up: that the amount of funding provided by the federal 
government was lower than the total project cost. Projects also cost more if they were 
not completed within the same plan. Project cost increased in nominal term as well as 
in 1990' s price. This has constrained the performance of this programme. Two 
reasons were associated with this problem: (a) poor project estimation, and (b) delays 
in implementing the projects which were therefore affected by inflation. 
The following Table 10.22 provides correlation between the six funding and 
resourcing variables. The correlation between allocation of funds per unit and adjusted 
total project cost per unit is low with the value of 0.37. Whereas the correlation 
between allocation of funds per unit and other five variables is modest. The amount of 
loan approved per unit has a high relationship with project cost per unit. 
Table 10.22: 
CORRELATION BETWEEN SEVERAL FUNDING AND RESOURCING 
VARIABLES 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.ALL$UNIT 
Mean Allocation of Funds for 1.0 
Projects per unit 
2.E$TUNlT .49 1.0 
Estimated Amount of Project 
Cost per Unit 
3.APP$UNIT .59 .72 1.0 
Amount of Loan Approved per 
Unit 
4. TDRSUNIT .47 .71 .65 1.0 
Amount of Project's 
Construction Tender Per Unit 
5.CO$TUNlT .46 .82 .79 .87 1.0 
Total Project Cost per Unit 
6.ADJ$UNIT .37 .80 .70 .81 .95 1.0 
Adjusted Total Project Cost 
per Unit in 1990's Price 
Number of Cases 166 162 166 161 166 166 
Mean $11,304 $15,364 $14,846 $14,531 $16,777 $18,531 
Standard deviation $5,334 $7,237 $6,529 $6,340 $7.086 $6,713 
NamL Correlation of .05 or greater are significant when two-tailed are used. 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection. 
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REVOLVING FUNDS AND PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 
The discussion in Chapter S mentioned that the Federal government decided 
in January 1978 to set up revolving funds of $S million for each state government to 
assist in speeding up the construction of public low cost houses. This enabled the state 
governments to make payment for the construction of public low-cost houses while 
waiting for the loan withdrawal from the federal government. These funds were to be 
utilised for the payment of land acquisition. site preparation and infrastructure 
development while waiting for project loans approval by the Federal Treasury. Then 
in 4MP. the government increased the revolving funds from M$S to M$20 million for 
each state. 
It is predicted the utilisation of financial 'revolving funds' led to a shorter time 
taken to reach project completion and this to lower total project cost per unit. 
Therefore to following statement was developed:-
Statement 2c : "Programme implementation performance is associated with the 
availability of funds; projects which utilised financial "revolving funds" 
exhibited better performance than projects which did not utilise financial 
"revolving funds." 
Table 10.23 provides a summary of information on the comparisons between 
projects which utilised revolving funds and projects which did not. In relation to this 
projects are compared between plans and their (a) average tender price per unit; (b) 
average total project cost per unit, and (c) average total project cost per unit adjusted 
to 1990's price. The majority of projects show that those utilised the "revolving 
funds" have higher cost than projects which did not utilised the revolving funds. This 
is contrary to the aim of the revolving fund to reduce the cost by speeding up the 
payment and as the result getting faster project completion. Another analysis was 
carried out to find whether this difference is statistically significant by engaging t-test. 
The result shows that they are statistically significant difference between the projects 
utilising and not utilising the revolving fund. The result of t-test on the variable 
"tender price per unit" (TDR$UNT) produced an F-value of 6.960 • probability value 
equal to .009 with two-tail significant of .0005 at an alpha of .OS. On the other hand. 
the of t-test on the variable "total cost per unit" (CO$TUNIT) produced quite a large 
an F-value of 8.308 with probability value of .004 and a two-tail significant of .0005 
at an alpha of .05. For the variable "adjusted total cost per unit in 1990's price" 
(ADJ$UNIT) with an F-value of 8.398 with probability value of .004 and a two-tail 
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significant of .0005 at an alpha of .05. All these results show there is significant 
different of the project cost between utilising and not utilising the revolving funds. 
Therefore we can conclude that we failed to reject the statement that projects utilised 
revolving funds had perfonned better in tenns of lower cost. 
Table 10.23: 
COMPARISON BETWEEN ON MEAN OF CONSTRUCTION TENDER PRICE 
FOR PROJECT UTILISED AND NOT UTILISED THE REVOLVING FUNDS 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Tender Project 1990's No. Of 
Price Per Cost Per Project Cases 
Unit Unit Cost Per 
Unit 
Meanfor3MP $11,106 $12,343 $15,269 80 
Utilised Rev. Fund $11,595 $15,304 $17,501 4 
Not Utilised Rev. Fund $11,080 $12,187 $15,151 76 
Meanfor4MP $17,001 $20,353 $21,311 74 
Utilised Rev. Fund $18,507 $22,184 $22,770 42 
Not Utilised Rev. Fund $15,025 $17,949 $19,395 32 
Meanfor5MP $22,130 $24,290 $23,132 12 
Utilised Rev. Fund $22,021 $24,377 $23,470 11 
Not Utilised Rev. Fund $23,334 $23,334 $19,413 1 
Source; Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection. 
The issue of revolving funds was further analysed to see whether the time 
taken had any statistical significant difference between projects which utilised and did 
not utilise the funds. A similar approach using t-tests was adopted with the variables 
FORMBEGN and FORMOCC. Variable FORMBEGN is the time taken between the 
fonnulation of project and the beginning of construction. Whereas, the variable 
FORMOCC is the length of time taken from project formulation to the occupation of 
houses. The results of the tests carried are shown in Table 10.24 and 10.25 below. The 
tests show that projects utilised the revolving funds have longer completion time and 
longer time to begin construction of project. The result of the test shows that for 
FORMBEGN, there is statistically significant difference between projects using and 
not using revolving funds with F-value of 6.095 and two-tail significant of .017 at an 
alpha of .05. Similarly the result in table 10.25 for the variable FORMOCC shows a 
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statistically significant difference for projects utilising and not utilising the revolving 
funds, with F-value of 3.774 with two-tail significant of .019 at an alpha of .05. 
Table 10.24: 
UTILISATION OF REVOLVING FUNDS AND THE TIME TAKEN TO BEGIN 
THE PROJECT (FORMBEGN) 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Was Revolving Funds Utilised? Mean Std.Dev Cases 
(month) (month) 
Yes, Utilised 58.4 33.5 57 
Not utilised 50.7 26.5 109 
Mean difference/total 7.7 166 
t-test for equality of means: 
F=6.095 
p= .015 
2-tail significant =0.107 at alpha 0.05 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 10.25: 
UTILISATION OF REVOLVING FUNDS AND THE TIME TAKEN FOR 
PROJECT COMPLETION (FORMOCC). 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Was Revolving Funds Utilised? Mean Std.Dev Cases 
(month) (month) 
Yes, Utilised 92 36.3 57 
Not utilised 79.6 30 109 
Mean difference/total 12.5 166 
t-test for equality of means: 
F=3.774 
P=0.054 
2-tail significant = 0.019 at alpha 0.05 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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This is to test the relationship between the length of time taken as an 
independent variable and the total project cost as a dependent variable. The total 
project costs are calculated in terms of total project cost per unit of house built. The 
aim is to test the statement that there is an association between the total project costs 
and the length of time taken for project completion; the longer time needed for the 
project implementation process, the higher the project costs. 
Statement 2d : "That there is an association between the total project costs and 
the length of time taken for project completion; the longer time needed for the 
project implementation process, the higher the project costs. " 
The approach adopted in examining this statement is as follows: (a) analysing 
the general pattern of the mean project cost per unit by project completion time 
according to quartile; (b) analysing the general pattern of the project cost adjusted 
according to 1990's price by the quartiles of time taken; (c) analysing project cost by 
regression analysis (d) analysing the mean project cost per unit adjusted 1990's price 
with the time taken for completion by the regression analysis. 
The project cost per unit and completion time by quartiles 
This analysis involved the mean project cost per unit and project completion 
time according to quartile. The variable of time taken from fonnulation to occupation 
(FORMOCC) is further categorised into its quartiles known as FOROCQTL. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the FOROCQTL variable is the time taken in 
completing projects which is divided into the four quartiles (refer page 371 ) The 
summary of project costing per unit based on quartiles of time taken is shown in Table 
10.26 below. The mean and median of project cost per unit show that faster projects 
have lower cost than slower projects. For example the mean of project cost in the first 
quartile is $14,093 while projects in the fourth quartile is $19,564. The median for 
project cost in the first quartile is $10,058 while the median for projects in the fourth 
quartile is $20,534. This tells us that when a longer time is taken to complete the 
project, the higher will be its costs. 
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Table 10.26: 
PROJECT PERFORMANCE BASED ON THE QUARTILE OF TIME TAKEN FOR 
THE WHOLE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS. 
FORMCQTL FORMCQTL FORMCQTL FORMCQTL 
Below 1st. 1st. Quartile 2nd. Quartile 3rd. Quartile 
Quartile 
Mean $14,093 $16,913 $16,984 $14,093 
Median $10,058 $14,913 $16,069 $20,534 
Std. Deviation $8,190 $7,167 $5,980 $5,985 
Minimum $5,900 $7,000 $6,952 $6.499 
Maximum $32,000 $40,324 $40,028 $34,756 
No. of cases 41 41 41 42 
Missing cases 0 0 0 0 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Project Cost Adjusted to 1990's Price and Quartiles of Time Taken 
A similar summary of project costing as in the earlier Table 10.26 was 
calculated in 1990's price as can be seen in Table 10.27 below. The mean and median 
of project cost still show that faster completed projects have lower total costs per unit, 
while slower projects have higher project cost per unit. The same table also provides 
information on standard deviations, and the minimum and maximum of project cost in 
1990' s price. 
Table 10.27: 
TOTAL PROJECT COST ADJUSTED TO 1990'S PRICE AND PROJECT 
RANKING BY QUARTILES OF THE TIME TAKEN FOR THE WHOLE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS. 
Time Taken FORMCQTL FORMCQTL FORMCQTL FORMCQTL 
Below lst. lst. Quartile 2nd. Quartile 3cd. Quartile 
Quartile 
Mean $17,315 $18,885 $18,736 $19,170 
Median $14,195 $16,900 $18,390 $19,460 
Std. Deviation $8,139 $7,447 $5.871 $5.189 
Minimum $8,723 $9,873 $8,335 $7.134 
Maximum $34.820 $44.556 $42,448 $30,144 
No. of cases 41 42 41 42 
No. of missing 0 0 0 0 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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Multiple Regression Analysis of Project Cost 
An analysis by a simple bivariate regression was also made on the mean 
project cost per unit (CO$TUNIT) and the time taken for completion (FORMOCC) as 
appears in Table 10.28. This aimed to test the degree of association and linearity of 
between these two variables. The multiple regression analysis test shows there was a 
linear relationship between the total project cost per unit and the time taken to 
complete the housing project. However the strength of association between these two 
variables were modest because the value of multiple-R was 0.41 only. The test 
produced the value of R -square of 0.17 that interpreted as only 17% of the variation in 
project cost per unit (CO$TUNIT) was explained by the linear regression on the 
completion time variable (FORMOCC). The test also provided the constant of $9,480 
and unstandardised B equal to 71.8 months which the linear equation is equal to:-
Y' = $9,480 + 71.8 X. 
Table 10.28 : 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TOTAL COST PER UNIT AND THE TIME 
TAKEN FOR PROJECT COMPLETION (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Cost Per Unit (CO$TUNIT) 
MuldpleR .41271 Analysis of D.F. S.S. 
Variance 
RSquace .17033 
Adjusted R Square .16480 Regression 1 847453921 
Standard Error 52445.94 Residual 150 4127982120 
Variable B S E-Beta Beta T 
From Formulation 71.7809 12.9318 .412708 5.549 
to Occupation 
(FORMOCC) 
Constant 9479.5827 1185.5377 7.996 
Durbin.Watson test = 1.2 
F·Value 
30.79 
Sig. F 
.000 
Sig.T 
.0000 
.0000 
Notes; 
This data analysis is based on 156 cases after excluded 10 cases with extreme 
values (outliers) 
Source; Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
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A similar analysis was also carried out engaging testing the relationship 
between the project cost per unit adjusted to 1990's price (ADJCUNT) as the 
dependent variable and time to complete the project (FORMOCC) as independent 
variable. The results are shown in Table 10.29. The test produced correlation result of 
multiple R of 0.24 where the strength of association between these two variable is 
low. The test also provided the constant of $14,168 (in 1990's price) and 
unstandardised B equal to 36.3 months which the linear equation is equal to: Y' = 
$14.168 + 36.3 X. However this is not a good predictor because the small R-square 
value of 0.06. 
Table 10.29: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT COST PER UNIT ADJUSTED TO 
1990'S PRICE AND PERFORMANCE BY TIME TAKEN (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted Project Cost Per Unit (ADJCUNT) 
MultipleR .24021 Analysis of D.F. S.S. 
Variance 
R Square .05770 
Adjusted R Square .05133 Regression 1 214316834 
F·Value 
9.06257 
Standard Error 4862.9791 Residual 148 3499987767 Significant 
ofF 
.0031 
Variable B S E·Beta Beta T Sfg.T 
Completion Time 36.2739 12.0495 .240209 3.010 .0031 
(FORMOCC) 
Constant 14167.6649 1106.4139 12.805 .0000 
Durbin-Watson test = 1.6 
Notesi 
This data analysis is based on 155 cases after excluded 11 cases with extreme values 
(outliers) 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Multiple Regression When Accounting Several Other Variables 
Table 10.30 provides a multiple regression predicting project cost per unit with 
the time taken (FORMOCC) and four other variables taken into consideration. This 
test used three dummy variables: Third Malaysia Plan (3MPLAN), the National 
Housing Department (NHD) and the state of Penang (pENANG). The result of this 
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analysis shows high association between project cost per unit (CO$TUNIT) and a 
series of variables: the time taken for project completion (FORMOCC). (3MPLAN). 
agency (NHD). states (PENANG) and the resourcing stage (RECOSING). The t-value 
produced significant t for three variables: the FORMOCC, 3MPLAN and PENANG 
but not with the resourcing stage (RECOSING). 
Table 10.30: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT COST PER UNIT IN NOMINAL PRICE 
AND PERFORMANCE BY TIME TAKEN (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Cost Per Unit (CO$TUNIT) 
Multiple R . 70501 Analysis of D.F . S.S. F-Value 
Variance 
R Square .49703 
Adjusted R .48102 Regression 5 4090207059 31.03 
Square 
Standard Error 5134.50179 Residual 157 4139008054 ignificant of 
F 
.0000 
Variable B Beta Standard T Significant of 
Error T 
FORMOCC 51.609657 .238159 13.028161 3.961 
.0001 
3MPLAN -8389.50509 -.590088 811.397762 -10.340 
.0000 
PENANG 6382.12505 .267426 1405.87007 4.540 .0458 
NHD -1236.64880 -.080260 907.429960 -1.363 
.0000 
RECOSING 58.900255 36.236910 .095634 1.625 
.1061 
Constant 15362.1868 1267.3326 12.122 
.0000 
Source; Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Another test examined relationships of completion time and adju t d co t p r 
unit based on 1990's price was carried out as in Table 10.31. Five other ari bl 
(3MPLAN, NHD, PENANG RESOCING and LOANSECR) were introduced int thi 
analysis. The test result in this Table to.31 has an improved correlation value than in 
Table 10.29. The correlation value of multiple-R increased to 0.61 and with R- qu r 
of 0.37. This interpreted as a modest relationship betw en adju ted co t p r unit in 
1990's price with dependent variables in which 37% of the regr ion line i 
explained. Three variables produced significant t value while NHD and RE 0 IN 
produced value of larger than 0.1. 
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Table 10.31: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROJECT COST PER UNIT (ADJUSTED IN 
1990'S PRICE) AND PERFORMANCE BY TIME TAKEN (FORMOCC) 
Dependent Variable: Project Cost Per Unit Adjusted in 1990's Price (ADJ$UNIT) 
Multiple R .61186 Analysis D.F. S.S. F-VaJue 
of 
Variance 
R Square .37438 
Adjusted R .35031 Regression 6 2765951813 15.55848 
Square 
Standard Error 5443.30994 Residual 156 4622221206 Significant 
ofF 
.0000 
Variable B Beta Standard T Sig. ofT 
Error 
FORMOCC -26.773652 -.130393 18.129247 -.1.477 .1417 
3M PLAN -6323.067096 -.469374 862.103166 -7.334 .0000 
PENANG 6357.424674 .280956 1490.764335 4.265 .0000 
NHD -1198.553143 -.082095 965.451452 -1.241 .2163 
RESOCING -6.951366 -.011912 42.446099 -.164 .8701 
LOANSECR 95.798136 .328434 27.812376 3.444 .0007 
Constant 18594.777057 1360.444917 13.668 .0000 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
In this analysis, there are two issues identified in relation to cost and time 
taken: (a) delays in project implementation, especially at the planning tage, caused 
longer time to complete projects, involved with increased nominal project costs; (b) 
delays which arise of inadequate project preparation made, meant that extra co ts w re 
incurred - so real cost rose. 
The following Table 10.32 shows that there were differences between the total 
project cost (in 1990's price) for projects completed by quartiles. Lower costs were 
shown for projects spent shorter planning stage, shorter beginning of con truction and 
shorter completion time. For example, project completed below the first quartile with 
average cost of $17,316 compare with $19,170 for projects completed in the third 
quartile where about 10% increase had occured. This implied that real price increas d 
when delays in project completion. 
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Table 10.32: 
COMPARISON OF TOTAL PROJECT COSTS (IN 1990'S PRICE) BY QUARTILE 
OF TIME TAKEN AT PLANNING, BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION AND 
COMPLETION STAGES 
Quartile of Mean Mean Mean 
Completion PLANQTL FORMBQTL FORMCQTL 
Below First Quartile $17,494 $17,315 $17,316 
$6,133 $8,139 $8,139 
First Quartile $17,299 $19,015 $18,885 
$7,428 $7,487 $7,448 
Second Quartile $18,549 $18,736 $18,736 
$7,099 $5,841 $5,871 
Third Quartile $20,725 $19,207 $19,170 
$5,736 $5,189 $5,189 
Total mean $18,531 $18,531 $18,531 
standard deviation $6,713 $6,747 $6,733 
1note: figures in italic are for standard deviations 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 10.33 below shows results analysis of variance test with the significant 
difference in real cost according to quartile for the planning stage, beginning of 
construction and completion time. This test confirms that clear projects spent shorter 
completion time and had lower real costs. This is more significant for projects spent 
shorter time to begin construction with the lowest significant of F of .003. 
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Table 10.33: 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TOTAL PROJECT COSTS (IN 1990'S PRICE) BY 
TIME TAKEN AT PLANNING, BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION AND 
COMPLETION STAGES. 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Dependent Variable: Total Project Cost in 1990's Price (Per Unit) ADJ$UNIT 
Source of Variation Sum of D.F. Mean Square F-value Significant 
Squares ofF 
Main Effects 962396377 106932930 2.548 .009 
PLANQTR 315679739 9 105226579 2.508 .061 
FOBEQTL 595670953 3 198556984 4.732 .003 
FORMOCTL 187215805 3 62405268 1.487 .220 
Explained 962396377 9 106932930 2.548 .009 
Residual 6504116284 155 41962040 
Total 7466512661 164 45527516 
Source: Researcher' s First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
Some Interpretations on the Quantitative Test 
In statement 1, it was confirmed that there was variation in the funds provided 
to the housing programme by the five-year plans and states. The amount of funds 
allocated to projects was used to measure this statement. In this analysis it was shown 
that the amount funds increased from 3MP to 5MP and that higher amounts were 
allocated to projects completed outside the intended plan. This implies that higher 
funding was required for projects taking longer time to complete. 
In the statement 2 the researcher compared between the amount of project 
funding and the project cost. It was highlighted that lower funding was provided than 
the total project cost. This was because the allocation of funds and loan were approved 
earlier, while delays in project implementation meant it took longer to complete the 
projects. As a result, the allocation of funds and amount of loan approved were not 
anymore valid to cover construction cost. Similarly, the estimate of project cost was 
also lower than the total project cost. Inadequate funding occurred because costs 
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increased: (a) because of delays and inflation, (b) because extra resources were needed 
to complete projects once they had been carried in detail following inadequately 
detailed initial price. 
Statement 3 examined the relationship between utilisation of revolving funds 
and project performance in terms of the amount of the project cost and the time taken 
to project completion. Revolving funds were created by the government to advance 
payment for projects with the expectation of speeding up the implementation and 
reducing the cost. The comparison between projects which utilised and which did not 
utilised this fund showed that projects which did utilised the funds cost more and took 
longer time. Thus, the revolving funds was not an effective arrangement in reducing 
the cost or expediting project implementation. However, these projects might have 
been worst, without using the revolving funds. 
In the statement 4 this researcher examined the association between the time 
taken to complete the project and the total project cost. The test by multiple regression 
showed that there was a linear relationship between the time taken and the total 
project cost however the association between the two was weak. 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ON PROJECT FUNDING AND 
RESOURCING 
This part of analysis discussed programme funding and resourcing from the 
qualitative data set. 
Allocation of Funds 
The process involved in the allocation of funds was lengthy and underwent 
several stages; starting from the request by SHD, then through several central agencies 
including the MHLG, EPU and Treasury. Annual budget allocations were made 
through the MHLG to enable provision of loans for the projects. 
Projects' allocation of funds were usually granted to states at the beginning of 
the five-year plan based upon average estimate of project cost per house for each of 
the plan. Allocation of funds to each state was made on criteria such as: the states' 
past trends in implementing this programme, their willingness to implement these 
projects, and the availability of land for the proposed projects. Tben, during five-year 
plans' mid-term review additional projects and funds were considered for the states. 
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Funds were allocated for each project formulated in the five year plans. 
However, they were sometimes inadequate to meet to total project cost. This occurred 
because estimates were made at the beginning of the five year plan. without taking 
into the consideration cost increases during construction which was taking place 
several years later. However, annual budget allocations were under-utilised by state 
governments. where the amount of loan withdrawn every year was less than the 
amount of funds allocated. 
The federal government set a project cost limit funded from the loan money of 
M$7,SOO per house during the 3MP, then to M$14,OOO in the 4MP and finally to 
M$2S,OOO during SMP. The cases analysed in Chapter 9. showed that the state 
governments had to provide additional funding meeting higher project costs. In 1982. 
the government approved the maximum selling price for low cost houses of not more 
than M$25,OOO. However, the policy of the federal government in allocating funds for 
the low cost housing projects was still at M$14,OOO per house. One of the 
respondents at the implementing agencies commented. " ... in the situation where basic 
construction criteria were fulfilled and the project did not face any diffiCUlty then it 
would possible to build within the cost limit. But several projects were facing 
problems where this cost limit had constrained the project implementation." 
Loan Approval 
As mentioned above, the policy on project cost limits constrained the 
programme. This was because the average cost per house was higher than the cost 
limit. As a result, many projects requested additional loans. In relation to this. one 
respondent described as "over controlled but short-sighted of the problems on the 
ground" (9) Another respondent who is a programme administrator at the 
implementing agency pointed out, "all problems include tailoring to the cost limit set 
by the amount of loan approved for a project is passed to the implementing agency to 
solve it . .. This problem had occurred over several plans, as a respondent pointed out 
..... the similar problem had also occurred during the past five year plans projects, it 
was of course, the loan provided by the federal government was lower than the actual 
total project cost, because of there was an understanding that a certain amount of 
cost had to be provided by the state government. Also certain project components 
were to be borne by the state government, such as the land and infrastructure costs. " 
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On the other hand, respondents from central agencies saw state governments 
as apathetic to this programme. They saw this demonstrated by the large number of 
initial planning problems, such as site selection, squatters problems, changes in 
project scope and priority and weak command of departments under state control. The 
Ministry found it difficult to persuade the state government to take loans which had to 
be repaid to the federal government. 
'Ras', a programme administrator at the Ministry, whose responsibility was 
monitoring project progress and liaison with state governments pointed out that:-
"The State governments feel very sensitive when federal Treasury imposed 
that before fund could be withdrawn they have to verify the project's progress 
through making visits. To state governments this indicate as 'distrust' feeling 
of the federal government and senses as over control. This was because the 
fund was provided in form of 'loan ',' whatever happen, the state has to pay 
back. Therefore the states should be given a more freedom like in the pasts. 
Although in the past plans federal agencies had made visits, but they were not 
the prime emphasis when to make payment for loan withdrawals. It was 
adequate just by certification of the superintending officer [project's 
engineer] in charge of the project. In fact in the past there were many projects 
where 'advance payments' made by the federal Treasury. Certain amount of 
the loan can be withdrawn while waiting for the agreements between the two 
government being formalised. II 
Examples were quoted from several projects where loans were disbursed even 
before agreements were signed (e.g. Trunkville). The justification was that tenders 
were called even before loan approval was granted by the TCOHL at the MHLG. That 
was why the Committee made the statement in 1982 that they were very upset with 
this practice and warned states not to call for tenders before loans were approved by 
the committee. 
Project Cost 
The central agencies were inclined to approve lower funding than requested. 
As a consequence, projects faced difficulties because of higher construction costs and 
inadequate funds. Additional loans had to be requested from federal government or 
the states had to bear the costs from their own funds. 
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The amount of loan provided was adequate if projects immediately proceeded 
to the construction stage. Delays in construction made the loan provided inadequate to 
cover the project cost. Accurate estimates and proper project preparation is important 
to fit within the constraint set by the programme. The Federal government controlled 
the amount of loan for the programme and the states therefore had to build houses 
confonning to the amount approved. Hence, states ran the risk of having to provide 
additional funds if the loans provided were inadequate. 
Revolving Funds 
Eight out of 24 projects studied under the qualitative data analysis utilised the 
revolving funds. These projects consisted of 5 slow projects, 2 average projects and 
one uncompleted projects. However, delays in implementation of the uncompleted 
and the slow projects were not the result of financial problems. The slow projects 
were faced with problems at the preparation and planning stage, such as delays in site 
selection. The uncompleted project was because of the incapability of the building 
contractor. Two respondents, Kas and Chali were of the opinion that revolving funds 
were useful in project financing, because they can be used as advance payments while 
waiting loan withdrawals fonn the Treasury. Chali explained that ..... project financing 
should not be a problem. .. the state can make payment in advance from this with a 
'revolving fund' while waiting for loan withdrawals from federal which were usually 
delays. n 
Summary on Project Resourcing 
Problem about funding and resourcing arose because of the following:-
• Firstly, the imposition of a "top-down" perspective in programme resourcing 
where there was project cost limit set by the federal government which determined 
the amount of loan approved and the maximum seUing price imposed the low-cost 
housing. Violation of the cost limit by a higher project cost than the permitted 
selling price, resulted in the states bearing the differences from their own funding. 
• Secondly, the federal agencies were inclined to approved lower loans than the 
amount requested. Based on the cases analysed, difficulty arose a result. 
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• Thirdly, inadequate funding was the result of delays in completing the planning 
stage, which caused delays in starting project construction. Delays in starting of 
project construction resulted in the increased of project cost (because of inflation 
and revision to schemes requiring more expenditure). The amount of loan 
approved for projects became inadequate because cost escalation. 
• Finally, the provision of PLCHP funding in the form of loans was considered 
"discouraging and burdening" when comparing with other grant allocations. 
Project financing in the form of loans was considered difficult because of the 
lengthy procedures involved besides "the hassle to collect payments from buyers." 
In addition, the loan withdrawal process became more difficult because of added 
steps and stricter procedures imposed by the federal Treasury on loan withdrawals 
by states. 
Overall the main theme involved in this resourcing stage is that a lengthy process, 
tighter procedures and inadequate funding provided by the federal government 
affected the implementation of the programme. 
Decision on Hypothesis Two 
Findings from the quantitative and qualitative data showed there were 
variations of funds allocation by five-year plans and states. The programme 
experienced inadequate funding because project costs were higher than the funding 
provided by the federal government. Inadequate funding occurred because delays in 
project implementation led to cost increases. 
SECTION THREE: INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND 
ACTORS AT THE BOTTOM 
Introduction 
This hypothesis looking into the question of interaction between agencies and 
actors at the bottom of the implementation process. Implementation of public 
programmes, especially those initiated from the federal level, involve various levels of 
government, multiple agencies or public and private sector arrangements. At the 
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bottom, programme implementation usually faces the problem of inter-agency 
relationships and intra-agency problems which affect the programme outcome. Many 
scholars view inter-agency problems as crucial to the programme implementation. 
This problem can be conceptualised as " ... a problem of co-operation and possibly co-
ordination" (O'Toole, 1995; pAS) or "assembly process in the hands of many" 
(Bardach, 1977). Similarly intra-organisational problems are acute in the programme 
implementation. Intra-organisational problems are control problems in the 
bureaucracy. In addition to the inter-organisational and intra-organisational problems. 
changing implementation climate and the interference by several other key players 
also affect programme performance. In PLCHP the array of players in the 
implementation process is large and diverse. including not only actors in the agencies 
but also politicians. contractors or even land owners and squatters whose livelihood 
are affected by the proposed schemes. 
Respondents View 
Many respondents believed that delays and problems with the implementation 
of this programme were associated with the interaction of inter-agency relatJonships 
and actors related to the programme. The scenario in Malaysian bureaucracy is the 
practise of consulting others. The reason is because each department has its own 
territory or • domain of responsibility'. Also other departments hold infonnation, 
resources or expertise. The practise of consultation is also an attempt at co-ordination, 
co-operation and to avoid being blamed for policy failure or problems. Respondents 
also pointed out that problems occurred because of political interference during site 
selection and occupant selection. This is because of the difference in opinion between 
administrator and politician; administrators are guided by the procedures and time and 
cost constraint whereas politicians are concerned with who is affected by the 
programme and whether this brings support. 
Official Capacity and Official Relationship 
Implementing public programmes has the advantage of better contact and 
accessibility with other government departments through formal channels and 
agendas. Programme administrators at the state level or implementing agencies can 
meet and negotiate in an official capacity. There are many agendas where 
administrators can voice their requests through several meetings at the district, state or 
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ministry level. (10) In general the acceptance of this programme by other departments is 
good, because of the tradition of giving priority to government programmes. 
Respondents mentioned that the changing treatment of this programme has 
created problems in respect of increased time and cost. In the past, especially during 
3MP, technical departments and local authorities were given priorities and relaxation 
to project specifications for the programme. But as time progressed, especially at the 
beginning of late 4MP and early 5MP, these departments began to impose many 
requirements. Some local authorities insisted that planning permission must first be 
obtained. Other government departments and local authorities seemed to have 
forgotten about the objective and philosophy of this low cost housing programme 
which they viewed simply in terms of imposing their own technical inputs and 
requirements, and imposed conformity with planning standards. Interpreting feedback 
from respondents, this problem can be summarised as follows:-
• Change in the policy stance of local authorities to the programme implemented 
by the states, when in the past, there had been more relaxation. 
• Increased standards, imposed by technical departments and local authorities 
which affected project costing. Difficulty arose when these requirements were 
imposed during project construction or after the completion of construction 
when certificates of fitness were required. 
• Requirement to conform to standards set by technical departments and local 
authorities. 
• The changing inter-agency climate in the implementation of public 
programmes, where similar treatment was given to the public and private 
sector programmes and where priority has been given to the privatisation 
projects. 
• Some of the implementation components were dependent on other agencies' 
input or their setting of priorities. 
This issue of interaction is clustered into the intervention of non-agency actors and the 
intervention of inter-agency actors. The non-agency actors consist of politicians 
contractors, land owners and squatters. The inter-agency actors are further clustered 
out the following categories: (a) interaction with other agencies in general; (b) 
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interaction with implementing agencies; (c) interaction with technical departments; (d) 
interaction with local authorities; and (e) interaction with agencies providing service, 
resources or utilities. In the PLCHP interaction of actors and agencies affected the 
programme by increasing implementation time and therefore project cost. 
Actors Outside the Agency 
Actors outside the agency are councillors, politicians, contractors, land owners 
and squatters. They may also intervene and deflect the project's implementation 
process, resulting in increased time and cost. Data analysis at the scheme level 
suggested that councillors and politicians are interested in the selection process; both 
the selection of sites and selection of occupants for the projects. Land owners and 
squatters affected this programme because projects were proposed on land that 
affected their livelihood. Therefore, land owners and squatters caused resistance and 
confronted the agency or authority through their connection with politicians or 
councillors. Councillors and politicians took the squatters and land owners' side to 
gain votes and "political mileage". 
Politicians 
Councillors and politicians may play the role of assisting the agency or 
otherwise. They did not necessarily provide hurdles to obstruct project 
implementation. In many instances, they assisted the agency in dealing with and 
solving problems on the ground, acted as middlemen, or pushed the agency to 
expedite project implementation. But, their involvement was especially pronounced if 
opportunities existed of getting votes or support, otherwise they would protect 
themselves from "getting their feet muddy". (11) Generally, councillors and politicians, 
from the perspective of programme administrators, can be summed as having 
difficulties in coming to agreement among themselves, especially in occupant 
selection, and this is one of the factors affecting the programme performance. 
Site Selection 
Examples from several schemes show that project implementation were 
affected by the involvement of councillors and politicians. For example, the Muddy 
CatUll project, where local politicians interfered and requesting the project to be 
located at another site. In this project, the state was depended for a decision by the 
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state legislative councillor for that constituency, of whether to proceed with this 
project or otherwise. Even the interference of the Deputy Minister of Housing was 
unable to reduce local politicians' interference on this issue of site selection. Site 
selection for this project was finally made in early 1993 by another state legislative 
councillor, who was appointed in 1990. In another example, the Black River 3 project, 
squatters strongly resisted this scheme through their state councillor, which led to 
project cancellation. In the Trunkville project, squatters refused to move from the 
proposed site and protested their eviction through their state councillor. This caused 
delays to site selection and a lower number of houses were built, in partly 
accommodating the squatters on the proposed project's site. Political interference at 
the scheme level caused difficulty in site selection. The SHD was unable to convince 
politicians on this matter, because of the wrong choice of the site itself and the states 
. d .. abo th . t (12) m eclslveness ut e proJec . 
Occupant Selection 
Occupant selection is another area involving politicians. State councillors were 
appointed as members of the selection committees. Although, there were guidelines 
on occupant selection made by the state, these did not solve the problem, because 
politicians usually had difficulty in coming to an agreement on whom to choose and 
they always had their own interpretations. For example, in the Risefield project, 
selection of occupants was made the state councillor himself neglecting the committee 
headed by the district officer. This caused conflict and friction between the politician 
and the district officer. The Stony River project is another example, where a state 
councillor believed he was the authority for selection. 
The examples cited above show that programme implementation was affected 
by outsiders to the agency: councillors and politicians. Their approach is usually 
vocal, whether pushing or giving resistance to public agencies. However, an emerging 
question arises, why agencies and politicians at the bottom are capable of co-operating 
among themselves when there is "top political figure" behind a project? Can this 
suggest that programme implementation needs strong leadership or strong backing 
from an influential leader? 
Contractors 
The capability of contractors also has significance to projects' perfonnances. 
This was demonstrated in several schemes such as the Broken Mound, Bamboo 
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Splinter, Risefield, Gingling and Blind Pheasant projects. For example, the Broken 
Mound project was abandoned halfway by the contractor and was finally cancelled. In 
the case of Bamboo Splinter project. the implementing agency blamed to contractor 
for being unable to distinguish the site's proper boundaries and that lead the state to 
cancel this project. Three other projects (Risefield, Gingling, Blind Pheasant) 
experienced delays and problem because of the problems faced by contractors. In 
contrast, fast projects (Barkings, Knee Lie, Manor) were built by capable contractors 
who had a good pedormance record with the NHD. While two other projects, Lumber 
Junction and Long Sand, were built by "experienced and capable contractors". 
Example of Inter-Agency Relationship at the Scheme Level 
The problem of obtaining the certificate of fitness for Ficuswood scheme is an 
example of inter-action between actors and agencies at the bottom. The delay in 
completing this project was raised in the State Action Committee meeting. It was 
informed that problems had occurred as a result of delays in removing illegal squatters 
on the site, where a feeder road to the scheme was proposed. After that, a visit to the 
site by Chief Minister, representatives of government agencies and the local UMNO 
(a ruling political party component) committee was made in early 1991. The 
implementing agency informed them there were 71 squatters families needing to be 
h ,,(13) U ~ I th resettled to temporary "long ooses. nlortunate y, ese squatters were not 
allocated the temporary "long houses" because the state was still undecided about 
accepting the grant money (about $1 million) from the EPU for squatter resettlement 
in the Klang Valley.(14) Instead, the UMNO committee proposed that the squatters 
move to another of the SEDC's own project elsewhere. SEDC refused to comply with 
this proposal because it already had 13,000 applicants to cater for. The project was 
completed in June 1991. Then, every month of the State's Housing Committee 
Meeting, the agency requested that the squatter problem be solved by the State's 
Housing Division and the District and Land Office. The implementing agency also 
requested the local authority to issue a temporary certificate of fitness for occupation, 
while waiting for this problem to be solved by the District and Land Office. Finally, a 
meeting was held to solve this problem when the District and Land Office promised to 
solve the squatters problem immediately, the district council promised to issue a 
temporary certificate of fitness and the state councillor for the constituency pledged to 
provide a list of selected occupants. The programme administrator at the 
implementing agency's level voiced her dissatisfaction, because the selection of 
occupants took three years and was completed only in April 1994. After resettling the 
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squatters temporarily elsewhere, the implementing agency constructed a feeder road to 
the scheme and the project was completed in November 1994, Then, an additional 
requirement to provide soft landscaping was imposed by the local authority, While 
recognising the importance of providing landscape for the scheme to comply with the 
newly formulated by-laws, the programme administrator appealed to the local 
authority to grant an exemption because expediting occupation of the houses was 
more important in fulfilling the national housing objective, besides being constrained 
by cost limitations, Unable to obtain exemption, the implementing agency had to 
comply with this requirement A waste of time occurred, because the implementing 
agency had to consult and obtain agreement of the State's Housing Division because 
of additional cost incurred, Having complied with this requirement, the said certificate 
of fitness of occupation was not obtained because a personnel in-charge of the issuing 
of certificate refused to obey directives from a superior officer, 
Relationship Between Central Agencies and the States 
Federal officers perceived programme implementation from the top 
down perspective characterised by the goal oriented approach of reaching 
the target by the end of the plan within cost limitations. Programme 
administrators at the federal level were of the opinion that the programme 
should have not faced many inter-agency problems because they viewed it 
. I' t' ts"(lS) " , th as "Imp ementmg governmen proJec carrymg out estate 
, , ts" (16) "fulf'II' "al 'b'l' governments own proJec or 1 mg constitutIon responsl I Ity 
on housing" (17) , This assumption was based on " .. ,the tradition of giving 
priority to government projects, where projects sometimes may be 
constructed first and approvals can be obtained later from planning 
authorities, "(18) Implementation and control of the programme was carried 
out by monitoring through reporting systems, visits to the states. meetings 
and persuasion. The following description illustrates this point. 
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"The way we dealt with this programme was through several means, such 
as monitoring the progress reports, the quarterly meetings, the quarterly 
meetings, special meetings and in other forums. In the first place, the states 
had to submit to the Ministry the monthly report on the physical and 
monetary progress. We also checked the projects' progress through 
'SETIA' (19) and 'SIAP' reporting system. SETIA provided physical 
progress and expenditure report. We also had regular quarterly meetings 
with the state governments. From these we had the feedback enabling us 
pushing the states to accelerate their performance. Also, don 't forget that 
through the technical committee on housing loan we can exert pressure. We 
can ask the state governments to improve their performance before 
approving new loan applications. 
Sometimes we presented states' housing performance in other forums like 
the National Housing Council, where EXCOs on housing from each states 
attended When this meeting involved the EXCO on housing it would 
provided an added pressure in the state. So by this, we had the 
administrators and politicians' level to attend on this low-cost housing 
projects' problem. 
Apart from meetings the MHLG also used to make regular visits. 
Pressurising the states sometimes may not help, so we have to develop a 
good relationship. This was because the state is another entity that we can 
not just give directives. Through this good relationship and we have to play 
a proper publiC relation roles. Usually things worked through this good 
relationship. We visited the states, talked to them, see the projects, helped 
them and sometimes we talked nicely to them "please work harder!" I think 
in the absence of other means these approaches were quite effective." 
[Halo, 23.11.1994} 
Inter-agency Relationship at the Bottom 
Programme administrators at the federal level assumed relationships between 
agencies and other actors at the local level were going very well. They thought that 
the programme was given a priority and treated with urgency. However inter-agency 
relationships become more complex with a changing environment. TOday, 
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government projects are treated similarly to private sector projects. Several 
respondents believed that the spirit of providing inter-agency co-operation had fallen. 
Prior to 4MP the programme was considered as the state governments' 
projects, and was not subject to any planning approval from local authorities. 
Standards and specifications for housing projects under this programme were 
determined by the implementing agency. 
The culture of inter-agency consultation, involved agendas and attempt to co-
ordinate. This was the arena where problems with technical departments were solved 
during interagency meetings and special meetings chaired by the Chief Minister. This 
'prominent figure' acted as a factor expediting project implementation and as a 
middleman to moderate differences between agencies, if they arose. 
Similarly inter-agency relationships in certain arenas helped to expedite the 
implementation process. When certain leaders emphasised the importance of the low 
cost the programme, programme implementation worked effiCiently and smoothly. 
These people bonded together with close relationships due to certain similarities and 
common interests. They can act as agents expediting the approval process or 
providing services and utilities. However, new questions may arise of how to ensure 
good relationships between agencies without the existence of these bonds? One 
respondent questioned: if they unable to have a mechanism to speed up the 
implementation process, it defeated the purpose of government itself building the 
project, some • co-operation' between government agencies was intended to speed up 
the project implementation. 
INTERACTION WITH IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
Acceptance by the state 
Programme implementation also involves interaction between the state and its 
implementing agencies. 
In Perak for example, during 3MP, the reception by the state to the technical 
services offered by the federal government through the engagement of NHD was very 
encouraging. Almost all housing projects were implemented by the National Housing 
Department. Before 3MP, the state used the service provided by PWD and SEDC. 
Since these two agencies, PWD and SEDC, had many projects of their own, the 
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assistance offered from the newly formed NHD was more than welcomed by the state 
then. 
In contrast, Selangor favoured the use of SEDC and PWD in the 
implementation of its own project. In Selangor, a larger number of projects were given 
to the SEDC and PWD. Whereas, Negeri Sembilan felt more comfortable to engaged 
it own SEDC than NHD or PWD for project because they were more experienced and 
knowledgeable about local conditions. 
Interaction With Technical Departments 
Specifications and standards were referred to other technical departments at 
the state and districts level. A range of departments such as Town and Country 
Planning Department, Public Works Department, Health Department, Fire Department 
and Drainage and Irrigation Department. The roles of these departments in the 
programme were: giving comment and applying sanctions as well setting the 
standards to be followed by projects. Reference to these departments were the result of 
statutory requirements or administrative arrangements. 
Project implementation progressed smoothly if co-operation amongst agencies 
was encouraging as evidenced in the Lakesland projects. However, occurrence of 
delay in the construction progress and increase in cost is found in the Coralville 
project. When the plan for Coralville project was referred to the Health Department, 
sewage treatment was imposed by group septic tanks. However, when federal health 
standards changed an oxidation pond was required. This caused an increase in cost to 
the project. Redrawing the detailed plan and negotiating construction work with the 
contractor caused additional time. 
Interaction With Local Authorities 
The Stand Adopted by Local Authorities 
During 3MP the programme was considered as a government project and was 
not subjected to any planning permission from the local authorities. However, at the 
beginning of 4MP some local authorities required planning permission to be obtained 
farst, before any project construction. In the past, projects carried out by the Public 
Wodes Department were not referred to any local authority or to other technical 
departments. This is because, traditionally, the Public Works Department is the 
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agency implementing government projects and standards are set by the department 
itself. 
Problem arose because projects did not conform to standards imposed by the 
local authorities. When the number of completed projects increased, they lead to 
increased responsibility for maintenance and services of these projects by the local 
authorities. The local authorities were reluctant to provide services to these project 
areas, unless planning approval was first obtained. 
Planning Requirements 
Administratively state governments may direct local authorities to issue 
certificates of fitness for projects. But this may create legal problem because the local 
authority is an autonomous body and the state government is not in the position to 
issue specific directives. Several attempts were made, but failed in negotiating with 
local authorities to grant more relaxed planning standards and to issue certificates of 
fitness for projects under the PLCHP. This created friction between officers working 
at the local authorities and at the state secretariat. Finally, many states decided to 
conform to the standards imposed by local authorities in order to obtain certificates of 
fitness and also to avoid further friction between themselves and the local authorities. 
When plans were submitted, the local authorities insisted the projects to be upgraded 
with additional facilities. 
Increased Standards 
Special considerations were given to planning standards when approving plans 
for low cost houses. Low cost houses are constrained by cost limits. If the 
requirements are too stringent this can result on cost increases. As a result, the 
programme is burdened with costs. Delays in approvals can also cause cost increase, 
because the loan approved was not valid anymore during the call of tender. (20) 
Interaction With Services, Resources and Utility Agencies 
These agencies interrupted projects by imposing new standards and 
requirements on the projects. In coping with these, several actions had to be taken 
such as re-drawing some projecC s detailed designs, amending contract agreements, 
calculating new costs, fulfilling certain procedures and seeking additional loans if the 
funding was inadequate. 
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Power Supply 
Several projects experienced increased of cost and delays because imposition 
of additional standards about power supply. Examples at the scheme level can be 
illustrated from projects such as the Swampy Village, Whiteville and Stony River. 
In the case of Swampy VIllage project, when it was completed in 1982, 
electricity supply could not be provided because the utility agency required an 
electricity power sub-station to be built, although the previous understanding it was 
not required. Another case the Whiteville project where a strong resentment by utility 
agency; the agency felt it must be consulted and it's consent must be obtained when 
dealing with matters related to its area of jurisdiction or area of its specialisation. 
However, what was wanted by the utility agency was not clear. This case highlighted 
that problems might occur if parties involved were not consulted and especially when 
the party could impose certain restrictions. Finally in the case of Stony River project, 
deflection occurred from practise, besides the imposed payment of contribution fees 
of M$238,OOO where the utility agency required that the land title must first be issued. 
It quite unusual for the utility agency to impose this condition because it was not the 
issue within it jurisdiction and should not the question at all. 
Water Supply 
The pace of this department dictated project completion. An example come 
from the Trunkvllie project where construction faced problem because of delays as 
the result of waiting for the plan amendments by the implementing agency to be 
agreed by the Water Supply Department, SHD and other technical agencies. Then, 
while constructing the project the Water Supply Department requested the water 
supply pipe for this project to be amended from a 200 mm to a 300 mm type. This 
type of change required amendments to the contract, which usually significantly 
increased the cost and required an extension of the construction period. In another 
project (Muddy Canal), the Water Supply Department insisted the water tank be built 
of concrete pillars, whereas in the past the department had always allowed steel 
pillars. This caused an increase in total project cost of M$33,OOO per house from 
merely M$25,OOO per house. For a small scale housing project such as this, the cost to 
build the required water tank made a significant increase to the total project costs. 
Land and District ORlee 
Land and District Offices play important roles in this programme in 
connection with project proposals, site selection, land matters, enforcement and 
squatter eviction, and occupant selection. Actions by these offices can affect the time 
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and cost of project. For example. the Golden Hope project. its land acquisition: was 
gazetted as 50 acres instead of only 20 acres intended. Amendment to the said gazette 
notification involved legal procedures which affected additional time concerned and 
payment of damages to land owners. Inability of the Land Office to evict squatters 
was the amongst the major reasons for project cancellation in Black River. Trunkville. 
Splinter Bamboo projects. In contrast, the ability of Land Office to effectively solved 
squatter problem in the Stony River project caused smooth implementation of the 
project. 
Intra-Agency Relatioosbip 
Intra-agency problem is a control problem in bureaucracy. Problems occurred 
because lower level personnel were not taking action. as directed by higher level 
personnel. This caused delays in issuing approvals or certificates of fitness. As one 
respondent mentioned " ... after all these works have to be done those lower level 
personnel, they can make the files move faster or slower. "21 Even within the 
organisation an issue was raised of how to co-ordinate the combination of works 
amongst planners. architects. civil and structural engineers so as to comply with the 
cost limit of maximum M$25.000 per house. 
Continuity of Personnel 
Lack of continuity of personnel at all levels of agencies involved in this 
programme also affected programme performance. In the Malaysian bureaucratic 
system. personnel are on transfer from one agency and one level of government to 
another. In general a range of personnel involved in the implementation of the 
programme were subject to this kind of transfer, with the exception personnel at the 
SEDCs. While this approach has advantages, this effected the implementation of the 
programme. For example, a new person has to learn about Mall the nodes and the 
trade about the implementation of this programme" (22) but when the personnel have 
attained experience and learned the trade of public policy implementation. he is then 
transferred to another agency. If programme implementation is considered as a 
learning process, then the learning was not canied through to the next plan. Amongst 
other reasons, this is a plausible explanation of the programme poor performance, 
where a series of similar problem repeatedly occurred in the programme 
implementation. 
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Interpretation and Conclusion 
In the section three of this chapter this researcher has analysed and attempted 
to test the hypothesis about interaction between agencies and actors at the bottom 
responding to the top-down policy set by the federal government. Interaction amongst 
agencies and politicians affected the implementation of the programme and eventually 
affected the programme perfonnance in tenns of achieving its pre-detennined target. 
This interaction caused deflections, hurdles and to an extent uncertainty about many 
decisions, especially during the early implementation stage. Inter-organisational 
relationships in programme implementation that involved the interaction between two 
or more units on behalf of a public policy, can be conceptualised as problem of co-
operation and possibly co-ordination. Broad reasons why inter-agency interaction was 
more difficult arose because of: (a.) agencies imposed their own requirements, own 
views and perspectives on the programme implementation, (b.) agencies imposing 
sanctions and requiring proper consultation (c.) the changing of bureaucratic climate 
and stance toward government programmes in general. 
Facing with difficulties and problems at the bottom, then the question is how 
to improve programme success by striking the balance between: (a.) reducing the 
effect and constraints created by actors and agencies; (b.) complying with the cost 
limit, and; (c.) meeting the time frame and targeted number of houses as intended 
early in the five-year plan. 
SECTION FOUR: DECISIONS ON THE HYPOTHESES 
This last section presents a summary of findings and the decisions on the 
hypotheses analysed in this chapter. The first hypothesis is testing the relationship of 
the programme's preparation and planning stage with the programme perfonnance in 
tenns of the time taken to complete the project implementation. The main findings 
from this hypothesis testing are as follows:-
1. There is relationship between project preparation and perfonnance in tenns of the 
completion time, whether within the same plan or intended plan; under or more 
than five years; and, completion time by quartiles. However, the association 
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between project preparation and shorter completion time is only partially 
supported. 
2. The project planning stage has a substantial association with the time taken from 
the formulation until the starting of construction, the completion of building and 
the occupation of houses. 
3. There was a substantial positive association between the project's planning stage 
and the project's completion time. This relationship was linear; when the time 
taken at the planning stage increased then the total time to complete the project 
would be longer. 
4. The length of time spent on the whole implementation process was varied 
significantly between states. The result of the ANOV A test confirmed that 
variability occurred between the time taken in the implementation process and the 
plan, states and implementing agencies jointly together. 
5. The qualitative data analysis confirmed that the pedormance of this programme 
was affected by delays in the project implementation because of inadequate 
preparation for project proposal, inadequate planning and projects not working as 
planned. Although the implementation of this programme has undergone several 
five-year plans, it is still experiencing an unsatisfactory pedormance and little 
improvement. 
6. The programme pedonnance was associated with the problems occurred during 
the project preparation and planning stage. These problems include unclear 
guidelines, rushing to meet the deadlines, unidentified project site, inappropriate 
and indecisiveness about site selection, difficulty in getting state land and the 
proposed site occupied by squatters. When projects were proposed to the states 
and central agencies, a large number of their sites was not identified. Sites were 
only identified after they were approved for the particular five year plan. Proper 
feasibility studies were also not carried out in many of these projects. 
7. Selection of project site has become more difficult because the state land became 
scarce, whereas private land became more expensive. Moreover, rapid 
development in some areas has caused greater competition in getting land for the 
public low cost housing projects. 
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Evidences from qualitative! and quantitative data proved that the programme's 
preparation and planning stage has significant towards the overall completion time. In 
the quantitative analysis, the correlation tests between the planning stage and other 
subsequent stages produced significant results although the examination on the 
preparation variables produced weak results. In the qualitative data analysis noting the 
pattern that the project preparation and planning stage produced plausible 
relationships with other stages, the project completion time and the programme 
performance directly. 
Funding and Resourcing 
The second hypothesis is on project funding and resourcing where it was 
predicted that the performance of the public low-cost programme is dependent on the 
allocation of resources devoted to it. Delays in implementing the projects caused cost 
increases which were affected also by inflation and as a result the states had to meet 
some of the project costs from their own funding. Data analysis on this hypothesis 
produced findings as follows:-
1. The allocation of funds varied between plans. It showed an increasing pattern on 
the amount of the average allocation per unit from the 3MP to 5MP. 
2. Several significant differences were evidenced in terms of project funding and 
resourcing of this programme. There were differences on the amount of funding 
between the projects completed within the same plan and projects completed 
outside the intended plan. Projects completed outside the intended plan cost more 
than those completed within the same plan. Projects were provided with 
inadequate funding where the amount of funds allocated and the amount of loan 
approved were lower than construction tender price and total project cost per unit. 
As a result, the state governments had to bear the shortage between the total cost 
and the funding provided by the federal government. 
3. The amount of loan requested for this programme was higher while the loan 
approved was lower. However, this project cost estimate was still lower than the 
cost of construction tender and total project cost. This occurred because there was 
a lapse of time between when the estimate was made and the construction end. 
The mean of time lapse between this two periods was almost four years. This 
explained the reason why the project estimate was no longer accurate. Similarly 
this also explained why the amount of loan provided was not adequate to cover the 
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project cost and as a result additional loan had to be requested from the federal 
government. 
4. The project cost more as the time progressed from 3MP to 5MP's period. The total 
project cost per unit was increasing from $12,342 in 3MP to $20,353 in 4MP and 
finally to $24,291 in 5MP. A similar pattern also occurred when the mean for total 
project cost per unit is calculated into 1990's price index where $15,268 in 3MP, 
$21,311 in 4MP and $23,132 in 5MP. In short this implied that the project cost 
was higher than in the past. 
5. Projects cost was higher if the project was not complete within the same plan but 
were carried over to the next five-year plan where this increase was in the nominal 
price as weB as in real prices (1990's adjusted price). 
6. The revolving funds (aimed to expedite project completion and reduce project 
cost) did not provide an effective result. The analysis showed that projects utilised 
revolving funds did not perform better in terms of lower project costs or shorter 
completion times. 
7. There was a linear relationship between the mean project cost per unit and the 
time taken for project completion, although the strength of· association between 
these two variables were considered low. When the total cost was calculated in 
1990's price, the result of correlation produced negligible association between 
these the adjusted cost and the time taken. However when additional variables 
were included in the multiple regression the relationship became modest. 
8. Data analysis in the qualitative part showed how the process involved in getting 
the allocation of funds for this programme was lengthy. There was delay in 
approving projects and the allocation of funds by the federal government in the 
early five year plan, because of the process and procedures involved. 
9. In general funds were allocated for each project formulated for the five year plans, 
however, they were sometimes inadequate to meet to total project cost. This 
occurred because the estimates were made at the beginning of the five year plan 
without taking into the consideration the cost increase during construction period 
which would taking place several years later. In contrast the annual budget 
allocation was under-utilised by the state governments where the amount of loan 
withdrawn every year was less than the amount of funds allocated. This occurred 
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because projects progressed slowly and so the state governments were unable to 
withdraw project loans. 
10. The amount of loan provided by the federal government was lower than the actual 
total project cost occurred because there was an understanding that a certain 
amount of the project cost was to be provided by the state governments. such as 
the land and infrastructure costs. The central agencies were thus inclined to 
approve lower funding than requested; as a consequence. projects were faced with 
difficulty because of higher construction cost and inadequate funds. Additional 
loans had to be requested from the federal government or the states had to bear the 
cost from their own funds. This became a discouraging factor to the state 
government. 
11. The funding and loan provided would have been adequate if projects had 
immediately proceeded to the construction stage. Delays in construction made the 
amount of loan provided no longer adequate to cover project cost. Right 
estimation and the proper preparation of project is important to fit within the 
constraints set by this programme. The Federal government controlled amount of 
loan for the programme. Therefore the states ran the risks of having to find 
additional funds if the loans provided were inadequate. 
Interaction of Agencies and Actors 
The third hypothesis related to the interaction between agencies and actors. 
Delays and problems with the implementation of this programme was 
associated with the interaction of inter-agency relationships and actors related to the 
programme such as the process of consulting others when encroached others' territory 
or • domain of responsibility'. Besides other departments hold information, resources 
or expertise. The practise of consultation is also as an attempt at co-ordination, co-
operation and to avoid being blamed for policy failure or problems. Respondents also 
pointed out that problems occurred because of political interference during site 
selection and occupant selection. This is because of the difference in opinion between 
administrator and politician; administrators are guided by the procedures and time and 
cost constraint whereas politicians are concerned with who is affected by the 
programme and whether this brings support 
The changing treatment of this programme where some local authorities 
insisted that planning pennission must first be obtained while other departments 
impose many requirements and higher project specifications. Other government 
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departments and local authorities seemed to have forgotten about the objective and 
philosophy of this low cost housing programme which they view simply in tenns of 
imposing their technical inputs and requirements, and imposing conformity to 
planning standards. 
Interpreting feedback from respondents, this problem can be categorised as: (a) 
the change of policy stance by some local authorities to this programme; (b) increased 
of standards imposed cause higher project costing; (c) difficulty in conforming 
standards after projects have been completed when requiring certificates of fitness; (d) 
the changing of inter-agency climate in the implementation of public programmes; 
and (e) some of the implementation components were dependent on other agencies' 
input or their setting of priorities. In finding the significance of these factors, they 
were clustered into two: (a) the intervention of non-agency actors, and (b) intervention 
of inter-agency actors. 
The non-agency actors consist of politicians contractors, land owners and 
squatters where they may intervene and deflect the project's implementation process. 
This caused delays and increased of cost. Political interference at the scheme level 
caused delays in site selection and occupant selection. The SHD was weak to 
convince politicians in this matter because of the wrong choice of the site itself and 
the state also indecisiveness of about the project. The success and performance of the 
project is also dependent on the capability of contractor to construct the project. 
Selection and monitoring of contractor are crucial for project completion within 
stipulated time and estimated cost. 
The inter-agency actors are clustered into: (a) interaction with other agencies 
in general; (b) interaction with implementing agencies; (c) interaction with technical 
departments; (d) interaction with local authorities; and (e) interaction with agencies 
providing service, resources or utilities. Inter-agency relationships at the bottom has 
become more complex and changing of climate where government projects are treated 
similarly like the private sector's projects. Several respondents believed that the spirits 
and roles of providing inter-agency co-operation has been reducing. The basic issue 
where clearance is to be obtained is the question of lengthy process and increased 
standards imposed where fmally involved increased in cost. 
Interaction amongst agencies and politicians affected the implementation of 
the programme which eventually affect the programme performance in terms of 
achieving it pre-detennined target. This interaction caused deflections, hurdles and to 
an extent of an uncertainty of many decisions especially during the early 
Chapter Ten: Hypotheses Testing 439 
implementation stage. Inter-organisational relationship in programme implementation 
that involved the interaction between two or more units on behalf of a public policy, 
can be conceptualised as problem of co-operation and possibly co-ordination. 
Faced with difficulties and problems at the bottom then the question is how to 
improve programme success by striking the balance between: (a.) reducing the effect 
and constraints created by actors and agencies; (b) complying with the cost limit, and; 
(c.) meeting the time frame and targeted number of houses as intended early in the 
five-year plan. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have tested and analysed three main hypotheses on 
programme preparation and planning, funding and resourcing, and interactions 
amongst agencies and actors at the bottom which affect the programme 
implementation. This chapter indirectly serves in finding explanations for the 
phenomenon of target under-achievement and the variable performance of the public 
low cost housing programme in Malaysia amongst states and periods of 
implementation. 
Important results deriv:ing from this hypotheses testing have major 
implications on the policies affecting further improvement of the public housing 
programme in Malaysia in light of the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) which has 
been launched early this year. Although there is a changing policy stance, 
implementation will be the same. These policy implications may also' apply,(public 
policy implementation in general. 
The next chapter is the final chapter of this thesis. This final chapter is 
devoted primarily to linking together an overview of literature and findings of this 
study. A summary of key findings and lesso~leamt from this study are also presented 
that provide implication and some recommendations to the public low-cost housing 
programme in Malaysia. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. The guidelines for interpreting value of gamma as proposed by Davies (1971; p.49) is 
as the following: 0.00 no association; 0.01- 0.09 negligible association; 0.10 - 0.29 low 
association; 0.30 - 0.49 moderate association; 0.50 - 0.69 substantial association; 0.70 -
0.99 very strong association; 1.00 perfect association (from Poister 1978; p.456). 
z. The mUltiple-regression analysis based on 166 cases (without excluding the outliers of 
case no.6 ) is as in the following table. The results produced slightly lower figure than in 
Table 10.6 in this chapter. 
RELA TIONSIDPS BETWEEN THE PLANNING STAGE (PLANSTAG) AND 
PERFORMANCE BY LENGTH OF TIME (FORMOCC) 
(Based on 166 Completed Cases) 
Dependent Variable' Total Project Completion Time (FORMOCC) . 
Multiple .61322 Analysis D.F. Sum F-Value 
R of Square 
Variance 
R Square .37604 
Adjusted .37224 Regression 1 66438.5 98.83887 
R Square 
Standard 25.92662 Residual 164 110239.1 Significan 
Error tofF 
.0000 
Variable 8 Beta Standard T Significant 
Error ofT 
Planning .998331 .613224 .100418 9.942 .0000 
Stage 4.28863 10.771 .0000 
Constant 46.19511 
1 
Source: Researcher's First Stage/Quantitative Data Collection 
3 This analysis produced a correlation coefficient of .53 because an outliers was excluded 
from the analysis. Whereas in the earlier table the multiple R was at .51 when all cases 
were included. 
". Regression analysis between FORMOCC and other variables (PLANST AG, 
FORMBEGN and SPAN) produced the results as followed: 
(a) FORMOCC and PLANSTAG using all dummy variables for agencies and 
states: 
Multiple-R = .653, R-square = .427, adjust R-square = .386, F-value = 10.45, 
F-significant = .0000, PLANSTAG's t-significant value = .0000, but other agency 
and state variables' t-significant values were not significant at an alpha .05. 
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(b) FORMOCC and FORMBEGN using dummy variables for agencies and 
states: 
Multiple-R = .835, R-square = .696, adjust R-square = .675, F-value = 10.45, 
F-significant = .0000, FORMBEGN's t-significant value = .0000, but other 
agency and state variables' t-significant values were not significant an alpha 
.05. 
(c) FORMOCC and SPAN using dummy variables for agencies and states: 
Multiple-R = .976, R-square = .953, adjust R-square = ., F-value = 281.6, F-
significant = .0000, SPAN's t-significant value = .0000, but other agency and 
state variables were not significant an alpha .05. 
5. See Ely et.al (1991; pp.143 -145) in Chapter 5 on interpreting of qualitative data. The 
idea of thinking units act as broadly framed sorting files or abstraction of data into several 
categories. 
6 SPSS prints significant level less than .00005 as zero. If the significant level is higher 
than .00005, it would have been round up. When the significant level is less than .00005 it 
means that less than 5 in 10,000 that we would get sample result like this if the variable 
are independent in the population (see M.Norusis, 1986; p.244). 
7 The detailed analysis of the total project cost per unit compared with the loan approved 
according to plan is as follows:-
COMPARISON BETWEEN TOTAL COST PROJECT COST AND THE LOAN 
APPROVED BY PLAN 
(in the number of projects) 
CostIPlaa 3MP 4MP SMP Total 
Cost Equal to Loan 29 30 1 60 
(36.1%) 
Cost Lower than 5 16 1 22 
Loan (13.3%) 
Cost More than 46 28 10 84 
Loan (50.6%) 
Total 80 74 12 166 
~ missing case: 0 
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8 The comparisons of project cost and estimate is as the following table: 
COMPARISON BETWEEN TOTAL COST PROJECT COST AND THE LOAN 
APPROVED BY PLAN 
(in the number of projects) 
CostlPlan 3MP 4MP SMP Total 
Cost Lower than 27 36 3 66 
Estimate (40.7%) 
Cost More than 53 34 9 96 
Estimate (59.3%) 
Total 80 70 12 162 
~ missing: 4 cases 
9 Interview with Ying. 
]0 Opinion expressed by Ying in the interview on, 29.11.1994. 
II. Interview with Aziz. Similar opinions expressed by Rawi, Hardy and ROHS. 
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IZ. Interview with Chali on 2.12.1994. Excerpt from this interview has been mentioned 
elsewhere in Chapter 9. 
lJ. Long house a form of temporary dwelling to resettle squatter while waiting project 
construction and completion. 
14. Reason of indecisiveness because lack of proper plan and still searching for proper site 
for the squatters resettlement. In December 1994, the state government decided to tum 
down this offer although increased the amount because it was unable to comply with the 
condition imposed by the EPU and lacked of suitable state land. 
15. Perspective viewed by HALO based on interview on 23.11.1994. 
16. Perspective viewed by Aziz based on interview on 3.12.1994 
17. Perspective viewed by Rosly based on interview on 8.11.1994 
J8. Excerpt from Interview with HALO, a senior programme administrator at the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government. 
19. For a detailed description on proj~t monitoring and evaluation system in Malaysia, 
see Ian Masser, "The Use of Monitonng Systems: An Evaluation of the SETIA Project 
Monitoring", TRP 108. Department of Town and Regional Planning. University of 
Sheffield. 
20. From quantitative data: about 51% of these projects were in the local authority areas, 
but only 10 % were subjected to local authorities' planning approval while 90 % were not, 
because they were outside local authorities' jurisdiction or subject by prior arrangement to 
planning exemption. However, this become a focal point and have impacts amongst 
respondents. 
ZI. Interview with Ying 29.11.1994. 
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22. Interview with Halo, and the same view point agreed by Chali, Kani, Ying, Rawi and 
Aziz. 
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Appendix to Chapter 10 
Li\!j)f Var'iables and Their Descriptions 
Scale of 
1\ I eaSlIn'llIe nt 
APLYTCHL Interval 
PLANSTAG Interval 
Interval 
TSRYAGRE Interval 
AG REBEGN Interval 
LOANSECR Interval 
RESOCING Interval 
Illterval 
house type, 
from previous 
of lime taken from 
the loan approval by to the 
The length of time taken "'i1JL"'U,lillt~U 
! (he .' of construction. 
, The length of time taken 
(,f clln~lruction. 
The completion stage. 
construction to houses 
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lULlldllUII to 
approval and the 
completed to houses 
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Process I 
SPAN lillen',t/ I The length of time taken between project formulation to project's 
! physical work's completion. 
FORl\[OCC 1:,len;li ---~rl1l' kngth of time taken between project formulation to houses 
: m:cupation by buyers or renters. 
STATUSIN l\ominai Project's completion time; whether the project was completed within 
the same plan 'five-year' plan or outside the intended plan (a 
dependent variable) 
STATUS3 DlImm\ Dummy variable for project completion status. Completed within 
five-year plan = 1, 0 = completed in other five-year plan 
FOROC5YR l\ominai Project's completion time: categorised of whether completed less 
than five years or more than five years (a dependent variable). 
FOROCQTL Orclin;" Project's completion time which is divided into four quartiles (a 
dependent variable) 
Other 
Variahles I 
PLAN Ordin,li The' five-year' development plans: 3MP, 4MP and 5MP 
3 MPLAN l\omin,tI Dummy variable for five-year plan. Code 1 = 3MP, 0 = other plans 
4MPLAN l\\)mina: DUlllmy variable for five-year plan. Code 1 = 4MP, 0 = other plans 
5MPLAN l\()mil1;l~ Dummy variable for five-year plan. Code 1 = 5MP, 0 = other plans 
STATE f\:\)min;l: The states 
JOHOR Dummy lJulllmy variable for the state. Code 1 = Johor, 0 = other states 
PAHANG I)umm\ Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 - Pahang, 0 = other states 
PENANG DlImm\ Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 = Penang, 0 = other states 
PERAK DlImm\' Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 ;:::: Perak, 0 = other states 
SELANGOR Dummy Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 = Selangor, 0 = other states 
SEl\lBILAN Dummy Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 ;:::: N.Sembilan, 0 ;:::: other states 
TRENGANU DlImm~' Dummy variable for the state. Code 1 = Trengganu, 0 = other states 
AGEj\;CY f\:ominal Implementing agencies for this PLCHP: NHD, SEDC or PWD 
NHD Dummy Dummy variable for National Housing Department (NHD): Code 1 = 
f\:HD. 0 = other agencies 
SEDC Dumnll Dummy variable for State Economic Development Corporations I (SEDC), Code I = SEDC, 0 = other agencies 
PWD I )UIllJll\ I Dummy variable for Public Works Department (PWD). Code 1 = 
I'W[), 0 = other ag.::ncies 
~"'ndjng 
:;Nariahles 
ALL$VNIT H:ilio The mean allocation of funds for the project. (The total allocation of fUl1d~ for a project divided by number of houses for the project) 
E$TUNIT Ratio Estimated amount of project cost per house (unit) 
APP$UNIT Ratio Amount of loan approved for the project per house (unit) 
TDR$UNIT Ratio The amount of project's construction tender per house (unit) 
CO$TUNIT Ratio Total project cost per unit of house 
ADJ$UNIT Ratio I Adjusted total project cost per unit of house to 1990's price. 
l 
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Chapter Eleven 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
Three previous chapters of this thesis have emphasised data analyses and 
discussion to explain target under-achievement and variable performance. They 
specifically focused on three key topics: (a) the programme's preparation and 
planning stage; (b) the programme's funding and resourcing; and, (c) the inter-actions 
amongst agencies and actors at the bottom. Data analyses have been presented by (a) 
the quantitative approach in Chapter 8; (b) the qualitative data analysis in Chapter 9, 
and; (c) hypotheses testing, combining the quantitative and qualitative data in Chapter 
10. Therefore. this chapter serves to fulfil three purposes: firstly, to present the 
essential gist of findings, secondly to re-examine an alternative view on programme 
implementation; and thirdly to highlight lessons learnt from PLCHP implementation 
and then to propose some recommendations. 
Three hypotheses have been presented and tested in this thesis. Their results 
confirmed there were associations between programme performance and the 
preparation made at planning planing stage, the funding and resourcing provided. and 
the effect of interaction between agencies and actors at the bottom. Data analyses in 
these three chapters also confirmed there were variations in the time taken to complete 
the implementation process and the amount of funds provided in the three five-year 
plans. states and implementing agencies. Analyses confirmed that delays during the 
planning stage affected other stages and the overall programme performance. Delays 
in project implementation were also affected by inflation which caused increase in 
project cost. Target shortfall occurred because a large number of projects were not 
completed within the intended plan. Programme performance was also affected by the 
interaction between actors and agencies when other resources and services are held by 
them. Compliance with other agencies requirements' and responsiveness to some 
actors interest also affected programme performance. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Linkages With Data Analyses Section 
The illustration about the linkage of this concluding chapter and three previous 
chapters on data analysis is depicted as in Diagram 11.1. The diagram shows that data 
analyses produce research findings in relation to programme performance and this 
leads to theoretical and practical recommendations. 
Quantitative Data 
Survey 
1\ Qualitative Data Survey 
~ 
---
-Hypotheses Testing 
Data Analyses 
\ 
.... 
Resear!;;b findings: 
• Formulation and 
Preparation 
• Funding and 
Resources 
• Agencies and Actors 
interaction 
• Programme 
Performance 
~ 
Main Research 
Findings 
Recommendations 
T heoretical Implication 
• Contribution to 
Knowledge 
• Suggestion for Further 
Research 
.. 
~ 
frllf.:th;1l1 Allllli!;;atiaDs 
• Lesson learnt on 
Programme 
Implementation 
Recommendations 
Diagram 11.1; Relationship of Data Analyses. Findings and Recommendations 
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GIST OF FINDINGS 
Data analysis in this study has shown the pattern of programme variations 
occurring between plans, states and implementing agencies and has detected where 
delays occurred along the stages of the implementation process. The average time 
taken for completing projects was almost seven years so that 'two five-year planning 
periods' were required to implement the housing projects. The mean between the five-
year plans, though varied, nevertheless statistically indicates no significant difference. 
The proportion of time spent on project implementation was: about half of the time on 
project planning and preliminary preparation; about a quarter for the construction; and 
another quarter for project resourcing and other necessary jobs related to its 
completion. The longest time spent on project implementation was on the planning 
stage. The comparison of mean duration for each of the implementation stages among 
the three five-year plans showed no statistically significant difference. This means that 
there was no improvement and no learning, despite attempts to shorten the time and 
improve the performance. It confirms that an overlong time is still being taken. 
Variability of performance occurred between the states where most states have 
a larger number of projects completed outside the intended plan. A comparison of the 
time taken for the four implementation stages (planning, resourcing, construction and 
completion) showed variability of performance between states but a comparison 
between the implementing agencies shows no significant difference found on the 
mean time taken in each of the four implementation stages. 
Analysis of preparation variables suggests that for a project to achieve a 
shorter completion time, adequate preparation must be carried out before the 
formulation stage. During the preparation and planning stage, delays occurred in site 
identification because states were indecisive on whether to implement projects or not. 
Delay in one stage of the implementation process causes further delays in later stages. 
It is established that there are relationships between programme performance 
and the funding allocated with the five-year development plans, the length of time 
taken over the implementation process, the states and the implementing agencies 
assigned to implement projects and other factors. The project funding and resourcing 
dependent on the allocation of resources devoted to it and upon the five year plan; 
delays in implementing the projects caused cost increases and meant that projects 
were also affected by inflation; as a result the states have to meet project cost from 
their own funding. Funding and loans provided would have been adequate if projects 
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had immediately proceeded to the construction stage. Delays in construction rendered 
the amount of loan provided no longer adequate to cover project cost. Correct 
estimation and the proper preparation of projects are important if agencies are to build 
within the funding limits. 
Data analyses showed that there were variations in allocation of funds between 
five-year plans and individual states. This programme experienced inadequate funding 
where the total project cost was higher than the amount of funding provided by the 
federal government. This inadequacy of funding occurred because of delays in project 
implementation, where the amount of loans and the project estimates were no longer 
valid due to increase in project construction price, land price and other charges as time 
progressed. Findings from the qualitative data highlighted some of the problems faced 
in the allocation of funds, loan approvals and the project costs. 
VIEW ON PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 
The body of literature on implementation study 'has reached a plateau' 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; p.xi), advancing from merely assessing how a single 
decision was carried out to further progressing into the application of frameworks and 
synthesis and revision (Lester, et aI, 1987; p.201). There have been many attempts to 
understand, explain, and analyse the relationship between programme and 
implementation. Similarly, a multitude of case studies with varying conceptual 
frameworks exist. However, there is still no generally accepted theory developed and 
little agreements among scholars in providing guidance to research on policy 
implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; p.xi). One of the drawbacks in this 
policy implementation area is where a typology for studying policy implementation is 
not yet developed, a major step toward theory building. For example, research on 
inter-organisation approaches to policy implementation is still characterised by 
diverse theoretical approaches (O'Toole, 1995). Approaches to explaining programme 
implementation is still divided into two approaches: the top-down and bottom-up 
approach. 
The top-down approach is concerned with how the implementation process is 
structured in achieving the objectives, assumed only pre-determined actors are 
involved with the policy and evaluating the programme outputs based on stipulated 
programme objectives. This implies that implementation is measured strictly by 
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policy objectives as intended. For example in the PLCHP's case: measured by the 
achievement of targets at the end of five year plan in terms of number of houses 
completed, carried over and uncompleted. In contrast, the bottom-up approach is 
concerned with networks of organisations and actors at the bottom who are 
responsible for putting policies into practice and also taking into account others who 
are not mandated. The bottom-up approach sees policy implementation as a way to 
suit implementers rather than policy makers. They adopted the "interactive" approach 
involving "bargaining" and "negotiation" among actors and agencies. They viewed 
putting policies into actions as something that involves adjustments of objectives 
"between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action 
depends." (Barret and Fudge, 1981; p.2S). 
Analyses from this study confirm the bottom-up approach despite the 
programme implementation emphasised heavily on the realisation objectives which 
manifested through detailed programme and its targets. This is because the program 
performance was affected by actors and agencies at the bottom who were more 
concerned with promoting their own interests. They were not bound by the target, 
time and cost limit constraints. The analysis also confirms a broader perspective of the 
interactive among actors and agencies where it is not strictly only to "those upon 
whom action depend" but also from those sanctions, agreements and approvals were 
required. This had been demonstrated in several projects where implementation delays 
occurred in obtaining agreements, sanctions and approvals from a range of actors and 
agencies. In view of the urge to carry out projects, implementers have to comply with 
the sanction imposed or taking into consideration of how to get agreements from 
various agencies and actors at the bottom. 
In implementing public programmes, the state has to deal with a number of 
agencies and actors that are in connection with the programme, where they may cause 
deflections, hurdles and, to an extent, uncertainty in many decisions especially during 
the early implementation stage. This eventually affects programme performance in 
achieving pre-determined targets. The non-agency actors consist of politicians, 
contractors, land owners and squatters where they may affect and deflect the project's 
implementation process. In this case, political interference has occurred during site 
selection and occupant selection because politicians are concerned with who are 
allocated these houses and whether this could bring support to them. Political 
interference at the scheme level causes delays in site selection and occupant selection. 
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Inter-agency relationships at the bottom of the hierarchy have become more 
complex and there has been a change of climate. where government projects are 
treated similarly to private sector projects. The imposition of planning permission and 
technical requirements have made the implementation of this programme more 
difficult. The basic issue, where clearance is to be obtained, is the question of a 
lengthy process and increased standards imposed which finally involve increases in 
cost. 
The contribution of this study is enhancing and providing better understanding 
on factors affected policy implementation. In terms of practical application this study 
helps to understand better the aspect of public low cost housing programme 
implementation in Malaysia. This study has identified major problems in the 
implementation stage and also calculated the length of time taken in each of the 
implementation stages. This directly traced down problem occurred in each steps of 
the implementation process. 
The line of approach taken by this study was gathering information from those 
directly involved with the programme in an attempt to achieve the programme 
intention and target. This study, however, did not conduct investigation of how others 
regulate or impose requirements on this programme. For example, the perspectives of 
local authorities when they imposed planning requirements or when the issuing of a 
certificate of fitness for building occupation. 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation is not simply a straight-forward action of carrying out 
decisions as intended. Implementation implies actions related to execution, carried 
out, fulfilled and brought to completion. The execution process involves not only 
achieving the end goal but proceeding through a large number of detailed processes, 
going through separate levels, inter-agencies and conformity with requirements and 
procedures. Executing a directive involves a number of people and activities before 
the desired results can be achieved. Based on this proposition a number of lessons 
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have been learned from the public policy implementation specifically to the PLCHP in 
Malaysia:-
• The Programme itself: although the targeted numbers were not achieved within 
the intended time, in general it is a realistic and workable programme and its 
implementation can be improved through drawing of lessons from projects 
completed within a specific five-year plan, those completed outside the intended 
five-year plan, and others left incomplete. 
• Lack of adequate preparation for projects during the formulation stage has 
caused projects to be dragged into further delays at other stages. Several 
constraints at this stage such as vague and generalised guidelines led to lists of 
projects being prepared in a hurry due to time constraints, difficulties in finding 
suitable land and poor site selection. All these contributed to poor project 
appraisal for each five year plan. Projects can be improved if adequate preparation 
is made as shown by some of the average and quickly-completed projects. To 
overcome this problem, it is suggested that the central agencies must inform state 
governments early and they should be given ample time to prepare their project 
proposal. 
• Inter-action and co-ordination: that the implementation process of this 
programme involved the bottom-up decisions such as in the site selection, project 
location, project size and occupant selection. In implementing the programme at 
the bottom it involved interactions between a range of actors and agencies. To 
achieve harmony, everyone who has interests in and jurisdiction over this matter 
must be properly informed or consulted. When a programme involves two levels 
of government and various 'actors', the basic implementation problem is the 
problem of co-ordination and the assembly of resources from the two levels of 
government and agencies operating in this programme. 
• Inter-agency and actors at the bottom differed in their interests and perceptions 
over a programme; therefore an influential leadership is needed in co-ordinating 
these various interests, perceptions and opinions to be in line with the PLCHP 
objective. An agency responsible for the programme must also able to negotiate 
and persuade others in realising the programme objective. 
• Lesson to Policy makers and impiementers: that they should never under-
estimate squatters' and land owners' capability in affecting the implementation 
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process through their connection with politicians, especially if their livelihoods are at 
risks. Evidence from some projects proved that their resistance caused project delays, 
to the extent of cancellation. However, they would co-operate and cause very little 
resistance if they were promised the benefit of obtaining legal houses from the project. 
Thus, policy makers and implementers must not viewed squatters' eviction from the 
perspectives of the land law only but to take into account unforeseen circumstances 
and other contingency aspects in aiming at the programme's target. 
Recommendations for Programme Implementation 
The author believes that the programme performance can be improved by 
better actions carried out at every stage of the project implementation process, 
especially by greater monitoring of and emphasis on the formulation and planning 
stage. Specific recommendations for improving this programme include the following:-
• The formulation stage: improvement to this programme must begin with 
better preparation at the formulation stage by issuing clear guidelines, giving 
adequate time for preparing project proposals and by conducting proper 
feasibility studies and project appraisal. All these pre-requisites are designed to 
ensure project success and to overcome weaknesses during the formulation 
stage. 
• A shorter implementation process and fewer steps are required to complete 
the projects. Attempts must be made to avoid delays and to shorten the 
implementation time by giving directives to government agencies to expedite 
the process at every step. For example, the land acquisition process must to be 
settled within six months. There must be improvement .to the procedures and 
red-tape by shortening the steps involved. Therefore attempts to avoid delays 
and to shorten certain procedures are essential key to the success of the 
project. 
• Funding and resourcing for projects must anticipate increases in cost by the 
end of the planning period. Preparation of project planning and estimation must 
consider the cost increase to avoid inadequate funding. The federal government 
should revise its policy on the amount of funding, cost limits and maximum 
allowable selling price for this programme in view of the fact that the cost has 
increased in nominal and constant price throughout the three five-year plans. 
Findings from this study have proved that projects cost more than the 
maximum cost limits and the amount funding provided by the federal 
government. 
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• Better relationships and understanding over this programme by actors and 
agencies at the bottom would help to reduce constrains to gain support and to 
make people view this programme in an objective way rather than in 
accordance with the agencies' or actors' yardstick. 
• The need to ensure realistic and achievable targets for low-cost and other 
housing targets. Evidence of underachievement of the overall housing target 
and low-cost housing target in every five-year plan has shown the need for a 
more realistic and achievable target when formulating the programme for a 
new five-year plan. 
• The challenge faced by Malaysia is to realise the housing objective that it 
. must provide every citizen with access to housing especially the lower income-
groups. The scale of the housing problem facing Malaysia in the future will be 
greater as a result of population increase, urbanisation and changing lifestyle. 
Improvements to the implementation of the overall housing programmes and 
housing policy must gear towards meeting this challenge. 
• The lower profile of the public sector in the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991 - 1996) 
and the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996 - 2000) has shifted a greater responsibility 
of housing supply to the private sector. These five-year plans adopted the 
private sector led approach for development and economic growth. In the area 
of housing, due to the economic prosperity of the country, more focus was put 
on medium and high cost housing because of the more lucrative profits from 
this category of housing. Thus, to encourage private sector's housing 
development the government must provide more incentives and a revision of 
the MS25,OOO maximum selling price of low-cost houses. This would 
encourage construction of more low-cost houses by public corporations and 
private developers. 
• The wider regional variations in low-cost housing programme performance 
must be overcome. States must improve their achievements in completing low-
cost houses as a measure to narrowing these variations while at the same time 
meeting the housing needs of the lower-income groups for affordable houses. 
Suggestion for Future Research 
In general Malaysia has been successfully implementing a number of public 
programmes ranging from socio-economic development to infrastructure development. 
Thus, an emerging question arises whether other housing programmes in the five-year 
plan also faced problems similar to those experienced by this PLCHP. As an object of 
further research it would be interesting to carry out a comparative study between this 
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programme and other housing programmes for lower-income groups such as the 
housing programme implemented by the land agencies, the State Economic 
Development Corporations and the Urban Development Authority. This would show 
to whether similar problems have occurred. 
Conclusion 
This research on the implementation of the Public Low-Cost Housing 
Programme has fulfilled three research objectives as set earlier: first, seeking 
explanations for the programme's underachievement; second, examining the 
programme's prominent features and describing of its implementation process~ and, 
finally, attaining relevant findings for the refinement and improvement of this 
programme. The main finding is that factors affecting project performance were the 
quality project preparation at the planning stage, the gap between funding and project 
cost and the interaction of agencies and actors at the bottom. 
As noted by the quantitative and qualitative data and the final confirmation of 
the hypotheses, successful implementation is dependent upon concrete actions at the 
planning stage which expedites the commencement of construction. This in tum would 
help to make allocated financing provision adequate. Furthermore, the better 
relationships amongst actors and agencies at the local level and committed to the 
programme objective would improve the implementation of this programme of which 
the aim is to fulfil the housing needs of lower-income groups. Agencies have to look at 
the ultimate aim of the programme not just the narrow perspectives of their technical 
requirements and agency interests. To conclude, we contend that adequate actions at 
the planning stage, adequate funding support and better understanding of the 
programme, improved inter-agency co-operation on the programme at the bottom and 
liberalised procedures are important in increasing the performance of public policy. 
Findings deriving from this thesis can have significant implications on the 
implementation of the low-cost housing programme in Malaysia, especially in light of 
the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996 - 2000) launched early this year. Although there is a 
shift of policy stance by the government in its approach to housing and in the light of 
privatisation which is as the buzzword for the present policy making scenario, this 
PLCHP is still necessary for low-income groups because of its convenient purchasing 
arrangement and because it builds houses in the area where the private sector is not 
operating for financial reasons. 
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Appendix 1 Data Collection Ro ter 
DATA COLLECTIO R 
Note: FormulatedprQiect means that the project was officially,., cogllis d by til 
federal and state government which both parties agreed to implement it and 
development allocation was made at the beginning of ea hfiveyear de vel pment plan 
or a revised plan. 
File Reference at MHLG: ............................................ . 
File Reference at State Secretariat: .................... ........... . 
File Reference at Implementing Agency (NHD/SEDCIPW ) ................. .. 
Date Roster Prepared: ........ ............... ...... .. .... ........... .. 
1.1. Project's Name: ..... ............. .............................. . 
1.2. State: Please circle 
1= Jahor = 
3= Kedah 
3= Kelantan 
4= Melaka 
5=N. embil n 
6= Pahang 
9= ulau in ng 
10= J ng r 
11= r ngg nu 
12= WiJ Y h r. kuluan 
13= h 
7= Perak 
1.3. Name of District ............................................... .. 
1.4. Name of Local Authority: ......................................... . 
(if the project located within a I cal auth rity r ) 
1.5. Which Five Year Plan period the pr ~ ct \i a 
1= 3MP (1976-1 ) 
2= 4MP (19 1-19 5) 
3= 5MP (19 6-1990) 
1.6. Date of Formulation: .............................................. . 
1.6. The project's location was cia ified as? 
I=URB 
2= RB - RI 
3= R RAL 
4=OTH 
k 
? 
4 9 
1. 7. Was the project within local authority's controlled area? 
(Investigate the lay-out plan or loan application particulars) 
1= YES 
2= NO 
1.8. Was this project an extension of previou phase? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
1.9. What were the number of houses propo ed in the lay-out plan? 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ... units 
1.10. Name of Agency who prepared the layout plan? 
1.11. State the date when the lay-out plan was prepared? 
[ ][ ][ ] 
1.12. Lay-out reference number (if appl icable) 
1.13. When was the lay-out plan obtain d appr I fr m planning ulh rily? 
Dat : r ][ ][ ] 
1.14 State the name of Authority! geney wh d the I y- ut pi n? 
1.15. Please provide any amendment to the I y- ut pi n (if ny) 
Date Number of Houses RCllSOn\ 
1.18. Number of houses built when the proj et fin Bye mpl ( ? 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] uni 
1.19. What type of houses constructed f r thi project? 
1= SINGLE TOR Y RRA I I 
2= DOUBLE STOREY T R IBRI 
3= SEMI-DETA H D/BRI K 
4= SEMI-DETACHEDIWOOD 
5= SINGLE HOU E W ODE 
6= MEDIUM RISE FLAT 
7= HIGH RISE FLAT 
8= OTHERS 
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1.20. What was the intended AIM of the project when it was formulated? 
I 
1= HOUSING FOR THE LOW INCOME PEOPLE 
2= RESETILEMENT PROGRAMME 
3= HOUSING FOR FACTORY WORKERS 
4= REHOUSING FOR THE FISHERMEN 
5= COMBINATION OF SEVERAL PURPOSES 
6= OTHERS 
2. INFORMATION ON LAND/SITE/ 
PREPARATION 
2.1. When was the site for the project being identified? 
1= identified before project being formulated. 
2= identified within three months after 
the project has been formulated 
3= identified within three to six months after 
the project has been formulated. 
4= identified more than six months after 
the project has been formulated. 
5= identified only in the next five year plan 
6= never identified at all 
2.2. Has the land investigation or site report prepared? 
1= Prepared before project being formulated. 
2= Prepared within three months after the 
project has been formulated 
3= Prepared within three to six months after 
the project has been formulated. 
4= Prepared more than six months after the 
project has been formulated. 
5= Prepared only in the next five year plan 
6= never prepared at a\l 
2.3. Was there any change to the proposed site? 
I=No 
2= Yes, Once 
3= Yes, Twice 
4= Yes, More than Twice 
2.4. If changed occured, was it changed to: 
1= Site only (within same locality/district) 
2= Site only with changed on number of units to 
built (change of scope) 
3. Change to the project (Project replaced) 
4. Change to the project and scope 
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2.5 What type of land acquired for this project? 
1= State land 
2= Reserve land 
3= Private Land (by Compulsory Acquisition) 
4= Other types 
2.6. What justification made to locate the project on a particular site? 
1= No clear justification 
2= Availability of State Land 
3= Nearness to infrastructure and other facilities 
4= Socio-political reasons 
5= Marketability of the project 
6= Advised by Land OfficelDistrict officer 
7= Others. 
2.7. When was the application for the land made to the Land Office? (Date) 
2.8 When was the land made available for the project? (Date) 
2.9. What was the size of land (acrelhectare) made available for the project? 
2.10. If the land was acquired from private land owner, state the amount for the 
compensation paid? 
2.11. What were the project's density per hectre 
2.12. When was the project estimate prepared? 
1= Prepared before project being formulated. 
2= Prepared within three months after the project 
has been formulated 
3= Prepared within three to six months after the project 
has been formulated. 
4= Prepared more than six months after the project 
has been formulated. 
5= Prepared only in the next five year plan 
6= never prepared at all 
2.13. Was there any survey work carried out before the project formulated? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
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2.14 Was there any technical feasibility studies made for the proposed project? 
1= Not Available 
2= Working Paper 
3= Technical Feasibility Studies 
4= Detailed Technical Feasibility Studies 
by Consultant! Technical Personnel 
2.15. Was this project cancelled? If cancelled state reasons for this cancellation? 
[ 3. PROJECT RESOURCING 
REVOL VING FUND 
3.1. Was the revolving fund available for the project financing? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
3= Not Sure/No record 
3.2. If the revolving fund available, was it utilised for the project funding? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
3.3. What were the original cost of project's estimated? 
3.4. What were the estimated average cost per unit? 
$ 
3.5. Information about project's application made by State's Housing Division to 
lawatankuasa Teknikal Pinjaman Perumahan KPKT (TCOHL at MHLG). 
Date of Application Number of Houses Amount of Loan Average Cost Per 
Requested (M$) House (M$) 
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3.6. Information about decisions of lawatankuasa Teknikal Pinjaman Perumahan 
KPKT (TCOHL at MHLG) about the project financing. 
Date of Number of Total Loan Additional A verage Cost 
Meeting Hou e Approved Loan Per House 
Approved (M$) 
(M$) 
3.7. Has the application for loan ever faced any difficultyl rejected or postpone by 
the lawatankuasa Teknikal Pinjaman Perumahan KPKT? 
3.B. State the dates and amount of loan signed between the State and Federal 
Government? 
Date of Number of Houses Total Amount of Amount of 
Agreement pproved Loan Approved Additional Loan 
Approved 
to \VITHDRA 
3.9. Information about r que t of loan withdrawal made by the state government to 
the Federal Go emment? 
Date of Appli alion Amount Requested Amount of Percentage of (M$) Expenditure Project's Progress 
Already Made by 
State 
3.10. (If ithdrawal made through MHLG) Infonnation about applications for loan 
Withdrawal r commended by the MHLG to the *reasury? 
Date of Recomm ndation Sent to 
Treasury 
The Amount Recommended 
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3.11 Information about loan payments made by the Treasury to the state government? 
Date Amount Paid (M$) 
3.12. What was the total amount ojloan withdrawn for the project by the state 
government? 
4. APPROVAL PROCESS 
4.1. Was this project subjected to any planning and building plan approvals from the 
local authority? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
3= EXEMPTED 
4.2. When was the date of application for planning permission submitted to local 
authority? 
4.3. When was the date of planning permission granted by the local authority? 
4.4. What are the reasons, if application for planning permission ever rejected by local 
authority? 
1. Non-Conformity to Administrative procedures 
2. Non-Conformity to Planning matters 
3. Non-Conformity to Land Laws and legal matters 
4. Social and Political justifications 
5. Other reasons (Please state) 
----------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
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4.5. When was the date of application for building plan permission submitted to local 
authority? 
4.6. When was the date of building plan permission approved by the local authority? 
4.7. Besides the local authority, how many other agencies were refereed related to 
proposal for development approval? 
4.8. After the planning and building permission had been approved, was there any 
extra technical requirements imposed later? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
4.9. When was the application for certificate of fitness made to the local authority? 
4.10. When was the certificate of fitness issued by the local authority? 
4.11 When was the handing over of project made to the state government? 
4.12. When was the official date of occupation to the houses by buyers/ renters, etc.? 
TENDERPROCUMENTS 
4.13 Details of Construction Tender: 
Date of Tender Date of Date of Tender Original Total Amount 
Advertised Closing Board's Amount A warded (inc. 
Decision Awarded Variation 
order) 
4.13 When was the tender made effective? (Date) 
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4.14. Was there more than one tender process occured to this project? 
1= YES 
2= NO 
4.15 What was the reason for more than one tendering process? 
1= failure of first contractor 
2= procedure requirement 
3= change of tender scope and specifications 
4= other reasons 
4.16 What was the total cost of the project (includes 4.19, land cost and contribution 
to utility agencies)? 
5. IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
5.1. What was the implementing agency responsible for the project? 
1= National Housing Department 
2= State Economic Development Corporation 
3= Specialised State Housing Authority 
4= Public Works Department 
5= Other agency 
497 
Appendix II Interview Questionaire 
GUIDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE ON 
PUBLIC LOW COST HOUSING PROGRAMME IN MALAYSIA 
SECTIO ONE:QUESTIONS RELATED TO SPECIFIC PROJECTS 
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This section aims to gather information about the development of a specific 
public low cost housing project. The questions below will help to facilitate description 
from respondent's perspective based on hislher knowledge, experiences and opinion 
on the project. If respondent involved with more than one projects, he/she is requested 
to describe responses separately for each project listed:-
Project's Name Location Five Year Plan 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
1.0. RESPONDENT'S BACKGROUND 
1.1. Could you please say in what way you were involved with the Public Low Cost 
Housing Programme (PLCHP) by describing the following:-
(a) the post you held, 
(b) the name of your department, 
(c) number of years of serving the programme, and 
(d) your duties and responsibilities. 
1.2 Were you given any particular PLCHP projects to look after? Were you given any 
other assignments, such as to look after projects in certain districts, certain states or at 
certain stages of project implementation? (e.g. in-charge of financial matters, 
re ponsible for site supervision, in-charge of administrative matters) 
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2.0. INCOMPLETE PROJECT: 
I Name of the Project: 
2.1. This project was formulated and included in the list of approved projects for the 
'jive year plan I, but was later cancelled. As a result, this project never reached the 
completion stage. Therefore in relation to this project could you please describe the 
following:-
(a) Do you remember how this project was selected for the list of five year 
plan projects? What criteria and justifications were used to select this project? 
(b) What problems were faced by this project? 
(c) What reasons led to the project1s cancellation? 
(d) What stage had been achieved by the project when it was cancelled? 
(e) Who made the decision to cancel the project? 
(f) Do you think this project was different from other projects? 
(g) What happened to the fund allocated to this project? What happened to the 
projecfs site if land was acquired? 
(i) Was this project replaced by another project? 
G) Let us assume that these problems could have been overcome or did not 
happen. Do you think the project could have been implemented successfully? 
2.2. By looking at the project brief as provided with this questionnaire, what is your 
comment on the reasons described for the project1s incompleteness. 
2.3. In general, based on your knowledge and experience what were the reasons that 
led to the cancellation of other projects. 
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2.4. In general what problems were faced by other projects which made them unable 
to reach completion stage. 
3.0.THE COMPLETED PROJECT 
Name of the Project: 
3.1. Could you please describe in what way were you involved in this project? Please 
provide the nomenclature of the post you held and your general responsibilities 
connected to the project. 
3.2. This project was formulated and included in the list of approved projects for the 
Jive year plan'. Do you remember how was the selection made that proposed this 
project into the list of five year plan projects? What justifications used when 
considering this project? 
3.3. What were the roles and responsibilities given to your department in relation to 
the implementation of this project? 
3.4. Was this project faced with any difficulties at the preliminary implementation 
stage? If it did not face any difficulties. do you think its progress was similar to or 
faster than other comparable projects? 
3.5. Did this project faced any difficulty in obtaining the land? What caused this 
difficulty and how it was resolved? If no, what factor assisted in obtaining the land for 
this project. 
3.6. Did this project face any difficulty in obtaining financing from the federal 
government? Was the state government informed of the basis for the loan approval? 
Was the amount provided adequate to cover the total project cost? If inadequate, how 
was this problem resolved? Was there any special consideration given to this project? 
3.7. Did this project face any difficulties during the construction stage? If so, were the 
difficulties rectified and can you describe in what ways? 
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(a.) Whal cnleria were normally used for making site selection of the project? 
(b.) Do you think the type of house proposed was also an issue during this 
early slage of implementation? 
(c.) Whal are other issues and problems you experienced during this 
early stage of project implementation? 
4.5. Whal do you think about the length of time given for project preparation before 
the five year plan? 
(a.) Would you suggest any improvement? 
(b.) If you were happy with it, state your reasons. 
5.0. PROJECT RESOURCING: 
5.1. Do you know how the central agencies decide on the amount of loan approved for 
any particular project? 
5.2. What factors detennined when the project's loan application can be submitted to 
the M inistty of Housing and Local Government? 
5.3 Do you aware mat the amount of loan applied by the state was higher than the loan 
approved by the Technical Committee of Housing Loan? 
(a) If so. in your opinion why this was happened? 
(b) What cnlena were used by the committee to consider loan application? 
(c) Were these criteria known to programme administrators? 
5.4. What normally were done when the amount of loan approved was inadequate to 
meec the project's cos,? 
5.5 In your opinion what problems normally caused delays in loan application? How 
could chis stage of implementation can be expedited? 
5.6. What were the main reasons of inadequate funding? 
6.0. CONSTRUCTION: 
6.1. Can you describe whal are &he responsibilities of implementing agency in relation 
to the projec,'s construction works? When normally construction take place? 
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6.2. Consrruclion's problems: 
(a) Whar problems usually faced by contractors? 
(b) How were these problems affected the project implementation? 
(b) What aClion nonnaUy taken to contractors incapable to complete projects? 
(d) What effecl to the project if new contractor had to be appointed? 
6.3. If known 10 you. what actions involved after the project had been completed by 
the contractor? What sort of additional works required before a house can be surrender 
to the tenant or buyer? 
6.4. In your opinion what factors expediting and limiting project's construction? How 
could this problem be overcome? 
7.0 IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
7.1. What do you feel aboul the bureaucratic procedures occurred in this programme? 
(a) Procedures related to formulating projects. 
(b) Procedures related to obtain loan approval. 
(c) Procedures related to loan withdrawals. 
(d) Procedures relaled to obtaining planning approval. 
In whal ways these procedures affect project's implementation process? What sort of 
improvements to the procedures introduced by the government? 
7.2. What were major problems encountered in the implementation of the PLCHP? 
What are your suggestions to improve the programme and what areas you think: to 
should be emphasized to improve the programme? 
7.3. It was a common occurrence to PLCHP that a certain number of projects was 
unable meeting their targets. failing to complete on time within the plan and difficult 
to comply with the cost limit? 
(a) Whal is your opinion on this statement? 
(b) Whal were the necessary steps taken to ensure projects meeting their 
target. completed within time and built within the cost limit? 
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7.4. From your knowledge and experiences dealing with the process of public housing 
implementation what strike you about:-
(a) The strength the programme? 
(b) The weaknesses of the programme? 
(c) Any allempt 10 improve the programme 
(d) Suggest in any way that the weaknesses can be rectify? 
Or in what area would you like to see the programme imprOVed? 
7.5. Taking into considerations of current government policy favouring on 
privatization what would be the future of PLCHP after the end of the Sixth Malaysia 
Plan (996)? 
7.6. Given the same facilities and arrangement do you think the state government are 
willing to continue this programme in the future? 
(a) If yes, what do you think the prospect? 
(b) If no, what factors discourage this programme? 
8.0 IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
8.1. Do you know what was basis an implementing agency (National Housing 
Depanment, Slale's Economic Development Corporation. Public Works Department) 
chosen 10 implement the public low cost housing projects? 
8.2. Do you think there were differences between these implementing 
agencies in leons of :-
(a) The approach on project implementation? 
(b) Their perfonnance to complete the project? 
8.3. What were major problems encountered by the implementing agency in 
implementing the public low cost housing projects. 
8.4. What is your opinion on the strength and weaknesses on this 
implementing agency arrangement? 
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9.0. REMEDY 
8.1. Had implementation problems of the public low cost housing ever 
identified. reported and analyzed? 
(a) What attempts were made to minimized these problems? 
(b) What channel was used to resolve this problem? 
(c) What son of forum ever discussed this problem? 
(d) What type of responses did the people in those forum made to take the 
problems? 
(e) Finally in your opinion has this effort contributed anything to the 
improvemenl of the programme? 
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APPENDIX III 
urn r Price Index 1975 to 1995 
r P rc ntage Percentage Percentage 
fIner to 1990's to 1995's 
Price Price 
1975 4.5 56.3 47.8 
1976 2.6 57.8 49.1 
1977 4.8 60.7 51.5 
1978 4.9 63.8 52.2 
919 3.6 66.2 54.2 
I-
1980 6.7 70.9 58.1 
1981 9.7 78.5 64.3 
J98- 5.8 83.4 68.3 
1983 3.7 86.6 70.9 
1984 3.9 90.1 73.7 
1985 0.4 90.5 73.9 
1986 0.7 91.1 74.5 
1987 0.9 91.9 74.5 
19S~ _.5 94.3 77.1 
1989 2.8 97.0 79.3 
1990 3. 1 100 81.8 
1991 4 104.4 85.3 
19Y_ 4.5 110.3 88.8 
1993 .. t5 1 t 5.3 93 
1994 4.5 120.2 97.4 
1995 .... 6 125 100 
